Vom 16. Januar 2008
Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 16/7769
16. Wahlperiode 16. 01. 2008
Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht
des Rechtsausschusses (6. Ausschuss)
zu der Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung
– Drucksache 16/7393 Nr. A 34 –
Vorschlag für einen Rahmenbeschluss des Rates zur Änderung des Rahmen-
beschlusses 2002/475/JI zur Terrorismusbekämpfung (inkl. 14960/07 ADD 1 und
14960/07 ADD 2) KOM(2007) 650 endg.; Ratsdok. 14960/07
A. Problem
Mit dem bestehenden Rahmenbeschluss 2002/475/JI zur Terrorismusbe-
kämpfung werden innerhalb der EU Merkmale terroristischer Straftaten ein-
heitlich bestimmt. Der Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission zur Änderung
des Rahmenbeschlusses soll – wie das Übereinkommen des Europarates zur
Verhütung von Terrorismus vom 16. Mai 2005 – eine Verpflichtung der Mit-
gliedstaaten begründen, die öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer ter-
roristischen Straftat sowie die Anwerbung und Ausbildung zu terroristischen
Zwecken, insbesondere über das Internet, unter Strafe zu stellen. Darüber hin-
aus sollen die Mitgliedstaaten weitere Straftaten unter besonderen Umständen
als terroristische Straftaten einstufen.
Im Rahmen eines Testlaufs, der auf Anregung der Konferenz der Ausschüsse
für Gemeinschafts- und Europaangelegenheiten der Parlamente der Europäi-
schen Union (COSAC) durchgeführt wird, ist vor der weiteren inhaltlichen
Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Vorschlag zu prüfen, ob der Entwurf des Rah-
menbeschlusses mit den Grundsätzen der Subsidiarität vereinbar ist. Hierzu soll
innerhalb von acht Wochen Stellung genommen werden.
B. Lösung
Feststellung, dass keine Bedenken hinsichtlich der Einhaltung des gemein-
schaftsrechtlichen Grundsatzes der Subsidiarität bestehen. Diese Feststellung
wird im Falle der Annahme der Beschlussempfehlung als Stellungnahme des
Deutschen Bundestages an die Präsidenten des Europäischen Parlaments, des
Europäischen Rates und der Europäischen Kommission übermittelt.
Annahme einer Entschließung mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen CDU/
CSU, SPD, FDP und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN gegen die Stimmen der
Fraktion DIE LINKE.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 2 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
C. Alternativen
Keine
D. Kosten
Wurden im Ausschuss nicht erörtert.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 3 – Drucksache 16/7769
Beschlussempfehlung
Der Bundestag wolle beschließen,
in Kenntnis der Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung auf Drucksache 16/7393
Nr. A 34 folgende Entschließung anzunehmen:
a) Der Bundestag stellt fest, dass der Vorschlag der EU-Kommission für einen
Rahmenbeschluss des Rates zur Änderung des Rahmenbeschlusses 2002/
475/JI zur Terrorismusbekämpfung – KOM(2007) 650 endg.; Ratsdok.
14960/07 – keinen Bedenken hinsichtlich der Einhaltung des gemein-
schaftsrechtlichen Grundsatzes der Subsidiarität begegnet.
b) Der Bundestag äußert Bedenken hinsichtlich der Einhaltung des gemein-
schaftsrechtlichen Grundsatzes der Verhältnismäßigkeit durch den Vor-
schlag für einen Rahmenbeschluss.
c) Im Übrigen bleibt der Vorschlag für einen Rahmenbeschluss einer späteren
Befassung vorbehalten.
Berlin, den 16. Januar 2008
Der Rechtsausschuss
Andreas Schmidt (Mülheim)
Vorsitzender
Siegfried Kauder
(Villingen-Schwenningen)
Berichterstatter
Dr. Carl-Christian Dressel
Berichterstatter
Mechthild Dyckmans
Berichterstatterin
Wolfgang Neskovic
Berichterstatter
Jerzy Montag
Berichterstatter
des Protokolls Nr. 2 zum Vertrag von Lissabon über die
Anwendung der Grundsätze der Subsidiarität und der Ver-
tert. Zwar verfügten alle Mitgliedstaaten über strafrecht-
liche Bestimmungen in dem durch den Rahmenbeschluss zu
hältnismäßigkeit innerhalb einer Frist von acht Wochen eine
Stellungnahme an die Präsidenten des Europäischen Parla-
ments, des Rates und der Kommission abzugeben, ob der
vorgeschlagene Rahmenbeschluss mit dem Subsidiaritäts-
regelnden Bereich, jedoch seien die Regelungen in Reich-
weite und Anwendungsbereich unterschiedlich. Für die von
der Europäischen Kommission vorgeschlagenen Regelun-
gen spreche insbesondere, dass dadurch die Strafverfolgung
Drucksache 16/7769 – 4 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Bericht der Abgeordneten Siegfried Kauder (Villingen-Schwenningen), Dr. Carl-
Christian Dressel, Mechthild Dyckmans, Wolfgang Neskovic und Jerzy Montag
I. Überweisung
Das Ratsdokument 14960/07 wurde mit Überweisungs-
drucksache 16/7393 (Nr. A 34) vom 3. Dezember 2007 ge-
mäß § 93 Abs. 1 GO-BT dem Rechtsausschuss zur feder-
führenden Beratung sowie dem Auswärtigen Ausschuss,
dem Innenausschuss, dem Ausschuss für Menschenrechte
und humanitäre Hilfe und dem Ausschuss für die Angele-
genheiten der Europäischen Union zur Mitberatung über-
wiesen.
II. Stellungnahmen der mitberatenden
Ausschüsse
Der Auswärtige Ausschuss hat die Vorlage in seiner 55. Sit-
zung am 16. Januar 2008 beraten und Kenntnisnahme emp-
fohlen.
Der Innenausschuss hat die Vorlage in seiner 57. Sitzung
am 16. Januar 2008 beraten und einvernehmlich festgestellt,
dass der Subsidiaritätsgrundsatz gewahrt sei.
Der Ausschuss für Menschenrechte und humanitäre
Hilfe hat die Vorlage in seiner 49. Sitzung am 16. Januar
2008 beraten und Kenntnisnahme empfohlen.
Der Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Europäi-
schen Union hat die Vorlage in seiner 48. Sitzung am
16. Januar 2008 beraten und mit den Stimmen der Fraktio-
nen CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP und BÜNDNIS 90/ DIE GRÜ-
NEN gegen die Stimmen der Fraktion DIE LINKE. be-
schlossen, im Hinblick auf die Wahl der Rechtsgrundlage
und das Subsidiaritätsprinzip keine Bedenken zu erheben.
III. Beratungsverlauf und Beratungsergebnis im
federführenden Ausschuss
Der Rechtsausschuss hat die Vorlage in seiner 81. Sitzung
am 12. Dezember 2007 erstmalig und in seiner 83. Sitzung
am 16. Januar 2008 abschließend beraten. Er hat mit den
Stimmen der Fraktionen CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP und BÜND-
NIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN gegen die Stimmen der Fraktion
DIE LINKE. beschlossen, dem Plenum zu empfehlen, keine
Bedenken hinsichtlich der Einhaltung des Grundsatzes der
Subsidiarität zu erheben, Bedenken hinsichtlich der Einhal-
tung der Verhältnismäßigkeit zu äußern und die weitere Be-
fassung einem späteren Zeitpunkt vorzubehalten.
Die Beratung des Vorschlags für den Rahmenbeschluss er-
folgte im Rahmen eines Testlaufs zur Subsidiaritätsprüfung,
der auf einen Beschluss der COSAC hin durchgeführt wird.
Der Deutsche Bundestag wurde gebeten, gemäß Artikel 6
Artikel 5 Abs. 2 des EG-Vertrags und Protokoll Nr. 30 zum
Vertrag von Amsterdam über die Anwendung der Grund-
sätze der Subsidiarität und Verhältnismäßigkeit (im Folgen-
den: Protokoll). Der Rechtsausschuss kam zu dem Ergebnis,
dass der Vorschlag den Anforderungen hinsichtlich der Sub-
sidiarität entspricht. Allerdings hat er Bedenken bezüglich
der Einhaltung des Grundsatzes der Verhältnismäßigkeit ge-
äußert.
Der Rechtsausschuss kam mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen
CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Vorschlag der Europäischen
Kommission den Anforderungen des Subsidiaritätsprinzips
entspricht. Ein Verstoß ist aus folgenden Erwägungen ver-
neint worden:
Da die in dem Rahmenbeschluss geregelte Materie der kon-
kurrierenden Zuständigkeit der Europäischen Gemeinschaft
unterfalle, komme gemäß Artikel 2 EU-Vertrag in Verbin-
dung mit Artikel 5 Abs. 2 EG-Vertrag (in der derzeit gelten-
den Fassung) das Subsidiaritätsprinzip zur Anwendung. Als
Rechtsgrundlage könne Artikel 34 Abs. 2 Buchstabe b in
Verbindung mit den Artikeln 29 und 31 Abs. 1 Buchstabe e
EUV herangezogen werden, wonach die EU – wie im vor-
liegenden Rahmenbeschlussentwurf vorgesehen – zur Er-
richtung eines Raums der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des
Rechts Mindestvorschriften über die Tatbestandsmerkmale
strafbarer Handlungen und die Strafen für terroristische
Handlungen annehme. Für diese Materie besitze die EU
nicht die ausschließliche Zuständigkeit.
Nach den in Nummer 5 des Protokolls enthaltenen Leitli-
nien entspreche der geplante Rahmenbeschluss den Anfor-
derungen des Subsidiaritätsprinzips. Eine Regelung durch
die Mitgliedstaaten könne das von der Europäischen Kom-
mission verfolgte Ziel nicht ebenso gut erreichen.
Es handele sich um einen Rechtsbereich, für den transnatio-
nale Aspekte typisch seien. Außer von potentiell innerhalb
eines Staates agierenden Terroristen gehe zunehmend von
international agierenden Terrornetzwerken eine Gefahr aus.
Insbesondere die gemäß dem geplanten Rahmenbeschluss
zu bestrafende Verbreitung von terrorismusfördernden straf-
baren Inhalten über das Internet habe in vielen Fällen grenz-
überschreitenden Charakter.
Die Bekämpfung von Terrorismus und Cyberkriminalität
auf EU-Ebene erforderte ein abgestimmtes Vorgehen der
Mitgliedstaaten sowie eine Zusammenarbeit auf internatio-
naler Ebene. Ein abgestimmtes Vorgehen werde durch die in
dem Kommissionsvorschlag vorgesehene Vereinheitlichung
strafrechtlicher Regelungen in den Mitgliedstaaten erleich-
prinzip vereinbar ist. Die inhaltlichen Anforderungen an die
Einhaltung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips ergeben sich aus
grenzüberschreitender terroristischer Aktivitäten erleichtert
werde. Die in Artikel 9 des geltenden Rahmenbeschlusses
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 5 – Drucksache 16/7769
enthaltenen Vorschriften zur Gerichtsbarkeit und zur Straf-
verfolgung seien dann auch auf die von der Europäischen
Kommission vorgeschlagenen neuen Tatbestände anwend-
bar. Außerdem würden die Kooperationsmechanismen der
EU, wie sie zum Beispiel im Beschluss 2005/671/JI über
den Informationsaustausch und die Zusammenarbeit betref-
fend terroristische Straftaten vorgesehen sind, ausgelöst
werden, weil diese Mechanismen auf den Rahmenbeschluss
anwendbar seien.
Des Weiteren lasse sich für die Notwendigkeit einer europä-
ischen Regelung anführen, dass eine gemeinsame rechtliche
Basis auch die Zusammenarbeit auf internationaler Ebene
vereinfachen und dort die Position der EU stärken würde.
Die Mehrheit der Mitglieder des Ausschusses äußerte je-
doch Bedenken hinsichtlich der Vereinbarkeit des Rahmen-
beschlusses mit dem in Artikel 2 EU-Vertrag in Verbindung
mit Artikel 5 Abs. 3 EG-Vertrag statuierten Grundsatz der
Verhältnismäßigkeit. Da aber die Verhältnismäßigkeit im
Rahmen des COSAC-Testlaufs nicht zu prüfen war, wurde
diese Frage nicht abschließend behandelt.
Nach dem Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit dürften Maß-
nahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft bzw. Europäischen
Union inhaltlich wie formal nicht über das zur Erreichung
der Ziele der Verträge erforderliche Maß hinausgehen.
Unter Zugrundelegung der in den Nummern 6 und 7 des
Protokolls formulierten Leitlinien erscheine es allerdings
fraglich, ob die von der Europäischen Kommission vorge-
schlagenen Regelungen im Hinblick auf die Ziele des EU-
Vertrags erforderlich seien. Eine Alternative zu dem vorge-
schlagenen Rechtsakt könne darin bestehen, dass die Mit-
gliedstaaten sich in einer Entschließung dazu verpflichten,
das Übereinkommen des Europarates zur Verhütung des
Terrorismus vom 16. Mai 2005 bis zu einem bestimmten
Zeitpunkt zu ratifizieren und umzusetzen. Die in den Arti-
keln 5 bis 8 dieses Übereinkommens enthaltenen Tatbe-
stände seien deckungsgleich mit den von der Europäischen
Kommission vorgeschlagenen Regelungen. Ein von allen
EU-Mitgliedstaaten ratifiziertes Übereinkommen könne
außerdem eine Vorbildwirkung über die Mitgliedstaaten
hinaus entwickeln. Da eine Ratifizierung des Europarats-
übereinkommens ohnehin von den Mitgliedstaaten abge-
strebt werde, stelle sich die Frage, welchen rechtlichen und
praktischen Mehrwert eine bloße Duplizierung von Vor-
schriften des Übereinkommens des Europarates in einem
Rechtsakt der EU habe.
Die Fraktion DIE LINKE. äußerte Bedenken gegen die
Mehrheitsauffassung.
Mit dem Vorschlag solle der Rahmenbeschluss des Rates
vom 13. Juni 2002 zur Terrorismusbekämpfung (2002/475/
JI, ABl. Nr. L 164 vom 22. Juni 2002 S. 3 bis 7) aktualisiert
und durch die Aufnahme neuer Straftatbestände, wie die öf-
fentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen
Straftat, Anwerbung für terroristische Zwecke und Ausbil-
dung für terroristische Zwecke ergänzt werden. Der Vor-
schlag verfolge insoweit Zwecke, die sich teilweise mit dem
Übereinkommen des Europarates vom 16. Mai 2005 (im
Folgenden: ER-Übereinkommen) überschnitten, das die
Vertragsparteien ebenfalls verpflichte, die öffentliche Auf-
forderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat, die
der Erwägungen zwölf Seiten in deutscher Sprache. Zur
Begründung sei zugleich ein nur in englischer Sprachfas-
sung vorgelegtes Arbeitsdokument vom 6. November 2007
(SEC (2007) 1424) beigefügt, das 106 Seiten umfasse.
Nach dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip werde die Gemeinschaft in
den Bereichen, die nicht in ihre ausschließliche Zuständig-
keit fallen, nur tätig, sofern und soweit die Ziele der in Be-
tracht gezogenen Maßnahmen auf Ebene der Mitgliedstaa-
ten nicht ausreichend erreicht werden könnten und daher
wegen ihres Umfangs oder ihrer Wirkungen besser auf Ge-
meinschaftsebene ausgeführt werden könnten (Artikel 5
Abs. 2 EG-Vertrag). Das Prinzip werde im Protokoll Nr. 21
zum EG-Vertrag über die Anwendung der Grundsätze der
Subsidiarität und der Verhältnismäßigkeit (sog. Subsidiari-
tätsprotokoll) näher erläutert.
Zunächst sei die Wahl der Rechtsgrundlage zu untersuchen,
da das Subsidiaritätsprinzip als Kompetenzausübungsregel
nur zur Anwendung komme, wenn sich die Maßnahme auf
eine nicht ausschließliche Gemeinschaftskompetenz stütze.
Der Vorschlag sei auf die Artikel 29, 31 Abs. 1 Buchstabe e
und Artikel 34 Abs. 2 Buchstabe b des EU-Vertrags gegrün-
det. Danach seien Rahmenbeschlüsse zur Angleichung der
Rechtsvorschriften, insbesondere Mindestvorschriften über
die Tatbestandsmerkmale strafbarer Handlungen und die
Strafen im Bereich des Terrorismus, zulässig. Es handele
sich um eine nicht ausschließliche Kompetenz der Europäi-
schen Union, auf die das Subsidiaritätsprinzip anzuwenden
sei.
Im Übrigen setze das Subsidiaritätsprinzip voraus, dass die
Ziele der in Betracht gezogenen Maßnahme durch die Mit-
gliedstaaten nicht ausreichend erreicht werden könnten.
Nach den Leitlinien des Subsidiaritätsprotokolls sei dies der
Fall, wenn der betreffende Bereich transnationale Aspekte
aufweise, die durch Maßnahmen der Mitgliedstaaten nicht
ausreichend geregelt werden könnten, oder wenn alleinige
Maßnahmen der Mitgliedstaaten gegen Anforderungen des
EG-Vertrags verstießen. Außerdem dürfe die Europäische
Gemeinschaft nur tätig werden, wenn die Ziele der Maßnah-
men wegen ihres Umfangs oder ihrer Wirkungen besser auf
Gemeinschaftsebene erreichbar seien als auf mitgliedstaat-
licher Ebene.
Ziel des Vorschlages und der Erwägungen, die zu seiner
Vorlage geführt hätten, könnten vom mitgliedstaatlichen Ge-
setzgeber nur nachvollzogen und an den Erfordernissen der
Subsidiarität gemessen werden, wenn sie umfassend und
vollständig in der Amtssprache oder den Amtssprachen des
Mitgliedstaates vorlägen. Eine sorgfältige Überprüfung der
Einhaltung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips von Seiten des Deut-
schen Bundestages sei sonst nicht möglich. Das sei hier nicht
der Fall. Auch aus diesem Grund könne nicht festgestellt
werden, dass der Grundsatz der Subsidiarität gewahrt sei.
In ihrer Folgenabschätzung stelle die Europäische Kommis-
sion darauf ab, dass die modernen Informations- und Kom-
munikationstechnologien bei der Verbreitung des Terroris-
mus eine erhebliche Rolle spielten. Sie räume zwar ein, dass
die überwiegende Zahl der Mitgliedstaaten über einschlägige
Gesetze verfüge, verweise aber darauf, dass diese sich in
ihrer Reichweite und ihrem Anwendungsbereich unterschie-
den. Die im Hinblick auf das Subsidiaritätsprinzip maßgeb-
Anwerbung und die Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke
unter Strafe zu stellen. Der Vorschlag enthalte einschließlich
liche Fragestellung, welche tatsächlichen Lücken die Straf-
rechtsordnungen der Mitgliedstaaten enthielten, werde nur
Drucksache 16/7769 – 6 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
oberflächlich behandelt. Zwar bestehe kein Zweifel daran,
dass die Verbreitung von Informationen über das Internet
grenzüberschreitenden Charakter haben könne. Die in der
Begründung zum Entwurf des Rahmenbeschlusses unter der
Überschrift „Subsidiarität“ aufgestellte Behauptung, Terro-
risten könnten sich die Unterschiede zwischen verschiede-
nen nationalen Rechtsordnungen und Gesetzeslücken zu-
nutze machen, werde jedoch nicht überzeugend belegt.
Der Hinweis, dass die Aufnahme der neuen Straftatbestände
in den Rahmenbeschluss 2002/475/JI die Anwendung der
Koordinierungs- und Zusammenarbeitsmechanismen der
polizeilichen und justiziellen Zusammenarbeit der Europäi-
schen Union ermögliche, führe ins Leere. Durch die Einbe-
ziehung bereits existierender Mechanismen werde notwen-
digerweise jede Zusammenarbeit soweit erleichtert, wie es
das bestehende Instrument vorsehe. Somit könne das Ergeb-
nis der Subsidiaritätsprüfung jederzeit durch die Bezug-
nahme auf bereits existierende Instrumente vorherbestimmt
werden, so dass die Prüfung gegenstandslos sein würde.
Zudem sei es zwar richtig, dass auch eine materielle Rechts-
vereinheitlichung die Koordination in verfahrensmäßiger
Hinsicht erleichtern könne. Das reiche aber für die Notwen-
digkeit der vorgeschlagenen Änderungen nicht aus. Insofern
müsse vielmehr überzeugend dargetan werden, dass eine Ko-
ordinierung bei Aufrechterhaltung unterschiedlicher mate-
rieller Regelungen so weit erschwert sei, dass ihre Funk-
tionsfähigkeit infrage gestellt sei.
Die Tatsache, dass das ER-Übereinkommen praktisch gleich
lautende Ziele verfolge, indem es die Unterzeichnerstaaten
verpflichte, die öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer
terroristischen Straftat, die Anwerbung und Ausbildung für
terroristische Zwecke unter Strafe zu stellen, lasse den Ände-
rungsvorschlag auch als Verstoß gegen den Grundsatz der
Verhältnismäßigkeit erscheinen. Das ER-Übereinkommen
sei zwar gegenwärtig (Stand 17. Dezember 2007) erst von
sieben Staaten, darunter vier Mitgliedstaaten der EU (Bulga-
rien, Dänemark, Rumänien und die Slowakei), ratifiziert
worden. Es könne aber nicht erwartet werden, dass Regie-
rungen von Mitgliedstaaten, die bereit sind, dem Vorschlag
zur Änderung des Rahmenbeschlusses zuzustimmen, das
Ratifizierungsverfahren nicht ernsthaft betreiben würden.
Ingesamt sei zu beanstanden, dass der Vorschlag sowohl ge-
gen die Zuständigkeitsordnung als auch gegen die Prinzipien
der Subsidiarität und der Verhältnismäßigkeit verstoße.
Die Fraktion merkte ferner an, Ausgangspunkt der Subsidia-
ritätsprüfung sei die Frage, ob bei einer alleinigen Regelung
auf europäischer Ebene erhebliche Beeinträchtigungen für
die Mitgliedstaaten entstehen oder umgekehrt, ob die ge-
meinschaftsrechtliche Regelung deutliche Vorteile bringe.
Dies sei nur zu subsumieren, wenn sämtliche Regelungen in
den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten bekannt seien. Die entspre-
chenden einzelstaatlichen Regelungen seien nicht zusam-
mengetragen worden, so dass eine entsprechende Bewertung
nicht möglich sei.
Die Vorlage des Referats Europa der Bundestagsverwaltung,
die dem Mehrheitsvotum zugrunde liege, führe nur abstrakt
aus, dass eine gemeinsame rechtliche Basis auch die Zusam-
menarbeit auf internationaler Ebene vereinfachen und dort
Die Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN entgegnete,
die Subsidiaritätsprüfung durch ein Parlament sei einer Sub-
sumtion, die etwa ein Richter vornehme, nicht vergleichbar.
Es handele sich vielmehr um eine rechtspolitische, summari-
sche und bewertende Prüfung, die gegenüber einer Subsum-
tion im strengen Sinne stets kursorischen Charakter habe,
weil anders auch kein zeitgerechtes Ergebnis zu erzielen sei.
In diesem Rahmen habe eine intensive Auseinandersetzung
stattgefunden, wie sich auch daran zeige, dass gegenüber der
Vorlage des Referats Europa auf ihre Anregung an zwei
Punkten Änderungen und Verbesserungen vorgenommen
worden seien.
Die Fraktion äußerte trotz grundsätzlicher Zustimmung zur
Mehrheitsauffassung einen Einwand in der Sache. Bei dem
von der Mehrheit verwendeten Begriff „Cyberkriminalität“
handele es sich zwar um einen im Europarecht gebräuchli-
chen Begriff. Allerdings habe der Deutsche Bundestag die
Bundesregierung aufgefordert, darauf zu dringen, dass dieser
Begriff in der Zukunft konkretisiert werde, weil er nach
deutschem Verständnis nicht bestimmt genug sei. Deshalb
wäre es zur Verdeutlichung der Position des Rechtsausschus-
ses und des Deutschen Bundestages besser gewesen, an die-
ser Stelle nur konkrete Fälle der Cyberkriminalität anzuspre-
chen.
Die Fraktion der SPD erachtete den zweiten Testlauf zur
Subsidiaritätsprüfung als sehr positive Erfahrung, die ins-
besondere zeige, dass es in dem vorgegebenen Zeitraum
möglich sei, nicht nur bei der Subsidiaritäts- sondern auch
– gleichsam überobligatorisch – in der Verhältnismäßigkeits-
prüfung zu wohlbegründeten Ergebnissen zu kommen.
Zweifel bestünden jedoch, ob das Sekretariat des Rechtsaus-
schusses mit der aktuellen Personalausstattung die Subsidia-
ritätsprüfung auch im künftig anstehenden Massenbetrieb
werde unterstützen können. Dies müsse Gegenstand künfti-
ger Haushaltsberatungen sein.
Problematisch würden auch in die parlamentarische Som-
merpause fallende Subsidiaritätsprüfungen. Hier dürfe man
sich nicht auf die Hoffnung verlassen, dass dieser Fall schon
nicht eintreten werde. Vielmehr müsse die Handlungsfähig-
keit des Rechtsausschusses sichergestellt werden. Hier
bleibe abzuwarten, welche Erkenntnisse weitere Testläufe
brächten.
An der Auffassung der Fraktion DIE LINKE. falle auf, dass
die Tischvorlage in Wortlaut und Gliederung weitgehend der
Stellungnahme des Ausschusses für die Angelegenheiten der
Europäischen Union entspreche und nur zu anderen Wertun-
gen gelange. Dies könne kaum als ausgiebige Auseinander-
setzung mit der Mehrheitsmeinung angesehen werden.
Die Fraktion der CDU/CSU zeigte sich erfreut darüber,
dass es dem Parlament in der Tat möglich sei, innerhalb der
Frist von acht Wochen eine begründete Stellungnahme abzu-
geben. Dies sei indes nur dank der Hilfe des Ausschusssekre-
tariats und des Bundesministeriums der Justiz möglich ge-
wesen. Zu überlegen sei, wie künftig der durch diese Verfah-
ren verursachte Mehraufwand zu bewältigen sei. Sollte das
Ausschusssekretariat hierfür zuständig bleiben, werde die
Erledigung dieser Aufgabe ohne Personalaufstockung nicht
möglich sein.
die Position der EU verstärken werde. Die konkreten Sub-
sumtionsschritte, die zu dieser Wertung hinführen, fehlten.
In dem sehr ergiebigen Berichterstattergespräch hätten sich
einige Verfahrensfragen ergeben, die in den nächsten Test-
Berlin, den 16. Januar 2008
Der Rechtsausschuss
Siegfried Kauder (Villing
Berichterstatter
Mechthild Dyckmans
Berichterstatterin
Wolfgang Neskovic
Berichterstatter
en-Schwenningen) Dr. Carl-Christian Dressel
Berichterstatter
Jerzy Montag
Berichterstatter
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 7 – Drucksache 16/7769
läufen zu klären seien. Man sei eigentlich nur aufgefordert,
zur Subsidiaritätsfrage Stellung zu nehmen. Offen sei auch
geblieben, an wen die Stellungnahme des Rechtsausschusses
weiterzuleiten sei.
Die Fraktion der FDP dankte dem Ausschusssekretariat
und dem Referat Europa für die Unterstützung in diesem
Testlauf. Im Regelbetrieb sei diese Aufgabe indes nicht ohne
Personalzuwachs im Ausschusssekretariat zu leisten. Sie
schließt sich den Ausführungen der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/
DIE GRÜNEN zum Begriff „Cyberkriminalität“ an. Ange-
sichts der häufig vorgebrachten Kritik des Deutschen Bun-
destages an diesem in den Listendelikten enthaltenen Begriff
wäre es wünschenswert gewesen, konkrete Erscheinungsfor-
men der Cyberkriminalität anzusprechen.
Die Äußerung zur Verhältnismäßigkeit sei sinnvoll, da im
Hinblick auf das parallele Übereinkommen des Europarates
große Bedenken hinsichtlich der Erforderlichkeit des Rah-
menbeschlusses bestünden. Das Übereinkommen enthalte
annähernd gleich lautende Straftatbestände und darüber hin-
aus immanente Schranken durch die Regelung von Bedin-
gungen und Garantien im Hinblick auf Freiheitsrechte, die
so in dem Rahmenbeschluss nicht vorgesehen seien. Hierzu
zähle die Aufforderung an die Vertragsstaaten, das Recht auf
freie Meinungsäußerung sowie die Vereinigungsfreiheit und
die Religionsfreiheit sicherzustellen. Auch wenn die inhaltli-
che Prüfung noch bevorstehe, sei es sinnvoll, schon jetzt dar-
auf hinzuweisen, dass der Rechtsausschuss keine Notwen-
digkeit für diesen Rahmenbeschluss sehe.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 9 – Drucksache 16/7769
Anlage
RAT DER
EUROPÄISCHEN UNION
Brüssel, den 13. November 2007
(OR. en)
Interinstitutionelles Dossier:
2007/0236 (CNS)
14960/07
CATS 122
DROIPEN 104
VORSCHLAG
der: Europäischen Kommission
vom: 12. November 2007
Betr.: RAHMENBESCHLUSS DES RATES
zur Änderung des Rahmenbeschlusses 2002/475/JI zur
Terrorismusbekämpfung
Die Delegationen erhalten in der Anlage den mit Schreiben von Herrn Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU,
Direktor, an den Generalsekretär/Hohen Vertreter, Herrn Javier SOLANA, übermittelten Vorschlag
der Kommission.
Anl.: KOM(2007) 650 endgültig
Drucksache 16/7769 – 10 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN
Brüssel, den 6.11.2007
KOM(2007) 650 endgültig
2007/0236 (CNS)
Vorschlag für einen
RAHMENBESCHLUSS DES RATES
zur Änderung des Rahmenbeschlusses 2002/475/JI zur Terrorismusbekämpfung
(von der Kommission vorgelegt)
{SEK(2007) 1424}
{SEK(2007) 1425}
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 11 – Drucksache 16/7769
BEGRÜNDUNG
1. KONTEXT DES VORSCHLAGS
� Gründe und Ziele des Vorschlags
Der Terrorismus stellt eine der größten Gefahren für die Demokratie dar, bedroht die freie
Ausübung der Menschenrechte und beeinträchtigt die Entwicklung von Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft.
Im Vertrag über die Europäische Union hat sich die EU das Ziel gesetzt, den Bürgern in
einem Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts ein hohes Maß an Sicherheit zu
bieten. Um dieses Ziel im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus zu erreichen, müssen die
Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union über wirksame Strafgesetze verfügen. Ebenso
unerlässlich sind Maßnahmen zur Intensivierung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit in
diesem Bereich.
Moderne Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien spielen bei der Ausbreitung der
terroristischen Bedrohung eine erhebliche Rolle. Dies gilt insbesondere für das Internet als
preiswertes, schnelles und leicht zugängliches Medium mit praktisch globaler Reichweite. All
diese Vorteile, die gesetzestreue Bürger, die das Internet tagtäglich nutzen, sehr zu schätzen
wissen, machen sich auch Terroristen zunutze. Sie nutzen das Internet sowohl für die
Verbreitung ihrer Propaganda, um Anhänger zu gewinnen und zu mobilisieren, als auch für
die Verbreitung von Anleitungen und Online-Handbüchern für die Terrorismus-Ausbildung
oder die Planung von Terroranschlägen. Adressaten sind Gefolgsleute ebenso wie
Sympathisanten.
Das Internet trägt auf diese Weise maßgeblich zur Verstärkung des Radikalisierungs- und
Rekrutierungsprozesses bei und dient darüber hinaus als „virtuelles Trainingscamp“, indem es
Informationen über Mittel und Methoden des Terrorismus verbreitet. Die Verbreitung
terroristischer Propaganda und Kenntnisse im Internet ergänzt und verstärkt die
Indoktrinierung und Ausbildung in der realen Welt und trägt dazu bei, den Kreis
terroristischer Aktivisten und Sympathisanten zu erweitern und zu festigen.
Dieser wachsenden Bedrohung Einhalt zu gebieten, ist eine politische Notwendigkeit. Die EU
muss den modernen Terrorismus und seine neuen Vorgehensweisen mit der gleichen
Entschlossenheit und Härte bekämpfen, die sie auch im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus
herkömmlicher Art unter Beweis gestellt hat. Mit diesem Vorschlag soll der
Rahmenbeschluss zur Terrorismusbekämpfung [ABl. L 164 vom 22.6.2002, S. 3-7]
aktualisiert und durch Aufnahme neuer Straftatbestände wie öffentliche Aufforderung zur
Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat, Anwerbung für terroristische Zwecke und Ausbildung
für terroristische Zwecke dem Übereinkommen des Europarats zur Verhütung des
Terrorismus angeglichen werden.
Diese Straftatbestände müssen vor allem aus folgenden Gründen in den Rahmenbeschluss zur
Terrorismusbekämpfung aufgenommen werden:
– damit werden die Vorteile des stärker integrierten institutionellen Rahmens der
Europäischen Union genutzt (insbesondere der Umstand, dass es keine langwierigen
Unterzeichnungs- und Ratifizierungsverfahren wie bei Übereinkommen des Europarats
gibt, dass besondere Follow-up-Verfahren vorgesehen sind, und dass eine für alle geltende
Auslegung durch den Gerichtshof gewährleistet ist);
Drucksache 16/7769 – 12 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
– der Rahmenbeschluss sieht spezifische Vorschriften in Bezug auf Art und Umfang der
Strafen sowie zwingende Vorschriften betreffend die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit vor, die
auch für die neu aufzunehmenden Straftatbestände gelten werden;
– der Rahmenbeschluss ist ein Schlüsselinstrument der EU-Strategie zur
Terrorismusbekämpfung: die ausdrückliche Aufnahme dieser spezifischen vorbereitenden
Handlungen lösen daher den Kooperationsmechanismus der EU mit Bezug zum
Rahmenbeschluss aus.
Der zusätzliche Nutzen, der mit der Aufnahme der Straftatbestände der öffentlichen
Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat sowie der Anwerbung und
Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke in die Terrorismus-Vorschriften der EU bewirkt wird,
ist ausführlicher in der Folgenabschätzung beschrieben.
Der Rahmenbeschluss zur Terrorismusbekämpfung ist auch auf Verhaltensweisen anwendbar,
die zu terroristischen Straftaten in Drittländern beitragen können. Damit bringt die
Kommission ihre Entschlossenheit zum Ausdruck, sich weltweit und auf europäischer Ebene
im Kampf gegen Terrorismus zu engagieren. Der vorliegende Änderungsvorschlag hält an
diesem Konzept fest und unterstreicht die Bedeutung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit im
Rahmen der bestehenden Einrichtungen und Kooperationsmechanismen.
Gleichzeitig ist dem Umstand Rechnung zu tragen, dass sich die Europäische Union und ihre
Mitgliedstaaten der Achtung der Menschenrechte, der Grundfreiheiten und der Würde des
Menschen sowie dem Schutz dieser Rechte gegenüber Einzelpersonen und Institutionen
gleichermaßen verschrieben haben.
� Allgemeiner Kontext
Europäische Union
Der Rahmenbeschluss zur Terrorismusbekämpfung führt für alle Mitgliedstaaten eine
einheitliche Definition terroristischer Straftaten ein und stellt sicher, dass für natürliche und
juristische Personen, die solche Straftaten begangen haben oder dafür haften, Strafen und
Sanktionen vorhanden sind, die der Schwere der Tat angemessen sind. Er legt fest, in welchen
Fällen die Mitgliedstaaten verpflichtet sind, die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit für terroristische
Straftaten zu übernehmen, damit diese wirksam verfolgt werden können. Aufgrund der
Schutzbedürftigkeit der Opfer terroristischer Straftaten sind darüber hinaus besondere Schutz-
und Unterstützungsmaßnahmen vorgesehen.
In ihrem ersten Bericht über die Durchführung des Rahmenbeschlusses zur
Terrorismusbekämpfung [KOM(2004) 409 vom 8.6.2004 und Arbeitsdokument der
Kommissionsdienststellen SEK(2004) 688 vom 8.6.2004] zog die Kommission Bilanz der auf
nationaler Ebene getroffenen Durchführungsmaßnahmen. Der zweite Bericht, den die
Kommission zeitgleich mit diesem Vorschlag angenommen hat, enthält eine Aktualisierung
des Umsetzungsstands in den Mitgliedstaaten, die bereits im ersten Bericht behandelt wurden,
sowie eine umfassende erste Bewertung des Umsetzungsstands in den Mitgliedstaaten, die im
ersten Bericht noch nicht berücksichtigt waren. Beide Berichte geben Auskunft über den nach
dem Erlass des Rahmenbeschlusses zur Terrorismusbekämpfung in der EU erreichten
Harmonisierungsgrad und enthalten hilfreiche Auslegungsleitlinien sowie einen nützlichen
Überblick über die einschlägige Gesetzgebung in den Mitgliedstaaten.
Wie der Europäische Rat im Haager Programm betonte, kann der Terrorismus bei
uneingeschränkter Wahrung der Grundrechte nur wirksam verhütet und bekämpft werden,
wenn sich die Mitgliedstaaten nicht nur auf ihre eigene Sicherheit konzentrieren, sondern die
Sicherheit der Union insgesamt im Auge haben.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 13 – Drucksache 16/7769
In der vom Rat „Justiz und Inneres“ im Dezember 2005 angenommenen EU-Strategie und
dem Aktionsplan zum Thema Radikalisierung und Anwerbung werden Maßnahmen gefordert,
um die Nutzung des Internets für terroristische Zwecke zu unterbinden. Gleichzeitig wird
betont, dass Maßnahmen auf Ebene der Mitgliedstaaten mit Maßnahmen auf EU-Ebene
einhergehen müssen.
In den Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rats vom 15./16. Juni 2006 wurden Rat und
Kommission ausdrücklich ersucht, unter Beachtung der Grundrechte und Rechtsgrundsätze
Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung des Missbrauchs des Internets zu terroristischen Zwecken
auszuarbeiten.
Internationale Zusammenarbeit
Im Übereinkommen des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus (Warschau, 16. Mai 2005)
werden die Vertragsparteien aufgefordert, dafür zu sorgen, dass die öffentliche Aufforderung
zur Begehung terroristischer Straftaten sowie die Anwerbung und Ausbildung für
terroristische Zwecke unter Strafe gestellt werden.
Relevant sind auf internationaler Ebene des Weiteren die Resolution 1624 des UN-
Sicherheitsrats (14. September 2005) und die Weltweite Strategie der Vereinten Nationen zur
Bekämpfung des Terrorismus (8. September 2006). Erwähnenswert sind auch der G8-Gipfel
vom 16. Juli 2006 in St. Petersburg und der Beschluss des OSZE-Ministerrats Nr. 7/06 über
die Bekämpfung der Nutzung des Internets zu terroristischen Zwecken.
� Bestehende Rechtsvorschriften auf diesem Gebiet
Nach Artikel 4 des Rahmenbeschlusses zur Terrorismusbekämpfung stellen die
Mitgliedstaaten bei terroristischen Straftaten die Anstiftung, Mittäterschaft und den Versuch
unter Strafe. Artikel 2 des Rahmenbeschlusses verpflichtet die Mitgliedstaaten, das Anführen
einer terroristischen Vereinigung und die Beteiligung an den Handlungen einer solchen
Vereinigung ebenfalls unter Strafe zu stellen. Diese Bestimmungen erstrecken sich jedoch
nicht ausdrücklich auf die Verbreitung terroristischer Propaganda und Fachkenntnisse,
insbesondere über das Internet.
Nach Artikel 5 bis 7 des Übereinkommens des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus
werden die Vertragsparteien aufgefordert sicherzustellen, dass die öffentliche Aufforderung
zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat sowie die Anwerbung und Ausbildung für
terroristische Zwecke, wenn diese Handlungen rechtswidrig und vorsätzlich begangen
werden, als Straftaten eingestuft werden. Nach Artikel 9 sind die Vertragsparteien überdies
verpflichtet, ergänzende Straftatbestände zu den in Artikel 5 bis 7 genannten einzuführen.
� Übereinstimmung mit anderen Politikbereichen und Zielen der Europäischen Union
Der Vorschlag steht im Einklang mit der EU-Strategie und dem Aktionsplan zum Thema
Radikalisierung und Anwerbung. Er aktualisiert und ergänzt den Rechtsrahmen der EU im
Bereich der Terrorismusbekämpfung und achtet die Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen
Union [ABl. C 364 vom 18.12.2000, S. 1].
Maßnahmen zur Terrorismusbekämpfung müssen mit dem Schutz der Menschenrechte und
Grundrechte einhergehen. Dieser Vorschlag betrifft Fragen, die sich im Grenzbereich
zwischen der rechtmäßigen Ausübung von Freiheitsrechten wie der Meinungs-,
Versammlungs- oder Religionsfreiheit und kriminellem Verhalten bewegen. Bei seiner
Ausarbeitung wurde daher den Menschenrechten und Grundfreiheiten besondere Beachtung
geschenkt. Die Beschränkungen des Rechts auf freie Meinungsäußerung durch den neuen
Straftatbestand der öffentlichen Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat sind
mit Artikel 10 EMRK vereinbar.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 14 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
2. ANHÖRUNG VON INTERESSIERTEN KREISEN UND FOLGENABSCHÄTZUNG
� Anhörung von interessierten Kreisen
Anhörungsmethoden, angesprochene Sektoren und allgemeines Profil der Befragten
Die Kommission gab 2006 drei verschiedene Fragebögen aus: einen Fragebogen an die
Mitgliedstaaten (26. Juni 2006), einen Fragebogen an die Medien, betroffenen
Wirtschaftszweige und die Zivilgesellschaft, nationale, europäische und internationale NRO,
die sich mit Menschenrechtsfragen befassen, Rechtsanwaltskammern, Verlagshäuser,
Sendeunternehmen und Journalistenverbände, Internetanbietern,
Telekommunikationsunternehmen und andere relevante Wirtschaftszweige (20. November
2006) sowie einen Fragebogen an Europol, Cepol und Eurojust (11. Dezember 2006). Darüber
hinaus fanden Gespräche und Zusammenkünfte mit Vertretern der europäischen Medien und
Internetanbieter statt. Am 20. März 2007 schließlich kamen auf einer Konferenz Vertreter der
Mitgliedstaaten, von Europol sowie Eurojust und Cepol zusammen, um die Ergebnisse aus
den Fragebögen zu erörtern und sich Gedanken darüber zu machen, wie der Missbrauch des
Internets für terroristische Zwecke unterbunden werden kann.
Zusammenfassung der Antworten und Art ihrer Berücksichtigung
Die Antworten auf die drei Fragebögen sind in den Anhängen I, II und III der
Folgenabschätzung, die diesem Vorschlag beigefügt ist, zusammengefasst.
Auf der Konferenz vom 20. März 2007 bestätigte sich, dass für eine Änderung des
Rahmenbeschlusses zur Terrorismusbekämpfung durch die Aufnahme neuer Straftatbestände
(öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat, Anwerbung und
Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke, einschließlich über das Internet) eine ausreichende
Unterstützung vorhanden ist, soweit die Kriminalisierung nicht über das im
Europaratsübereinkommen zur Terrorismusverhütung festgelegte Maß hinausgeht.
Bei dem vorliegenden Vorschlag handelt es sich um eine ausgewogene Regelung, in die die
Ergebnisse der drei Fragebögen und die in der Konsultation geäußerten Meinungen
eingeflossen sind und die sich auf die im Anhang beigefügte Folgenabschätzung stützt. Die
neuen Straftatbestände entsprechen zudem denen im Europaratsübereinkommen zur
Verhütung des Terrorismus. Auf diese Weise ist gewährleistet, dass der öffentlichen
Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat sowie der Anwerbung und
Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke, einschließlich über das Internet, mit geeigneten
rechtlichen Mitteln begegnet werden kann. Der Vorschlag steht voll im Einklang mit den
Menschenrechten und lässt die Haftung der Diensteanbieter auf der Grundlage der E-
Commerce-Richtlinie unberührt.
� Einholung und Nutzung von Expertenwissen
Externes Expertenwissen war nicht erforderlich.
� Folgenabschätzung
Optionen:
1. Keine Änderung der bisherigen Politik (die Beibehaltung des Status quo erscheint
angesichts des Übereinkommens des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus
fragwürdig)
2. Internetanbietern wird untersagt, Zugang zu Inhalten zu gewähren, die auf eine
öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat, Anwerbung
oder Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke gerichtet sind
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 15 – Drucksache 16/7769
3. Durch geeignete Schulungen, eine leistungsfähige Ausrüstung und mit Hilfe von
Experten – eventuell von der Kommission finanziert – werden die
Strafverfolgungsbehörden in die Lage versetzt, sich mehr Kapazitäten und
Fachkenntnisse anzueignen, mit denen sie dem Missbrauch des Internets für
terroristische Zwecke entgegenwirken können
4. Die Mitgliedstaaten werden (im Wege einer politischen Erklärung) nachdrücklich
aufgefordert, das Übereinkommen des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus zu
unterzeichnen bzw. zu ratifizieren
5. Der Rahmenbeschluss zur Terrorismusbekämpfung wird geändert, um im Einklang
mit dem Übereinkommen des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus
Straftatbestände aufzunehmen, die die öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer
terroristischen Straftat sowie die Anwerbung und Ausbildung für terroristische
Zwecke, einschließlich über das Internet, unter Strafe stellen.
Nach sorgfältiger Prüfung der Folgen, die mit jeder einzelnen Option für die Sicherheit, die
Wirtschaft und die Menschenrechte verbunden sind, und nach Abwägung ihrer Vor- und
Nachteile erscheint eine Kombination der Optionen 3 und 5 die wirksamste Strategie zu sein,
um den Missbrauch des Internets für terroristische Zwecke bei uneingeschränkter Achtung der
Menschenrechte zu unterbinden.
Die Kommission hat die im Arbeitsprogramm aufgeführte Folgenabschätzung vorgenommen,
die unter www.europa.eu abgerufen werden kann.
3. RECHTLICHE ASPEKTE
� Zusammenfassung des Vorschlags
Mit der vorgeschlagenen Änderung des Rahmenbeschlusses des Rates vom 13. Juni 2002 zur
Terrorismusbekämpfung sollen die einzelstaatlichen Vorschriften für die öffentliche
Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat sowie für die Anwerbung und
Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke in der Weise angeglichen werden, dass diese
Handlungen, auch wenn sie über das Internet begangen werden, überall in der EU unter Strafe
gestellt werden und dass die für terroristische Straftaten geltenden Strafvorschriften sowie die
Bestimmungen über die Haftung juristischer Personen, die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit und die
Strafverfolgung auch für solche Handlungen gelten.
� Rechtsgrundlage
Artikel 29, Artikel 31 Absatz 1 Buchstabe e und Artikel 34 Absatz 2 Buchstabe b EUV.
� Subsidiaritätsprinzip
Handlungen der Europäischen Union unterliegen dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip.
Die Ziele des Vorschlags können von den Mitgliedstaaten aus folgenden Gründen nicht
ausreichend verwirklicht werden:
Terrorismus ist heutzutage eindeutig global ausgerichtet. Die Verbreitung von Propaganda zur
Mobilisierung und Rekrutierung von Sympathisanten und Aktivisten sowie die Verbreitung
von Anleitungen und Online-Handbüchern für die Terrorismus-Ausbildung oder die Planung
von Terroranschlägen über das Internet haben grenzübergreifenden, internationalen
Charakter. Die Bedrohung ist international und international - zumindest zum Teil - muss
auch die Reaktion darauf sein.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 16 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Die erfolgreiche Bekämpfung von Terrorismus und Cyberkriminalität auf EU-Ebene setzt ein
abgestimmtes Vorgehen der Mitgliedstaaten sowie eine Zusammenarbeit auf internationaler
Ebene voraus. Unterschiede in den Rechtsordnungen der Mitgliedstaaten erschweren sowohl
ein abgestimmtes Vorgehen auf EU-Ebene als auch die Zusammenarbeit auf internationaler
Ebene.
Die Ziele des Vorschlags können aus folgenden Gründen besser durch Maßnahmen der EU
erreicht werden.
Es besteht eine klare Notwendigkeit, die Anstrengungen auf nationaler und EU-Ebene zur
Bekämpfung des Terrorismus dem neuen Operationsmodus der Terroristen anzupassen.
Durch die Ausweitung der derzeitigen gemeinsamen Terrorismus-Definition wird verhindert,
dass sich Terroristen Unterschiede zwischen den nationalen Rechtsordnungen und
Gesetzeslücken zunutze machen. Dies wird die Verfolgung grenzübergreifender krimineller
Aktivitäten ganz erheblich erleichtern. Eine gemeinsame Basis, auf die sich alle
Mitgliedstaaten stützen können, wird auch die Zusammenarbeit auf internationaler Ebene
einfacher machen und die Position der EU in internationalen Gremien stärken.
Eine intensivere Zusammenarbeit in der EU und auf internationaler Ebene bewirkt eine
effizientere Ermittlungsarbeit und Strafverfolgung und erhöht damit die Sicherheit.
Der Vorschlag steht daher mit dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Einklang.
� Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit
Der Vorschlag entspricht aus folgenden Gründen dem Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit.
Der Vorschlag geht nicht über das hinaus, was erforderlich ist und zudem einen Mehrwert auf
EU-Ebene bewirkt. Als Rahmenbeschluss ist er für die Mitgliedstaaten hinsichtlich des zu
erreichenden Ziels verbindlich, überlässt jedoch den innerstaatlichen Stellen die Wahl der
Form und der Mittel.
Die E-Commerce-Richtlinie und die Richtlinie über die Vorratsspeicherung von Daten
bleiben unverändert, so dass für Telekom-Betreiber oder Anbieter von
Telekommunikationsdiensten keine neuen Pflichten entstehen. Mit dem Vorschlag ist für sie
kein Aufwand in Form neuer Kooperationsmechanismen verbunden. Die vorhandenen
Mechanismen im Rahmen der E-Commerce-Richtlinie und der Richtlinie über die
Vorratsspeicherung von Daten werden lediglich in größerem Umfang genutzt werden. Die
indirekten Kosten, die sich aus diesem Vorschlag ergeben, beschränken sich auf die
zusätzliche Arbeitsbelastung, die mit der Einführung der neuen Straftatbestände einhergeht. In
Anbetracht der Zahl der im Jahresdurchschnitt in der EU zu verzeichnenden
Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen wegen terroristischer Delikte dürften diese Kosten nicht
sonderlich ins Gewicht fallen.
� Wahl des Instruments
Vorgeschlagenes Instrument: Rahmenbeschluss nach Artikel 34 Absatz 2 Buchstabe b EUV;
andere Instrumente kommen nicht in Frage, da eine Angleichung der mitgliedstaatlichen
Rechtvorschriften angestrebt wird.
4. AUSWIRKUNGEN AUF DEN HAUSHALT
Der Vorschlag hat keine Auswirkungen auf den EU-Haushalt.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 17 – Drucksache 16/7769
2007/0236 (CNS)
Vorschlag für einen
RAHMENBESCHLUSS DES RATES
zur Änderung des Rahmenbeschlusses 2002/475/JI zur Terrorismusbekämpfung
DER RAT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION -
gestützt auf den Vertrag über die Europäische Union, insbesondere auf Artikel 29, Artikel 31
Absatz 1 Buchstabe e und Artikel 34 Absatz 2 Buchstabe b,
auf Vorschlag der Kommission1,
nach Stellungnahme des Europäischen Parlaments2,
in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe:
(1) Terrorismus stellt einen der schwersten Verstöße gegen die universellen Werte der
Würde des Menschen, der Freiheit, der Gleichheit und der Solidarität, der Achtung der
Menschenrechte und der Grundfreiheiten dar, auf die sich die Europäische Union
gründet. Er stellt zudem einen der schwersten Angriffe auf die Grundsätze der
Demokratie und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit dar, die allen Mitgliedstaaten gemein sind und
die der Europäischen Union zugrunde liegen.
(2) Der Rahmenbeschluss 2002/475/JI des Rates zur Terrorismusbekämpfung bildet die
Grundlage der EU-Strategie zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus. Mit der Einführung
eines allen Mitgliedstaaten gemeinsamen Rechtsrahmens und insbesondere einer
einheitlichen Definition terroristischer Straftatbestände konnte eine EU-Politik zur
Terrorismusbekämpfung entwickelt und ausgestaltet werden, die auf der Achtung der
Grundrechte und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit gründet.
(3) Die Bedrohung durch den Terrorismus hat in den letzten Jahren stark zugenommen
und eine andere Qualität erhalten. Die Vorgehensweise von Terroristen und
Sympathisanten hat sich verändert. An die Stelle organisierter, hierarchisch
aufgebauter Strukturen sind halbautonome Zellen getreten, die nur locker miteinander
verbunden sind. Solche Zellen stellen Verbindungen zwischen internationalen Netzen
her und machen zunehmend von neuen Technologien, insbesondere dem Internet,
Gebrauch.
(4) Das Internet wird zur Beeinflussung und Mobilisierung von lokalen Terrornetzen und
Einzelpersonen in Europa eingesetzt und dient darüber hinaus als „virtuelles
Trainingscamp“, indem es Informationen über Mittel und Methoden des Terrorismus
verbreitet. Aktivitäten mit dem Ziel, öffentlich zur Begehung einer terroristischen
Straftat aufzufordern oder Personen für terroristische Zwecke anzuwerben und
auszubilden, haben sich angesichts der sehr niedrigen Kosten und Risiken vervielfacht.
(5) Dem Haager Programm zufolge kann Terrorismus unter uneingeschränkter Wahrung
der Grundrechte nur dann wirksam verhütet und bekämpft werden, wenn sich die
1 [...]
2 [...]
Drucksache 16/7769 – 18 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Mitgliedstaaten nicht nur auf ihre eigene Sicherheit konzentrieren, sondern auch die
Sicherheit der Union insgesamt im Auge haben.
(6) Im Aktionsplan zur Umsetzung des Haager Programms wird festgestellt, dass sich
Terrorismus nur mit einer globalen Strategie bekämpfen lässt. Die Erwartungen, die
die Bürger an die EU stellen, dürfen nicht ignoriert werden. Ebenso wenig kann die
Union es sich leisten, diesen Erwartungen nicht zu entsprechen. Prävention und
Krisenmanagement sind wesentliche Aspekte, um die Kapazitäten der Mitgliedstaaten
zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus zu stärken und erforderlichenfalls zu ergänzen. Hier
gilt das Hauptaugenmerk dem Personalbedarf, der Risikoanalyse, dem Schutz
anfälliger Infrastruktureinrichtungen und der Folgenbewältigung.
(7) Um zu dem allgemeineren politischen Ziel der Terrorismusprävention beizutragen und
die Verbreitung von Material zu reduzieren, das Personen zu Terroranschlägen
anstiften könnte, sollten Straftaten im Zusammenhang mit terroristischen Aktivitäten
unter Strafe gestellt werden.
(8) In der Resolution 1624 des UN-Sicherheitsrats (2005) werden die Staaten
aufgefordert, die notwendigen und geeigneten Maßnahmen im Einklang mit ihren
völkerrechtlichen Verpflichtungen zu ergreifen, um die Anstiftung zur Begehung einer
terroristischen Handlung oder terroristischer Handlungen gesetzlich zu verbieten und
ein solches Verhalten zu verhindern. Dem Bericht des Generalsekretärs der Vereinten
Nationen „Vereint gegen den Terrorismus – Empfehlungen für eine weltweite
Strategie zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus“ vom 27. April 2006 zufolge bietet die
vorstehende Resolution die Grundlage dafür, die Anstiftung zu terroristischen
Handlungen und die Rekrutierung, einschließlich über das Internet, unter Strafe zu
stellen. In der Weltweiten Strategie der Vereinten Nationen zur Bekämpfung des
Terrorismus (8. September 2006) haben die UN-Mitgliedstaaten beschlossen, Mittel
und Wege zu erkunden, um die auf internationaler und regionaler Ebene
unternommenen Anstrengungen zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus in allen seinen
Arten und Erscheinungsformen im Internet zu koordinieren.
(9) Im Übereinkommen des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus werden die
Vertragsparteien verpflichtet, die öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer
terroristischen Straftat sowie die Anwerbung und Ausbildung für terroristische
Zwecke, wenn diese Handlungen rechtswidrig und vorsätzlich begangen werden, unter
Strafe zu stellen.
(10) Die Definition terroristischer Straftaten einschließlich von Straftaten im
Zusammenhang mit terroristischen Aktivitäten sollte in allen Mitgliedstaaten weiter
angeglichen werden, um auch die öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer
terroristischen Straftat sowie die Anwerbung und Ausbildung für terroristische
Zwecke zu erfassen, wenn diese Handlungen vorsätzlich begangen werden.
(11) Für natürliche und juristische Personen, die öffentlich zur Begehung einer
terroristischen Straftat aufgefordert oder Personen für terroristische Zwecke
angeworben oder ausgebildet haben oder die für solche Handlungen haften, sind
Strafen und Sanktionen vorzusehen, wenn diese Handlungen vorsätzlich begangen
wurden. Diese Verhaltensweisen sollten in allen Mitgliedstaaten unter Strafe gestellt
werden, unabhängig davon, ob sie über das Internet begangen werden.
(12) Es sollten zusätzliche Vorschriften zur gerichtlichen Zuständigkeit festgelegt werden,
um eine wirksame Verfolgung der öffentlichen Aufforderung zur Begehung einer
terroristischen Straftat sowie der Anwerbung und Ausbildung für terroristische
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 19 – Drucksache 16/7769
Zwecke sicherzustellen, wenn diese auf die Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat
gerichtet sind oder zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat geführt haben, die in die
gerichtliche Zuständigkeit eines Mitgliedstaats fällt.
(13) Da die Ziele der in Betracht gezogenen Maßnahmen einseitig durch die
Mitgliedstaaten nicht ausreichend verwirklicht werden können, sondern aufgrund der
erforderlichen Rechtsangleichung in der Europäischen Union besser auf EU-Ebene zu
erreichen sind, kann die Europäische Union im Einklang mit dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip
tätig werden. Dieser Rahmenbeschluss geht entsprechend dem Grundsatz der
Verhältnismäßigkeit nicht über das für die Erreichung dieser Ziele erforderliche Maß
hinaus.
(14) Die Union achtet die in Artikel 6 Absatz 2 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union
anerkannten und in der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, insbesondere
in den Kapiteln II und VI, niedergelegten Grundsätze. Dieser Rahmenbeschluss kann
nicht dahin ausgelegt werden, dass er Grundrechte oder Grundfreiheiten wie das Recht
auf Meinungs-, Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit, das Recht auf Achtung des
Privat- und Familienlebens einschließlich des Rechts auf Achtung des Brief- und
Fernmeldegeheimnisses schmälert oder behindert.
(15) Bei der öffentlichen Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat sowie
der Anwerbung und Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke handelt es sich um
vorsätzliche Straftaten. Dieser Rahmenbeschluss kann daher nicht dahin ausgelegt
werden, dass er die Verbreitung von Informationen für Wissenschafts-, Forschungs-
oder Berichtszwecke schmälert oder behindert. Die Äußerung radikaler, polemischer
oder kontroverser Ansichten in einer öffentlichen Diskussion über sensible politische
Themen einschließlich Terrorismus fällt nicht in den Anwendungsbereich dieses
Rahmenbeschlusses und wird insbesondere nicht von der Definition der öffentlichen
Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat erfasst -
HAT FOLGENDEN RAHMENBESCHLUSS ANGENOMMEN:
Artikel 1
Der Rahmenbeschluss vom 13. Juni 2002 zur Terrorismusbekämpfung wird wie folgt
geändert:
(1) Artikel 3 erhält folgende Fassung:
„Artikel 3
Straftaten im Zusammenhang mit terroristischen Aktivitäten
1. Im Sinne dieses Rahmenbeschlusses gelten folgende Begriffsbestimmungen:
(a) „Öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat“: das
öffentliche Verbreiten oder sonstige öffentliche Zugänglichmachen einer
Botschaft mit dem Vorsatz, zur Begehung einer unter Artikel 1 Absatz 1
Buchstaben a bis h aufgeführten Handlung anzustiften, wenn dieses Verhalten,
unabhängig davon, ob dabei terroristische Straftaten unmittelbar befürwortet
werden, die Gefahr begründet, dass eine oder mehrere solcher Straftaten
begangen werden könnten;
(b) „Anwerbung für terroristische Zwecke“: eine andere Person dazu zu
bestimmen, eine Handlung im Sinne von Artikel 1 Absatz 1 oder Artikel 2
Absatz 2 zu begehen;
Drucksache 16/7769 – 20 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
(c) „Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke“: die Unterweisung in der Herstellung
oder im Gebrauch von Sprengstoffen, Feuer- oder sonstigen Waffen oder
schädlichen oder gefährlichen Stoffen oder die Unterweisung in anderen
spezifischen Methoden oder Verfahren mit dem Ziel, eine Handlung im Sinne
von Artikel 1 Absatz 1 zu begehen, in Kenntnis der Tatsache, dass die
vermittelten Fähigkeiten für diesen Zweck eingesetzt werden sollen.
2. Jeder Mitgliedstaat trifft die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, damit folgende vorsätzliche
Handlungen als Straftaten im Zusammenhang mit terroristischen Aktivitäten
eingestuft werden:
(a) öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat;
(b) Anwerbung für terroristische Zwecke;
(c) Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke;
(d) schwerer Diebstahl mit dem Ziel, eine der in Artikel 1 Absatz 1 aufgeführten
Handlungen zu begehen;
(e) Erpressung mit dem Ziel, eine der in Artikel 1 Absatz 1 aufgeführten
Handlungen zu begehen;
(f) die Ausstellung gefälschter Verwaltungsdokumente mit dem Ziel, eine der in
Artikel 1 Absatz 1 Buchstaben a bis h und in Artikel 2 Absatz 2 Buchstabe b
aufgeführten Handlungen zu begehen.
3. Für die Strafbarkeit einer Handlung nach Absatz 2 ist es nicht erforderlich, dass
tatsächlich eine terroristische Straftat begangen wird.“
(2) Artikel 4 Absatz 2 erhält folgende Fassung:
„Jeder Mitgliedstaat trifft die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, damit der Versuch der
Begehung einer Straftat nach Artikel 1 Absatz 1 und Artikel 3 mit Ausnahme des
Besitzes nach Artikel 1 Absatz 1 Buchstabe f und der Straftaten nach Artikel 1
Absatz 1 Buchstabe i und Artikel 3 Absatz 2 Buchstaben a bis c unter Strafe gestellt
wird.“
(3) In Artikel 9 wird folgender Absatz 1a eingefügt:
„1a. Jeder Mitgliedstaat begründet seine Gerichtsbarkeit über die in Artikel 3
Absatz 2 Buchstaben a bis c genannten Straftaten, wenn es Ziel oder Ergebnis
der Straftat war, eine Straftat im Sinne des Artikels 1 zu begehen und diese
Straftat nach den Kriterien in Absatz 1 Buchstaben a bis e seiner
Gerichtsbarkeit unterliegt.“
Artikel 2
1. Die Mitgliedstaaten treffen die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um diesem
Rahmenbeschluss vor dem [31. Dezember 2008] nachzukommen.
2. Die Mitgliedstaaten teilen dem Generalsekretariat des Rates und der Kommission vor
dem [31. Dezember 2008] den Wortlaut der Bestimmungen mit, mit denen sie die
sich aus diesem Rahmenbeschluss ergebenden Verpflichtungen in ihr nationales
Recht umgesetzt haben. Auf der Grundlage eines anhand dieser Angaben erstellten
Berichts sowie eines Berichts der Kommission überprüft der Rat vor dem [31.
Dezember 2009], inwieweit die Mitgliedstaaten den Bestimmungen dieses
Rahmenbeschlusses nachgekommen sind.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 21 – Drucksache 16/7769
Artikel 3
Dieser Rahmenbeschluss tritt am Tag seiner Veröffentlichung im Amtsblatt der Europäischen
Union in Kraft.
Geschehen zu Brüssel am
Im Namen des Rates
Der Präsident
Drucksache 16/7769 – 22 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Brussels, 13 November 2007
Interinstitutional File:
2007/0236 (CNS)
14960/07
ADD 1
CATS 122
DROIPEN 104
PROPOSAL
from: European Commission
dated: 12 November 2007
Subject: COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Accompanying document to the proposal for a
COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION amending Framework Decision
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Delegations will find attached a proposal from the Commission, submitted under a covering letter
from Mr Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU, Director, to Mr Javier SOLANA, Secretary-General/High
Representative.
________________________
Encl.: SEC(2007) 1424
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 23 – Drucksache 16/7769
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Brussels, 6.11.2007
SEC(2007) 1424
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Accompanying document to the
Proposal for a
COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION
amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
{COM(2007) 650 final}
{SEC(2007) 1425}
Drucksache 16/7769 – 24 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..................................................................................................... 27
1. Section 1: Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties.......................... 29
1.1. Background: organisation and timing, consultation and expertise ........................... 29
1.2. The Impact Assessment Board.................................................................................. 31
1.3. State of play: Existing policy documents and legal instruments............................... 32
1.3.1. Policy documents ...................................................................................................... 32
1.3.2. Legal instruments ...................................................................................................... 33
2. Section 2: Definition of the problem......................................................................... 34
2.1. What is the issue or the problem that may require action? ....................................... 34
2.1.1. The increasing dissemination of propaganda as well as bomb-making and other
expertise for terrorist purposes, especially through the Internet ............................... 34
2.1.2. Insufficient legislation to tackle the increasing dissemination of terrorist
propaganda and terrorist expertise ............................................................................ 38
2.1.2.1. Criminal law ............................................................................................................ 39
2.1.2.2. Non criminal law....................................................................................................... 42
2.1.3. Practical difficulties of law enforcement authorities facing increasing
dissemination of terrorist expertise and terrorist propaganda ................................... 43
2.1.3.1. Lack of law enforcement authorities' capacities and expertise ................................. 43
2.1.3.2. The nature of the Internet itself................................................................................. 44
2.2. Who is affected, in what ways, and to what extent? ................................................. 44
2.3. How would the problem evolve, all things being equal? .......................................... 45
2.4. Does the EU have the power to act? ......................................................................... 45
3. Section 3: Objectives................................................................................................. 46
4. Section 4: Policy options........................................................................................... 48
4.1. Option 1: No policy change ...................................................................................... 48
4.2. Option 2: Forbidding internet services providers to give access to material aiming
at ublic provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment or training for
terrorism .................................................................................................................... 50
4.3. Option 3: Enhancing law enforcement authorities' capacities and expertise to
counter the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes ................................................ 51
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 25 – Drucksache 16/7769
4.4. Option 4: Urging Member States to sign and/or ratify the Council of Europe
Convention on the prevention of terrorism. .............................................................. 52
4.5. Option 5: Revising the Framework Decision on combating terrorism in order to
introduce parallel offences to those foreseen under the Council of Europe
Convention ............................................................................................................... 52
5. Section 5: impacts ..................................................................................................... 53
5.1.1 Option 1: No policy change ...................................................................................... 53
5.1.2. Security impact.......................................................................................................... 54
5.1.3. Economic impact:...................................................................................................... 55
5.1.4. Human rights impact: ................................................................................................ 58
5.2. Option 2: Forbidding internet service providers to give access to material aiming
at public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment or training for
terrorism ................................................................................................................... 63
5.2.1. Security impact.......................................................................................................... 63
5.2.2. Economic impact....................................................................................................... 64
5.2.3. Human rights impact ................................................................................................. 67
5.3. Option 3: Enhancing law enforcement authorities' capacities and expertise to
counter the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes ................................................ 69
5.3.1. Security impact: ........................................................................................................ 69
5.3.2. Economic impact....................................................................................................... 70
5.3.3. Impact on human rights:............................................................................................ 71
5.4. Option 4: Urging Member States to sign and ratify the Council of Europe
Convention on the prevention of terrorism ............................................................... 71
5.5. Option 5: Revising the Framework Decision on combating terrorism in order to
introduce parallel offences to those foreseen under the Council of Europe
Convention ................................................................................................................ 73
5.5.1. Security impact.......................................................................................................... 73
5.5.2. Economic impact........................................................................................................ 76
5.5.3. Impact on human rights:............................................................................................. 77
6. Section 6: Comparing options.................................................................................... 78
6.1. Summary table: costs and benefits............................................................................. 78
6.2. Advantages and drawbacks of the policy options ...................................................... 80
6.3. Summary table: check list of benefits ........................................................................ 83
Drucksache 16/7769 – 26 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
6.4. Introduction of public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment and
training for terrorism, also via the internet, as offences: An overview of options 1,
4 and 5. ...................................................................................................................... 86
6.5. Strengths and weaknesses of each policy option and preferred option..................... 87
7. Section 7: Monitoring and evaluation ....................................................................... 88
7.1. Monitoring of legislative measures (option 5) .......................................................... 88
7.2. Monitoring of non-legislative measures (option 3)................................................... 89
ANNEXES .............................................................................................................................. 90
Annex I: Replies to the First Questionnaire Addressed to Member States............................. 90
Annex II: Replies to the Second Questionnaire Addressed to Civil Society, Industry and
Media......................................................................................................................... 98
Annex III: Replies to Third Questionnaire Addressed to Europol, Cepol and Eurojust ........108
Annex IV: Insufficiency of EU and national legislation applicable to the dissemination of
terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise ..............................................................114
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 27 – Drucksache 16/7769
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Modern information and communication technologies play an important role in the
development of the threat which is currently represented by terrorism: they may serve as a
means of dissemination of propaganda aiming at mobilisation and recruitment as well as
instructions and online manuals intended for training or planning of attacks, addressed at
current and potential supporters.
The Internet, in particular, may serve as one of the principal boosters of the processes of
radicalisation and recruitment: it is used to inspire and mobilise local networks and
individuals in Europe and also serves as a source of information on terrorist means and
methods, thus functioning as a ‘virtual training camp’. The dissemination of terrorist
propaganda and terrorist expertise through the Internet has therefore empowered terrorists,
making the terrorist threat grow. Moreover, the importance of such dissemination can only be
expected to increase, taking into consideration the fast growing number of users that will
make the Internet an even more vital element of modern society than it is today.
Law enforcement authorities are presently in a difficult position to contain the spiral of
violent radicalisation and easier terrorist attacks deriving from the dissemination of terrorist
propaganda and terrorist expertise, especially through the Internet. The difficulties stem from
insufficient legislation, from lack of capacity and expertise to cope with the volume and
plurality of languages in which the terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise are
disseminated as well as from the nature of the Internet itself: its extra-territoriality together
with the anonymity it provides seriously hinders the reaction of law enforcement authorities
complicating both the removal of such contents from the Internet and the investigation and
prosecution of those responsible for a website and its contents.
EU legislation does not explicitly cover public provocation to commit terrorist offences,
recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the
Framework Decision on combating terrorism requires Member States to ensure that a
significant part of the dissemination of messages through the Internet encouraging the
commission of terrorist offences or providing for terrorist expertise, either accessible to
anyone (i.e. website), restricted (i.e. chat forum) or addressed to pre-selected candidates for
recruitment, is made punishable.
However, the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism tackles the use of
the Internet as a means for public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment and
training for terrorism. Furthermore, it contains conditions and safeguards ensuring the respect
of human rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression. It will lead to the
harmonisation of Member States' legislation in this area if all of them sign and ratify the
Convention.
Adopting effective measures to counter the public provocation to commit terrorist offences,
recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism, especially through the Internet, would
contribute to the prevention of the development of a stronger and wider platform of terrorist
activists and supporters. Such measures should include legal provisions to remedy the
insufficient legislation referred to above as well as practical measures to enhance law
enforcement authorities' capacities and expertise. These actions would help to reduce the risk
of terrorist attacks and to diminish the possibilities for radicalisation and recruitment.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 28 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Any legislation in this field, dealing with issues which are on the border between the
legitimate exercise of freedoms (such as freedom of expression, association or religion) and
criminal behaviour would necessarily have a direct impact on fundamental rights. The
establishment, implementation and application of criminalisation have to be carried out while
respecting fundamental rights obligations. This also implies that all establishment,
implementation and application of criminalisation is subject to the principle of
proportionality, with respect to the legitimate aims pursued and to their necessity in a
democratic society, excluding any form of arbitrariness or discriminatory or racist treatment1.
The options identified to achieve this objective are:
1. No policy change (which is a debatable status quo because of the existence of the
Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism).
2. Forbidding internet service providers to give access to material aiming at public
provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment or training for terrorism.
3. Enhancing law enforcement authorities' capacities and expertise to counter the use of
the Internet for terrorist purposes (through adequate training, the support of experts
and efficient equipment, possibly financed by the Commission).
4. Urging Member States to sign and/or ratify the Council of Europe Convention on the
prevention of terrorism (through a political statement).
5. Revising the Framework Decision on combating terrorism in order to introduce
parallel offences to those foreseen under the Council of Europe Convention on the
prevention of terrorism and make public provocation to commit terrorist offences,
recruitment and training for terrorism, also via the Internet, punishable.
After careful examination of the impacts on security, economy and human rights of each of
the options as well as weighing their advantages and drawbacks, the combination of options 5
and 3 appears to be the most effective policy to counter terrorist use of the Internet while fully
respecting human rights.
The monitoring and evaluation of these measures would be ensured, concerning the revision
of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, by the evaluation of national
implementation which generally applies to framework decisions, as foreseen under Article 11
of this instrument and, as regards the non-legislative measures of option 3, by Articles 13 and
15 of the Specific Programme Prevention of and Fight against crime. Article 13 details the
monitoring of each of the actions financed under this programme and Article 15 sets out the
rules for the evaluation of the programme itself.
1 See the Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, points
143-151.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 29 – Drucksache 16/7769
1. SECTION 1: PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES
1.1. Background: organisation and timing, consultation and expertise
The Commission Legislative and Work Programme for 2007 includes a proposal for the
revision of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (hereafter,
"Framework Decision") in order to devise effective solutions towards fighting terrorist
propaganda through various media and limiting the transmission of expertise, in particular on
explosives and bomb making, for terrorist purposes.
In view of the eventual revision of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, and
taking into consideration the sensitivity of the subject because of real or perceived inroads in
freedom of expression, a wide stock-taking exercise was launched in June 2006. The
Commission issued three different questionnaires in 2006: a questionnaire to Member States
on 26 June 2006; a questionnaire to national, European and international NGOs dealing with
human rights issues, Human Rights bodies, Bar and Lawyers' associations, publishers,
broadcasters and journalists' associations, internet service providers, telecommunication
companies, and other relevant industry on 20 November 2006, and finally, a questionnaire to
Europol, Cepol and Eurojust on 11 December 2006. In addition, conversations and meetings
were held with representatives of European media and internet service providers. These
included, in particular, the intervention of the Commission at the Corporate Affairs Group
Meeting of the European Publishers Association on 19 September 2006 as well as a the
meeting with the representatives of the European Federation of Magazine Publishers, the
European Publishers Council, the European Newspaper Publishers' Association and the
Association of Commercial Television in Europe on 10 October 2006.
In addition, a conference was held on 20 March 2007 in order to bring together Member
States, Europol, Eurojust and Cepol, present the results of the questionnaires and discuss
possible solutions to fight the use of the internet for terrorist purposes. The focus of the
discussion was the eventual revision of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism in
view of including explicit provisions on public provocation to commit a terrorist offence,
recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism comparable to those included in the
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.
Besides the data obtained throughout the consultation process, various other information
sources have been taken into account, namely the Report of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations "Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism
strategy" of 27 April 20062, reports of the General Intelligence and Security Service of the
Netherlands as well as of its National Coordinator for counter-terrorism3, the EU Terrorism
2 Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations "Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for
a global counter-terrorism strategy" of 27 April 2006, Sixtieth session Agenda items 46 and 120,
A/60/825 section C "Denying access to recruits and communication by countering terrorist use of the
internet", p. 12, http://www.un.org/unitingagainstterrorism/sg-terrorism-2may06.pdf.
3 Annual Report 2005 of the General Intelligence and Security of the Netherlands,
http://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/81211/aivd_annual_2005.pdf and the 2006 report of the same body
"Violent Djihad in the Netherlands, current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat",
www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf. The 2006 report "Djihadis and the Internet" of the
National Coordinator for counter-terrorism, http://english.nctb.nl/publications/reports/nctb/.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 30 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Situation and Trend Report 2007 of Europol4 –as well as studies and articles from research
centres, such as the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies5, and from scholars,
including Maura Conway6, Johnny Ryan7, Gabriel Weimann8, Bruce Hoffman9, Hanna
Rogan10 and Alfonso García Merlos11. Additionally, this impact assessment takes stock of the
first and second evaluation reports of the Commission on the implementation of the
Framework Decision on combating terrorism12, the explanatory report to Council of Europe
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism13, and publications including "Apologie du
terrorism and incitement to terrorism" by the Council of Europe14, "Droit pénal comparé
spécial"15 and "Grunderfordernisse einer Regelung des Allgemeinen Teils"16. It also reflects
4 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report of Europol 2007,
http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=news&news=pr070410.htm.
5 "Tendances en terrorisme - L'usage d'Internet à des fins terroristes" http://www.csis-
scrs.gc.ca/fr/itac/itacdocs/2006-2.pdf.
6 Several publications of this author have been used for the elaboration of this impact assessment. Among
them "Terrorism and the Internet: new media-new threat?", Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 59 No. 2, 2006,
Advance Access Publication 10 February 2006, http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/59/2/283 and
“Terrorist use of the Internet and fighting back”,
www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/cybersafety/extensions/pdfs/papers/maura_conway.pdf. In addition, Ms.
Conway intervened in the conference organised on 20 March 2007 in the context of the impact
assessment of the proposal, offering highly relevant expertise.
7 His study, "Countering Militant Islamist radicalisation on the Internet: a user driven strategy to recover
the web", Institute of European Affairs 2007, has been especially useful concerning the analysis of
technical solutions to the spread of violent radicalisation through the Internet.
8 One of the most influential authors in the area of the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, his
studies "Terror on the Internet: the new arena, the new challenges", Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of
Peace Press 2006, and "www.terror.net - How modern terrorism uses the Internet",
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.pdf, have been taken into account in the elaboration of
this impact assessment.
9 His study, “The use of the Internet by Islamic extremists”,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf, analyses very eloquent cases of the
use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.
10 Her study, “Djihadism online – A study of how Al-Quida and radical Islamist groups use the Internet
for terrorist purposes”, http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2006/00915.pdf, constitutes an exceptional in-
sight on the online Djihad.
11 "Internet como instrumento para la Djihad", Araucaria Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y
Humanidades. Año 8, Nº 16 Segundo semestre de 2006. ISSN 1575-6823
http://alojamientos.us.es/araucaria/nro16/ideas16_5.htm, has also been relevant in the elaboration of this
impact assessment.
12 Concerning the first evaluation, the relevant documents are Report from the Commission based on
Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism - COM(2004)
409, 8.6.2004 and Commission staff working paper annex to the Report from the Commission based on
Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism - SEC(2004)
688, 8.6.2004. The relevant documents concerning the second evaluation are still to be published.
13 The explanatory report, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/196.htm, does not constitute
an instrument providing an authoritative interpretation of the Convention, although it may serve to
facilitate the application of the provisions contained therein.
14 "Apologie du terrorisme and incitement to terrorism", Council of Europe publishing, F-67075
Strasbourg Cedex, collects and analyses information received from the Member States in view of the
elaboration of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. In particular, it deals
with a relatively new phenomenon: the public expression of praise, justification and other forms of
support for terrorism and terrorists, which it refers to as "apologie du terrorisme" and "incitement to
terrorism".
15 "Droit pénal comparé spécial, Dalloz, 2002, by Jean Pradel.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 31 – Drucksache 16/7769
the legal expertise provided for by Erling Johannes Husabø, Professor of criminal law at the
University of Bergen (Norway).
1.2. The Impact Assessment Board
On 20 July 2007, the Impact Assessment Board of the European Commission delivered an
opinion regarding a preliminary version of this Impact Assessment report. In the opinion, the
Board in brief stated:
(1) The IA needs to develop further the problem definition and explain gaps and
differences in Member States' current legislation.
(2) The value added of a new EU initiative vis-à-vis the Convention of Council of Europe
needs to be better demonstrated.
(3) The objectives of the proposal need to be clarified, particularly the relation between
enabling easier tracking down of terrorists and limiting the terrorist propaganda.
(4) The impacts on fundamental rights should include positive indirect impacts on right to
life, right to respect for physical and mental integrity, etc.
(5) The reasoning for discarding Option 2 could be developed further, expanding the
discussion on (cost-) efficiency of this option, advantages and disadvantages of using
currently available technologies.
The present version of the Impact Assessment report has been significantly redrafted, with a
view to taking these recommendations fully into account. Additional information and
modifications have been introduced to this end in many of its sections and an additional
section has been created (Section 6.3. summary table: check list of benefits). As regards the
need to develop further the gaps and differences in Member States' current legislation, the
information is however limited by the number of Member States that replied to the
Commission's questionnaire –eighteen- as well as by the completeness of the replies. The
recommendation has in this case been followed to the possible extent.
16
"Grunderfordernisse einer Regelung des Allgemeinen Teils", in "Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der
Europäischen Union", (Rechtsdogmatik- Rechtsvergleich-Rechtspolitik), by Klaus Tiedemann (ed.)
Carl Heymanns Verlag KG. München, 2001.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 32 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
1.3. State of play: Existing policy documents and legal instruments
1.3.1. Policy documents
At international level, there are already a number of international policy documents adopted
by the United Nations, the OSCE and the G8 which deal with the use of the Internet for
terrorist purposes. The following (non-exhaustive) examples can in particular be mentioned.
1. The United Nations Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) calls upon States to take
measures that are necessary and appropriate, and in accordance with their obligations
under international law, to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts
and to prevent such conduct;
2. The Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations "Uniting against
terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy" of 27 April
2006, A/60/825 whose section C "Denying access to recruits and communication by
countering terrorist use of the internet" interprets the abovementioned resolution as
providing for a basis for the criminalisation of incitement to terrorist acts and
recruitment, including through the Internet;
3. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy mentions in its point II (12)
that the Member States of the UN resolve to "work with the United Nations, with due
regard to confidentiality, respecting human rights and in compliance with other
obligations under international law, to explore ways and means to:
coordinate efforts at the international and regional level to counter terrorism in all its
forms and manifestations on the Internet, and;
use the Internet as a tool for countering the spread of terrorism, while recognising
that States may require assistance in this regard."
6. The commitment by the G8 Summit (St. Petersburg, Russian Federation, 16 July
2006), to effectively counter attempts to misuse cyberspace for terrorist purposes,
including incitement to commit terrorist acts, to communicate and plan terrorist acts,
as well as recruitment and training of terrorists;
7. Decision No. 7/06 "Countering the use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes" of the
Ministerial Council of the OSCE, of 5 December 2006, to intensify action by the
OSCE and its participating States, notably by enhancing international co-operation
on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.
At EU level, the Communication "Terrorist recruitment - Addressing the factors contributing
to violent radicalisation"17 was an initial contribution to an EU Strategy and Action Plan on
Radicalisation and Recruitment which was adopted by the JAI December 2005 Council as
was foreseen by the Hague Program. This policy document identified various existing EU
policies that could play an important role in addressing the problem, including broadcasting
17
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council entitled "Terrorist
recruitment - Addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation" of 21 September 2005 -
COM(2005) 313.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 33 – Drucksache 16/7769
media and the Internet. The Revised Radicalisation and Recruitment Action Plan of the
Council of the European Union, in its Paragraph 44 notes that "the Union should promote full
implementation of UNSCR 1624 (2005) and use in this context its external relations policy to
encourage third states not to allow the transmission through satellite channels or other media,
of messages that contain hate speech or incite terrorist violence"18.
Furthermore, the Communication "Towards a general policy on the fight against cyber
crime"19 formulates a general policy on the fight against cyber crime at EU level, including
incitement to terrorist acts and glorification of terrorism. It also identifies the problem of the
growing number of illegal content sites that are accessible in Europe20. In order to fight illegal
content, the actions envisaged by the Communication include the promotion of dialogue as
well as developing EU-level voluntary agreements and conventions between public
authorities and private operators, especially Internet service providers21.
1.3.2. Legal instruments
Within the European Union, the main legal instrument to be mentioned is the Council
Framework Decision on combating terrorism22. This instrument approximates the definition
of terrorist offences in all Member States and ensures that penalties and sanctions are
provided for natural and legal persons having committed or being liable for such offences,
which reflect their seriousness. In addition, this instrument set up the cases in which Member
States are obliged to take jurisdiction over terrorist offences so that they can be efficiently
prosecuted and includes specific measures with regard to protection of and assistance to
victims of terrorist offences because of their vulnerability.
In particular, its Article 4 states that inciting, aiding or abetting terrorist offences should be
made punishable by the Member States and its Article 2 requires Member States to hold
criminally liable those directing a terrorist group or participating in its activities. The scope of
these provisions vis-à-vis the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise in
so far as they amount to public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for
terrorism and training for terrorism, in particular through the Internet, will be carefully studied
and discussed below.
At international level, the main legal instrument to be mentioned in this context is the Council
of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism of 2005, which entered into force on 1
June 2007. All Member States of the European Union have signed this Convention, with the
exception of the Czech Republic and Ireland whereas only Bulgaria, Denmark, Romania and
Slovakia have ratified it so far23. This should however not be understood as reluctance since
ratification procedures are underway and the final text of the Convention reflects a very fine
18 See Revised Radicalisation and Recruitment Action Plan Doc. 16530/1/06 REV 1 ENFOPOL 218
COTER 35.
19 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Committee of
the Regions "Towards a general policy on the fight against cyber crime" of 22 May 2007 - COM(2007)
267.
20 Communication referred to above in footnote 19, p. 3.
21 Communication referred to above in footnote 19, p. 10.
22 Other relevant EU legal instruments are studied in Section 2.5.3.
23
See
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=196&CM=8&DF=5/16/2007&CL=EN
G to check exact situation regarding signatures and ratifications.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 34 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
balance and broad consensus obtained after extensive work, including consultations and
negotiations. According to this Convention, parties must adopt the necessary measures to
establish public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism and
training for terrorism, when committed unlawful and intentionally, as criminal offences under
their domestic law.
Although these provisions do not explicitly refer to the commission of such offences via the
Internet, they are in fact applicable irrespective of whether they are committed over the
Internet or not, as the explanatory report to the Convention clarifies. These provisions,
therefore, cover terrorist propaganda and dissemination of bomb-making and other terrorist
expertise through the Internet as long as they amount to public provocation to commit a
terrorist offence, recruitment or training for terrorism as defined in the Convention.
In addition, the instrument contains conditions and safeguards (i.e. Article 12) ensuring the
respect of human rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression.
2. SECTION 2: DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
2.1. What is the issue or the problem that may require action?
2.1.1. The increasing dissemination of propaganda as well as bomb-making and other
expertise for terrorist purposes, especially through the Internet
"Since the advent of the printing press using industrial age technologies in the 19th century,
terrorists and extremist movements have employed every available mass communication
technology"24. Yet, the use of media by modern terrorism nowadays is not comparable with
that preceding the widespread use of the Internet and other new media technologies. At that
time, in order to reach a wide audience and gain publicity for their cause, terrorists were
obliged to draw the attention of conventional media and conditioned to the presentation of the
facts made by these. The arrival of new media technologies represents a turning point:
terrorists are no longer reliant on intermediaries to interpret their deeds. They now have the
ability to tell their own stories via their websites and television stations. The level of editorial
control afforded to terrorists by their access to new media technologies has substantially
empowered them25.
However, the dramatic change stemming from the access of terrorists to new technologies
goes far beyond allowing them to spread their views among large audiences, particularly
when it comes to the Internet. Actually, more worrying than disinformation reaching public
opinion is the propaganda aiming at mobilisation and recruitment as well as the dissemination
of instructions and online manuals intended for training or planning of attacks, addressed at
current and potential sympathisers.
This concern cannot but increase when the dimensions of the phenomenon are taken into
account. Websites, chat-forums and blogs operated by terrorist groups and their supporters
24 See Terrorism and the Making of the ‘New Middle East’: New Media Strategies of Hizbollah and al
Qaeda", by Maura Conway, p 3.
25 See Terrorism and the Making of the ‘New Middle East’: New Media Strategies of Hizbollah and al
Qaeda", by Maura Conway, pp. 3-7.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 35 – Drucksache 16/7769
have multiplied in the last years26. Studies and reports from scholars, research centres and
international organisations including the United Nations as well as from national intelligence
services coincide to point out its importance. As an illustrative example, the Report of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations "Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a
global counter-terrorism strategy" of 27 April 2006, states27:
"Terrorist networks rely on communication to build support and recruit members. We must
deny them this access, particularly by countering their use of the Internet — a rapidly growing
vehicle for terrorist recruitment and dissemination of information and propaganda. In 1998,
there were fewer than 20 terrorist websites. By 2005, that number was estimated by experts to
have surged into the thousands. Indeed it seems that some major recent attacks drew support
from content on the Internet."
The Internet is cheap, fast, easily accessible and has a practically global reach. All these
advantages, highly appreciated by law-abiding citizens that benefit from the Internet in their
daily lives, are also unfortunately exploited by terrorists, who have perfectly understood the
potential of the Internet as a tool to spread propaganda aiming at mobilisation and recruitment
as well as to provide for instructions and manuals intended for training or planning of attacks
at very low risk and cost. The Internet can be regarded as the largest platform for relatively
anonymous public comments, where expression of radical opinions is unhampered by social
control or risk of persecution. This explains why terrorists have taken to the Internet with such
alacrity.
An example that illustrates the priority that terrorists place upon communication is the fact
that in 1998 Al-Qaeda established four departments to conduct affairs in military, finance,
Islamic study and media matters. For this last department, the Internet was a particularly
important tool.
No form of terrorism ignores the importance of communication nor renounces to exploit the
Internet28. However, it should be noted that Islamist terrorism29 is particularly active in this
field. Its activists and supporters produce high quality material and favour an inter-active use
of the web which has proven very effective to fuel radicalisation and recruitment.
Furthermore, its de-centralised structure perfectly fits into the web allowing Islamist terrorism
to exploit the Internet to a further extent than forms of terrorism operating through highly
structured and hierarchical groups.
26 Reports and studies coincide in the quick multiplication of these websites, estimating that nowadays
there are over 5 000 of them. They also highlight their increasing sophistication, including the use of
several languages as well as audiovisual material of high quality. An important aspect in the evolution
of the terrorist use of the Internet is the increasing importance of the interaction through chat-forums
and blogs.
27 See the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations "Uniting against terrorism:
recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy" of 27 April 2006, Sixtieth session Agenda
items 46 and 120, A/60/825 section C "Denying access to recruits and communication by countering
terrorist use of the internet", p 12, http://www.un.org/unitingagainstterrorism/sg-terrorism-2may06.pdf.
28 Furthermore, nowadays almost all active terrorist organisations maintain websites, and many maintain
more than one website.
29 Islamist terrorism is defined under Europol's report TE-SAT 2007 referred to above, in footnote 3, title
3 "TE-SAT 2007 Methodology", pp. 9-12, as a type of terrorism motivated either in whole or in part by
an extreme interpretation of Islam and where the use of violence is regarded by its practitioners as a
divine duty or sacramental act.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 36 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
A report of the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands30 confirms that
modern information and communication technologies play a crucial role in the development
of the threat which is currently represented by Islamist terrorism. With a graphic example, the
report compares the Internet with a turbo propelling the global violent Djihad31 movement,
stating that it is one of the principal boosters of the processes of radicalisation and
recruitment. The report continues detailing the mobilising and training purposes for which the
Internet is used by terrorists groups explaining that the radical and extremist messages spread
via the Internet both inspire and mobilise local Djihadist networks and individuals in Europe.
The Internet, the report adds, can also stimulate and accelerate the emergence of real and
virtual networks, and serves as a source of information on terrorist means and methods, thus
functioning as a ‘virtual training camp’.
The report notes that this is a relatively recent phenomenon and therefore the study of the
influence of the Internet on the development of the Djihadist movement and the role of this
medium in individual radicalisation and Djihadisation is still at an early stage. However, on
the basis of a number of recent cases, the report continues, it is possible to draw some
tentative conclusions on various aspects of the so-called virtualisation of violent Djihad:
"Virtualisation means that the ideological and organisational development of Djihadist
networks and individuals is increasingly taking place on or with the help of the Internet. This
obviously involves the risk that sooner or later virtual threat will turn into the specific threat
of an actual attack. The General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands expects
that this virtualisation trend in particular will be essential in the future threat against Europe
and the Netherlands"32.
Despite the existence of other means through which mobilisation, recruitment and training can
occur, the effort into distributing information online, and cases of militant operations in which
the Internet is known to have played an important role, leads to the conclusion that Internet
represents an increasingly important instrument to fuel violent radicalisation and ease terrorist
attacks. The Internet has therefore empowered terrorists, making the terrorist threat grow.
Moreover, the importance of online terrorism can only be expected to increase, taking into
consideration the fast growing number of users that will make the Internet even a more vital
nerve in modern society than it is today.
However, it is important to clarify that the dissemination of terrorist propaganda aiming at
mobilisation or recruitment and instruction or manuals intended for training or planning of
attacks does not only take place online. The Internet has not eliminated traditional means of
dissemination such as distributing printed material or exhibiting videos. Moreover, the web
boosts and complements other methods of dissemination. In those countries or regions where
the Internet is not so widespread, the access of one individual is enough to record audio or
video files or copy documents containing terrorist propaganda or terrorist expertise that will
be latter distributed or exhibited to those who do not have the means to go online. In this
30 Report of the General Security and Intelligence Service of the Netherlands, "Current trends in the
Islamist terrorist threat", 2006, www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/65582/jihad2006en.pdf.
31 This study uses the concepts of "Djihad", "Djihadism" or "Djihadist" when it quotes papers, reports or
studies previously elaborated. Otherwise, the term employed is "Islamist terrorism", in the sense of the
definition of Europol's report TE-SAT 2007 referred to above, in footnote 30.
32 See the report mentioned above, footnote 23, pp. 43-44,
www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/65582/Djihad2006en.pdf.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 37 – Drucksache 16/7769
sense, the lack of access to the new technologies does not impede access to material originally
posted online.
Europol's report TE-SAT 2007 analyses the situation of terrorism in the European Union
specifying that 706 individuals were arrested in 2006 as terrorist suspects33. Islamist terrorism
is examined in detail, including the importance of propaganda for this type of terrorism. A
total of 340 persons were reported to have been arrested on Islamist terrorism related offences
between October 2005 and December 200634. Concerning propaganda, in general, 2006 saw a
rise in the frequency of statements and communiqués by Islamist groups, especially Al-
Quaeda35.
The concepts of terrorist propaganda, terrorist expertise and dissemination
Terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise in this impact assessment are not legal concepts,
but cover a variety of acts. From the legal point of view, in accordance with the Council of
Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism, these acts are to be criminalised only in so
far as they amount to public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for
terrorism and training for terrorism.
Terrorist propaganda in this impact assessment refers to a variety of contents. From
glorification of suicide bombers as “martyrs” to open encouragement to join terrorism,
including direct invitations to “kill the heretic” without forgetting the justification of
terrorism36 or the dissemination of images of brutal assassinations as a way to gain publicity
for the terrorists cause or prove their power, increasing fear. Thus, this term covers terrorist
propaganda for diverse purposes: mobilising, recruiting or fund-raising.
However, the scope of this notion is restricted by two requirements: first of all, the
information transmitted should actually create the risk that one or more terrorist offences are
committed or the risk of recruitment; secondly, the content should be disseminated for the
purpose of contributing to terrorist activity.
Terrorist expertise in this impact assessment includes all sorts of materials, from brief military
instruction manuals to comprehensive encyclopaedias such as the infamous “Encyclopaedia
for the preparation of the Djihad”, in both written as well as audio-visual form. The concept
also covers content such as how to produce home-made explosives and poisons or how to use
weapons, as well as strategic information including instructions on how to carry out attacks,
reconnaissance operations, hostage-taking or how to establish an underground organisation,
without forgetting data on targets to help the planning and co-ordination of attacks.
Similarly to terrorist propaganda, the scope of terrorist expertise is restricted by two
requirements: first of all, the information transmitted should be actually useful for the
commission of one or more terrorist offences; secondly, the information should be transmitted
with the purpose of contributing to terrorist activity.
33 Europol's report TE-SAT 2007, referred to above in footnote 3, p. 14.
34 See Europol's report TE-SAT 2007, referred to above in footnote 3, p. 19.
35 See Europol's report TE-SAT 2007, referred to above in footnote 3, p. 26.
36
See i.e. “Djihadism online – A study of how Al-Qaeda and radical Islamist groups use the Internet for
terrorist purposes”, mentioned above, footnote 9, p. 15 and “The use of the Internet by Islamic
extremists”, mentioned above, footnote 8, pp. 6-7.
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Pointing out the intentional element in the transmission of terrorist expertise is particularly
relevant. Actually, unintentional propaganda is quite difficult to imagine. However,
transmitting expertise on bomb-making or the use of weapons may have a different purpose
than contributing to terrorist activity. Sometimes, the author might even be unconscious of
such a risk. Even information in governmental sites may constitute a significant help for
terrorists. For example, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Security
and Incident Response recently took more than 1,000 sensitive documents off line considering
that they would provide clear and significant benefit to a terrorist planning an attack37.
The element of "terrorist intent" would exclude the dissemination of material for scientific,
academic or reporting purposes (or any other purpose that is not contributing to terrorist
activity). It follows that the expression of radical, polemic or controversial views in the public
debate on sensitive political questions, including on terrorism issues, as well as the
dissemination, even consciously, of distorted information, does not amount to the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda or terrorist expertise.
It should be noted that there are often mixed cases where the transmission of terrorist
propaganda and expertise comes together: messages containing instructions for a terrorist
attack often include a component of encouragement38.
This study focuses on the study of online dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist
expertise through messages accessible to anyone (i.e. website), restricted (i.e. chat forum) or
addressed to pre-selected candidates for recruitment, as a recent phenomenon of important
consequences and huge dimensions. However, offline distribution of terrorist propaganda and
terrorist expertise is also comprised in the concept of "dissemination" used in the impact
assessment, which includes any form of distribution that makes available terrorist propaganda
or terrorist expertise to the public, to a group of current or potential sympathisers or to pre-
selected candidates for recruitment.
Dissemination in this impact assessment consists of making terrorist propaganda and terrorist
expertise available to the public, to a group of current or potential sympathisers or to pre-
selected candidates for recruitment, by any means either on or offline.
2.1.2. Insufficient legislation to tackle the increasing dissemination of terrorist propaganda
and terrorist expertise
The analysis of EU and national legislation included in Annex IV explains in detail why
existing legislation at EU and national level is insufficient. This analysis covers the Television
without frontiers Directive, the Directive on electronic commerce and the Data retention
Directive although it focuses on Criminal law, in particular, on the relevant provisions of the
Framework Decision on combating terrorism – Articles 2 and 4 - as well as the relevant
Criminal law in Member States.
37 See “Terrorist use of the Internet and fighting back”, by Maura Conway, pp. 14-15,
www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/cybersafety/extensions/pdfs/papers/maura_conway.pdf.
38 See i.e. the example of the website Ansar al-Muslimin cited by Hanna Rogan as a site that
“recommended attacks in lunch areas, overhead walkways and traffic snarls, where westerns would be
trapped in their vehicles” in “Jihadism online – A study of how Al-Qaeda and radical Islamist groups
use the Internet for terrorist purposes”, mentioned above, p. 30.
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2.1.2.1. Criminal law
As regards Criminal law, the analysis provided for in Annex IV offers the following
conclusions:
1. It is doubtful that Article 4 of the Framework Decision requires Member States to ensure
that the dissemination of messages through the Internet encouraging the commission of
terrorist offences, either accessible to anyone (i.e. website), restricted (i.e. chat forum) or
addressed to pre-selected candidates for recruitment, is made punishable.
The doubt stems from the fact that Article 4 does not include the obligation for Member
States to ensure that attempts to incite others to commit terrorist offences are made
punishable. In this sense, it could be defended that the provision only obliges Member States
to incriminate incitement when at least one of the recipients of the message is actually incited.
This would lead to the conclusion that Article 4 does not require Member States to make the
dissemination of messages encouraging the commission of terrorist offences via the Internet
itself punishable.
The first evaluation report on national implementation seems to confirm this interpretation
concerning public dissemination (the case of messages accessible to anyone): it concluded
that all Member States would be able to meet the terms of Article 4 through their national
provisions on complicity and inchoate offences whereas only three Member States had
submitted provisions dealing with public dissemination of messages encouraging the
commission of terrorist offences.
2. It is doubtful that Article 4 of the Framework Decision requires Member States to ensure
that the dissemination of messages through the Internet providing for terrorist expertise, either
accessible to anyone (i.e. website), restricted (i.e. chat forum) or addressed to pre-selected
candidates for recruitment, is made punishable.
Once again, the doubt stems from the fact that this provision does not include the obligation
for Member States to ensure that the attempt of aiding or abetting others to commit terrorist
offences is made punishable and it seems that the dissemination of the messages referred to
above via the Internet should be qualified as an attempt.
3. It seems that Article 2 of the Framework Decision does not require Member States to
ensure that a significant part of the dissemination of messages through the Internet
encouraging the commission of terrorist offences, either accessible to anyone (i.e. website),
restricted (i.e. chat forum) or addressed to pre-selected candidates for recruitment is made
punishable.
Article 2 includes the requirement of contributing to the criminal activities of a terrorist
group.. In this sense, it could be defended that messages accessible to anyone, restricted to
members of a chat-forum or addressed to potential recruits fall out of the scope of Article 2.
Concerning messages aimed at fund-raising or recruitment for a terrorist group, they seem to
meet such requirement. However, these messages would actually constitute an attempt of
fund-raising and recruitment and the criminalisation of attempt under Article 4 does not cover
the attempt to commit offences related to terrorist groups.
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4. It seems that Article 2 of the Framework Decision does not require Member States to
ensure that a significant part of the dissemination of messages through the Internet providing
for terrorist expertise, either accessible to anyone (i.e. website), restricted (i.e. chat forum) or
addressed to pre-selected candidates for recruitment is made punishable, save in exceptional
cases.
Once again, since Article 2 includes the requirement of contributing to the criminal activities
of a terrorist group, it could be argued that the dissemination of terrorist expertise is not
covered by Article 2 insofar as the recipients are undetermined (i.e. messages accessible to
anyone or disseminated in a chat forum) or potential recruits.
6. Seventeen Member States that replied to the questionnaire have got or are adopting
provisions addressing direct invitations to commit a specific terrorist offence through
messages accessible to anyone (i.e. website), restricted (i.e. chat forum) and addressed to pre-
selected candidates for recruitment.
Seventeen out of the eighteen Member States that answered the questionnaire have got or are
adopting provisions addressing direct invitations to commit a specific terrorist offence under
offences of "provocation", "instigation", "public incitement" etc. Additionally, eight Member
States have got or will have provisions explicitly condemning glorification or approval of
terrorist offences (and often of other crimes). Two Member States deal specifically with the
denigration or humiliation of the victims. Two also refer to apology of terrorism or crime
apology.
7. Nine Member States that replied to the questionnaire have got or are adopting provisions
that explicitly cover the transmission of terrorism expertise which are applicable to either
messages accessible to anyone (i.e. website), restricted (i.e. chat forum) or addressed to pre-
selected candidates for recruitment.
8. Generally speaking, national provisions of Member States, although not harmonised,
substantially cover the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and in some cases also terrorist
expertise while the Framework Decision on combating terrorism stays behind. Furthermore,
the European instrument already appears to be out-dated in the international context, where
the Council of Europe39 and the United Nations40 have set the basis for further reaching
national legislation.
Therefore, the analysis included in Annex IV leads to the conclusion that EU legislation does
not fully cover the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise - most
Member States currently provide only for non-harmonised and partial legal solutions. In
particular, the Framework Decision on combating terrorism does not require Member States
39 See the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, mentioned above.
40 The Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations "Uniting against terrorism:
recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy", interprets Security Council Resolution 1624
(2005) as providing for a basis for the criminalization of incitement to terrorist acts and recruitment,
including through the Internet.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 41 – Drucksache 16/7769
to ensure that the dissemination of messages containing terrorist propaganda or providing for
terrorist expertise is made punishable save in exceptional cases.
Concerning national legislation, as explained above, seventeen Member States (out of
eighteen that answered the questionnaire) currently provide for or are adopting legal solutions
to tackle the dissemination of messages encouraging the commission of terrorist offences.
Nevertheless, very different concepts are used, including "provocation", "instigation", "public
incitement", "glorification", "approval" or "apology" and "denigration of the victims", which
results in lack of clarity and sometimes obviously different scopes. In particular, it seems that
in many cases indirect provocation is not covered. In consequence, the dissemination of
messages encouraging persons to join a terrorist movement or to become a terrorist, without
reference to a specific terrorist offence risks to remain unpunished. Concerning the
dissemination of terrorist expertise, nine Member States (out of the eighteen that answered the
questionnaire) have got or are adopting rules that can cover the dissemination of messages
containing terrorist expertise. It follows that there is a security gap to be addressed and that
harmonisation is required.
Lack of harmonisation and insufficient legislation in many Member States hinders
prosecutions within the national territory as well as police and judicial co-operation with other
Member States where the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise have
been made punishable. In this sense, Europol notes that the number of investigations into
terrorist propaganda seems small compared to the amount of the propaganda circulating on
the Internet41. It indicates that one of the reasons is the lack of legislation allowing for arrests
or investigations42. Similarly Eurojust states that, in order to be able to fight adequately the
use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, proper legislation would need to be enforced so that
law enforcement authorities working on such cases are not hindered by a lack of legal
provisions. This body notes that outlawing Internet websites supporting or displaying terrorist
views would already be a good step forward43.
This situation is expected to improve, since the signature and ratification of the Council of
Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism by a large number of Member States will
address the problems of lack of harmonisation and legal loopholes identified at national level
to a large extent. It will constitute a significant improvement in terms of security allowing law
enforcement authorities to investigate the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist
expertise throughout the European Union and hold terrorist activists and supporters behind
such dissemination liable for public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for
terrorism and training for terrorism44. However, it does not appear as the optimal solution to
the problem because of several reasons.
First of all, given the urgency of the problem, it would not be appropriate to wait for the
process of signature and ratification by all Member States – as mentioned above two Member
States have not even signed the Council of Europe Convention. Experience shows that
ratification processes are usually lengthy and often extend over long periods of time.
Secondly, framework decisions present important advantages vis-à-vis international
conventions and treaties, namely the obligation of Member States to notify the
41 See Europol's report TE-SAT 2007, referred to above in footnote 3, p. 21.
42
See Europol's report TE-SAT 2007, referred to above in footnote 3, p. 21.
43 See Annex III.
44 See Section 5.1.1, security impact of option 1.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 42 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
implementation measures adopted, the elaboration of an evaluation report on the correct and
full implementation of Member States by the Commission, which is later assessed by the
Council, and the fact that the European Court of Justice is entitled to deliver preliminary
rulings45.
In addition, if the new offences introduced by the Council of Europe Convention remain
outside the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, such offences remain outside the
benefits achieved through all prior harmonisation in the field of the fight against terrorism.
This includes rules on penalties and jurisdiction as well as the automatic application of the
European Arrest Warrant and other instruments linked to the Framework Decision on
combating terrorism46. Given the importance of the phenomenon and the commitment of the
European Union to the fight against terrorism, the EU arsenal of counter-terrorism measures
should clearly also be applicable to public provocation to commit terrorist offences,
recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism.
Moreover, it would create illogical discrepancies where, for example, producing a counterfeit
passport to contribute to a terrorist plot would come under all EU harmonisation on counter-
terrorism but not recruiting or training through the Internet, encouraging the commission of
terrorist offences and even arranging the entrance of new recruits in a training camp.
Similarly, those stealing sensitive data on public infrastructure in preparation of a terrorist
attack that others plan to commit are now covered by the regime of the Framework Decision.
However, those distributing the very same information through the Internet, and even
accompanying it with instructions on how to perpetrate the attack, would not be covered by
the Framework Decision.
Finally, the nature of the problem requires international co-operation and co-operation with
internet service providers. The insufficiency of EU legislation incriminating the dissemination
of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise leaves the European Union in a weak position to
request their assistance. Once again, given the commitment of the European Union to the fight
against terrorism, the European Union should not loose an opportunity to strengthen its
position to seek the required co-operation with third countries and private sector (see section
5.5.1 security impact of section 5).
2.1.2.2. Non criminal law
Concerning EC instruments, the analysis included in Annex IV examines the Television
without frontiers Directive, the Directive on electronic commerce and the Data retention
Directive.
The conclusions of this analysis with respect to non-criminal law are the following:
1. The Television without frontiers Directive does not currently apply to the Internet and after
its ongoing revision will only apply to a restricted portion of the content available on the
internet. In addition, it does not directly outlaw the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and
terrorist expertise but prohibits incitement to hatred. It follows that this instrument provides
for a rather limited solution to tackle the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist
expertise, especially through the Internet.
45 See section 5.5.1 security impact of option 5.
46 See section 5.5.1 security impact of option 5.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 43 – Drucksache 16/7769
2. The Directive on electronic commerce allows law enforcement authorities to request
internet service providers to remove from or disable access to a website. However, its
application requires that the dissemination of terrorist propaganda or terrorist expertise is
outlawed. In many Member States the dissemination of terrorist propaganda or terrorist
expertise is not fully incriminated or forbidden, excluding the use of the co-operation
channels foreseen under the e-commerce Directive.
3. The Data retention Directive allows law enforcement authorities to request to internet
service providers the location and traffic data. Nevertheless, the data retention Directive only
applies regarding serious crimes. It follows that the complete or partial lack of incrimination
by many Member States excludes the request of data to service providers under the Data
retention Directive.
Therefore, the analysis leads to the conclusion that the relevant EC legislation either will only
very partially cover the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise
(Television without frontiers Directive) or requires that the behaviour is previously outlawed
or made punishable in order to be applicable (Directive on electronic commerce and Data
retention Directive respectively). As regards the two last instruments, the absence of relevant
criminal law fully covering the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise in
many Member States referred to above plays an important role, limiting the use of such
instruments.
Additionally, it should be noted that the investigation of the dissemination of terrorist
propaganda and terrorist expertise and the prosecution of the terrorist activists and supporters
behind it is currently impossible under all three instruments.
2.1.3. Practical difficulties of law enforcement authorities facing increasing dissemination
of terrorist expertise and terrorist propaganda
Law enforcement authorities are currently in a difficult position to contain the spiral of violent
radicalisation and ease of terrorist attacks deriving from the dissemination of terrorist
propaganda and terrorist expertise, especially through the Internet. The difficulty does not
only derives from the insufficient legislation referred to above, but also from practical
difficulties such as the lack of capacities and expertise as well as the nature of the Internet
itself: its extra-territoriality together with the anonymity it provides greatly complicates the
investigation and prosecution of those using the web as a means to disseminate propaganda
aiming at mobilisation and recruitment for terrorism, as well as to transmit bomb-making and
other terrorist expertise.
2.1.3.1. Lack of law enforcement authorities' capacities and expertise
The volume and number or languages of the messages disseminating terrorist propaganda and
terrorist expertise is huge. Law enforcement authorities and other services involved in the
fight against terrorism (hereafter law enforcement authorities) lack of capacity and expertise:
processing and interpreting the websites in question is an enormous time-consuming and
Drucksache 16/7769 – 44 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
labour-intensive process, because of the quantity of the material47 and the languages48 in
which the documents have been established.
2.1.3.2. The nature of the Internet itself
Concerning the difficulties stemming from the nature of the Internet itself, Europol notes that
law enforcement agencies have difficulties in identifying individuals who spread Islamist
terrorist propaganda on the Internet49. The virtual nature of the Internet knows no boundaries
and together with its anonymity complicates the identification of those responsible of a
website and its contents50. Besides high technical skills, assistance from internet service
providers is often required to achieve the desired identification. However, it is extremely
likely that the internet service providers whose assistance is needed are outside the Member
State that carries out the investigation. Furthermore, in many cases they will be based outside
the European Union. As regards the removal of the sites in question, the problem of extra-
territoriality is equally present, since most of the websites containing terrorist propaganda and
terrorist expertise are hosted by internet service providers based in third countries. In addition,
the issue of the speedy re-apparition of websites that have been closed down must be
considered: when a website is successfully removed from a host server, it reappears very
easily under another name. It can also reappear outside the jurisdiction of the European
Union, in order to avoid the eventuality of being closed down once more.
The success of both kinds of requests – obtaining data to identify the one responsible for the
website and its contents or closing down the website itself - depends on the legislation in the
State where the internet service provider is based, as well as on existing co-operation
agreements between the requesting and the requested States. Currently, insufficient legislation
in many Member States means that such co-operation is not even guaranteed within the
European Union. Successful co-operation with third countries appears even more uncertain.
Europol states that, considering that a wide range of terrorism related websites fall outside the
jurisdiction of Member States, there is a need for a common European Union approach
towards foreign States which, knowingly or not, are harbouring terrorism-related websites, in
order to make them adopt or change their legislation51. However, such EU approach requires
previous legal measures outlawing the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist
expertise in all Member States.
This dimension of the problem, including technical difficulties and international co-operation
issues is however not specific to the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes but shared by all
content-related crimes. The Communication "Towards a general policy on the fight against
cyber crime" has addressed this issue when referring to illegal content in a general sense52.
2.2. Who is affected, in what ways, and to what extent?
Firstly, terrorists: characteristics of the Internet such as ease of access, global reach, speed,
lack of regulation, dynamicity and interactivity, individual control, anonymity and reduced
47 As explained in footnote 24, reports and studies coincide in the quick multiplication of these websites,
estimating that nowadays there are over 5 000 of them.
48 These include many non European languages.
49 See Europol's report TE-SAT 2007, referred to above in footnote 3, p. 21.
50
See Annexes II and III.
51 See Annex III.
52 Communication referred to above in footnote 19, pp. 3 and 10.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 45 – Drucksache 16/7769
transaction costs, make of it a key tool for terrorists. It allows for spreading violent
radicalisation and easing terrorist attacks at very low cost and risk. The Internet has therefore
empowered terrorists.
Potential and current sympathisers are also affected: selected as potential recruits or financers
through the Internet, they become the target of messages aiming at recruitment or fund-
raising. Therefore, they are more easily accessible for recruiters that can multiply the number
of targets, the frequency of contacts, and the volume of information supplied at very low cost
and risk. Exposure of sympathisers to specifically targeted propaganda increases therefore the
chances that more sympathisers become activists and supporters.
Citizens are generally concerned: since the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes
contributes to fuel violent radicalisation and makes terrorist attacks easier, the dissemination
of these contents through the Internet increases the terrorist threat and hinders security.
Internet service providers since their services are abused: internet service providers cannot
monitor all information they host or give access to, because of its volume. Terrorist activists
and supporters benefit from this circumstance and use the Internet to disseminate terrorist
propaganda and recruitment without internet service providers noticing.
Finally, law enforcement authorities are logically affected: first of all, as explained above,
they are in a difficult position to contain the spiral of violent radicalisation and easier
preparation of terrorist attacks deriving from the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and
terrorist expertise, especially through the Internet53. Secondly, because the resulting stronger
and wider platform of activists and supporters amounts to a growing terrorist threat, which
directly concerns law enforcement authorities in their task of preventing crimes and protecting
citizens.
2.3. How would the problem evolve, all things being equal?
As hinted at above, the fast growing number of users will make the Internet in the future even
a more vital infrastructure in modern society than it is today. Therefore, the importance of the
online dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise can only be expected to
increase and, with it, the role of the Internet as a key instrument to fuel violent radicalisation
and make terrorist attacks easier. Terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise will reach an
even larger audience which will easily access messages providing for encouragement,
justifications and expertise to perform a terrorist attack. The number of both supporters and
activists is in consequence expected to rise, creating a stronger and wider platform which will
amount to a growing terrorist threat. Helped by the Internet, terrorists will become even more
de-centralised, be able to communicate and operate faster and become even more difficult to
trace.
2.4. Does the EU have the power to act?
Given the scope and magnitude of the terrorist threat posed by the proliferation of the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda as well as terrorist expertise through the Internet, a need
to tackle this threat persists and is growing. Radicalisation, recruitment and training connected
53 For more detailed information on the difficulties of law enforcement authorities to cope the terrorist use
of the Internet, see Annex III.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 46 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
to the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise have a global dimension
and, in consequence, cannot be dealt with only at national level. The threat is international,
and so must be at least a part of the answer. It is beyond any doubt that the fight against
terrorism will continue to be most important at a national level, but there is a clear need to
extend the current complementary efforts at national and EU level to the new modus operandi
of terrorist groups referred to above.
The EU actions discussed in this impact assessment report will not go beyond what is required
and what is adding value at the EU-level. The fight against terrorism, including the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise through the Internet will also in
the future primarily be a responsibility of Member States, and the scale of EU intervention
will remain limited. However, the benefits of EU-level action in this field should not be
underestimated. Operational law enforcement work against cross-border criminal activities
would be considerably facilitated.. The intrinsic international and cross-border character of
dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise through the Internet is proof
enough that actions are needed both at international and at EU-level. This study will identify
the need for appropriate measures at EU level. This action shall be understood in the context
of both terrorist and cyber-crime EU policies, which require coordinated efforts of Member
States as well as co-operation at an international level in order to achieve their aims. It should
again be underlined that EU action in the field of dissemination of terrorist propaganda and
terrorist expertise especially through the Internet will only be a supplement to national and
other international policies. A reinforced EU coordination should mainly be regarded as a
limited but nevertheless very important contribution to the national and global actions against
terrorism and cyber crime.
The proportionality of the options analysed in this impact assessment will be carefully
assessed so that it becomes clear whether or not they go beyond what is necessary to achieve
the objectives described under section 3. The proportionality will be especially considered
concerning the respect of human rights, since this impact assessment addresses issues that are
on the borderline between the legitimate exercise of freedoms, such as freedom of expression,
association or religion, the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms, and criminality. Those
options which do not prove fully compliant with human rights and fundamental freedoms will
have to be rejected.
Proportionality is also an element to be taken into consideration regarding the costs that the
options assessed might entail for the private sector, in particular for internet service providers.
Any action imposing a disproportionate burden on the private sector will therefore be
discarded.
This report will assess, among other policy options, the adoption of a proposal for the revision
of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism. The legal basis for this action would be
the same as the legal basis for the adoption of the Framework Decision on combating
terrorism itself: Articles 29, 31 (1) (e) and 34 (2) (b) TUE.
3. SECTION 3: OBJECTIVES
General objective: Countering the increasing dissemination of terrorist propaganda and
terrorist expertise in particular through the Internet.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 47 – Drucksache 16/7769
Effective measures should be adopted in order to make the Internet a more hostile
environment for terrorists and reduce its contribution to mobilisation of terrorism supporters,
recruitment and training for terrorism. Since the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and
terrorist expertise, especially through the Internet, represents an increasingly important factor
contributing to fuelling violent radicalisation and assisting in the preparation of terrorist
attacks, adopting effective measures against such dissemination would contribute to prevent
the development of a stronger and wider platform of terrorist activists and supporters. Such
measures would therefore help to reduce the possibilities for radicalisation and recruitment as
well as the risk of terrorist attacks.
In order to meet this goal, two operational and more specific objectives should be achieved.
1. Strengthening the legal framework to fight the dissemination of terrorist propaganda
and terrorist expertise, especially through the Internet.
In order to contain the development of a stronger and wider platform of terrorist activists at
European Union level, modern terrorism and its new modus operandi must be fought by the
European Union with the same determination and strength as demonstrated in the fight against
traditional terrorism. Law enforcement authorities must be clearly allowed to investigate the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise, also through the Internet, and
prosecute the terrorist activists and supporters behind such dissemination throughout the
European Union. Furthermore, law enforcement authorities must benefit from all
harmonisation that has already been achieved in the fight against terrorism and use co-
operation instruments such as the European Arrest Warrant for these new forms of crime.
Therefore, the definition of terrorist offences, including offences linked to terrorist activities,
should be further approximated in all Member States so that the dissemination of terrorist
propaganda and terrorist expertise, also through the Internet, is punishable throughout the
European Union. This would also allow a common EU approach towards foreign States
whose co-operation may be crucial for the success of an investigation of cases of
dissemination of terrorist propaganda or terrorist expertise.
Law enforcement authorities should also be in a position to ask hosting providers based in the
European Union to disable access to relevant websites, within the limits set out in the
Directive on electronic commerce and according to national provisions implementing this
instrument. However, this is only a desirable objective in those cases where disabling access
to a relevant website does not interfere nor conflict with monitoring and investigation
purposes..
Furthermore, in the long term, and from a general perspective, the messages disseminating
terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise through the Internet would be included in the
global strategy of the EU to fight illegal content, including the dialogue and co-operation with
third countries which, knowingly or not, are harbouring terrorism-related websites.
2. Enhancing the capacities and expertise of law enforcement authorities to counter the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise, especially through the
Internet.
Law enforcement authorities should be conveniently trained, sufficiently equipped and
supported by experts both on languages and IT, in order to detect and analyse violent radical
content on the Internet. Pro-active policing of such content on the Internet may provide for
Drucksache 16/7769 – 48 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
key information in order to understand terrorist trends, anticipate terrorist actions and prevent
attacks. Efficient detection and analysis may also provide for crucial data contributing to
successful investigations and prosecutions. In this sense, law enforcement authorities should
be equally trained, equipped and supported to trace and identify the individuals behind the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise. They should be able to request
traffic and location data from telecommunication operators within the limits set out by the
Directive on data retention and in accordance with the national provisions implementing this
instrument.
The importance of the data that may be obtained through monitoring and analysis of violent
radical content on the Internet, either as pro-active policing or deriving from the investigation
of a specific case, makes the disablement of access to websites a secondary objective. As
explained above, disabling access to a relevant website is only a desirable objective when it
does not interfere or conflict with monitoring or investigating purposes.
Such interference or conflict should be considered on a case by case basis. The decision
implies weighing the benefits from closing down a website in terms of prevention of
radicalisation and avoiding the risk of availability of certain information (i.e. the
vulnerabilities of eventual targets of terrorist attacks) and the drawbacks of both giving up an
information channel and alerting the terrorist activists and supporters behind the relevant
contents.
4. SECTION 4: POLICY OPTIONS
4.1. Option 1: No policy change
This option implies that no new legislative or other measures will be adopted, neither aiming
at adopting a new instrument nor amending an existing one. However, in the no policy change
scenario, it is necessary to take into consideration the Council of Europe Convention on the
prevention of terrorism of 2005, which recently entered into force. Under this instrument,
parties must adopt the necessary measures to establish public provocation to commit a
terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism, when committed
unlawful and intentionally, as criminal offences under their domestic law, irrespective of the
actual commission of a terrorist offence. Therefore, the Council of Europe Convention on the
prevention of terrorism provides for a harmonised legal basis to fight the use of the Internet as
a means for public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for terrorism and
training for terrorism including through the Internet, overcoming the obstacles identified in
the relevant provisions of the Framework Decision to cover these forms of behaviour. It will
lead to the harmonisation of Member States' legislation provided that all of them sign and
ratify the Convention. It follows that, even if no measure is taken at EU level, a co-ordinated
response to the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise by Member States
would be possible.
In particular, the relevant provisions, Articles 5 to 8 of the Convention, read as follows:
"Article 5 – Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence
1. For the purposes of this Convention, "public provocation to commit a terrorist
offence" means the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the
public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 49 – Drucksache 16/7769
conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that
one or more such offences may be committed.
2. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish public
provocation to commit a terrorist offence, as defined in paragraph 1, when
committed unlawfully and intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law.
Article 6 – Recruitment for terrorism
1. For the purposes of this Convention, "recruitment for terrorism" means to solicit
another person to commit or participate in the commission of a terrorist offence, or to
join an association or group, for the purpose of contributing to the commission of one
or more terrorist offences by the association or the group.
2. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish recruitment
for terrorism, as defined in paragraph 1, when committed unlawfully and
intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law.
Article 7 – Training for terrorism
1. For the purposes of this Convention, "training for terrorism" means to provide
instruction in the making or use of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious
or hazardous substances, or in other specific methods or techniques, for the purpose
of carrying out or contributing to the commission of a terrorist offence, knowing that
the skills provided are intended to be used for this purpose.
2. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish training for
terrorism, as defined in paragraph 1, when committed unlawfully and intentionally,
as a criminal offence under its domestic law.
Article 8 – Irrelevance of the commission of a terrorist offence
For an act to constitute an offence as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention, it shall not
be necessary that a terrorist offence be actually committed."
Although these provisions do not explicitly refer to the commission of such offences via the
Internet, they are in fact applicable irrespective of whether they are committed over the
internet or not, as the explanatory report to the Convention clarifies. These provisions
therefore cover the issues of dissemination of terrorist propaganda aiming at mobilisation,
recruitment or fund-rising as well terrorism expertise through the Internet.
Moreover, Article 9 (2) of the Convention clarifies that attempting to recruit or train must also
be made punishable. Finally, recruitment is widely defined: soliciting another person to
commit or participate in the commission of a terrorist offence constitutes recruitment even if
the person is not asked to join a group or association.
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4.2. Option 2: Forbidding internet services providers to give access to material
aiming at public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment or
training for terrorism
This option implies the introduction of a new legislative instrument specifically addressed to
internet service providers or the amendment of the existing provisions. It intends that internet
service providers based in Europe apply systematically blocking techniques in order to
prevent internet users from accessing material aiming at public provocation to commit
terrorist offences, recruitment or training for terrorism. This material should be kept outside
EU cyber-space.
Existent technical methods to implement such obligation include dynamic filtering or black
lists systems based on IP, DNS or URL filtering.
Dynamic filtering: "this is a system in which software examines incoming Internet content
and determines whether to permit the Internet user access the content based on how closely
that content conforms to a set of censorship criteria"54.
Black lists systems: these are systems in which Internet users are impeded access to
prohibited websites contained in a black-list, previously created by individuals, through
different technical solutions:
(a) IP filtering or packet dropping systems: "they are conceptually very simple.
Packets destined for the IP addresses of the websites to be blocked are
discarded and hence no connection can be made to the servers. The main
problem with packet dropping is the collateral damage that it causes because all
of the web content on the particular IP address will become inaccessible. This
can be very significant"55.
(b) DNS filtering or DNS poisoning systems: "they work by arranging that DNS
lookups for the hostnames of blocked sites will fail to return the correct IP
address. This solution also suffers from overblocking in that no content within
the blocked domain remains available. However, the over-blocking differs
from that of IP filtering in that it does not extend to blocking other domains
that are hosted on the same machine. There is also some "under-blocking" in
that a URL containing an IP address, rather than a hostname, would not be
affected; because a browser would simply use the IP address and would not
consult the DNS at all"56.
(c) URL filtering or content filtering systems: "they will not only block entire
websites but can also be used to block very specific items, such as a particular
web page or even a single image. They determine that the URL being accessed
is one of those to be blocked and then ensure that the corresponding content is
not made available. This type of system is extremely accurate in blocking
54 See "Countering Militant Islamist radicalisation on the Internet: a user driven strategy to recover the
web", Institute of European Affairs 2007, referred to above, in footnote 6, p. 91.
55 See "Failures in a Hybrid Content Blocking System", by Richard Clayton,
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/cleanfeed.pdf
56 See "Failures in a Hybrid Content Blocking System", by Richard Clayton, mentioned above, footnote
70.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 51 – Drucksache 16/7769
exactly what is on the list of URLs, no more, no less, and hence there should be
no overblocking (provided, of course, that the list of URLs was correct in the
first place). Quite clearly, web proxies are ineffective at blocking content if
their usage is optional. Hence it must be arranged that all customer traffic
passes through the proxy, leading to a considerable expense in providing
equipment that can handle the load. Also, to prevent a single point of failure,
the equipment must be replicated, which considerably increases the cost. The
bottom line for most ISPs considering blocking systems is that although
content filtering is the most precise method, it is also far more expensive than
the alternatives"57.
Encouraging blocking through the industry's self-regulation or through agreements with
industry, without the previous adoption of legal measures outlawing the dissemination of
terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise has been ruled out. The adoption of blocking
measures necessarily implies a restriction of human rights, in particular the freedom of
expression and therefore, it can only be imposed by law, subject to the principle of
proportionality, with respect to the legitimate aims pursued and to their necessity in a
democratic society, excluding any form of arbitrariness or discriminatory or racist treatment.
This is also the approach of the Communication on cyber-crime which foresees the
development of EU-level voluntary agreements and conventions between public authorities
and private operators as regards illegal content, but not harmful content.
Adopting legal measures obliging internet service providers to remove or disable access to the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda or terrorist expertise they host has also been ruled out.
As explained under Section 2.1.3 b, the issue of the speedy re-apparition of websites that have
been closed down must be considered: when a website is successfully removed from a host
server, it reappears very easily under another name. It can also reappear outside the
jurisdiction of the European Union, in order to avoid the eventuality of being closed down
once more. Therefore, the removal or disablement of access to terrorist propaganda or terrorist
expertise by internet service providers hosting such information, without the possibility to
open an investigation and prosecute the one responsible behind such content, appears
inefficient.
4.3. Option 3: Enhancing law enforcement authorities' capacities and expertise to
counter the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes
This option does not require the adoption of a legislative instrument but the Commission's
financial support, which should be foreseen in the annual work programmes implementing the
Council Decision of 12 February 2007 establishing for the period 2007 to 2013, as part of
General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties, the Specific Programme
Prevention of and Fight against Crime.
The Commission's support could include the co-financing of different projects aiming at:
� stimulating the co-operation between academic experts and law enforcement
authorities to provide these with the expertise they lack;
57 See "Failures in a Hybrid Content Blocking System", by Richard Clayton, mentioned above, footnote
70.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 52 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
� enhancing co-operation between Member States to develop and exchange efficient
methods of monitoring the internet for radical violent content, and
� strengthening specific training required for law enforcement authorities and others
involving in countering the terrorist use of the internet.
It could also include the contract of studies on:
� non-legislative measures to prevent the distribution of violent radical content on
the Internet, including notice and take down procedures and co-operation between
NGOs and law enforcement authorities, and
� methodologies and adapted technological tools to efficiently detect violent radical
content on the Internet .
Option 3 would in this manner provide for practical measures to support law enforcement
authorities in the acquisition of further capacities and expertise to counter more efficiently the
use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.
Options 4 and 5: Ensuring that Member States explicitly incriminate the use of the Internet as
a means of public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for terrorism and
training for terrorism
Both options would ensure that Member States explicitly incriminate the use of the Internet as
a means of public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for terrorism and
training for terrorism.
4.4. Option 4: Urging Member States to sign and/or ratify the Council of Europe
Convention on the prevention of terrorism.
In this case, a political statement should be made urging Member States to sign and/or ratify
the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism. The incrimination of public
provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism
would not become EU law. Harmonisation would however be achieved through the signature
and ratification of the Convention.
It must be clarified that, under Articles 24 and 38 TEU, the European Union could have
acceded to the Convention if the Presidency, authorised by the Council and assisted by the
Commission, had negotiated on behalf of all Member States. However, this did not occur in
the case of the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism, and therefore,
the EU cannot presently sign and ratify the Convention - this can only be done by the Member
States individually.
4.5. Option 5: Revising the Framework Decision on combating terrorism in order to
introduce parallel offences to those foreseen under the Council of Europe
Convention
This option implies the introduction of an EU legislative instrument or the amendment of an
already existing one. Given the existence of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism
that already contains terrorist offences, offences related to terrorist groups and terrorist-linked
offences, it is preferable to amend this instrument rather than to introduce a new one. As for
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 53 – Drucksache 16/7769
the content of the amendment, it seems appropriate to opt for the level of incrimination of the
Council of Europe Convention of the prevention of terrorism. This reasoning also applies to
the formulation of the new offences. As explained above, the Convention tackles the new
modus operandi of terrorist, including the use of the Internet as a means for public
provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism.
It therefore overcomes the obstacles to cover the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and
terrorist expertise identified in the Framework Decision on combating terrorism. Additionally,
the Convention was elaborated bearing in mind the relevant case-law of the European Court
of Human Rights, so that human rights and especially the freedom of expression are duly
taken into account. Finally, it is advantageous to both the European Union and the Council of
Europe as institutions, but also particularly for their Member States, if there is a consistency
in approach between the two organisations. This sends a clear political message that the two
organisations work in the same direction. At a more practical level, it should be avoided that
Member States would need to implement in their national legislation two different
international legal instruments. This is especially important considering the fact that in many
Member States of the European Union ratification procedures related to the Council of Europe
Convention are currently underway.
Despite the existence of the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism, a
revision of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism so that it would also cover these
forms of behaviour would not amount to a mere formal change. It would entail significant
differences in terms of the application of harmonised rules on penalties and jurisdiction and
ensure the application of related EU instruments.
5. SECTION 5: IMPACTS
The impact of particular policy options on specific issues is measured below as a function of
the magnitude of the impact. The magnitude of each impact should be viewed as the level of
influence a particular policy option would have on specific issues falling within the security,
economic and human rights context.
Table of symbols (distinguishes "-" for costs and "+" for benefits
Small magnitude - / +
Medium magnitude -- / ++
Significant magnitude - - - / +++
No impact 0
5.1.1 Option 1: No policy change
As a preliminary clarification, it must be taken into account that the existence of the Council
of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism considerably mitigates or modifies the
impacts of non action at EU level. Had the Convention not existed, the effects resulting from
no policy change would have greatly differed from those exposed below.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 54 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
5.1.2. Security impact
As explained under section 1, all other things being equal, the fast growing number of users
will make the Internet in the future even more important in modern society than it is today.
Therefore, the importance of online terrorism could only be expected to increase and, with it,
the role of the Internet as a key instrument to fuel violent radicalisation and facilitate terrorist
attacks. Terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise would reach an even larger audience
which would easily access messages providing for encouragement, justifications and expertise
to perform a terrorist attack. The number of both supporters and activists within the territory
of the European Union is in consequence expected to rise.
Helped by the Internet, terrorists would become even more de-centralised, faster and more
difficult to trace. Law enforcement authorities would lack the appropriate legal instruments to
combat the new modus operandi of terrorists, who would exploit this security gap to their
advantage. Lack of legal basis or lack of harmonisation of national legislation and
consequently deficient international cooperation regarding the use of the Internet for terrorist
purposes would substantially hinder law enforcement authorities in their task of fighting
terrorism.
This worst case scenario will not however become true because the Council of Europe
Convention on the prevention of terrorism provides for a harmonised legal basis to fight the
use of the Internet as a means for public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment
for terrorism and training for terrorism. The harmonisation of Member States' legislation
would therefore be achieved if all of them sign and ratify the Convention, which is an
outcome that cannot be guaranteed. Although such harmonisation will not bring about the
same results as legislation at EU level58, it would certainly achieve some positive results and
contribute to counter the present successful spread of violent radicalisation through the
Internet.
In particular, those disseminating terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise would be held
liable for public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment or training for
terrorism throughout the EU. In addition, the incrimination of such behaviour in all Member
States, would amount to an increased co-operation of national law enforcement authorities
both with industry and law enforcement authorities in other Member States in the context of
criminal investigations. In particular, the use of the co-operation mechanisms foreseen under
the Directive on electronic commerce and the data retention Directive would be possible
concerning the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise in all Member
States. Law enforcement authorities could request traffic and location data in the context of
the investigation of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment or training
for terrorism as well as the disablement of access to terrorist propaganda or terrorist expertise
according to the national rules implementing, respectively, the Directive on data retention and
the Directive on electronic commerce It should be stressed that the regime set out under both
instruments remains unchanged. In particular, the liability regime foreseen under the Directive
on electronic commerce is fully respected.
The security impact of this instrument is mitigated by the existence or current elaboration of
provisions dealing with the dissemination of terrorist propaganda in seventeen out of the
58 See the added value of the revision of the Framework Decision in relation to the existing Council of
Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism. above, in section 4, option 5.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 55 – Drucksache 16/7769
eighteen Member States that answered the respective questionnaire (see Annex I). In addition,
provisions dealing with terrorist expertise are applicable in nine of those Member States.
Concerning the Member States' legislation applicable to terrorist propaganda, it is important
to stress that the scope of existing national provisions is usually narrower than public
provocation to commit a terrorist offence and recruitment for terrorism. In particular, while
direct provocation may be considered punishable in all those Member States that have legal
measures in place, indirect provocation, explicitly punishable under the Council of Europe
Convention, is not covered in many cases. This is a very important issue since the inclusion of
indirect provocation in the Convention constitutes a key step forward. It represents the results
of an ad hoc committee of the Council of Europe ("CODEXTER-apologie") and is in line
with existing case law of the ECHR59. This case law provides for some examples of cases
where indirect provocation (defending the ideology or supporting the views of a terrorist)
were not considered to be covered by the right to freedom of speech60. There is, therefore, a
security gap which the Convention can address.
� Magnitude of the impact on security: +
5.1.3. Economic impact:
Indirect economic impact on public authorities and tax-payers:
There are no direct costs identified. However, the ratification of the Convention on the
prevention of terrorism by Member States might involve indirect costs. The new harmonised
legislation to combat the terrorist threat would amount to an increased co-operation of
national law enforcement authorities both with industry and law enforcement authorities in
other Member States in the context of criminal investigations. This should lead to improved
results, which implies more successful investigations and more prosecutions than presently.
However, further cross-border co-operation and increased contacts with industry as well as
increased prosecutions involve an additional work-load.
The hypothesis of an additional work-load resulting from the signature and ratification of the
Council of Europe Convention of the prevention of terrorism by Member States is in line with
Europol's report TE-SAT 2007. The report states that the number of police investigations into
terrorist propaganda seems small compared with the amount of material circulating on the
Internet adding that this is partially explained by the lack of legal basis for arrests or
investigations using the Internet in this manner61.
If the increased activity of law enforcement authorities required the allocation of further
resources, tax-payers would not necessarily assume higher taxes: the budget allocated to law
enforcement and security may be increased at the expense of other State's policies.
� Magnitude of the impact on economy: -
Indirect economic impact for companies and consumers:
59 See explanatory report to the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism, mentioned
above, footnote 13.
60 See section 5.1.3, impact on human rights of option 1.
61 See the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007 of Europol, p. 21.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 56 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
No direct economic impact derives from the absence of legal measures at EU level. However,
the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism may indirectly lead to an
increased use of the co-operation mechanisms foreseen under the Directive on electronic
commerce and the data retention Directive. Further requests of removing material or
providing information by law enforcement authorities can easily result in additional work-
load for internet service providers.
It must be clarified, however, that the signature and ratification of the Convention on the
prevention of terrorism by all Member States would not create or impose any new co-
operation channel. Both the Directive on electronic commerce and the data retention directive
have already foreseen such collaboration. The inclusion of new offences under national law
would simply lead to an increased use of existing mechanisms of co-operation. But even if no
new co-operation channels are created, a rise in the number of investigations related to the
new offences would logically imply an additional work-load for internet service providers.
These would have to assume the resulting costs unless they were able to transfer them to
consumers or national authorities without seeing their sales figures reduced.
In particular, internet service providers are especially concerned with the costs deriving from
the co-operation mechanisms foreseen in the Data retention Directive. Data retention involves
the obligation of collection, storage and retrieval of certain traffic data. While internet service
providers must automatically collect and store the relevant data, retrieving only takes place in
case the data are requested by law enforcement authorities. The revision of the Framework
Decision on combating terrorism would therefore not imply any change to the collection and
storage of data. It would only affect the retrieval of data, in all likelihood increasing the
number of requests to internet service providers.
When the Data Retention Directive was under preparation, EuroISPA indicated that costs
associated with data retrieval would be very high, taking into account increased levels of data
retention for extended periods62.
However, the development, maintenance and staffing of data retrieval systems is already
required by the data retention Directive, and the option contemplated here would not change
that. More numerous retrieval requests under the new offences of public provocation,
recruitment and training would therefore simply imply further use of existing infrastructure.
Expected additional costs for internet service providers will with all probability be limited to
an increased work-load of staff assigned to these tasks. The work-load of attending to such
request is estimated at a maximum of four hours per request. This must be related to the
number of arrests of terrorist suspects in 2006 in the European Union (706) as well as the
number of internet service providers. In 1998, the estimations were that there were around
3,000 internet service providers in Western Europe alone. It should be assumed that many
arrests do not require requesting traffic or location data from providers and that some data can
lead to the arrest of more than one individual but also that some information obtained from
providers does not lead to any arrest. Under the assumption that there are currently at least
5,000 providers in the EU, the number of hours of work per year and internet service provider
that could be originated with the introduction of the three new offences which already exist in
some Member States, is not considerable.
62 Answer of EuroIspa to DG INFSO – DG JAI Consultation Document on Traffic Data Retention, 15
September 2004, http://www.euroispa.org/23.htm.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 57 – Drucksache 16/7769
As regards removing or disabling access to certain websites under the Directive on electronic
commerce, the same estimation – a maximum of four hours work per request - can be made,
including the notification to the website owner. Once again, the number of terrorist arrests and
the estimated number of internet service providers in the EU greatly reduces the impact of this
measure per individual service provider. Although the number of websites disseminating
terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise is relatively high, only a limited portion of these
are said to be hosted by internet service providers based in the EU63. Most importantly, most
investigations do not seek to close down the websites but to monitor them, since very valuable
information may be obtained64.
It should be kept in mind that, insofar as the impact on security of option 1 is mitigated by
existing legislation in Member States, the economic impact is also reduced. The number of
Member States already providing for some legal measures mentioned above should be taken
into consideration as indicators of the minimal estimated additional costs.
� Magnitude of the impact on economy: -
63 See the newsletter of the Department of Justice of the US attorney's office Northern District of Indiana,
of 28.7.2004, http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/anti-terrorism-advisory-council/atac-vol-07-04.pdf,
which states that the US hosts 76 percent of Islamist terrorist websites.
64 The coordinated monitoring of websites run by terrorist activists and supporters is the aim of the
German initiative Check the Web, that was launched in 2006 and has achieved the establishment of a
portal in Europol serving as a data base for this kind of sites and avoiding double working – concerning
all detection, translation and monitoring.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 58 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
5.1.4. Human rights impact:
Direct impact on freedom of expression
The new offences introduced by the Convention on the prevention of terrorism imply a direct
impact on the right to freedom of speech, especially the offence of public provocation to
commit terrorist offences. Nevertheless, the explanatory report to the Convention clarifies that
the Convention on the prevention of terrorism contains several provisions concerning the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, both in respect of internal and
international co-operation on the one hand and as an integral part of the new criminalisation
provisions (in the form of conditions and safeguards). Articles 12, "conditions and
safeguards" and 21 "discrimination clause" of the Convention are particularly important in
this respect. Namely, Article 12 (1) contains an explicit obligation of the Member States to
ensure that the establishment, implementation and application of the criminalisation for which
it provides are carried out while respecting human rights obligation, in particular the right to
freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of religion. It further specifies
that the establishment, implementation and application of the offences shall furthermore be
subject to the principle of proportionality, with respect to the legitimate aims pursued and to
their necessity in a democratic society while excluding any form of arbitrariness or
discriminatory or racist treatment. The protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
continues the explanatory report, is a crucial aspect of the Convention, given that it deals with
issues which are on the border between the legitimate exercise of freedoms, such as freedom
of expression, association or religion, and criminal behaviour.
Concerning public provocation to commit terrorist offences, it is indirect provocation which
raises more concerns65. However, paragraphs 86-105 of the explanatory report to the
Convention clearly stress the human rights compliant approach followed by the Council of
Europe in drafting the provision in question. These paragraphs recall that freedom of
expression is one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and applies, according
to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, not only to ideas and information
that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive but also to those that "offend, shock or
disturb". Nevertheless, it is noted that, in contrast to certain fundamental rights which are
absolute rights and therefore admit no restrictions, such as the prohibition of torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, interference with, or restrictions on freedom
of expression may be allowed in highly specific circumstances. Article 10, paragraph 2 of the
ECHR lays down the conditions under which restrictions on, or interference with, the exercise
of freedom of expression are admissible under the ECHR66, while Article 15 of the ECHR
provides for possible derogations in time of emergency. The explanatory report gives the
65 See, in particular, paragraph 97 of the Explanatory report to the Council of Europe Convention on
prevention of terrorism: "Direct provocation does not raise any particular problems in so far as it is
already a criminal offence, in one form or another, in most legal systems. The aim of making indirect
provocation a criminal offence is to remedy the existing lacunae in international law or action by adding
provisions in this area".
66 Article 10(2) of the ECHR states: "The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary".
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 59 – Drucksache 16/7769
example of incitement to racial hatred that cannot be considered admissible on the grounds of
the right to freedom of expression67. The same goes, it clarifies, for incitement to violent
terrorist offences and explains that the Court of Human Rights has already held that certain
restrictions on messages that might constitute an indirect incitement to violent terrorist
offences are in keeping with the ECHR.
Furthermore, the UN Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism highlighted the human rights compliant approach of the
Convention, stating that the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism,
which includes a provision calling on states to criminalize public provocation to commit a
terrorist offence, is "a sound response which would respect human rights". The Special
Rapporteur viewed favourably the Convention’s definition of "public provocation" since it
was based on a "double requirement of a subjective intent to incite (encourage) the
commission of terrorist offences and an objective danger that one or more such offences
would be committed"68.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the restrictions on freedom of speech and access to
information included in the Council of Europe Convention are in fact compliant with
international human rights norms. The restrictions imposed by the new offence of public
provocation to commit terrorist offences are covered by Article 10(2) of the ECHR.
The European Court of Human Rights provides for very interesting examples of cases where
it was found that interferences with freedom of expression in connection with the fight against
terrorism complied with Article 10 of the ECHR69. Furthermore, as explained above, such
case-law was taken into consideration for the introduction of the new offences, especially the
public provocation to commit a terrorist offence.
In the case Brind and others v. UK, for example, the British Government ordered the
applicants, a television producer and five other broadcast journalists, to refrain at all times
from sending any broadcast matter which consisted of or included statements expressing or
supporting the views of several terrorist groups. The European Commission of Human Rights
found, in the circumstances of the case and bearing in mind the margin of appreciation
permitted to States and the importance of measures to combat terrorism, that it could not be
said that this interference with the applicants' freedom of expression was disproportionate to
the aim sought to be pursued. Consequently the application was manifestly ill-founded and
therefore inadmissible.
In the case Hogefeld v. Germany, the applicant was a former member of the Red Army
Fraction (RAF), a left-wing extremist terrorist movement that had been responsible for
numerous attacks on high-ranking personalities in Germany since the early seventies. In 1993,
the applicant was arrested and detained on remand. Subsequently, German courts denied the
request of a radio journalist to allow an interview with the applicant because such an
interview would conflict with the purpose of the detention on remand, since it was to be
67 See Article 9, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
of 21 December 1965.
68 See paragraph 57 of the Report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to the Security Council on the
implementation of Resolution 1624 (2005) (document S/2006/737 of 15 September 2006).
69 See Collection of relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights related to "apologie du
terrorism" and "incitement to terrorism", Council of Europe, CODEXTER (2004) 19.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 60 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
expected, in respect of the declaration made by the applicant during the trial, that the applicant
would explain and advocate ideological positions of the RAF, which would amount to a new
act of participation in a terrorist organisation. The European Court of Human Rigths noted
that in assessing this limitation of the freedom of expression the applicant's personal history
had to be considered. As the applicant was most probably one of the main representatives of
an organisation which had waged a murderous war against the public order of the Federal
Republic of Germany for more than twenty years, the words of the applicant could possibly
be understood by supporters as an appeal to continue the activities of the RAF, even if they
did not directly incite violence. In consequence, it was concluded that there had been no
breach of Article 10 of the ECHR.
These two cases clearly show restrictions of freedom of expression stemming from the
incrimination of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, and how they nevertheless
comply with Article 10 of the ECHR. In two other cases the European Court of Human Rights
found, on the contrary, that Article 10 of the ECHR had not been respected70. These
judgements help to understand which restrictions of human rights would not be acceptable in
relation with the offence of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence.
In Sener v. Turkey, charges were brought under the Prevention of Terrorism Act against an
author of an article containing separatist propaganda. It was concluded that the subsequent
conviction constituted a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR because the article taken as a
whole did not glorify violence. Nor did it incite people to hatred, revenge, recrimination or
armed resistance.
Another relevant case is Castells v. Spain. Mr. Castells, a senator elected on the list of Herri
Batasuna, a political movement seeking the independence of the Basque Country71, was
convicted for having written an article published in a weekly magazine which contained
insults directed against the Spanish nation and its institutions. In the trial, he was denied the
opportunity to prove the truth of his allegations and his good faith, because it was held that,
lacking precision, it was impossible to demonstrate their truth. The European Court of Human
Rights attached decisive importance to the fact that Mr. Castells was a political representative
of the opposition party, criticising the Government, and to the alleged inadmissibility of
evidence on behalf of the applicant, and ruled that in sum there had been a violation of Article
10 of the ECHR.
� Magnitude of the impact on freedom of expression : -
It should be clarified that the Convention does not imply an impact on the right to privacy and
data protection. Existing rules on the right to privacy and data protection at both EU and
national level remain unchanged. It is true that law enforcement authorities may request
traffic and location data from internet service providers in order to trace terrorist activists and
supporters behind the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise. However,
these requests will have to be submitted and dealt with under the regime established in the
existing Directive on data retention and in accordance with the national rules implementing
70 See Collection of relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights related to "apologie du
terrorism" and "incitement to terrorism", mentioned above, footnote 87.
71
It should be noted that the decision of the ECHR dates from 24 April 1992. Herri Batasuna was
declared illegal on 27 March 2003 by the Spanish Supreme Court for its support to the terrorist group
ETA.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 61 – Drucksache 16/7769
this instrument. Therefore, the signature and ratification of the Convention does not entail any
modification of such regime nor, therefore, an impact on the right to privacy and data
protection.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 62 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Indirect impact on right to life and to integrity
Moreover, the explanatory report of the Convention also states that the human rights that must
be respected are not only the rights of those accused or convicted of terrorist offences, but
also the rights of the victims, or potential victims, of those offences. The incrimination of
public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for terrorism and training for
terrorism has as final aim the protection of human rights of potential victims, in particular the
right to life and the right to physical and mental integrity. In fact, such protection concerns all
citizens, since experience shows that anyone is a potential victim. From this point of view, the
Convention has a positive, although indirect impact on human rights that should also be taken
into consideration. The magnitude of such impact logically corresponds to the level of
increased security achieved by the Convention.
� Magnitude of the impact on right to life and to integrity: +
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 63 – Drucksache 16/7769
5.2. Option 2: Forbidding internet service providers to give access to material
aiming at public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment or
training for terrorism
5.2.1. Security impact
Option 2 aims at keeping messages provoking people to commit terrorist offences, recruiting
for terrorism and training for terrorism outside EU cyberspace. It should be clarified however
that impeding completely that a certain kind of content is accessible to the public through the
Internet is technically unfeasible. Existing technical methods of filtering (dynamic filtering or
black lists systems based on IP, DNS or URL filtering) do not constitute a perfectly solid
barrier.
First of all, existing methods of filtering can be circumvented72. Moreover, such systems have
been designed specifically for web access. They do not function appropriately for most other
Internet services and cannot be applied to “peer-to-peer” technologies. Information-sharing
using encryption tools, for example, cannot be blocked or usefully intercepted by internet
service providers73.
In addition to these weaknesses, methods based on a black list suffer from the inevitable
incompleteness of the list. Given the volume of the material circulating through the Internet,
as well as the speedy edition of new material and re-edition of material in new websites, a
black list is bound to be seriously incomplete and out-dated. Therefore, the efficiency of
filtering is limited by the incompleteness of the black-list in the first place.
But dynamic blocking also presents initial imperfections. "It is based on an automated form of
censorship, bypassing a black list created by humans and using instead a set of criteria of
characteristics of the kind of material that should be censored"74. Pre-fixed criteria will not be
able to cover all cases of contents that should be blocked. There will necessarily be some
materials that do not meet the set of criteria and still aim at provoking to commit terrorist
offences, recruitment for terrorism or training for terrorism.
In consequence, if filtering methods were to be applied, terrorist propaganda and terrorist
expertise would still be accessible from the European Union for those seeking for the
prohibited contents and having some Internet literacy. The dissemination of such content
would only be hindered but not eliminated. It is questionable whether such additional
difficulties would be a true deterrent for those determined to access violent radical contents or
72 Authors do not agree on the ease of the circumvention and while some argue that filtering methods are
easily circumvented, others state that most circumvention techniques are technically complex or
burdensome to the user or need the cooperation of a third party. See "Government mandated blocking of
foreign Web content", by Maximillian Dornseif, http://md.hudora.de/publications/200306-gi-
blocking/200306-gi-blocking.pdf. However, all seem to agree on the feasibility of circumventing
filtering methods. In this sense, Klaus Langefeld, technical expert of EuroIspa, states that "blocking or
removing anything but the source is an illusion and will not be effective". See "Investigating Internet
traffic", p. 16, http://www.euroispa.org/23.htm.
73 Response of EuroISPA, the European Association of internet service providers to the second
questionnaire issued by the Commission in view of the elaboration of the impact assessment on the
revision of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism.
74 See "Countering Militant Islamist radicalisation on the Internet: a user driven strategy to recover the
web", Institute of European Affairs 2007, referred to above, in footnote 6, p. 91.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 64 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
would only prevent the access of those that would come across the material accidentally or
consult it out of curiosity. Furthermore, it should be considered that the access of one
individual is enough to record audio or video files or copy documents containing terrorist
propaganda or terrorist expertise that may be later easily distributed through mailing lists or
other electronic means.
In conclusion, the role of the Internet as a means to fuel violent radicalisation and facilitate
terrorist attacks would not disappear. In addition, as explained above, authors of messages
aiming at provoking others to commit terrorist offences, recruiting for terrorism and training
for terrorism could not be prosecuted. This represents an important weakness from the point
of view of security.
� Magnitude of the impact on security: +
5.2.2. Economic impact
Indirect economic impact on public authorities and tax-payers:
It would be similar to the one described above under option 1.
Direct economic impact on internet service providers and consumers
In this case, there would be a direct economic impact on internet service providers, deriving
from the costs of filtering technology. The level of costs differs, however, from one method to
another. "Filtering access to specific IPs is comparatively cheap because the "router"
machines that internet service providers use to provide access to the Internet to their
customers have built-in blocking capabilities. Unlike other web filtering technologies, no
further equipment is necessary"75. By contrast, URL filtering would be extremely expensive:
"comparing all URLs flowing through an internet service provider's network with a list of
URLs to be blocked is "expensive" in the computational sense – it requires a significant
amount of computing power. Performing these computations would slow down the switches
(the hardware that bridges different parts of computer networks together) and routers
substantially, decreasing the overall capacity of the network and degrading the speed of
Internet access provided to customers. Internet service providers would be required to
purchase additional switches and routers to maintain the network’s prior level of traffic"76.
Costs resulting from DNS and dynamic filtering would be in between. The former "can also
be difficult for some Internet service providers to manage, depending on the configuration of
their systems"77. In the case of the later, "internet service providers may have to purchase
additional hardware to allow for the computationally expensive inspection of incoming traffic
by the filtering software, although some internet service providers already offer this service as
an option to their clients"78.
75 See "Countering Militant Islamist radicalisation on the Internet: a user driven strategy to recover the
web", Institute of European Affairs 2007, referred to above, in footnote 6, p. 89.
76 See "Countering Militant Islamist radicalisation on the Internet: a user driven strategy to recover the
web", Institute of European Affairs 2007, referred to above, in footnote 6, p. 92.
77 See "Countering Militant Islamist radicalisation on the Internet: a user driven strategy to recover the
web", Institute of European Affairs 2007, referred to above, in footnote 6, p. 90.
78 See "Countering Militant Islamist radicalisation on the Internet: a user driven strategy to recover the
web", Institute of European Affairs 2007, referred to above, in footnote 6, p. 91.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 65 – Drucksache 16/7769
Internet service providers would suffer an economic impact unless they are able to transfer the
total of the incurred costs to consumers without seeing their sales figures reduced.
Indirect impact on internet service providers and consumers
In addition to the costs mentioned before, incorrect blocking of legitimate material represents
an economic impact. Collateral blocking may have serious legal and economic implications.
Blocking users from accessing commercial websites may cause important losses to the
companies selling or providing services through the Internet as well as to their clients.
Furthermore, consequences of interrupting the advertising which finances most websites must
be taken into account. Therefore, although in terms of initial investment it is considered a
relatively cheap system, IP filtering might end up being the most expensive. Although not to
the extreme of IP filtering, DNS poisoning is also prone to over-blocking. URL filtering,
which is so expensive in terms of initial investment, is by contrast much more precise and less
likely to cause collateral blocking. In this sense, URL filtering may end up being not such an
expensive system. As for dynamic blocking, since it automates censorship, bypassing a black
list created by humans and using instead a set of criteria of characteristics of the kind of
material that should be censored, there is an obvious risk that legitimate contents fulfil the
predetermined criteria and are consequently blocked.
It should be noted that the most of the direct costs of URL filtering and indirect costs of IP
filtering referred to above can be overcome by URL hybrid filtering. This method combines
the best of both IP and URL techniques: it is considered as precise as pure URL filtering and
yet considerably cheaper, because filtering based on URL is only applied to pre-selection of
websites based on IP filtering.
The economic costs analysed so far may be summarized as follows:
Economic costs for
ISPs
Direct costs Indirect costs Global assessment of
costs
IP filtering - --- --
URL filtering --- 0 --
URL hybrid filtering - 0 -
DNS filtering -- -- --
Dynamic filtering -- - -/--
The costs deriving from imposing any of these filtering methods to all internet service
providers based in the EU is impossible to calculate. EuroISPA, the world's largest
association of Internet Service Providers, representing approximately 1,000 internet service
providers across the EU, considers it unfeasible to provide for any figure, arguing that there
are so many variables in the composition of systems that might be used for blocking, that it is
Drucksache 16/7769 – 66 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
not possible to give general figures. Johnny Ryan79 confirms this statement detailing the
factors that make a general estimation of costs impossible, in particular:
1. The different sizes of networks operated by internet service providers and the amount
of traffic passing across it. This is a very important variable in the implementation of
a filtering method. It determines how much additional hardware or personnel will be
required to process the filtering without reducing the speed of the network.
2. The network typology that changes from one internet service provider to another.
The more centralised the network, the fewer the locations where the filtering must be
implemented and the less expensive it becomes, since equipment and personnel costs
depend on the number of places where the filtering is carried out.
3. The wide spectrum of technology with different capabilities used by the different
internet service providers so that they would not be in the same position if they were
obliged to implement a filter method. Some internet service providers would be
ready to filter but others would have to buy new expensive hardware.
If general costs are impossible to estimate, the costs of a specific method of filtering
implemented by a single internet service provider can be calculated, but must be considered a
specific example only. HEA Net is an Irish research and education network which provides
broadband internet access to approximately 100,000 computers at 4,000 schools and has
implemented URL filtering. The costs of developing and building this system from scratch
have been close to 1,000,000 euros, which represents around 10 euros per computer. This
case-study represents an indicator of the upper-limit of what the most expensive method of
filtering – URL-filtering - might cost, if the internet service provider had to start from zero. It
does not however include maintenance costs80.
Additional direct economic impact deriving from filtering methods relying on a black list
"A system based on IP, DNS or URL filtering relies on a black-list of prohibited websites. If a
black-list was introduced to censor violent radicalisation material in the EU, a centrally
maintained and up-dated black list could be instantaneously accessed by ISPs operating
throughout the Union, instantly blocking newly added websites"81. Therefore, for these
filtering methods, it is necessary to study the costs deriving from maintaining a black-list,
although it should be noted that centralisation would moderate the costs considerably.
Furthermore, these costs should not necessarily be supported by internet service providers or
at least not entirely, since law enforcement should be involved in the selection of the list's
elements. Actually, if all costs were assumed by public authorities, taking into consideration
the ongoing work in many Member States to identify and study this kind of material on the
Internet, a central black-list might actually become economically efficient, by avoiding double
79 "Countering militant Islamist radicalisation on the Internet – A user driven strategy to recover the web",
mentioned above, in footnote 6, pp. 108-109.
80 See "Countering Militant Islamist radicalisation on the Internet: a user driven strategy to recover the
web", Institute of European Affairs 2007, referred to above, in footnote 6, pp. 110-112.
81 See "Countering Militant Islamist radicalisation on the Internet: a user driven strategy to recover the
web", Institute of European Affairs 2007, referred to above, in footnote 6, p. 89.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 67 – Drucksache 16/7769
work82. It can then be concluded that maintaining and up-dating a black-list would at least not
amount to a negative economic impact on public authorities (and eventually tax-payers).
The Internet Watch Foundation in the United Kingdom, an organisation that is a key
component in the UK’s Industry/Police/Government partnership for tackling illegal content
online, runs a black-list for illegal content. The estimated costs, in this case, include the
development and building of the database, approximately 110,000 euros, as well as
maintenance and regular up-grading costs of approximately 30,000 euros per year and human
resources costs of about 60,000 euros per year.
But this list might also be co-financed, as it is the case of the black-list compiled and
maintained by the Internet Watch Foundation. The Internet Watch Foundation relies on both
private and public funding.
Therefore, if the black-list were to be financed by internet service providers to some extent,
the costs indicated in the table above would slightly increase for all blocking systems save
dynamic filtering.
5.2.3. Human rights impact
Direct impact on freedom of expression
This option implies a direct restriction of the freedom of speech. The extent of the negative
consequences depends on the filtering system used. First of all, dynamic filtering clearly
limits freedom of speech and access to information because it automates censorship,
bypassing a black list created by humans and using instead a set of criteria of characteristics
of the kind of material that should be censored. Freedom of speech and access to information
would be subject to automated judgement calls determined by software designers. Under this
system, a separate assessment of the necessity and proportionality of blocking a specific
content could not take place.
The systems relying on a black list imply human intervention in the establishment and up-
dating of the list. Therefore, the impact on the freedom of speech and access to information
depends on two factors: first of all, how and by whom the content of the black-list is
determined as well as on the legal remedies offered to web owners in order to challenge the
decision of inclusion. Secondly, it depends on the degree of precision of the method of
filtering. Collateral blocking, referred to above, may not only cause serious economic losses
but necessarily involves a violation of the freedom of speech. Assuming that the manner in
which the black-list was maintained and up-dated incorporated enough human rights'
safeguards so that it did not involve any further restriction of freedom of speech than
necessary, the table below reflects the impact of the different blocking methods on freedom of
speech.
Filtering methods Impact on freedom of speech
82 Avoiding double-work is in fact the logic behind the project "Check the web" launched by the German
presidency in close co-operation with Europol and aiming at centralising information on Islamic radical
websites identified by Member States. It does not however intend to block any of the materials
identified.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 68 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
IP filtering --
URL filtering -
URL hybrid filtering -
DNS filtering --
Dynamic filtering ---
It should be noted that terrorist activists and supporters are increasingly using dynamic
communication services through the Internet instead of static websites. Discussion forums,
chat-rooms or instant messengers are therefore of growing importance. The access to these is
often restricted. Therefore, if filtering methods were to be extended to such internet services,
concerns regarding freedom of speech would increase. Moreover, this would add concerns as
regards the right to privacy.
Indirect impact on right to life and right to integrity
Forbidding internet service providers to give access to material to block the dissemination of
messages through the Internet aiming at public provocation to commit terrorist offences,
recruitment or training for terrorism would have as its final aim the protection of human rights
of potential victims, in particular the right to life and the right to physical and mental
integrity, similarly to the offences introduced in the Council of Europe Convention on the
prevention of terrorism. From this point of view, such prohibition has a positive, although
indirect impact on human rights that should also be taken into consideration. However, the
magnitude of such impact is rather moderate since it suffers from the same weaknesses
identified when analysing the security impact of this option.
� Magnitude of the impact on the right to life and the right to integrity: +
It should be noted that the assessment of impacts resulting from option 2 and especially of its
security impact, is based on two main circumstances: firstly, that forbidding internet service
providers to give access to violent radical material will never allow law enforcement
authorities to investigate, prosecute and convict the activists and supporters behind the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise, and secondly, that existing
technology suffers from important limitations, in particular current filtering methods can be
circumvented and have been designed specifically for web access and do not function
appropriately for most other Internet services including “peer-to-peer” communication
technologies.
While the first of these factors will remain the same, future developments are likely to
improve existing technology and may modify the statements made as regards the second
factor. Concerning the possibility of supporting the development of new and more efficient
filtering technologies, one should consider that: although filtering techniques may improve,
the manner in which the Internet is built, the various services it provides and the amount of
information it contains, makes it hardly possible to find a system with no gaps, no less
because of constantly emerging new services. In this sense, the effort and costs of developing
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 69 – Drucksache 16/7769
and, especially, implementing such technology appear to be disproportionate to the results
that would be achieved.
Furthermore, as stated above, it should be considered that discussion forums, chat rooms and
instant messengers are increasingly used by terrorist activists and supporters. If filtering
techniques were to be generally extended to postings and messages on discussion forums, chat
rooms and instant messengers, concerns regarding the respect for human rights would
considerably increase, not only with respect to freedom of speech but also the right to privacy.
Necessity and proportionality make such interferences unjustified in a democratic society.
It appears more appropriate to focus on the surveillance and prosecution of terrorist activists
and supporters behind the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise.
Therefore, funding projects and studies aiming at enhancing law enforcement authorities'
capabilities and expertise to detect and analyse radical violent material as well as to trace their
authors within the existing limitations and requirements of the legal framework is analysed
below.
5.3. Option 3: Enhancing law enforcement authorities' capacities and expertise to
counter the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes
5.3.1. Security impact:
Law enforcement authorities would receive the expertise of academics, would increase their
own knowledge by specific training - including the development of technical and linguistic
skills- and share their knowledge with law enforcement authorities of other Member States in
order to develop and exchange efficient methods of monitoring. The results of the studies
foreseen under this option could also advise the adoption of non-legislative measures to
prevent the distribution of violent radical content on the Internet, including co-operation
between NGOs and law enforcement authorities as well as to the development of
methodologies and adapted technological tools to efficiently detect violent radical content on
the Internet.
It can be concluded that law enforcement authorities would be empowered in order to detect
and analyse violent radical content on the Internet. They would equally be in a better position
to identify the individuals behind such content.
Pro-active policing of violent radical content on the Internet can provide for key information
in order to understand the terrorist trends, anticipate terrorist actions and can provide for
crucial data to prevent attacks. In this sense, enhancing law enforcement authorities' capacities
and expertise to counter the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes is worthy to be
considered as a standing-alone option. However, option 3 does not provide for a legal basis to
open an investigation and prosecute the author of the messages of terrorist propaganda or
terrorist expertise. In order to overcome these limitations, option 3 should be accompanied by
adequate criminal law measures. Prohibitions such as those studied under option 2, would not
be able to overcome such limitations since they do not constitute criminal law.
As regards the added value of European Union funding over national funding, it should be
noted that the Commission plans to finance training and tools of national law enforcement,
through trans-national projects that encourage sharing resources and avoiding double work.
Moreover, financing through the Commission is efficient because it can exploit existing
bodies and infrastructure (i.e. the Joint Research Centre to develop adequate software,
Drucksache 16/7769 – 70 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
European Judicial Training Network for judicial training) it produces economies of scale (i.e.
results of studies will be automatically shared) and encourages the division of tasks through
trans-national projects.
� Magnitude of the impact on security: ++
5.3.2. Economic impact
Direct economic impact for public authorities and tax-payers
Direct costs deriving from this option would be mainly assumed by the budget of the
Commission. According to the Council Decision of 12 February 2007 establishing for the
period 2007 to 2013, as part of General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties,
the Specific Programme Prevention of and Fight against Crime, grants financing projects must
cover at least 65% of the costs, the maximum being determined in each of the annual work
programmes. In the case of the contracts of studies, the budget of the Commission would fully
cover the costs. The total costs for the Commission in 2008 are estimated in 1.200.000 euros.
In a second phase, studies might lead to the development of non-legislative measures,
methodologies and tools to support law enforcement authorities' work. Further costs would be
then generated, to be financed with charge to future Commission's budgets. The magnitude of
these would be probably determined in the studies. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the
costs estimated for 2008 are not significant in the Commission's budget and that, although
costs generated in a second phase may be more important, the development of non-legislative
measures, methodologies and tools at EU level would be, by far, more efficient than if similar
actions were undertaken at national level.
Under Article 5 of the Decision referred to above, the Programme is destined for law
enforcement agencies, other public and/or private bodies, actors and institutions, including
local, regional and national authorities, social partners, universities, statistical offices, non-
governmental organisations, public-private partnerships and relevant international bodies. It
follows that the remaining percentage of costs will be mainly financed by the public
authorities of Member States. It must be noted that these costs can be analysed in two
different ways. If the project was going to be developed even in the absence EU funding, the
economic impact will imply only a change of funding source: EU funding instead of funding
obtained from public authorities in the Member States. In this case, the Commission's support
constitutes important savings at national level since the costs are distributed among a much
bigger number of tax-payers. However, it should be assumed that in many cases EU funding
is decisive since it covers most of the costs of the projects. Member States would then face
additional, although quite limited, costs.
� Magnitude of the impact on economy: -
Indirect economic impact for internet service providers and consumers
Indirectly, the possibility of additional and more efficient surveillance of violent radical
content might lead to further investigations on terrorist activities. It follows that internet
service providers might be asked more often for traffic data under the data retention Directive.
Therefore, indirectly, option 3 may lead to additional costs for internet service providers
deriving from more extended use of the Data retention Directive. This is explained in detail
below, under option 5. However, it is important to note that under option 3 law enforcement
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 71 – Drucksache 16/7769
authorities could only ask for location and traffic data if the dissemination of terrorist
propaganda or terrorist expertise was a serious crime in the Member State where the internet
service provider is based. Another possibility would be that, in the course of the investigation,
another behaviour qualified as serious crime in that Member State is discovered.
� Magnitude of the impact on economy: -
5.3.3. Impact on human rights:
Direct impact on freedom of expression
Since the dissemination of messages of terrorist propaganda or terrorist expertise would not
become illegal under option 3, no content circulating on the Internet could be censored and no
individual could be prosecuted for this behaviour (unless this was already possible according
to national law). It follows that option 3 does not introduce restrictions to freedom of speech.
Similarly, concerning the right to privacy, further and more efficient surveillance on violent
radical contents would not amount to any restriction. The absence of a legislative framework
implies that the rules on the right to privacy and data protection at both EU and national level
remain unchanged and that law enforcement authorities continue to respect the limits
established by the law. Nevertheless, the human rights consequences will be the same as
under option 1.
� Magnitude of the impact on human rights: -
Indirect impact on right to life and right to integrity
Enhancing the capabilities and expertise of law enforcement authorities has the final aim of
protecting potential victims, in particular their right to life and their right to physical and
mental integrity. In fact, such protection concerns all citizens, since experience shows that
anyone is a potential victim. From this point of view, these practical measures have a positive,
although indirect impact on human rights that should also be taken into consideration. The
magnitude of such impact logically corresponds to the level of increased security achieved by
this option.
As stated above, efficient detection and analysis of violent radical content should provide for
crucial data contributing to successful investigations and prosecutions. In addition, law
enforcement authorities conveniently trained and equipped would considerably improve their
chances to trace and identify the individuals behind the dissemination of terrorist propaganda
and terrorist expertise.
� Magnitude of the impact on right to life and to integrity: ++
5.4. Option 4: Urging Member States to sign and ratify the Council of Europe
Convention on the prevention of terrorism
A political statement advising Member States to ratify the Convention might accelerate
signatures and ratifications or even increase them. However, as a political statement, it would
lack a binding character. It would be merely a political reinforcement of Member States'
commitment to ratify the instrument, already expressed by their signatures thereof – with the
exception of four Member States which have not signed the Convention. Even more, it should
be considered that such recommendation has already been included in the list of actions of the
Drucksache 16/7769 – 72 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
counter-terrorism action plan, advising Member States to sign and ratify various international
instruments relevant to the fight against terrorism. From this point of view, a specific political
instrument would represent even less of a change.
More importantly, assuming that the statement made a difference for the quick signature and
ratification by all Member States, the harmonised incrimination of public incitement to
terrorism, terrorist recruitment and training would remain outside the EU legal framework.
Harmonisation would indeed be achieved through the signature and ratification of the
Convention by all Member States. However, such harmonisation will not bring about the
same results as legislation at EU level83. It can then be concluded that the impact of this
option on security, economy and human rights will be quite similar to that of the status-quo
option, assessed above.
83 See under section 5.5.1 below the added value of the revision of the Framework Decision in relation to
the existing Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 73 – Drucksache 16/7769
5.5. Option 5: Revising the Framework Decision on combating terrorism in order to
introduce parallel offences to those foreseen under the Council of Europe
Convention
5.5.1. Security impact
The revision of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism would explicitly incriminate
the use of the Internet as a means of public incitement to terrorism, recruitment and training
through the dissemination of bomb-making and other terrorist expertise, at least as long as it
falls within the jurisdiction of the European Union. In addition to the impact on security
resulting from option 1, option 5 would bring clear added value in terms of the application of
harmonised rules on penalties and jurisdiction and ensure the application of related EU
instruments. Moreover, it would guarantee a consistent approach between the Council of
Europe and the European Union, putting the EU in a stronger position to request co-operation
from third countries and private operators. These added benefits are detailed below:
Added value of the revision of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism vis-à-vis
relying on the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism:
1. The new offences would benefit from all previous harmonisation achieved by the
European Union in the field of the fight against terrorism
� Rules on penalties: Article 5 in relation with Article 6 of the Framework Decision
on combating terrorism imposes a detailed regime on penalties and applicable
particular circumstances for the offences mentioned in that Framework Decision.
Most importantly, Article 5(1) contains a link to the European Arrest Warrant.
This means that if the offences of public provocation to commit a terrorist
offence, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism would be included in
the Framework Decision on combating terrorism:
(a) The new offences should be punished with imprisonment of at least
one year. Other penalties, such as pecuniary sanctions, would not be
sufficient.
(b) The Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European
arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States
would apply automatically to these three offences. If these offences
were not included in Articles 1 to 4 of the Framework Decision, the
application of the European Arrest Warrant would depend on whether
the penalties' established by the Member States would meet the
thresholds foreseen in the Framework Decision on the European
Arrest Warrant which are a maximum custodial sentence of at least
three years for certain serious crimes, including terrorism, and a
maximum custodial sentence of at least one year with the possibility
of refusal by the executing State if the behaviour is not a crime under
its national law.
� Rules on jurisdiction: Article 9(2) includes rules solving positive conflicts of
jurisdiction, a set of criteria to determine jurisdiction when several Member States
are competent. Such rules contribute to ensure fast and efficient prosecution of
Drucksache 16/7769 – 74 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
trans-national terrorist offences. If the offences of public provocation to commit a
terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism would be
included in the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, the prosecution of
the new offences would benefit from the application of these rules.
� The Council Decision 2005/671/JHA on the exchange of information and
cooperation concerning terrorist offences: It ensures the provision of information
concerning terrorist offences as laid down in the Framework Decision to Europol,
Eurojust and the Member States when criminal investigations concerning
prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences which affect or may affect two
or more Member States. Additionally, it foresees the setting up of joint
investigation teams when appropriate to conduct criminal investigations into
terrorist offences and obliges Member States to ensure that requests from other
Member States for mutual legal assistance and recognition and enforcement of
judgements in connection with terrorist offences are dealt with as a matter or
urgency and are given priority. If the offences of public provocation to commit a
terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism would be
included in the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, its investigation and
prosecution would benefit from such enhanced co-operation.
By introducing the new offences in the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, law
enforcement personnel and judges are further empowered and investigations, prosecutions and
convictions are facilitated. Public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for
terrorism and training for terrorism would be fought with the full EU arsenal of measures on
terrorism.
1. The new offences would benefit from the advantages of third pillar instruments, in
particular Framework Decisions, vis-à-vis international treaties and conventions
� Adoption by the Council implies an automatic obligation for Member States to
adapt their national legislation. In contrast with the lengthy procedures to sign and
ratify international conventions that can last for many years, Framework
Decisions enter into force exactly as first pillar instruments do, most often the day
of their publication in the Official Journal and set out a restricted period for
implementation.
� Third pillar legislation becomes EU acquis: Therefore, it is compulsory for new
Member States to adapt their legislation to existing Framework Decisions before
joining the EU. By contrast, candidate countries are not obliged to adopt
international conventions or treaties.
� Member States must notify the national measures implementing Framework
Decisions to the Council and Commission. By contrast, such an obligation does
not exist as regards the national measures adopted to implement international
conventions or treaties.
� The correct and full implementation of Member States is evaluated as regards
Framework Decisions: Framework Decisions generally foresee the establishment
of an implementation report from the Commission and its assessment by the
Council. Obviously, the European institutions are not empowered to assess the
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 75 – Drucksache 16/7769
correct implementation of international conventions and treaties by Member
States.
� The European Court of Justice is entitled to interpret Framework Decisions via
preliminary rulings. Sixteen Member States have accepted so far the authority of
the European Court of Justice to deliver preliminary rulings as regards
instruments of the third pillar. The European Court of Justice lacks any direct
jurisdiction over international conventions and treaties.
� The European Court of Justice has stated that national courts are obliged to
interpret national rules according to Framework Decisions. According to the
Pupino case-law, national courts are required to interpret rules of national law, as
far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the Framework
Decision.
By introducing the new offences in the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, Member
States are expected to adapt their legislation earlier. Furthermore, European institutions could
control the correct implementation and interpretation of the instrument.
1. The new offences affirm the position of the EU in the international context & vis-à-
vis the private sector
� Co-operation with third countries and internet service providers is required to
tackle public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for terrorism
and training: Terrorism exceeds the territory and jurisdiction of the European
Union, especially when it comes to the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes
(i.e. 76% of the Islamist terrorist websites are hosted by internet services
providers based in the United States). Therefore, international co-operation is
required to tackle public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for
terrorism and training for terrorism. In particular, co-operation may be crucial in
order to trace the terrorist activists and supporters behind such dissemination and,
secondarily, disabling access to the relevant websites. A common ground shared
by all Member States will strengthen the position of the European Union to
achieve positive results in international fora such as the G8, the United Nations as
well as through bilateral co-operation with relevant third countries. In addition,
since all Member States are bound by EU legislation, the European Union could
guarantee reciprocity. Similarly, the European Union would lack of legitimacy
when seeking co-operation and agreements from internet service providers if
public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism and
training for terrorism were not outlawed at European Union level.
� Outlawing public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruiting for
terrorism and training for terrorism would be in line with the Communication on
cyber-crime: The Communication refers to incitement to terrorism and
glorification of terrorism when referring to illegal content84. It envisages certain
actions in order to fight against illegal content, such as initiating and promoting
dialogue with third countries on technical methods to fight illegal content as well
84 Communication referred to above in footnote 19, p.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 76 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
as on procedures to shut down illegal websites, also with a view to the possible
development of formal agreements with neighbouring and other countries on this
issue as well as developing EU-level voluntary agreements and conventions
between public authorities and private operators, especially Internet service
providers85. Such actions are not foreseen as regards harmful content.
By introducing the new offences in the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, law
enforcement authorities could benefit in their investigations and prosecutions from stronger
and more successful international co-operation. They could also request the disablement of
access to a relevant websites hosted by an internet service provider based in a third country in
those cases where this would not interfere or conflict with intelligence and investigation
purposes.
� Magnitude of the impact on security: ++
5.5.2. Economic impact
Economic impact on public authorities and tax-payers:
There are no direct costs identified. However, the revision of the Framework Decision on
combating terrorism might involve indirect costs. These costs would be similar to those that
would stem from the signature and ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on the
prevention of terrorism by all Member States, although they are likely to be marginally higher
because of the link of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism with EU co-operation
instruments referred to under the security impact. The new means to combat the terrorist
threat would result in an increased co-operation of national law enforcement authorities both
with industry and law enforcement authorities in other Member States. This should lead to
improved results, which implies more successful investigations and more prosecutions than
presently. However, further international co-operation and increased contacts with industry as
well as increased prosecutions involve an additional work-load for law enforcement
authorities.
The hypothesis of the additional work-load resulting from the revision of the Framework
Decision on combating terrorism is in line with Europol's report TE-SAT 2007. The report
states that the number of police investigations into terrorist propaganda seems small compared
with the amount of material circulating on the Internet. The report clarifies that this is
partially explained by the lack of legal basis for arrests or investigations using the Internet in
this manner86.
If the increased activity of law enforcement authorities required the allocation of further
resources, these should come from the general national budget. Tax-payers would not
necessarily assume higher taxes: the budget allocated to law enforcement and security may be
increased at the expense of other public policies.
� Magnitude of the impact on economy: -
Economic impact on internet service providers and consumers:
85 Communication referred to above in footnote 19, p. 10.
86 See the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007 of Europol, p. 21.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 77 – Drucksache 16/7769
Option 5 would not involve direct costs for companies or consumers. Nevertheless, the same
indirect costs as those detailed under option 1 have been identified.
� Magnitude of the impact on economy: -
5.5.3. Impact on human rights:
Direct impact on freedom of expression
Similarly to what has been explained under option 1 about the Convention on the prevention
of terrorism, the inclusion of public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment and
training for terrorism under the Framework Decision on combating terrorism has a direct
impact on the right to freedom of speech. This is especially true of the offence of public
provocation to commit terrorist offences.
The analysis of this impact will therefore be very close to that of option 1. In fact, while the
expected increase of investigations or prosecutions is relevant to figure out the impact of a
criminal measure on security or on economy, the same does not apply to its effects on human
rights. A measure must conform to human rights standards irrespective of the number of
additional investigations or prosecutions stemming from it. A criminal measure which does
not respect human rights does not become more acceptable because it is hardly applied in
practice. Conversely, a criminal measure compliant with the ECHR does not become less
acceptable because it is widely applied. In consequence, the main question is whether the
restrictions of the freedom of speech deriving from the revision of the Framework Decision
on combating terrorism would be covered by Article 10(2) of the ECHR. Insofar as the
approach of the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism is respected,
including its safeguards and requirements, the revision of the Framework Decision on
combating terrorism should comply with the ECHR.
In particular, public provocation to commit terrorist offences should require that two
conditions are met87 as explained in the explanatory report to the Convention on the
prevention of terrorism. Firstly, there has to be a specific intent to incite the commission of a
terrorist offence, which is supplemented with the requirements in paragraph 2 that
provocation must be committed unlawfully and intentionally. Secondly, the result of such an
act must be to cause a danger that such an offence might be committed.
The specific intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence is of special relevance to
ensure that the dissemination of information, opinions, views on terrorism and political
conflicts as well as encouraging public debate on such issues is fully excluded from the scope
of the revision of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism.
However, this option entails a risk linked to the negotiation process. Indeed, any Commission
proposal to insert the definition of the offences of the Council of Europe Convention on the
prevention of terrorism into the Framework Decision on combating terrorism is open to
modifications during the negotiations by the Member States. Bearing in mind that the Council
of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism is an outcome of intensive negotiations,
it must be seen as the best compromise in this sensitive area aiming at enhancing the
87 See the Explanatory report to the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism,
paragraphs 99 and 100.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 78 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
efficiency of the fight against terrorism while ensuring the protection of fundamental rights. It
follows that this option would require that all the institutions involved pay particular attention
that the wording of the Council of Europe convention is maintained throughout the
negotiation process.
� Magnitude of the restriction of freedom of speech: -
Indirect impact on right to life and right to integrity
The incrimination of public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for
terrorism and training for terrorism has as its final aim the protection of human rights of
potential victims, in particular the right to life and the right to physical and mental integrity.
In fact, such protection concerns all citizens, since experience shows that anyone is a potential
victim. From this point of view, the amendment of the Framework Decision would have a
positive, although indirect impact on human rights that should also be taken into
consideration. The magnitude of such impact logically corresponds to the level of increased
security achieved by the Convention. A higher level of security results in a lower the threat to
the right to life and the right to physical and mental integrity of potential victims.
� Magnitude of the impact on right to life and to integrity: ++
6. SECTION 6: COMPARING OPTIONS
6.1. Summary table: costs and benefits
Economic impact Human rights impact Options Security impact
Impact for
public
authorities
Impact for
ISPs and
consumers
Freedom
of
expression
Right to
life
integrity
Option 1
No policy change
+ - - - +
Option 2
Filtering obligations
+
- +
IP filtering
--
--
URL filtering --
-
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 79 – Drucksache 16/7769
URL hybrid filtering
-
-
DNS filtering
--
--
Dynamic filtering
-/--
---
Option 3 Practical
support to LEA
++ -
-
- ++
Option 4
Political statement
+
-
-
- +
Option 5
Revision Framework
Decision
++
-
-
- ++
Drucksache 16/7769 – 80 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
6.2. Advantages and drawbacks of the policy options
Policy options Advantages Drawbacks
Option 1: no policy change. � Empowerment of law enforcement to fight new
modus operandi of
terrorists, including
offences committed
through the Internet.
� Respect of freedom of
expression.
� Indirect protection of
right to life and to
integrity
� No need for new EU or
EC legislation .
� Lengthy signature and
ratification of the
Convention by all MS.
� Rules of the Framework
Decision on penalties and
jurisdiction would not
apply to the offences.
� Some EU co-operation
instruments could not be
used if the offences
remain outside the EU
Legal Framework.
� The EU would be in a
weak position to request
the co-operation of third
countries and private
sector
� Indirect costs for internet
service providers
� Lack of control on
national implementation.
� ECJ not entitled to deliver
preliminary rulings
� EU counter-terrorist
legislation outdated in
relation to the UN and
CoE.
� No solution for the lack
of capacities and
expertise of law
enforcement authorities
Option 2: Forbidding internet
service providers to give
access to material to block
� Direct restriction of
terrorist propaganda and
expertise through the
Internet.
� Compulsory filtering does
not allow for prosecution
of the authors of the
relevant material.
the dissemination of
messages through the � Possibility of building on � Compulsory filtering does
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 81 – Drucksache 16/7769
Internet aiming at public
provocation to commit
terrorist offences,
recruitment or training for
terrorism.
existing experience on
combating child
pornography in certain
Member States.
� Indirect protection of
right to life and to
integrity
not allow for the use of
EU instruments for police
and judicial co-operation
in criminal matters.
� Filtering can be
circumvented by
experienced Internet
users.
� Costs of implementation
for internet service
providers.
� Consumers are likely to
be imposed additional
charges.
� Risk of costs for
companies and consumers
in case of collateral
blocking.
� Compliance with the
ECHR is not guaranteed
in all cases.
Option 3: Enhancing law
enforcement authorities'
capacities and expertise
� Addresses basic
limitations of law
enforcement authorities
such as lack of technical
or linguistic skills to
counter the terrorist use of
the Internet providing for
practical solutions.
� Helps to understand
terrorist trends, anticipate
terrorist actions and
prevent attacks.
� Stimulates the co-
operation and sharing of
knowledge between
Member States so that
they can benefit from
existing efficient methods
in others.
� Explores the development
of methodologies and
tools for more efficient
detection and monitoring
� The absence of legal basis
which forbids or makes
punishable public
provocation, recruitment
and training through the
Internet implies that these
forms of behaviour
cannot be censored nor
prosecuted.
� Strong skills and
expertise would then be
frustrated at the moment
of taking action.
� All drawbacks of option
1.
of violent radical contents
Drucksache 16/7769 – 82 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
� Explores the possibility of
involving NGOs that
could support law
enforcement authorities,
acting as complaint hot-
lines.
� Embodies the concept of
economy of scale and
prevents double working.
� Complements and builds
on the German project
"Check the web"
� No adoption of EU or EC
legislation required.
� Respects freedom of
expression
� Indirect protection of
right to life and to
integrity
Option 4: Urging Member
States to sign and/or ratify
the Council of Europe
Convention on the
prevention of terrorism
(through a political
statement).
See Option 1 See Option 1
Option 5: Revising the
Framework Decision on
combating terrorism in order
to introduce parallel offences
to those foreseen under the
Council of Europe
Convention.
� Empowerment of law
enforcement authorities to
face new modus operandi
of terrorists, including
offences committed
through the Internet
� Rules of the Framework
Decision on penalties and
jurisdiction would apply
to the offences.
� Application of the
European Arrest Warrant
guaranteed.
� EU co-operation
instruments linked to the
Framework Decision
could be used
� Successful co-operation
with third countries is not
guaranteed.
� Indirect costs for internet
service providers
� No solution for the lack
of capacities and
expertise of law
enforcement authorities
� Conformity of
amendment of the
Framework Decision with
the Council of Europe
Convention of the
prevention of terrorism at
the end of the
negotiations process is
� Full compliance with the not guaranteed.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 83 – Drucksache 16/7769
ECHR, as long as
amendment of the
Framework Decision fully
corresponds to the
existing human rights
standards
� Control on national
implementation
� ECJ entitle to deliver
preliminary rulings
� Consistency between the
UN, CoE and EU
counter-terrorist policies.
� Strengthened position to
seek co-operation from
third countries and
internet service providers
� No need to amend
national legislation
already adapted to the
Convention
6.3. Summary table: check list of benefits
The table below compares the policy options against the same set of criteria, which detail
relevant aspects of their impact on security, economy and human rights. It provides for a clear
overview of the benefits of each policy option.
Table of symbols
The benefit is present �
The benefit is absent -
Option 1
No policy
change
Option 2
Filtering
obligations
Option 3
Practical
support to
LEA
Option 4
Political
statement
Option 5
Revision FD
Security impact
Drucksache 16/7769 – 84 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Legal basis for
investigation and
prosecution
�88 - - � �
Increase expertise and
capabilities of law
enforcement
authorities
- - � - -
Access to radical
violent content on the
Internet hindered
directly
- � - - -
Application of rules on
penalties and
jurisdiction of the FD
- - - - �
Automatic application
of EAW and other EU
instruments
- - - - �
No need for lengthy
signature and
ratification process
- � � - �
Control on national
implementation
- - - - �
ECJ interpretation via
preliminary rulings
- - - - �
Consistency between
the UN, CoE and EU
counter-terrorist
policies
- - - - �
Strengthened position
to seek co-operation
from third countries
and internet service
providers
- - - - �
Economic impact
No substantial costs
for private sector
� - � � �
88 Once all Member States have signed and ratified the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention
of terrorism.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 85 – Drucksache 16/7769
No substantial costs
for national authorities
� � � � �
Human rights impact
Compliance with
freedom of speech
� - � � �
Protection of fight to
life and to integrity
� � � � �
D
ru
cksach
e 16/7769
– 86 –
D
eutscher B
undestag – 16. W
ahlperiode
ng for terrorism, also via the internet, as
istence of comparable offences in the MS's
tems)
equences for treatment of new
ffences by EU legal order
icability of Data retention
tive ("retrieval of data")*
icability of E-Commerce
tive ("shut down sites")*
duction of minimum penalties
ing use of EAW) warrant)
duction of rules on positive
icts of jurisdiction
icability of Council Decision
xchange of information and
eration concerning terrorist
ces (2005/671/JHA)
icability of Framework
sion on confiscation of crime
d proceeds (2005/212/JHA)
64
6.4. Introduction of public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment and traini
offences: An overview of options 1, 4 and 5.
(*The extent of the changes depends on the ex
legal sys
Options
Cons
o
Modification of
FD on terrorism
(option 5)
Appl
Direc
Ratification of
Council of Europe
Convention on
Terrorism (options 1
and 4) Appl
Direc
Intro
(allow
Intro
confl
Appl
on e
coop
offen
Appl
Deci
relate
Same effect if ratification in
all MS and modification of
Framework Decision
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 87 – Drucksache 16/7769
6.5. Strengths and weaknesses of each policy option and preferred option
Option 1, no policy change, is not a true status-quo, since the Convention on the prevention of
terrorism will bring about some positive impact on security, helping to tackle the issue of the
use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. This option implies the empowerment of law
enforcement to fight new modus operandi of terrorists, including offences committed through
the Internet while fully respecting human rights and implies that there is no need for further
regulation at EU level. However, full harmonisation will only be achieved once all Member
States sign and ratify the Convention, which can last for many years.
Option 2, forbidding internet service providers to give access to material to block the
dissemination of messages through the Internet aiming at public provocation to commit
terrorist offences, recruitment or training for, i.e. compulsory filtering of terrorist propaganda
and terrorist expertise content is the most extreme of the options examined. It presents the
advantage of restricting directly the dissemination of the relevant materials through the
Internet. However, it involves serious disadvantages, most importantly, it does not incriminate
the behaviour of those producing terrorist propaganda and expertise nor does it fully
guarantee compliance with human rights standards.
Option 3, enhancing law enforcement authorities' capacities and expertise, provides for
practical solutions to overcome limitations of law enforcement authorities to detect and
analyse the messages disseminating terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise thought the
Internet. It also helps them to identify the authors of such messages. The information obtained
in this manner contributes to understand terrorist trends, anticipate terrorist actions and
prevent attacks. However, it does not allow law enforcement authorities to investigate the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorism expertise nor does it allow the prosecution
of the terrorist activists and supporters behind it, since no legislation is adopted. In
consequence, option 3 leads to a partial empowerment of law enforcement authorities, lacking
the legal side.
Option 4, making a political statement urging Member States to ratify the Convention on the
prevention of terrorism, does not present substantial differences from option 1.
Option 5, revising the Framework Decision on combating terrorism in order to introduce
parallel offences to those foreseen under the Council of Europe Convention is the most
advantageous option. This policy option is similar to option 1 as regards its impact on human
rights, because it includes conditions and safeguards of the Council of Europe Convention on
the proevention of terrorism, aiming to ensure the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. However, it implies important advantages such as the application of the rules of the
Framework Decision on penalties and jurisdiction to the new offences introduced in the
Framework Decision on combating terrorism. Additionally, it would guarantee the application
of the European Arrest Warrant and allow for the use of specific EU co-operation instruments
linked to the Framework Decision on combating terrorism in relation with the new offences.
Furthermore, it brings about all advantages of EU legislation vis-à-vis international
conventions and treaties.
Based on this analysis, it appears that the combination of options 5 and 3 would constitute the
most effective policy to counter the new modus operandi of terrorist, in particular their use of
the Internet as a means for public provocation to commit terrorist crimes, recruitment and
training for terrorism, while fully respecting human rights.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 88 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Choosing option 5 does however not exclude option 4. The benefits of international
instruments in the fight against the terrorist use of the Internet are beyond doubt and the
importance of the Convention on the prevention of terrorism in this specific case is by no
means underestimated or contested. The adoption of additional legislation along the same
lines as those contained in the Convention intends to exploit all EU co-operation channels and
instruments in order to fight the provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment and
training for terrorism more efficiently, including their commission through the Internet. The
revision of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism would therefore build on the
Convention and boost its effects. A revised Framework Decision would also benefit from a
widely ratified Convention operating at international level in a much broader forum than the
EU and improving the chances of co-operation with third countries.
Option 3 appears to be the perfect complement to option 5. Law enforcement authorities do
not only need the legal basis to counter the use of the Internet as a means to disseminate
terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise but also require the technical and linguistic skills
as well as appropriate tools and methodology. Only with the appropriate training, the support
of experts and efficiently equipped, will law enforcement authorities be able to make use of
the new legislation. Similarly to option 5, option 3 as a stand- alone option would not provide
for a complete solution to the problem. It would provide law enforcement with the expertise
and capacity to detect, monitor and analyse the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and
terrorist expertise as well as to trace the terrorist activists and supporters. However, law
enforcement authorities could not open an investigation or prosecute such individuals.
Accompanied by the legal measures foreseen under option 5, the capacities and expertise
offered to law enforcement authorities under option 3 would be fully exploited. Only with
adequate new legislation law enforcement authorities would be able to make full use of their
additional capacities and resources.
7. SECTION 7: MONITORING AND EVALUATION
7.1. Monitoring of legislative measures (option 5)
Under Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism
(hereafter ‘the Framework Decision on combating terrorism’), the Commission has to
establish a written report on the measures taken by the Member States to comply with this
instrument.
In accordance with that Article, a report from the Commission as well as a Commission staff
working paper associated with this report were adopted on 8 June 2004. A second report from
the Commission also accompanied by a Commission staff working paper is currently under
inter-service consultation and should been soon approved.
To be able to evaluate on the basis of objective criteria whether a Framework Decision has
been fully implemented by a Member State, the two precedent written reports have applied
some general criteria developed with respect to directives, such as:
1. form and methods of implementation must be chosen in a manner which ensures that
the directive functions effectively with account being taken of its aims89;
89 See relevant case law on the implementation of directives: Case 48/75 Royer [1976 ECR 497 at 518].
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 89 – Drucksache 16/7769
2. each Member State is obliged to implement directives in a manner which satisfies the
requirements of clarity and legal certainty and thus to transpose the provisions of the
directive into national provisions having binding force90,
3. transposition need not necessarily require enactment in precisely the same words in
an express legal provision; thus a general legal context (such as appropriate already
existing measures) may be sufficient, as long as the full application of the directive is
assured in a sufficiently clear and precise manner91;
4. a Directive must be implemented within the period prescribed therein92.
If the Framework Decision on combating terrorism is revised, the evaluation system referred
to above would also apply to the new provisions introduced.
7.2. Monitoring of non-legislative measures (option 3)
Article 13 of the Council Decision of 12 February 2007 establishing for the period 2007 to
2013, as part of General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties, the Specific
Programme Prevention of and Fight against Crime deals with monitoring. It ensures the
monitoring of each of the actions financed by the programme. To this end, among other
requirements, it obliges the beneficiary to submit technical and financial reports on the
progress of work as well as a final report within three months of the completion of the action.
In addition, it foresees the supervision and financial control of contracts and agreements
resulting from the implementation of the Programme by the Commission, if necessary by
means of on-the-spot checks, including sample checks, and audits by the Court of Auditors.
Article 15 of the same instrument refers to evaluation ensuring that the Programme is
monitored regularly in order to follow the implementation of activities carried out there under.
To this end, this provision foresees independent and external evaluation of the Programme as
well as the submission, to the European Parliament and the Council, of an annual presentation
on the implementation of the Programme; an interim evaluation report on the results obtained
and the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the implementation of the Programme no later
than 31 March 2010; a communication on the continuation of the Programme no later than 31
December 2010, and finally, an ex-post evaluation report no later than 31 March 2015.
Since the non-legislative measures envisaged in option 3 would be financed in the framework
of this Specific Programme Prevention of and Fight against crime, Articles 13 and 15 would
apply to these measures.
90 See relevant case law on the implementation of directives: Case 239/85 Commission v. Belgium [1986]
ECR 3645 at 3659. See also Case 300/81 Commission v. Italy [1983] ECR 449 at 456.
91 See relevant case law on the implementation of directives for instance Case 29/84 Commission v.
Germany [1985] ECR 1661 at 1673.
92 See substantial case law on the implementation of directives, for example : Case 52/75 Commission v.
Italy [1976] ECR 277 at 284, See, generally, the Commission annual reports on monitoring the
application of Community law, for instance COM(2001) 309.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 90 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
ANNEXES
ANNEX I: REPLIES TO THE FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE ADDRESSED TO MEMBER STATES
Two Member States did not provide for any provision or answered very briefly because of
their undergoing legislative modification in view of the ratification of the Convention on the
Prevention of Terrorism of the Council of Europe.
The rest of the Member States referred to different criminal law provisions in their answers.
A first overview shows that every Member State but one have got or will have specific rules
dealing with public dissemination of messages encouraging the commission of terrorist
offences (and often of other crimes). Although terminology is not at all uniform (i.e.
"provocation", "instigation", "public incitement" etc.) we observe that there is a reiterative
characteristic: they explicitly refer to publicly disseminated information. Often, the provision
makes reference to dissemination in a meeting, via publication or sound and images supports.
Some provisions deal specifically with "terrorist publications", including even a reference to
the dissemination via the Internet. In other cases, the comments of the Member States explain
that messages on the internet are included. Two Member States express theoretically this
characteristic by saying that the recipient does not have to be previously determined.
Actually, these two Member States stress that, by contrast with the general rules on
incitement, in the relevant provisions the offence does not need to be determined beforehand
either. In this sense, some Member States retain direct and indirect provocation. In five
Member States, these provisions refer to the irrelevance of the subsequent commission of the
offence or the actual incitement of the recipients of the message.
Additionally, eight Member States have got or will have provisions condemning
glorification or approval of terrorist offences (and often of other crimes).
Two Member States deal specifically with the denigration or humiliation of the victims. Two
also refer to apology of terrorism or crime apology.
Three Member States referred to provisions explicitly covering the public dissemination of
terrorist expertise. Six Member States have got or will have provisions on training or
recruiting, mainly resulting from its adaptation to the Council of Europe Convention on the
Prevention of Terrorism. One Member State points out its provision on preparation of a
crime, explaining that it comprises holding something especially intended to be used as an
1) Besides the necessary transposing provisions making incitement to commit terrorist
offences punishable, does your country have (or plan to have) more detailed/further
reaching provisions setting out restrictions or sanctions in relation to public provocation
to commit terrorist offences, terrorist apology or glorification of terrorist offences or their
authors?
And does your country have (or plan to have) more detailed/further reaching provisions
in relation to the transmission of expertise on bomb or explosives-making, preparation of
attacks, hostage-taking or other instructions for committing a terrorist offence?
auxiliary means and that compiled information can be regarded as the said auxiliary means.
Furthermore, it clarifies that the intent does not have to cover a specific terrorist offence.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 91 – Drucksache 16/7769
Another Member State refers to its general rules on complicity. Three Member States explain
that the transmission of expertise would be criminalised under its penal code only if was done
intentionally and the terrorist act was actually committed or attempted/planned. Two Member
State link the dissemination of terrorist expertise to terrorist groups, making punishable the
transmission information on terrorist targets. One Member State points out it has no specific
provision concerning the transmission of terrorism expertise.
Six Member States mentioned provisions that are not part of their criminal law in their
answers. Only one referred to aliens and associations law. The rest mentioned their media
law as well as provisions on electronic communications or only the latter. Various
highlighted that the dissemination of terrorist propaganda or terrorist expertise should be in
principle fall within the scope of penal law or that media acts had not specific provisions
concerning the said issues. The provisions forwarded prohibit incitement to hatred,
endangering public order, security or important domestic interests and incitement to commit
terrorist offences in the case of one Member State. It should be noted that such prohibitions,
save in one case, go beyond the encouragement to the commission of a specific offence or
approval of its commission. Indeed, they provide for wider prohibitions such as incitement to
hatred or call for violence. Two Member States explicitly refer to their broader scope,
indicating either that the threshold of incitement does not have to be trespassed or that cover
behaviours that do not constitute a criminal offence.
Regarding their regulations on electronic communications, one Member State requires
Internet Service Providers to be licensed, one Member State obliges them to delete illegal
contents, while one Member State stresses that they are not liable and another one notes that
they are not subject to a general obligation to monitor.
If so;
i) We would be extremely grateful if you could specify whether these provisions would
constitute:
a) Criminal legislation
b) Media legislation
c) Other. Please, specify the branch of law in this case.
Please, tick the appropriate choice(s) and kindly give further details about the relevant
legal instruments.
All Member States referred to criminal law. Additionally, six of them referred to non
criminal law: one referred to aliens and associations law. The rest mentioned their media law
as well as provisions on electronic communications.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 92 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
ii) We would very much appreciate if you could indicate what problems have been
encountered in implementing these provisions:
a) Problems in interpreting the criminal law provisions in question in full respect
of the fundamental right of freedom of expression. We would be particularly grateful if
you could provide us with legal opinions or national jurisprudence as to how the issue
has been dealt with in your countries.
b) Resistance for commercial reasons from media, service providers or
publishers.
c) Law-enforcement difficulties linked to the nature of the internet such as
identifying the source of the illegal content or eliminating this illegal content.
c) Others. Please kindly provide further details in this case.
Please, tick the appropriate choice(s).
Some Member States declare not having had any problems concerning the implementation of
the relevant provisions although some clarify that the rules are very recent and others explain
that no cases of the relevant offences have occurred in their territory (Lithuania).
Six Member States pointed out problems of enforceability derived from the extra-territorial
nature of internet and, in particular, the fact that illegal contents are often hosted in third
countries. Some of them referred to cases where there is no international convention with the
third country, in particular, convention of legal assistance. One Member State refers to the
lack of harmonisation of illegal contents and data retention rules at an international level.
There is also a specific mention of the United States and the first amendment to its
constitution, which limits substantially the intervention of the authorities. One Member State
describes the problem of determining the location, for which tracing the IP is required, as
well as competent jurisdiction.
Two Member States refer to the contra-strategies used by terrorists: encryption, which
complicates the task of policemen, especially regarding the respect of investigation
procedures in a democratic society; new technologies such as Skype or WI-FI; measures
complicating the identification of the authors such as proxy servers, anonymizers or pre-paid
SIM cards; the enormous number of connections in little time; the minor providers and their
limited capacities, their cache memory being often switched off.
One Member State mentions the high price of blocking techniques since minor service
providers would be unable to apply them.
Two Member States stress the need to cooperate with internet service providers to access the
information required to identify the authors of the messages while one of them refers to the
lack of will from the side of webmasters of "risky" websites to cooperate with law enforcement
authorities.
Technical problems regarding monitoring the transmission of data among computers are as
well mentioned by one Member State, which also refers to the problem of lengthy procedures.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 93 – Drucksache 16/7769
One Member State refers to the problems of interpretation of the relevant provisions in full
respect of the fundamental right of freedom of expression.
2) Does your country carry out any informal or administrative
monitoring/suppression/restriction on public provocation to commit terrorist offences,
terrorist apology or glorification of terrorist offences or their authors (e.g. blocking of
websites, confiscation of materials, censorship etc)?
And does your country carry out such informal or administrative
monitoring/suppression/restriction on the transmission of expertise on bomb or explosive-
making, preparation of attacks, hostage-taking or other instructions for committing a terrorist
offence?
If so,
i) It would be extremely useful if you could give details including which are the enforcement
bodies (law enforcement authorities, other public administration bodies, private
bodies/independent authorities representing media, service providers or publishers etc), their
method of operation and the perceived benefits.
Eight Member States refer to systematic monitoring of the Internet or systematic collection
of information for terrorism prevention pointing out in most of the cases that the authorities
in charge are police authorities or intelligence services. Three Member States mention the
authorities responsible for mass-media such as radio or TV, for contents disseminated
through those media. One Member State refers to an inspectorate responsible for the
activities of electronic media within the Ministry of Economy. Eight Member States explain
that police authorities act on a case by case basis further to judicial orders or under
supervision of the competent attorney. One Member State states it does not carry out any
measures as those referred to in the question.
ii) We would very much appreciate if you could indicate what problems have been
encountered in carrying out this system:
a) Problems in interpreting the criminal law provisions in question in full respect
of the fundamental right of freedom of expression. We would be particularly grateful if
you could provide us with legal opinions or national jurisprudence as to how the issue
has been dealt with in your countries.
b) Resistance for commercial reasons from media, service providers or
publishers.
c) Law-enforcement difficulties linked to the nature of the internet such as
identifying the source or eliminating the illegal content.
d) Others. Please, kindly provide further details in this case.
Only one Member State answered, indicating the different process to close-down a site with
illegal content depending on its location: national territory, UE Member State or third
country. In last case, everything would depend on a principal problem the problem of sites
Drucksache 16/7769 – 94 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
hosted in a third country, as the success would depend on the cooperation agreements with
the country in question.
Some Member States, however, had already answered this question in their replies to question
1(ii) which is indeed closely connected.
3) Does your country maintain data or studies on public provocation to commit terrorist
offences, terrorist apology or glorification of terrorist offences or their authors that it
would be willing to make available for the elaboration of the proposal for a modification
of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2001 on combating terrorism or for the
development of further EU legislation in this area? The Commission will respect any
security restrictions specified on the publication and dissemination of such information.
And does your country maintain such data or studies on the transmission of expertise on
bomb or explosives-making, preparation of attacks, hostage-taking or other instructions
for the commission of a terrorist offence?
Most Member States stated that they do not have specific or separated data or studies on the
transmission of terrorist propaganda as well as bomb-making and other terrorist expertise.
Yet, one Member State explained that Service of Postal and Communication Police stores
data and information concerning the results of investigation and monitoring of
communication systems and services on the relevant subjects. Another Member State referred
to its action plan against radicalisation including a contact point "Internet". Finally, one
Member State pointed out a data base specifically on terrorist offences that would be willing
to make available.
4) Considering the unique position of the EU to help tackle what is often a cross-border
issue, with protagonists in different countries, and information flowing freely between
different jurisdictions, does your country consider there is a need for more detailed/further
reaching legislation dealing with both terrorist propaganda and the transmission of bomb or
explosives-making expertise ?
The answers given by Member States have been compiled in the tables below.
Need to
revise the
Framework
Decision
No
answer/open
answer
No Yes Yes only
regarding
terrorist
propaganda
Yes only regarding
bomb-making and
other terrorist
expertise
Member
States
3
7
5
1
2
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 95 – Drucksache 16/7769
If so;
i) It would be extremely useful if you could indicate which of these options you think is
preferable:
a) Limit the scope of this legislation to the circulation of terrorist propaganda and
transmission of expertise on bomb or explosives-making, preparation of attacks, hostage-
taking or other instructions for the commission of a terrorist offence through the internet
since the use of this channel for terrorist purposes is undoubtedly much higher than that of
any other media and very often, there is not appropriate legislation covering the internet.
b) Extend the scope of the legislation to the circulation of terrorist propaganda and
transmission of expertise on bomb or explosives-making, preparation of attacks, hostage-
taking or other instructions for the commission of a terrorist offence through all media,
including the press and broadcasters, assuming that the study of Member State's legislation
on the latter makes us conclude that there is a need to modernise these rules in order to adapt
them to present day forms of terrorism.
options
None of the given
options/open answer
a b
Member
States
9
3
6
ii) We would be extremely grateful if you could tell us whether your country considers that the
Framework Decision of 13 June 2001 on combating terrorism should be modified so that
public provocation to commit terrorist offences, terrorist apology or glorification of terrorist
offences or their authors are punishable in all Member States.
If so, please kindly indicate which of the following options is preferable in your view:
a) Make punishable the public provocation directly advocating a specific terrorist offence.
b) Make punishable the public provocation to commit terrorist offences in line with the
Convention on the prevention of terrorism of the Council of Europe (directly or indirectly
advocating terrorist offences with the risk that one or more offences can be committed).
c) Make punishable the apology/glorification of terrorism.
Options None of the a b c
given
options/open
Drucksache 16/7769 – 96 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
answer
Member States 13
2
3
iii) It would be extremely useful if you could indicate whether your country considers
that the Framework Decision of 13 June 2001 on combating terrorism should be
modified so that transmission of expertise on bomb or explosives-making preparation of
attacks, hostage-taking or other instructions for the commission of a terrorist offence is
punishable in all Member States.
If so, please kindly specify which options would be preferable in your view:
a) Make punishable all transmission of such expertise.
b) Make punishable only the transmissions made with terrorist intent.
c) Impose criminal liability only on the transferor.
d) Impose criminal liability only on the transferee.
d) Impose criminal liability on both of the parties involved.
Options None of the
options
given/open
answer
a b c d e
Member States 13
4
1
ii) Does your country consider that it would be preferable to address the issue of terrorist
propaganda by using first pillar legislation so that public provocation to commit terrorist
offences, terrorist apology or glorification of terrorist offences or their authors would not be
punishable under criminal law but restricted or sanctioned under internal market and/or
media legislation?
And does your country consider the use of such legislation preferable to address the issue of
transmission of bomb or explosives-making expertise through the media?
The vast majority of Member States agree that it would be preferable to address the subject
through legislation under the third pillar.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 97 – Drucksache 16/7769
5) Apart from the possibility of more detailed/further reaching legislation to address the
issues of terrorist propaganda and transmission of bomb or explosive-making expertise,
would your country like to see the EU, with Europol in the operational sphere, play a
greater role in coordinating the efforts of the Member States in order to develop joint
monitoring of the internet, co-ordinated notification of and closure of websites, unified
negotiating position in relation to internet service providers or any other initiative in this
area? If so, could you please specify which role?
All Member States stress the importance of coordinating the efforts of Member States in
fighting the use of the Internet with terrorist purposes. Eight Member States refer to the co-
operation with Europol, two of them also mention Eurojust and one of them Sit-Cen. Several
express their support to the Germany's Check the Web proposal.
One Member State highlights the role of the EU might have in co-operating with Internet
Service Providers and negotiate with third countries, in particular with the USA, where most
of the Internet sites are hosted. It also points out the need to reflect, at an international level,
on the sensitive material often exposed on Internet sites by administration and particulars as
well as on the exchange and sale of e-bay.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 98 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
ANNEX II: REPLIES TO THE SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE ADDRESSED TO CIVIL SOCIETY,
INDUSTRY AND MEDIA
As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that eight of the answers have not followed the
questionnaire but have given a general reply expressing their main concerns or raising their
interests.
In this sense, the following recurrent points should be highlighted:
Regarding Media Associations
� Concern for the respect of human rights and, in particular, freedom of
speech: by attempting to increase security, the EU can undermine civil liberties
and damage the basic role of the media in democratic societies. Fearful of
terrorism, the EU might adopt measures leading to censorship or simple ignorance
of the facts on the ground.
� Need to return to defence of human rights, reinforce freedom of speech and
strengthen quality and ethical journalism. The weapons against terrorism are
reason, information, debate and wisdom. To achieve this objective, we need free
and responsible media.
� The EU should strictly respect the editorial independency of the media. There
should not be government control on editorial content. State-led measures
disguised as self-regulation will not be supported.
� The EU should not introduce any new measures on freedom of expression
and information in the media unless strictly necessary and proportionate in a
democratic society. It should check carefully whether existing regulation or
measures are not enough. In particular, the EU should refrain from adopting
measures equating media reporting on terrorism with support for terrorism.
Too widely formulated provisions on incitement might end up applying to
journalists and media. Special concern causes in this sense the criminalisation of
glorification of terrorism.
� No need to define "incitement" at EU level. The Framework Decision should be
confined to setting the goals and leave specific measures and means to the
Member States.
� Need to enhance human and technical means available for the detection and
elimination of that kind of threat while respecting Rule of Law and the
Human Rights.
Regarding Associations of internet service providers and telecommunications operators
� According to the e-commerce Directive, Internet Service Providers do not
disseminate information but are mere conduits, not liable for information
transmitted over the services they provide. Similarly, under the same instrument,
they are not liable for the information they host unless they have actual knowledge
of illegal material and fail to take steps to remove it.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 99 – Drucksache 16/7769
� A concern regarding the eventual intention of the EU to use blocking
techniques to tackle terrorist contents.
� The decision regarding the legality of contents disseminated through the
Internet should not be left to Internet Service Providers.
� Offer for further dialogue and co-operation to develop feasible, appropriate
and effective tools to fight terrorist contents on the Internet. Possibilities of
public-private partnership would include further training and support for law
enforcement by Internet Service Providers and development of technology
directly assisting law enforcement authorities in their work.
Technical points
� The Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of the Council of Europe builds
on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and contains several
clauses of safeguard of freedom of expression, i.e. Articles 12 and 21, ensuring its
full compliance with human rights.
� Incitement to terrorism should be a criminal offence only where there is a criminal
intention and the speech concerned causes the commission of a terrorist act or the
imminent risk of such a commission.
Concerning the detailed answers, they have been compiled below:
1. How would you assess the effectiveness of Article 4 of the Framework Decision on
Combating Terrorism, and of its implementation in Member States, against inciting,
aiding or abetting a terrorist offence as defined by the Framework Decision itself?
One answer notes that effectiveness must be seen as preventing terrorist activity or preventing
dangerous dissemination of terrorist materials, yet respecting the freedom of speech of
individuals and the media to be able to report on the events.
Other reply points out its complexity and danger as verbalising ideas might become a crime.
Another one stresses that the scope should not be extended to include conducts such as
apology, encouragement, justification or glorification of terrorism. Broadly worded offences
may have a chilling effect in inhibiting a constructive debate.
2. Could you provide any information or examples that in your view demonstrate how
Article 4 fails to cover certain terrorist offences or, on the contrary, information or
examples demonstrating how this provision applies to cases which should not be
considered as a terrorist offence?
According to one of the answers, the main point is not how to legislate, but how to apply the
law. It refers to the example of a Portuguese court which failed to prevent a terrorist threat,
releasing a terrorist suspect, who was only condemned to leave the country.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 100 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Another reply shows its concern about the description of the intentional element of a terrorist
offence under Article 1 of the Framework Decision "unduly compelling a Government or an
international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act" since "any act"
might cover an act of publishing. Nevertheless, it notes that there have not been specific
problems up-to-date.
Otherwise, it is noted that too wide competences of criminal investigation may hinder
journalists in their profession.
3. What are your views with regard to the fact that there is no legal definition of
incitement in the Framework Decision?
The lack of definition of incitement in the Framework Decision is generally not regarded as
problematic. Different reasons are given: the Framework Decision does not apply directly but
must be implemented by Member States so that national law can provide for legal certainty; a
case-by-case system, sufficiently open for the judge is considered preferable to too exhaustive
provisions, or there is no need for a uniform definition of incitement, generally understood as
public instigation.
One answer explains that properly defined and applied, offences of incitement to acts of
terrorism are sufficient to criminalise indirect incitement, without resort to broader offences
of apology, glorification, justification or encouragement of terrorism. It adds that if
“incitement” in Article 4 were to be broadly defined to include glorification, justification or
encouragement of terrorism then this, combined with the wide definition of terrorism and the
range of terrorism offences to which it would apply, would make the scope of the prohibition
under the Framework Decision highly indeterminate, in breach of the principle of legality,
and would risk disproportionate or discriminatory interference with rights to freedom of
expression. In order to safeguard against such over-broad definitions at a national level, an
express clarification that incitement under Article 4 should be limited on the basis of the
Johannesburg Principles would be beneficial.
4. a) What are your views with regard to Article 5 of the recently adopted Council
of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005) in which the public
provocation to commit a terrorist offence is defined as: "the distribution or
otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite
the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly
advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may
be committed"?
b) Please, if possible, complement your answer by assessing the impact that the
implementation of such a provision might have on you as an industry, association,
organization or body concerned, or the impact that it might have on civil society in
general.
Two replies noted that the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of the Council of
Europe was elaborated bearing in mind the relevant case-law of the European Court of
Human Rights and after conducting a survey of relevant national law and practice on
incitement. Furthermore, it contains several clauses of safeguard of freedom of expression,
i.e. Articles 12 and 21, ensuring its full compliance with human rights.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 101 – Drucksache 16/7769
One of the replies points out that, in order to effectively protect freedom of expression, the
Article 5 requirement that conduct should cause a “danger” of a terrorist offence should be
interpreted as requiring a real and imminent risk of such an offence in the particular
circumstances of the case, rather than a mere abstract danger.
One answer fears misinterpretations of the provision having a negative effect on the media.
Another answer goes further, considering that a provision that criminalises the behaviour of
transmitting a "terrorist" message on the sole basis that it causes a danger jeopardises
freedom of information. This reply also insists on the role of media to disseminate knowledge
on terrorist deeds so that a critical debate on terrorism can take place.
One reply notes that the resource to propaganda has shown as one of the most efficient
weapons of terrorist groups as Al-Qaeda, that must be fought by all the means. This task of
prevention implies the existence of permanent teams on the Net, which can interact in the sites
of propaganda, identifying authors and places of diffusion.
5. a) What are your views with regard to the analysis made in the Explanatory
Report to the above mentioned Council of Europe Convention that the above-
quoted provision would cover:
- dissemination of messages praising the perpetrator of an attack
- denigration of victims
- calls for funding terrorist organisations
- other similar behaviour
b) Please, if possible, complement your answer by assessing the impact that the
implementation of a provision explicitly forbidding the dissemination of one or more of
the abovementioned messages might have on you as an industry, association,
organization, or body concerned, or the impact that it might have on civil society in
general.
One of the replies notes that such acts are committed with intent to incite acts of terrorism,
and where they lead directly to an act of terrorism or the imminent risk of such an act, they
can legitimately be criminalised. Conversely, however, where such acts are not committed
with the requisite intent, and do not lead to an act of terrorism or the immanent risk of such
an act, their criminalisation would not serve a pressing social need and would risk non-
compliance with Article 10 ECHR.
One reply opposes to such interpretation and wonders who is held responsible if someone
posts a message on the website of a media company. It also notes that "other similar
behaviour" it too a wide expression.
A last reply indicates that "denigration of victims" and "calls for funding terrorist
organisations" are punishable in Germany. It adds that "messages praising the perpetrator of
an attack" should not be punished if disseminated in the context of an objective, critical report
whose sole basis is to meet the public's request for information.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 102 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
6. Are there any other situations that, in your view, could also be covered by a
provision of this type addressing indirect incitement to commit terrorist offences?
Are there any situations that, in your view, should not be covered by a provision of
this type?
One reply considers that the situations in which indirect incitement to acts of terrorism is
criminalised, should be limited to situations where there is a subjective intent to incite, and an
imminent risk that an act of terrorism will result from the incitement. Where these criteria are
fulfilled, and where the offence is based on a determinate and adequately circumscribed
definition of terrorism, and is applied in a way that is non-discriminatory, there is likely to be
compliance with human rights law. It further enumerates five situations that should be
excluded from any provision on incitement to terrorism:
• Explanation of circumstances surrounding the resort to terrorist acts – for example,
expression of understanding of the desperation of those who resort to suicide bombing in
response to a repressive regime;
• Teaching and academic or media debate on the political situation in countries where there
is armed opposition to the government, or concerning ideologies grounding terrorist
movements;
• Debate within immigrant communities of the political situations in home countries where
there is internal conflict or terrorist violence, including constructive debate on how to
counter an oppressive or undemocratic regime;
• Dissemination – including by the media and by human rights organisations – of
information on violations of human rights by a government, or criticism of a government
for violations of human rights, for example those committed in suppressing a terrorist threat
or in the course of an internal armed conflict;
• Media or NGO reporting of statements by terrorist groups, where such reporting is not
intended to incite terrorism.
Another reply states that any prevention of general news reporting would have a grave effect
on the freedom of the press. Any attempt by governments to silence critical voices is a
concern. The situations that should not be covered by a provision of this type are: news
gathering, investigation and reporting, editorial comment. A similar reply adds teaching to
these forms of behaviours not to be covered by this kind of provision.
One answer stresses the existence of such indirect attempt in nowadays terrorist activity.
7. Could you provide any information/analysis/assessment on the compatibility
between freedom of expression and the notion of incitement, whether direct or
indirect, to commit terrorist offences? Would you have any information/analysis
on concrete cases examined by the competent authorities or Courts?
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 103 – Drucksache 16/7769
One of the answers points out the necessary respect of the principle of legality, the principle
of proportionality and the absence of discrimination. It further notes the importance of the
authoritative standards set out in the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom
of Expression and Access to Information. They should provide the benchmark for offences of
incitement to acts of terrorism, including European law. Principle 6, in particular, states that:
“Expression may be punished as a threat to national security only if a government can
demonstrate that:
(a) the expression is intended to incite imminent violence;
(b) it is likely to incite such violence;
(c) there is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood or
occurrence of such violence.”
Another answer stresses that it is an extremely delicate frontier. It points out that it is
necessary to decide in a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the context.
One answer claims that It is not always possible for reporters to fully foresee the results that
their reporting will have. This is where the public interest test comes in, twinned with
editorial responsibility. Freedom of expression should be guaranteed for the press media in
all circumstances. Journalists do have a right to inform the public about events that are
outlawed, or indeed inform on information that is restricted if it is in the public interest to do
so.
Another answer notes that journalistic activity cannot be considered as direct or indirect
incitement unless especial personal circumstances provide evidence of this.
8. a) Could you provide any information/analysis/assessment on how Member
States' legal systems deal with the question of the glorification and/or the apology
of terrorism or terrorist offences?
b) If, for instance, a specific incrimination exists, how is such behaviour defined
and how is the compatibility with freedom of expression guaranteed?
One association notes that the treatment varies widely from Member State to Member State
and it is difficult to generalise. It claims that several of its members would have had problems
with the national legislation relating to terrorism. It emphasises how difficult it would be to
develop a definition of glorification of terrorism at a EU level and the associated difficulties it
would entail for freedom of speech.
One reply expresses concern at the emerging trend for national implementation measures to
go further than is required by Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention and thereby
impose unnecessary and unjustifiable restrictions on rights to freedom of expression. It adds
that the political invocation of international law obligations to prevent terrorism as a
justification for measures restrictive of human rights, to an extent that is not justified by the
terms of international agreements on terrorism, is of particular concern.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 104 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
One answer states that the Occidental legal systems have become heavy and slow. The
current legislation referred to crimes related to terrorist activity constitutes some innovation
in a controversial field where the human rights of the suspects are in fact respected.
Another reply explains that every criminal act have to be interpreted in accordance with the
constitution.
One answer stresses that the mere act of publishing information about the ingredients of such
devices should not be considered as a criminal act. It should not be illegal for the media to
show film footage from terrorist camps or on how to make bombs in the interests of reporting.
Another reply points out that, more than the legal treatment, what matters is the means to
identify and consequently deactivate such sources of information.
A last reply details that if the action serves the purposes of art, science, research, teaching or
reporting on current affairs or past events, it does not constitute a criminal offence according
to German law.
10. Which one or more of the acts in the list below would you qualify as "other
terrorist expertise"? Should you think that certain acts should be added to or
removed from the list, kindly specify them and motivate your answer.
- in general, terrorist manuals or handbooks
- instructions on how to conduct hostage-taking
- instructions on how to create a terrorist cell
- recipes for making poisons
- instructions on how to make or utilise terrorist weapons (eg CBRN weapons) or
a weapon of mass destruction
One association agrees with all elements on the list but points out that may be other that are
9. a) Could you provide any information/analysis/assessment on how Member
States' legal systems deal with the question of transmission of bomb-making or
other terrorist expertise, as well as any exceptions in pre-defined legitimate
circumstances?
b) If, for instance, a specific incrimination exists, how is such behaviour
defined and how is the compatibility with freedom of expression guaranteed?
Kindly provide concrete examples if possible.
unknown.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 105 – Drucksache 16/7769
Another association states that it is important not to be over-reaching to such an extent that
people don’t receive information that is factually useful for them to be able to inform
themselves against the dangers that are existing.
11. Please, if possible, assess the impact that the implementation of a provision
explicitly forbidding the transmission of bomb-making expertise or one or more or
the abovementioned categories of "terrorism expertise" has or might have on you,
as an industry, organization or body concerned, or the impact that it might have on
civil society in general.
The effects, points out one answer, depending on the way in which the provision is worded,
could hinder the freedom of the press to report on terrorist acts, or to report on terrorist
cases before the court. It would be unwise to enter into the territory of banning the factual
element of information to the public, at the risk of being too restrictive of public information
and infringing the right to receive information as protected by Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
Another answers states that, since the dissemination of "terrorism expertise" may have
extremely pernicious consequences, the detection and close down of websites containing such
information is an urgent need.
A last reply indicates that media in Germany are already bound by constitutional order,
general legislation and rules for the protection of youth and personal honour, so that their
activities are already limited by criminal law. In addition, journalists are adequately bound
by voluntary undertakings to take responsible action. As for the danger that media
involuntarily promote terrorist aims, such indirect effect of reporting could only be
completely prevented by unacceptable methods that would significantly restrict the use of the
Internet and completely prohibit reporting on terrorism.
12. Could you provide any information/analysis/assessment on whether Member
States'legal systems differentiate between various types of media in relation to
inciting tocommit, aiding or abetting terrorist offences and restricting the
transmission of bomb-making or other terrorist expertise?
Another reply explains that to their knowledge, newspapers are not treated differently to other
media and adds that it cannot support any extension of police powers into the realms of
preventing publication of news reporting whether electronically or in print.
One reply points out Great-Britain as the example of how working jointly, authorities and
Media, can keep the society informed.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 106 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
13. Keeping in mind the generic nature of Framework Decisions of the EU, how
would you view the possibility of amending article 4 of the EU Framework
Decision on Combating Terrorism in order to achieve the following:
- strengthen the prevention of incitement, aiding and abetting commit
terrorist attacks, particularly via the internet
- avoid unjustified or abusive incrimination of acts or behaviour which
should not be considered as terrorist offences
One answer stresses the two important points are the human and technical means available
for the detention of that kind of threat and always respect Rule of Law and the Universal
Declaration of the Human Rights.
Another replay points out they would accept amendments that avoid as far as possible any
unjustified or abusive criminalisation of acts or behaviours that should not be considered as
terrorist offences, especially where this endangers the media investigation, news gathering,
reporting, exchange of comment, opinion, taste, or suchlike on any press media platform.
Another answer states that the Decision 7/06 of the OSCE Ministerial Council points out an
important first step with regard to online content, calling on participating States “…when
requested to deal with content that is illegal under their national legislation and is hosted
within their jurisdiction, to take all appropriate action against such content and to co-operate
with other interested States, in accordance with their national legislation and the rule of law,
and in line with their international obligations, including international human rights law.”
Another reply explains that German criminal law the distribution of written communications
is on a par with the distribution of sound and image carriers, data storage devices,
illustrations and other depictions and is sanctioned in the same way as incitement to criminal
offences via the Internet. It is therefore unnecessary to specifically include actions that take
place via the Internet. In addition, this replies comments that unfounded suspicion is
adequately countered in that incitement is only punishable if it takes place intentionally.
14. How would you address the particular difficulty of implementing Article 4 of the
Framework Decision with respect to internet content?
The replies stress that the solution does not lie in the updating of the Framework Decision in
terms of its detailing but it mainly concerns finding sophisticated technical solutions that
would enable fulfilment of the Framework Decision. The question should thus be dealt at the
level of assignment of the human and technical resources.
A last reply notes that German Internet law provide for a differentiated system that responds
to the Internet-specific difficulty of foreign content being stored on own servers or on an
access provider's servers without the provider being able to thoroughly check all the content.
The Framework Decision, the reply continues, should be therefore confined to setting goals
and should leave specific measures and means to the Member States.
15. Please feel free to provide any further comments you might have on the subject.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 107 – Drucksache 16/7769
Two remarks should be noted:
� The need to safeguard the current occidental legal system and the focus on
technical and human means available for prevention and combat of terrorism.
� The media should never be encouraged by policymakers to practice any kind of
self-censorship.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 108 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
ANNEX III: REPLIES TO THIRD QUESTIONNAIRE ADDRESSED TO EUROPOL, CEPOL AND
EUROJUST
As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that most answers have not followed the
questionnaire but have given a general reply expressing their main concerns or raising their
interests.
In this sense, the following recurrent points of the replies from Eurojust and the
European Judicial Network93 should be highlighted:
� The present subject certainly constitutes a political urgency. Terrorist suspects are
active on the Internet, disseminating their message, taking part in chat-forums, using email
and downloading terrorist or radical material. In major investigations an enormous amount
of digital material has been seized.
� Need for translators and technical expertise for monitoring radical material on the
Internet- Need for enhancing instruction and training of law enforcement authorities.
Presently, law enforcement authorities lack of capacity and expertise, processing and
interpreting the radical websites in question is an enormous time-consuming and labour-
intensive process, because of the quantity of the material and the languages in which the
documents have been established. Experiences on the field show that for the successful
implementation of this task it is necessary (thorough) knowledge of the Arab language and
culture. The capacity at European level for interpreting radical websites should be
improved. Attention should also be given on the possibilities of innovative detection
methods for the internet surveillance.
� Need for proper legislation so that law enforcement authorities are not hindered by
lack of legal provisions. Outlawing internet websites supporting terrorist views would be
a good step forward (designating as terrorist crimes the offences of sedition, dissemination
of seditious writings and fomenting hatred). The dissemination or possession of bomb-
making and similar expertise in itself is not considered a criminal offence in itself in
several Member States but needs the intention of the transferor to facilitate to commit a
crime or offence which the transferee should plan or commit. It might be assimilated to
child pornography and become a criminal offence in itself (designating as terrorist crimes
the possession and dissemination of terrorist material such as instructions for making
bombs).
� Particular difficulties to trace suspects when the radical material is hosted in
countries lacking appropriate legislation. Sometimes, these countries lack of ability or
willing and are reluctant to prosecute or extradite a certain individuals.
� Need to respect human rights and freedom of speech in particular. Certain measures
are bound to be more intrusive and would sometimes limit individual rights but their
impact will be limited by their legality, proportionality and necessity in a democratic
society.
93 European Judicial Network has not sent a unified answer but several replies from three of its Members.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 109 – Drucksache 16/7769
� Interventions on the Internet Notice and take down of radical internet sites and/or
radical material remain laborious until now. In addition, after the radical thinking and
terrorist material is taken down from a website, it re-appears very easily on another
website. A more universal application of the Cyber-crime convention may improve the
success of prosecutions.
� Need of dialogue with internet service providers, trying to bring about agreements to
improve detection and tracing of radical material and its authors. Importance of the Data
retention Directive, which requires Internet Service Providers and telecom operators to
keep details of their subscribers' communication for up to two years.
Concerning the detailed answer forwarded by Europol, it has been summarised below:
1. How would you assess the ability of law enforcement authorities in Member States and
your own organisation if applicable to respond to the use of new technologies and especially
of the internet for terrorist purposes?
The ability of law enforcement authorities in Member States to respond to the use of new
technologies and especially of the Internet for terrorism purposes is not homogenous and
depends on several factors:
� Evaluation of the threat directly related to each Member State’s experience in the field
of terrorism. There is an important difference between those who have and those who have
not experienced national terrorism.
� Law enforcement authorities’ action against propaganda website is very limited due to
the fact that most of these are located outside the remit of the national legislation.
Websites have such a short lifespan that by the time a legal action is brought through the
international legal channels, they will have disappeared.
Factors to be considered also include the diversity of policing within the Member States
regarding:
� the legal mandate of concerned law enforcement authorities
� the monetary, technical and personal resources available
� the quality & training of respective law enforcement officers
� the technical equipment & standards at their disposal
� the language & translation capabilities of the staff
� the standardisation of information exchange
� the handling, processing, storing & forwarding of data
2. How would you assess, in particular, the ability of law enforcement authorities in Member
States and your own organisation if applicable to respond to the dissemination of terrorist
propaganda and bomb-making and other terrorism expertise through the internet? Do you
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consider that this ability could improve by modifying the existing legal framework and the
Framework Decision on combating terrorism in particular?
The ability of law enforcement in Member States to respond to the dissemination of
terrorism related information via the Internet is very limited. Their task depends on codified
constitutional and/or national law. While the administrators of the websites are most often
outside the EU and thus out of reach, this leaves law enforcement with the issue, at MS level,
of policing the individual use on a local computer and perhaps the network to which the
system is connected.
Besides, resources are scarce. Therefore Member States critically need to evaluate and direct
their efforts properly.
The use of the Internet for terrorism support or activities clearly identifies how the law
enforcement network is divided in terms of competencies:
� When proactive Internet policing is conducted on a long term base, which is usually
conducted by intelligence services, to detect and monitor the movement of Islamist
websites. The likelihood of detection and identification of the website administration
increases significantly.
� On the other hand, when Internet policing is conducted by Law enforcement agencies for
the aim of reactive policing, the likelihood of detection and identification of the website
administration decreases because the primary objective is to prevent the crime from
continuing.
3. Could you indicate the main difficulties of the law enforcement authorities in Member
States and your own organisation if applicable, to survey those who disseminate terrorist
propaganda and bomb-making and other terrorist expertise through the internet?
In case your organisation keeps relevant statistics or data, we would be extremely grateful if
you could make them available.
The number of terrorism related websites that need to be monitored in relation to the
potential threat to the European Union and its Member States is huge and the scope of
languages covered by these websites includes many non European languages. The problem of
efficient website evaluation and assessment through native speakers continues to be a
major one. Not only have the officers in charge to read the language of the website, but also
to speak and to understand the hidden messages of the Islamist extremist terrorism subculture
or the specific content the website is concerned with or intended to address.
4. Could you indicate the main difficulties of law enforcement authorities in Member States
and your own organisation if applicable, to prosecute those who disseminate terrorist
propaganda and bomb-making and other terrorist expertise through the internet?
In case your organisation keeps relevant statistics or data, we would be extremely grateful if
you could make them available.
The main problem of law enforcement to forward a case to be prosecuted in the court of
law is the identification of those who are responsible for the website and its contents.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 111 – Drucksache 16/7769
Because the Internet is virtual and impersonal, the responsible person(s) can hide behind the
medium’s anonymity. Therein harboured is the reasoning of the increasing use of the Internet
being a platform for Islamist propaganda and indoctrination.
To overcome these difficulties, prevention and neutralization of Islamist indoctrination and
propaganda should be a top priority on the agenda of law enforcement agencies and security
or intelligence services alike. Reluctances to share information between both sides need to
be reduced through joint operations.
A way of fighting against anonymity: users should be required to identify themselves to the
provider before going online, at least as far as European jurisdictions are concerned.
5. Which measures, either legislative or not, would in your view be preferable to overcome
the difficulties you have indicated in your answers to questions 3 and 4 above? Please, kindly
detail your answer.
Member States should be encouraged to combat the phenomenon in a consistent effort and
to share the burden. The duplication of efforts and waste of scarce resources can no longer
be accepted. There is an urgent and absolute need to develop a common platform where all
non sensitive material related to the use of the Internet for terrorism support and propaganda
should be pooled and made available to all European Law enforcement agencies. This is what
is intended by the German Presidency’s “Check the Web” initiative. However such an
ambitious project needs to be supported by the intelligence community and legal constraints
related to data protection have to be considered.
Furthermore, resources need to be distributed to develop systematic training with respect to
awareness, phenomenon, expertise, language, research and assessment training of law
enforcement and intelligence institutions officers.
Considering that a wide range of terrorism related websites are out of range of Member
States legislation, there is a need for a common European Union approach towards foreign
States which, knowingly or not, are harbouring terrorism-related websites to have them
establish or change their legislation.
While the European Union maintains a list of proscribed terrorist organisations,
consideration should be given to drafting a list of terrorism-related websites; such a list
should be classified and frequently updated, but it would at least provide an evaluation
instrument at European Union level.
6. Which measures, either legislative or not, would in your view be preferable to improve the
ability of law enforcement authorities in Member States and your own organisation if
applicable, to address the more general threat of the use of new technologies and especially of
the internet for terrorist purposes? Please, kindly detail your answer.
As for Europol, the main constraints in relation to being proactive in monitoring and
disseminating information related to terrorist propaganda on the Internet are:
1. Limitations imposed by the Europol Convention preventing proactive approach when
related to private chat rooms or forums.
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2. Extensive data protection regime related to personal data which hinders free storage
and exchange of assessment of information gathered from the Internet.
7. Concerning the measures you have referred to in your answers to questions 5 and 6:
a Could you estimate their costs for law enforcement authorities in Member States and
your own organisation if applicable, and the need of economic support of the latter?
b) Could you estimate their impact on internet users, and their compatibility with
freedom of expression and the right to respect for private and family life as laid
down in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of the Council of Europe?
c) Could you estimate their impact on the effectiveness of the fight of law enforcement
authorities against terrorism?
a) The estimation of development costs of a common exchange platform needs an in-depth
study, but it would be relatively low and should be considered in relation with the benefit
generated by avoiding duplication of work amongst law enforcement agencies in the Member
States.
b) The question of data protection regime and protection of privacy and family life for
known terrorist who post statements on the Internet calling for mass murder should be
considered.
8. What are your views on the need to enhance the technological and linguistic resources of
law enforcement authorities in Member States and your own organisation if applicable, in
order to improve their ability to monitor the use of the internet for terrorist purposes? Please,
kindly detail your answer.
There is a need for cooperation between law enforcement agencies and the intelligence
community within the European Union and with external partners. The main topics to be
developed would be:
� To exchange information to avoid duplication of work between agencies
� To develop a common platform such as the one foreseen with the German initiative “Check
the web” and with the Europol counter-terrorist Handbook Project, to provide law
enforcement with readily available material.
� To develop technical training to ensure that all Member States have a minimum capability
in the field of monitoring and countering terrorist propaganda on the Internet.
� To provide training for linguists in the relevant languages, including the enhancement of
their cultural knowledge and their understanding of the groups or individuals they are
facing. Thus they would be able to better assess the material found on the Internet.
9. What are your views on the need to strengthen the instruction and training of law
enforcement authorities in Member States and your own organisation if applicable, on the use
of new technologies and especially the internet for terrorist purposes in order to improve their
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 113 – Drucksache 16/7769
ability to respond to the new modus operandi of terrorists groups? Please, kindly detail your
answer.
In the field of communication, the private sector is constantly developing a number of new
technologies. There is a need to monitor these future developments in order to be prepared
when these technologies will be on the market. For this purpose, a good cooperation between
the concerned agencies and the private sector is required. Information gathered should in
turn be made available to all Member States to avoid discrepancies in their respective
capabilities.
10. Concerning the enhancement of technological and linguistic resources as well as the
strengthening of instruction and training as referred to in questions 8 and 9 above:
a) Could you estimate their costs for law enforcement authorities in the Member States and
your own organisation if applicable, and the need of economic support of the latter?
b) Could you estimate their impact on the effectiveness of the fight of law authorities against
terrorism?
It is not possible to assess the cost or impact of these measures without a proper study.
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ANNEX IV: INSUFFICIENCY OF EU AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION APPLICABLE TO THE
DISSEMINATION OF TERRORIST PROPAGANDA AND TERRORIST EXPERTISE
Table of contents
1. The Framework Decision on combating terrorism
1.1 Article 2
a. The provision in the Framework Decision
b. National provisions implementing Article 2
1.2 Article 4
a. The provision in the Framework Decision
b. Doctrinal background: participation and authorship in comparative law
c. National provisions implementing Article 4
13. Additional national legislation
1.4 Conclusions
2. Other relevant instruments
1. The Framework Decision on combating terrorism
The question addressed in this Annex is whether the Framework Decision on combating
terrorism covers the transmission of both terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise, in
particular through the Internet. It is easy to verify that neither "terrorist propaganda" nor
"terrorist expertise” are explicitly referred to in the instrument referred to. Nevertheless, it is
more complex to examine whether such forms of behaviour are in fact covered by some of its
provisions. Articles 2 (offences relating to a terrorist group) and 4 (inciting, aiding or abetting,
and attempting) should be examined in this respect.
1.1 Article 2
a. The provision in the Framework Decision
Article 2 of the Framework Decision reads as follows:
"Offences related to a terrorist group,
1. For the purposes of this Framework Decision, "terrorist group" shall mean: a structured
group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to
commit terrorist offences. "Structured group" shall mean a group that is not randomly formed
for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined
roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.
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2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following
intentional acts are punishable:
(a) directing a terrorist group;
(b) participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or
material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that
such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group."
It will therefore be examined whether the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist
expertise fully or partially fit in "participating in the activities of a terrorist group with
knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the
terrorist group".
Two preliminary remarks can be made on Article 2(2) (b) before trying to answer the question
above. Firstly, "supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any
way" constitute mere examples of a non exhaustive enumeration. Secondly, the "knowledge
of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist
group" represents a compulsory requirement for any participation. Actually, this requirement
comprises two requisites: not only must the participation contribute to the criminal activities
of the terrorist group but the offender must also be aware of this.
For further clarification, The Commission Staff Working Paper annexed to the Report from
the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on
combating terrorism (hereafter, the "report") provides for an interpretation of this provision on
its page 14 reproduced below:
"From the Commission’s point of view the rationale behind this provision is to provide for
offences related to terrorist groups as independent criminal facts. Although this is not
explicitly mentioned in the Framework Decision, it still derives from the logic of the
instrument; as such offences they are specifically referred to in relation to inciting, aiding and
abetting, have been assigned specific minimum-maximum penalties, may lead to the liability
of legal persons or must be covered by rules on jurisdiction. Moreover the drafting of Article
2(2) (b) uses an extremely wide and open formula designed to embrace not only membership
in a terrorist organisation but any other acts of assistance likely to contribute to the criminal
activities of the group, even if undertaken by those who do not belong to or can not be proven
to be members of the organisation. In addition this participation, as described in the
Framework Decision, is not necessarily linked to the commission of specific terrorist
offences, not even as concerns the intentional element. In this sense, the aim of Article 2(2)
(b) is to ensure that those who through their actions, contribute to the development of a
terrorist group may be prosecuted, even if such actions have no direct link with the
commission of specific offences. To prevent an excessive incrimination, it is required that the
offender acts with the knowledge that by his actions he will contribute, in general, to the
criminal activities of the group. Should the intention to contribute to a specific offence be
required, there would be no added value in relation to the general rules on criminal
participation."
Despite this broad interpretation, it is doubtful that public provocation to commit terrorist
offences, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism through the internet are covered
by Article 2(2) (b). Such propaganda aims at increasing the number of either supporters or
violent activists but it is not linked to a particular terrorist group. There are many examples of
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this kind of activity94 that must be explained in the context of an increasingly decentralised
terrorist activity, favoured by the Internet95: the modern terrorist network and particularly that
of the global Djihadist movement, has no hierarchy anymore. It consists of a sum of lightly
structured cells, sometimes linked to the network, sometimes independent96. Only one part of
radical websites spread information about a specific terrorist group; the rest are concerned
with the general movement of Djihad97.
Something different is the case of terrorist propaganda, when it aims at the recruitment of new
members into a terrorist group as well as the financing of a terrorist group. The explicit
mentioning of terrorism funding as a form of participation leads to the conclusion that those
collecting such funding should, with more reason, be considered as participants. The same
goes for recruitment: if membership is a crime those recruiting new members should be
punished even more seriously. However, the transmission of messages of propaganda aiming
at collecting funds or recruiting new members is not strictly the same as actual fund-raising or
recruiting.
In order to consider that both types of messages referred to here are in fact covered by Article
2, it might be argued that they represent an attempt at fund-raising and recruitment. However,
Article 4 on inciting, aiding or abetting and attempting does not oblige Member States to
ensure that attempting to commit an offence referred to in Article 2 is made punishable.
As for the transmission of terrorist expertise, we should highlight, firstly, that Article 2(2) (b)
refers explicitly to “supplying information” as a way to participate in the activities of a
terrorist group, which seems to suit perfectly the transmission of terrorism expertise.
However, the requirement of contributing to the criminal activities of a terrorist group
provides for a major threshold. In this sense, the transmission of expertise to an undetermined
audience, such as online manuals posted in websites or chat-forums falls outside of the scope
of Article 2(2) (b). And the same would apply to instructions addressed to specific potential
recruits who, although they might be determined, by definition are not yet members of a
terrorist group. This interpretation rules out a significant part of the transmission of terrorist
expertise from the scope of application of Article 2. Furthermore, since the information
supplied must "contribute to the terrorist activities of a terrorist group", it could be argued that
terrorist expertise addressed to the members of a terrorist group but not useful for the criminal
activities of that particular group would not be covered.
However, the dissemination of terrorist expertise to an undetermined audience or potential
recruits may be punished a posteriori, if such information was actually accessed by the
members of a terrorist group or the potential recruit joins a terrorist group and, in both cases,
the said information contributes to the activities of the group.
It seems that a significant part of the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and
terrorist expertise, amounting to public provocation to commit terrorist offences,
recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism, is – as such - not punishable under
Article 2. However, the dissemination of terrorist propaganda may be punished a posteriori,
insofar as recipients are actually recruited into a terrorist group or provide for funding for a
94 See, i.e. “The use of the Internet by Islamic extremists”, mentioned above, pp. 9 and 11.
95
See “Terrorist use of the Internet and fighting back”, mentioned above, p. 11.
96 See "L'usage d'Internet à des fins terrorists", mentioned above, p. 5.
97 See “Jihadism online – A study of how Al-Quida and radical Islamist groups use the Internet for
terrorist purposes”, mentioned above, p. 15.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 117 – Drucksache 16/7769
terrorist group. The dissemination of terrorist expertise is punishable as long as it is addressed
to the members of a terrorist group and contributes to their criminal activities. The
dissemination of terrorist expertise addressed to undetermined audience or to potential recruits
may also be punishable a posteriori, if such information was accessed by the members of a
terrorist group and contributes to its criminal activities.
b. National provisions implementing Article 2
First of all, the assessment of the first evaluation report should be examined98. Although it
does not explore this question in particular, it analyses the content and scope of the different
national provisions, which is useful for our purposes.
Some of the national provisions examined in the first evaluation report seem to have a broader
scope than that of Article 2(2) (b). Germany and Portugal incriminate the "support" for
respectively terrorist organisations and groups. However, Germany does not define the term
and Portugal limits itself to reproduce the examples of participation of the Framework
Decision. Germany, in addition, punishes those who recruit for a terrorist group. The United
Kingdom punishes "inviting support" for proscribed organisation besides “belonging or
professing to belong” to it while in Spain performing, requesting or facilitating any act of
collaboration with the activities or purposes of a terrorist group constitutes an offence. In
Austria, participation in a terrorist group consists of “taking part in its activities by supplying
information or assets or in some other way in the knowledge that, by doing so, he is furthering
the group or its offences”. Ireland incriminates the provision of assistance to a terrorist group.
Finally, Italy and France condemn the participation in a terrorist group, using the terminology
of Article 2, but they do not define it or include the requirement of “knowledge of the fact that
such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group”, which might
also amount to a broader scope99.
Concerning the information submitted in view of the second evaluation report, which is
currently under elaboration, Member States already evaluated in the previous report have not
forwarded new relevant provisions in this respect. However, the implementing provisions
submitted by the Member States not yet evaluated constitute relevant information. Some of
them seem to have a broader scope than that of Article 2(2) (b). For example, Luxembourg
legislation punishes those that consciously and willingly participate actively in a terrorist
group as well as those participating in the preparation or commission of a licit activity by a
terrorist group, knowing that their participation will contribute to its objectives. Cyprus
incriminates not only “involvement” in a terrorist group but also “support”, which is very
broadly defined, covering both providing services and offering to provide them. Slovenian
criminal code makes the participation in the activities of a criminal association punishable,
irrespective of the actual commission of the criminal offences, without defining
“participation”. In addition, other Member States incriminate membership or participation
without defining it or including the requirement of Article 2, as it is the case of the
Netherlands or Poland, which may also amount to a broader scope.
98 See Report from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June
2002 on combating terrorism COM(2004) 409, as well as The Commission Staff Working Paper annex
to the Report from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June
2002 on combating terrorism, SEC(2004) 688.
99 See The Commission Staff Working Paper annex to the Report from the Commission based on Article
11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, pp. 10-13.
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Without prejudice to the relevant national case-law, not examined for the elaboration of the
evaluation reports, it seems that various Member States have implemented Article 2 through
provisions that cover the dissemination of terrorist propaganda to a further extent than this
Article requires. In particular, some Member States have eliminated the requirement of
contributing to the criminal activities of the terrorist group included in Article 2; others have
changed it into a broader formula such as the Austrian “in the knowledge that, by doing so, he
is furthering the group or its offences” or have included clarifications such as the Slovenian
“irrespective of the actual commission of criminal offences”. The use of terms such as
“support” or “inviting support” suits even better the transmission of terrorist propaganda
aiming at fund-rising or recruitment. Moreover, most Member States implement Article 4
through generally applicable provisions. As a consequence, attempting offences related to
terrorist groups and, in particular, attempting to recruit members or to rise funding for a
terrorist group would be punishable.
However, most of these national formulas seem to be still limited to propaganda referring to a
terrorist group and resemble Article 2 in the sense that they would not cover messages
intending to gain supporters for the terrorist cause or encourage supporters to engage into
terrorist activity without referring to any terrorist group in particular.
By contrast with the transmission of terrorist propaganda, the national provisions
implementing Article 2 do not seem to imply any significant advance in tackling the
dissemination of terrorist expertise. Taking into consideration that the Framework Decision
already refers to “supplying information” as a way of participation, broader formulas do not
suit better the relevant behaviour. As for the main limit of Article 2 to cover the transmission
of terrorist expertise, i.e. contributing to the criminal activities of a terrorist group, the
situation remains unchanged under national implementing provisions.
National provisions implementing Article 2 of the Framework Decision generally seem
to cover the dissemination of terrorist propaganda to a further extent than this Article
requires. However, general publicity not linked to a specific terrorist group appears to
remain uncovered by the relevant provisions in most Member States. The dissemination
of terrorist expertise does not seem better tackled by Member States' implementing provisions
than by Article 2 of the Framework Decision.
1.2 Article 4
a. The provision in the Framework Decision
Article 4 of the Framework Decision reads as follows:
"Inciting, aiding or abetting, and attempting
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that inciting or aiding or
abetting an offence referred to in Article 1(1), Articles 2 or 3 is made punishable.
2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that attempting to commit
an offence referred to in Article 1(1) and Article 3, with the exception of possession as
provided for in Article 1(1)(f) and the offence referred to in Article 1(1)(i), is made
punishable."
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The question to answer in this case is: does the obligation for Member States to "take the
necessary measures to ensure that inciting or aiding or abetting an offence referred to in
Article 1(1), Articles 2 or 3 is made punishable" cover, either fully or partially, the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda or terrorist expertise?
Some preliminary remarks can be made. First of all, it is important to note that Article 4 refers
to inciting, aiding or abetting not only the terrorist offences laid down in Article 1(1) of the
Framework Decision but also to the offences relating to a terrorist group and offences linked
to terrorist activities under Articles 2 and 3 of the same instrument. The combination of
Articles 2 and 4 may be especially far reaching. For example, since funding the activities of a
terrorist group constitutes a category of participation under Article 2, inciting, aiding or
abetting the funding of terrorist activities falls within the scope of Article 4. And the same
logic applies to the request for all kinds of participation in the activities a terrorist group,
including invitations to become a member. It cannot be stated, however, that all messages
requesting funding or new recruits for a terrorist group are automatically included in the scope
of the provision in question. It is necessary to study the nature of inciting, aiding or abetting
and see, in particular, whether messages that are not addressed to particular recipients but
accessible to anyone in a website or restricted to “members” of a chat forum fit in the concept
of participation.
Secondly, it must be stressed that Article 4 does not constitute an autonomous offence:
inciting, aiding or abetting and attempting are only punished insofar as they are linked to
other offences included in the Framework Decision. In particular, Member States are obliged
to “ensure that inciting, aiding or abetting an offence referred to in Article 1(1), Articles 2 or 3
is made punishable”.
A strict interpretation of the required link to one of these offences would rule out the
application of Article 4 to several messages of terrorist propaganda: for example, those that
glorify suicide-bombers, justify terrorism or generally encourage to join the Djihad.
Nevertheless, even under a broader interpretation, terrorist propaganda aiming at fund-raising
or recruiting cannot be considered automatically covered by Article 4. As explained above, it
will be necessary to study the nature of inciting, aiding or abetting and see whether messages
that are not addressed to particular recipients respond to the concept of participation. In
addition, it must also be considered whether messages that do not detail the circumstances of
the offence, such as general calls for terrorist violence, can be qualified as participation.
As regards messages containing terrorist expertise, they might be easily considered to be
forms of aiding or abetting under Article 4. But once more, an examination of whether
“inciting, aiding or abetting” a criminal offence implies other requirements, in particular
concerning the individualisation of the recipient as well as certain degree of determination of
the circumstances of the offence is still required.
Finally, Article 4 does not require Member States to ensure that attempting to incite, aide or
abet is made punishable. This is because Article 4(2) only obliges Member States to
incriminate the attempt of the offences laid down by Articles 1(1) and 3. Following this
reasoning, messages posted on the Internet would be excluded from the scope of Article 4
unless a recipient was actually incited, aided or abetted to commit one of the relevant
offences. Under this interpretation, the Framework Decision would not require that the
transmission of terrorism propaganda or terrorist expertise itself is made punishable. So, even
if the message was addressed to a particular person and represented a clear intent of inciting,
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aiding or abetting the commission of a circumstanced offence, its author would not be
punishable under Article 4 unless the recipient was actually incited, aided or abetted.
It is doubtful that the dissemination of terrorist propaganda or terrorist expertise itself
is not punishable under Article 4, since the mere attempt of incitement, aide or abet is
not incriminated. This behaviour may be incriminated a posteriori insofar if specific
recipients are actually incited, aided or abetted to commit some of the offences referred to in
Articles 1(1), 2 and 3.
b. Doctrinal background: authorship and participation in comparative law
In order to better understand both Article 4 and the national provisions on participation and
common commission of offences, a brief explanation of the main doctrinal positions is
offered under this section. The commission of an offence together with others receives very
different treatments under the various national systems stemming from two main concepts of
complicity: the theory of the plurality of offences, for which there are as many offences as co-
operators and the theory of the unity of the offence, for which several persons co-operate to
the commission of a single offence.
The plurality of offences implies that every co-operator shall be punished for his own offence
and any distinction between perpetrator, accomplice, instigator or other becomes irrelevant.
Furthermore, it implies that the aggravating circumstances between the co-operators are not
transferable.
The unity of the offence, on the other hand, assumes that the co-operators do not necessarily
have the same role and creates different categories, mainly that of the accomplice. The
criminality of his act “derives” from the criminality of the act committed by the main
perpetrator.
The unity of the offence is the dominant theory, followed by most criminal laws100. However,
it comprises different systems, depending on the categories used: some only distinguish
between the main author and the accomplice or accessory, some add the concept of
“accomplice after the fact” or “receleur”, some use the category of “instigator”, some national
systems make a distinction between direct and indirect accomplices.... Despite the
divergences, some common rules may be established: every form of complicity requires the
intent of the agent and the action of the accomplice has to be linked to the main action.
Among the legal systems following the dominant theory, in some of them incitement is not
punishable unless the offence is committed, or at least the commission has started, whereas in
others incitement is punishable even in the absence of any result. The common law falls in
this last group, punishing incitement as an autonomous offence. According to the example of
the English case law, a material and intentional elements are required: the behaviour, which is
very broadly described as the fact of “persuading, asking, corrupting, threatening, and this
either explicitly or implicitly” and “the intention of the instigator that the offence will be
100 The article "Grunderfordernisse einer Regelung des Allgemeinen Teils", in "Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der
Europäischen Union", (Rechtsdogmatik- Rechtsvergleich-Rechtspolitik), Freiburg-Symposium,
Tiedemann (ed.), Carl Heymanns Verlag KG. München, 2001, identifies Austria, Italy, Denmark and
Norway as criminal codes adopting the theory of the plurality of offences and notes that all other
Members of the European Union follow the theory of the unity of the offence. The article, however,
precedes the enlargement of 1 May 2004.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 121 – Drucksache 16/7769
committed, which implies the knowledge of all circumstances of this offence, including the
intention of the perpetrator(...)”101.
Concerning the theory of the plurality, anybody materialising an element required for the
commission of the offence is considered a perpetrator, his behaviour being punishable
according to his intention. As a consequence, the co-operator is criminally liable irrespective
of the liability of the rest of co-perpetrators and whether or not they have come to the
commission or the attempt of an offence. Moreover, under this model, attempted participation
is punishable. However, it cannot be excluded that the criminal liability of the participant
requires certain degree of determination of the circumstances of the final offence or the
individualisation of the co-perpetrators.
It can be defended that under the theory of the unity of the offence, participation
requires either the commission of the offence, its attempt, or at least a concrete idea or
project of the commission of a specific offence. Furthermore, it seems that the perpetrator or
potential perpetrator needs to be individualised, either because he commits or attempts to
commit the offence or because the participant knows his intention. Under the theory of the
plurality, participation does not seem to require the commission or attempt of the final
offence. It remains uncertain whether the criminal liability of the participant requires certain
degree of determination of the circumstances of the final offence and the identity of the co-
authors.
The aim of this section is not to classify Member States under one of the two theories and
extract the conclusions from this sole basis. However, this background constitutes a relevant
reference: offering a general idea of these opposed concepts may be important to better
understand the national provisions on participation and common commission of offences that
will be explained below.
c. National provisions implementing Article 4
First of all, we will examine the assessment of the first evaluation report102. While going
through the analysis of the different national provisions, two Member States stand out: Ireland
and Spain. Ireland not only provides generally that any person who aids, abets, counsels or
procures the commission of an indictable offence is liable to be indicted, tried and punished as
a principal offender, but also makes it an offence for any person to recruit, incite or invite
another person – or other persons generally - to join an unlawful organisation or to take part
in, support or assist in its activities. Spain criminalises provocation in addition to instigation.
Provocation is defined as public instigation and only applies if the offence is not committed.
But, although it is interesting to note the existence of such "parallel" provisions, the report
does not provide for any hint of the wider or narrower scope of inciting, aiding or abetting
under the national provisions. The table annex to the report contains however relevant
information, very often directing the reader to general provisions on participation. The study
of the general provisions on participation together with the examination of additional
provisions submitted by some Member States in view of the elaboration of the second
101 See "Droit pénal comparé spécial, Dalloz, 2002, mentioned above, pp. 312-325.
102 See The Commission Staff Working Paper annex to the Report from the Commission based on Article
11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, pp. 18-19.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 122 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
evaluation report, has led to some interesting findings irrespective of the national case-law,
which, as explained above, is not examined for the elaboration of the reports.
National provisions from an important number of Member States explicitly require
participation to be intentional (Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and
Slovenia) while only Sweden foresees the possibility of negligent participation. Since the
concepts of transmission of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise require the intent of
the author, national provisions would cover it in both cases.
For some Member States, participation is made punishable only when the offence has been
started or attempted (as Portugal, Slovak Republic and Spain clarify). Such requirement limits
the scope of participation. Other Member States go beyond the level required by the
Framework Decision by making the attempt of incitement punishable: for example Italy in
Article 302 of its penal code, punishing certain intentional serious crimes, amongst them
certain terrorist offences, when incitement is not followed by an agreement or by the
commission of the offence; Poland, making the attempt of incitement explicitly punishable in
Article 18 of its criminal code and similarly Germany in Article 30 of its penal code. Sweden
not only makes attempted incitement punishable but also attempted complicity in Chapter 23
of its penal code. Similarly, Austria generally incriminates attempted perpetration and
participation under Article 15(3) of its penal code. Finland also goes beyond the Framework
Decision, although in another direction, by making instigation to participation punishable.
It should also be noted that Article 115 of the Italian penal code incriminates the agreement of
the co-operators to commit the offence, even if finally it is not committed. Under Articles 21
and 23 of the Danish penal code it is clear that the participant is punished even if the offence
is not carried out, and Article 26 of the Slovenian penal code explains that solicitation is
punished even if the offence is not attempted. Similarly, Latvian penal code clarifies that, if
the perpetrator does not start the execution of the offence, the joint participants will be liable
for preparation of the offence in question.
Even if some Member States make the attempt to incite or participate punishable, it does not
mean necessarily that they cover most of the cases of dissemination of terrorist propaganda
and terrorist expertise through the Internet. Cases of transmission to a specific recipient,
addressed as a possible main perpetrator of a defined offence will normally be covered.
However, it is doubtful that such national rules cover the cases that represent an important
part of this report: messages disseminated through a website or a chat-forum, where the main
author and circumstances of the eventual offence are not determined.
Finally, national provisions on public incitement, provocation or dissemination of propaganda
of a general nature should be examined. The analysis of the table annexed to the report
together with the additional information sent in view of the elaboration of the second report
reveal that not only Ireland and Spain have adopted this kind of provisions. For example, the
Belgian penal code refers explicitly to the case of "public provocation" under Article 66,
punishable even if the offence is not perpetrated. Section 164 of the Slovak penal code
criminalises "public incitement". France refers to Articles 23 and 24 of the Law on the
Freedom of the Press of 29 July 1881 which refers to direct provocation to commit terrorist
offences or their apology through the press, the distribution of printed documents or drawings
as well as their exhibition in public places and their distribution, including via e-
communications, as well as through speeches or threats pronounced in public places. Finally
the Cypriot Bill Section 6 makes the possession of documents with seditious content
punishable and publication etc. of propaganda material of an unlawful organisation qualifies
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 123 – Drucksache 16/7769
as a terrorist offence. Germany adopted Article 129a, paragraph 5, of its Criminal Code
dealing with recruitment or propaganda in favour of a terrorist group.
Some of these provisions specify that the perpetration of the offence is not required for the
behaviour to be punishable. The common point in all these provisions is that they punish
publishing a message addressed to a large audience. They therefore appear to cover the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise through the Internet, even if the
propaganda or expertise is accessible to anyone on a website.
The variety of national rules on participation and common commission of offences, together
with the existence of additional provisions which look very much the same as the former, with
the difference that a message is addressed to a wide audience, may seem chaotic. Nonetheless,
the analysis of the answers to the questionnaire under Section 3.1 will reveal the logic lying
behind. At this stage, only the following conclusions can be formulated:
Some Member States go beyond the Framework Decision by making the attempt to
incite punishable. It is however doubtful that such national rules cover the dissemination
of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise through a website or a chat-forum,
where the main perpetrator and circumstances of the eventual offence are not
determined. It seems that, in order to punish this behaviour under national law, national
conceptions of participation and incitement should not require that the eventual perpetrator
and the circumstances of the eventual offence are determined at the moment of the incitement
or the participation.
1.3. Additional national legislation
In the consultation process referred to in Section 1, Member States were asked about national
provisions, in addition to those implementing the Framework Decision, that may apply to
transmission of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise through the media and the internet
in particular103. Two Member States did not provide for any answer or answered very briefly
because of their undergoing legislative modification in view of the ratification of the
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of the Council of Europe104. The rest of the
Member States save one included different provisions to those submitted in view of the
elaboration of the evaluation reports105. Yet many combined these different provisions or
envisaged provisions with some already analysed under the evaluation reports. As we have
already commented on national provisions implementing the Framework Decision, the focus
of this paragraph will be the complementary information provided for by Member States106.
A first overview shows that every Member State but one have got or will have specific rules
dealing with public dissemination of messages encouraging the commission of terrorist
offences (and often of other crimes). Although terminology is not at all uniform (i.e.
"provocation", "instigation", "public incitement" etc.) we observe that there is a reiterative
103 See the questionnaire addressed to Member States in view of the eventual revision of the Framework
Decision on combating terrorism and the compilation of their answers in Annex I.
104 The Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism will be analysed under a section dealing with
International instruments applicable to the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise.
105 It must be noted that some Member States answering the questionnaire were not evaluated in the first
report nor did they submit the information in view of the elaboration of the second report. This is the
case of Greece and, for obvious reasons, of Bulgaria and Romania, since the cut-off date taken to admit
information on national implementation was 31 July 2006.
106 For the full analysis of the answers from Member States, see Annex I.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 124 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
characteristic: they explicitly refer to publicly disseminated information. Often, the provision
makes reference to oral dissemination in a meeting, via written publications or audiovisual
material. Some provisions deal specifically with "terrorist publications", including even a
reference to dissemination via the Internet. In other cases, the comments of the Member States
explain that messages on the internet are included. Two Member States express this
characteristic theoretically by saying that the recipient does not have to be previously
determined. Actually, these two Member States stress that, by contrast with the general rules
on incitement, in the relevant provisions the offence does not need to be determined
beforehand either. In this sense, some Member States retain direct and indirect provocation. In
five Member States, these provisions refer to the irrelevance of the subsequent commission of
the offence or the actual incitement of the recipients of the message.
Additionally, eight Member States have got or will have provisions condemning glorification
or approval of terrorist offences (and often of other crimes).
Two Member States deal specifically with the denigration or humiliation of the victims. Two
also refer to apology of terrorism or crime apology.
Three Member States referred to provisions explicitly covering the public dissemination of
terrorist expertise. Six Member States have got or will have provisions on training or
recruiting, mainly resulting from the adaptation of their legislation to the Council of Europe
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. One Member State refers to its provision on
preparation of a crime, explaining that it comprises holding something especially intended to
be used as an auxiliary means and that compiled information can be regarded as the said
auxiliary means. In this case the intent does not have to cover a specific terrorist offence.
Another Member State refers to its general rules on complicity. Three Member States explain
that the transmission of terrorist expertise is criminalised under the penal code only if done
intentionally and the terrorist act was actually committed or attempted/planned. Two Member
State link the dissemination of terrorist expertise to terrorist groups, making the transmission
information on terrorist targets punishable. One Member State clarifies that it has no specific
provisions concerning the transmission of terrorism expertise in place.
1.4 Conclusions
1. It is doubtful that Article 4 of the Framework Decision requires Member States to
ensure that the dissemination of messages through the Internet encouraging the
commission of terrorist offences, either accessible to anyone (i.e. website), restricted (i.e.
chat forum) or addressed to pre-selected candidates for recruitment, is made
punishable.
As stated above, Article 4 does not include the obligation for Member States to ensure that
attempts to incite others to commit terrorist offences are made punishable. Following this
reasoning, the provision only obliges Member States to incriminate incitement when at least
one of the recipients of the message is actually incited. Under this interpretation, Article 4
does not require Member States to make the dissemination of messages encouraging the
commission of terrorist offences via the Internet itself punishable.
Furthermore, concerning public dissemination (the case of messages accessible to anyone),
the first evaluation report on the national implementation of Article 4 concluded that all
Member States would be able to meet the terms of Article 4 through their national provisions
on complicity and inchoate offences whereas only three Member States had submitted
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 125 – Drucksache 16/7769
provisions dealing with public dissemination of messages encouraging the commission of
terrorist offences.
2. It is doubtful that Article 4 of the Framework Decision requires Member States to
ensure that the dissemination of messages through the Internet providing for terrorist
expertise, either accessible to anyone (i.e. website), restricted (i.e. chat forum) or
addressed to pre-selected candidates for recruitment, is made punishable.
This provision does not require Member States to ensure that the attempt of aiding or abetting
others to commit terrorist offences is made punishable and it seems that the dissemination of
the messages referred to above via the Internet should be qualified as an attempt.
3. It seems that Article 2 of the Framework Decision does not require Member States to
ensure that a significant part of the dissemination of messages through the Internet
encouraging the commission of terrorist offences, either accessible to anyone (i.e.
website), restricted (i.e. chat forum) or addressed to pre-selected candidates for
recruitment is made punishable.
Article 2 includes the requirement of contributing to the criminal activities of a terrorist
group. In this sense, it could be defended that messages accessible to anyone, restricted to
members of a chat-forum or addressed to potential recruits fall out of the scope of Article 2.
Concerning messages aimed at fund-raising or recruitment for a terrorist group, they seem to
meet such requirement. However, these messages would actually constitute an attempt of
fund-raising and recruitment and the criminalisation of attempt under Article 4 does not cover
the attempt to commit offences related to terrorist groups.
4. It seems that Article 2 of the Framework Decision does not require Member States to
ensure that a significant part of the dissemination of messages through the Internet
providing for terrorist expertise, either accessible to anyone (i.e. website), restricted (i.e.
chat forum) or addressed to pre-selected candidates for recruitment is made punishable,
save in exceptional cases.
Once again, since Article 2 includes the requirement of contributing to the criminal activities
of a terrorist group. It could be argued that the dissemination of terrorist expertise is not
covered by Article 2 insofar as the recipients are undetermined (i.e. messages accessible to
anyone or disseminated in a chat forum) or potential recruits.
6. Most Member States that replied to the questionnaire have got provisions addressing
direct invitations to commit a specific terrorist offence through messages accessible to
anyone (i.e. website), restricted (i.e. chat forum) and addressed to pre-selected
candidates for recruitment.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that many would cover general encouragement to join the Djihad,
without reference to a specific terrorist offence. However, the offences on recruitment
introduced by some Member States may cover such messages, at least when they are
addressed to pre-selected candidates. These messages, when associated to the name of a
certain terrorist group, are likely to be covered by the legislation of many Member States.
Indeed, as it has been explained above, numerous Member States have got far-reaching
provisions that implement Article 2 and might apply to the propaganda in favour of a terrorist
group.
Drucksache 16/7769 – 126 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
7. Few Member States have provisions that explicitly cover the transmission of terrorism
expertise which are applicable to either messages accessible to anyone (i.e. website),
restricted (i.e. chat forum) or addressed to pre-selected candidates for recruitment.
Sweden, through very far reaching concepts of preparation and participation in an offence,
would at least cover the dissemination of expertise to pre-selected candidates and the same
goes for the offences introduced by some Member States on training and instruction, mainly
adopted in view of the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of
Terrorism.
8. Generally speaking, national provisions of Member States, although not harmonised,
substantially cover the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and in some cases also
terrorist expertise while the Framework Decision on combating terrorism seems to stay
behind. Furthermore, the European instrument already appears to be out-dated in the
international context, where the Council of Europe107 and the United Nations108 have set
the basis for further reaching national legislation.
2. Other instruments: The Television without frontiers Directive109, the Directive on electronic
commerce110 and the Data retention Directive111.
The Television without frontiers Directive aims to ensure the free movement of broadcasting
services within the internal market and at the same time to preserve certain public interest
objectives, such as cultural diversity, the right of reply, consumer protection and the
protection of minors. It is also intended to promote the distribution and production of
European audiovisual programmes, for example by ensuring that they are given a majority
position in television channels' programme schedules.
The Directive prohibits incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality in
broadcast. This includes third country programmes (mostly satellite television) if they use
either a frequency, satellite capacity or an uplink appertaining to a Member State. Member
States are responsible for the implementation of these rules and, as noted in the
Communication on Radicalisation and Recruitment, cases of prohibition to retransmit
channels like al-Manar or Sahar-1 within Europe show that the effective application of these
rules works quite well.
107 See the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, mentioned above.
108 The Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations "Uniting against terrorism:
recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy", interprets Security Council Resolution 1624
(2005) as providing for a basis for the criminalization of incitement to terrorist acts and recruitment,
including through the Internet.
109 Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 amending Council
Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities (OJ
L 202, 30.7.1997, p. 60).
110 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market
('Directive on electronic commerce') (OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1).
111 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention
of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic
communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 127 – Drucksache 16/7769
The Directive was amended in 1997 for the first time. In December 2005, the Commission
published a proposal for revision of the Directive, aimed at modernising the existing rules,
which is still under discussion in the Parliament and the Council.
Additionally, it should be noted that the revision of the Directive underway would broaden its
scope so that the instrument would cover certain content transmitted through the Internet. The
Directive would apply to the delivery of moving images with or without sound, in order to
inform, entertain or educate, to the general public, also when transmitted by electronic
communication networks provided that the audiovisual content is not merely incidental to the
service but its principal purpose.
It seems that messages disseminating terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise will be, at
least in some cases, covered by the prohibition of incitement to hatred. Therefore, the
prohibition of the television without frontiers would apply to the content under examination.
Nevertheless, the Directive will not be applicable to all content disseminated via the Internet
even after its revision nor, obviously, does it allow for the prosecution of the person
responsible for the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise.
The Directive on electronic commerce seeks to contribute to the proper functioning of the
internal market by ensuring the free movement of information society services between the
Member States. To this end, it approximates certain national provisions, including rules on the
liability of intermediaries.
In particular, under Article 12, service providers are broadly exempted from liability
regarding the information they transmit or give access to ("mere conduit"). Articles 13 and 14
deal, respectively, with their liability as intermediates that automatically and temporarily store
information ("caching") or that store it at the request of the recipient of the service
("hosting"). In these cases, they are not liable unless they have actual knowledge of the illegal
activity or information. Such exemptions, though, do not affect the possibility for a court or
administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the
service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, including the removal of illegal
information or the disabling of access to it.
Additionally, Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when
providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which
they transmit or store or a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating
illegal activity. Nonetheless, the provision states that Member States may establish obligations
for service providers promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal
activities undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service or obligations to
communicate to the competent authorities, at their request, information enabling the
identification of recipients of their service with whom they have storage agreements.
This liability regime is important from the point of view of the fight against terrorism. Firstly,
it allows for co-operation with law enforcement authorities so that Member States can require
service providers to provide law enforcement authorities with certain data which might be of
utmost importance in the investigation of terrorist cases. Furthermore, this regime allows for
"notice and take down" procedures, by which the service providers storing illegal content can
become liable when they do not remove illegal information after they are given notice of its
presence. In order to be able to benefit from this liability regime as regards the dissemination
of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise through the Internet is qualifying this behaviour
as illegal. Its application does not require that the behaviour is made punishable. Forbidding
Drucksache 16/7769 – 128 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise suffices. So, even if the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise is not incriminated, the liability
regime would apply if non-criminal law in Member States forbids this behaviour. Few
Member States, however, seem to have relevant legislation in this sense112. Once again, even
if the Directive on electronic commerce applies, it obviously does not allow for the
prosecution of the responsible behind the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist
expertise.
The Directive on data retention aims to harmonise Member States' provisions concerning the
obligations of the providers of publicly available electronic communications services or of
public communications networks with respect to the retention of certain data which are
generated or processed by them, in order to ensure that the data are available for the purpose
of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member
State in its national law. It is important to note that this instrument does not apply to the
content of electronic communications, including information consulted using an electronic
communications network. It applies to traffic and location data on both legal entities and
natural persons and to the related data necessary to identify the subscriber or registered user.
If the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise through the Internet were
qualified as serious crimes, public authorities could be assisted in the detection, investigation
and prosecution of these forms of behaviour by the providers referred to above, to which they
could request traffic and location data, crucial to identify the responsible individuals behind
such dissemination.
Therefore, it can be concluded that:
1. The Television without frontiers Directive does not currently apply to the Internet and
after its ongoing revision will only apply to a restricted portion of its content. In addition, it
does not directly outlaw the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise but
prohibits incitement to hatred. It follows that this instrument provides for a rather limited
solution to tackle the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise, especially
through the Internet.
2. The Directive on electronic commerce allows law enforcement authorities to request
internet service providers to remove content from or disable access to a website. However, its
application requires that the dissemination of terrorist propaganda or terrorist expertise is
outlawed. In many Member States the dissemination of terrorist propaganda or terrorist
expertise is not fully incriminated or forbidden, excluding the use of the co-operation
channels foreseen under the e commerce.
3. The Data retention Directive allows law enforcement authorities to request internet
service providers to provide location and traffic data. Nevertheless, the data retention
Directive only applies to serious crimes. It follows that the partial lack of incrimination of the
dissemination of terrorist propaganda and terrorist expertise by many Member States excludes
the request of data from service providers in the field of criminal law.
112 See Annex I.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 129 – Drucksache 16/7769
RAT DER
EUROPÄISCHEN UNION
Brüssel, den 13. November 2007 (14.11)
(OR. en)
Interinstitutionelles Dossier:
2007/0236 (CNS)
14960/07
ADD 2
CATS 122
DROIPEN 104
ADDENDUM ZUM VORSCHLAG
der: Europäischen Kommission
vom: 12. November 2007
Betr.: ARBEITSDOKUMENT DER KOMMISSIONSDIENSTSTELLEN
Begleitdokument zum Vorschlag für einen
RAHMENBESCHLUSS DES RATES zur Änderung des
Rahmenbeschlusses 2002/475/JI zur Terrorismusbekämpfung
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER FOLGENABSCHÄTZUNG
Die Delegationen erhalten in der Anlage den mit Schreiben von Herrn Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU,
Direktor, an den Generalsekretär/Hohen Vertreter, Herrn Javier SOLANA, übermittelten Vorschlag
der Europäischen Kommission.
Anl.: SEK(2007) 1425
Drucksache 16/7769 – 130 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN
Brüssel, den 6.11.2007
SEK(2007) 1425
ARBEITSDOKUMENT DER KOMMISSIONSDIENSTSTELLEN
Begleitdokument zum
Vorschlag für einen
Rahmenbeschluss des Rates zur Änderung des Rahmenbeschlusses 2002/475/JI zur
Terrorismusbekämpfung
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER FOLGENABSCHÄTZUNG
{KOM(2007) 650 endgültig}
{SEK(2007) 1424}
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 131 – Drucksache 16/7769
Zusammenfassung der Folgenabschätzung
TEIL 1: VERFAHREN UND KONSULTATION DER BETEILIGTEN KREISE
Das Legislativ- und Arbeitsprogramm der Kommission für 2007 enthält einen Vorschlag für
eine Änderung des Rahmenbeschlusses des Rates vom 13. Juni 2002 zur
Terrorismusbekämpfung (nachstehend der „Rahmenbeschluss“). Ziel dieser Änderung ist es,
der Verbreitung terroristischer Propaganda über die Medien entgegenzuwirken und die
Weitergabe von terroristischem Wissen, insbesondere über den Umgang mit Sprengstoffen
und den Bau von Bomben für terroristische Zwecke, zu beschränken.
Im Juni 2006 wurde eine umfassende Bestandsaufnahme durchgeführt, in deren Rahmen die
Kommission drei verschiedene Fragebögen versandte: einen an die Mitgliedstaaten (26. Juni
2006), einen an die Medien, die Wirtschaft und die Zivilgesellschaft (20. November 2006)
und einen weiteren an Europol und Eurojust (11. Dezember 2006). Eine Zusammenfassung
der Antworten auf die Fragebögen ist in den Anhängen I, II und III zu der Folgenabschätzung
nachzulesen. Darüber hinaus fanden Gespräche und Zusammenkünfte mit Vertretern der
europäischen Medien und Internetanbieter statt. Am 20. März 2007 schließlich kamen auf
einer Konferenz Vertreter der Mitgliedstaaten, von Europol sowie Eurojust und Cepol
zusammen, um die Ergebnisse aus den Fragebögen zu erörtern und sich Gedanken darüber zu
machen, wie der Missbrauch des Internets für terroristische Zwecke unterbunden werden
kann.
TEIL 2: PROBLEMATIK
Moderne Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien spielen bei der Ausbreitung der
terroristischen Bedrohung eine erhebliche Rolle. Insbesondere das Internet ist ein preiswertes,
schnelles, leicht zugängliches Medium mit praktisch globaler Reichweite. All diese Vorteile,
die gesetzestreue Bürger, die das Internet tagtäglich nutzen, sehr zu schätzen wissen, machen
sich auch Terroristen zunutze, die das Potenzial des Internet voll erkannt haben: Sie nutzen
dieses grenzenlose Medium sowohl für die Verbreitung ihrer Propaganda, um Anhänger zu
gewinnen und zu mobilisieren, als auch für die Verbreitung von Anleitungen und Online-
Handbüchern für die Terrorismus-Ausbildung oder die Planung von Terroranschlägen. Die
damit verbundenen Kosten und Risiken sind äußerst gering.
Das Internet trägt auf diese Weise maßgeblich zur Verstärkung des Radikalisierungs- und
Rekrutierungsprozesses bei: Es wird zur Beeinflussung und Mobilisierung von
Einzelpersonen und lokalen Netzwerken in Europa eingesetzt und dient darüber hinaus als
„virtuelles Trainingscamp“, indem es Informationen über Mittel und Methoden des
Terrorismus verbreitet. Die Verbreitung terroristischer Propaganda und terroristischen
Wissens über das Internet trägt dazu bei, den Kreis terroristischer Aktivisten zu festigen und
so die terroristische Bedrohung zu verstärken. Angesichts der rasch wachsenden Zahl von
Nutzern, durch die das Internet einen noch höheren Stellenwert in der modernen Gesellschaft
haben wird, muss davon ausgegangen werden, dass die Verbreitung terroristischer Inhalte
weiter zunehmen wird.
Für die Strafverfolgungsbehörden ist es schwer, die Spirale aus Radikalisierung und
Terroranschlägen zu durchbrechen, die sich aus der terroristischen Propaganda und dem
Drucksache 16/7769 – 132 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
terroristischen Wissen - insbesondere über das Internet - speist. Die Schwierigkeiten sind auf
unzureichende Rechtsvorschriften zurückzuführen sowie auf fehlende Kapazitäten und
mangelnde Kenntnis der zahlreichen Sprachen, in denen die terroristische Propaganda und das
terroristische Wissen verbreitet werden, und nicht zuletzt auf die Beschaffenheit des Internets,
das durch seine Extraterritorialität und Anonymität die Arbeit der Strafverfolgungsbehörden
ernsthaft behindert und die Entfernung derartiger Inhalte aus dem Netz sowie die Aufdeckung
und Strafverfolgung der für solche Webseiten und ihren Inhalt verantwortlichen Personen
erschwert.
Die Prüfung der einzelstaatlichen Rechtsvorschriften hat gezeigt, dass die Verbreitung
terroristischer Propaganda und terroristischen Wissens nicht in allen Mitgliedstaaten
strafrechtlich verfolgt wird. Unzureichende Rechtsvorschriften in Bezug auf die Verbreitung
von Anleitungen zum Bau von Bomben für terroristische Zwecke und sonstigem
terroristischem Wissen sowie große Unterschiede zwischen den rechtlichen Mitteln der
Mitgliedstaaten, insbesondere in Bezug auf die Verbreitung terroristischer Propaganda,
zeigen, dass es in diesem Bereich eine Sicherheitslücke zu schließen und die entsprechenden
Rechtsvorschriften anzugleichen gilt.
Die öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat sowie die
Anwerbung und Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke sind im EU-Recht nicht explizit
geregelt. Außerdem ist im Rahmenbeschluss zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus nicht eindeutig
festgelegt, dass die Mitgliedstaaten gewährleisten müssen, dass ein bedeutender Anteil der
über das Internet verbreiteten Aufforderungen zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat oder
zur Bereitstellung terroristischen Wissens, das für jedermann zugänglich ist (Website), das
beschränkt zugänglich ist (Chat-Forum) oder das an einen ausgewählten Personenkreis
gerichtet ist, unter Strafe gestellt wird.
Die Nutzung des Internets zur Verbreitung öffentlicher Aufforderungen zur Begehung
terroristischer Straftaten sowie zur Anwerbung und Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke ist
allerdings Gegenstand des Übereinkommens des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus,
das darüber hinaus Bedingungen und Garantien enthält, die die Achtung der Menschenrechte,
insbesondere das Recht der freien Meinungsäußerung, gewährleisten. Das Übereinkommen
wird zu einer Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten in diesem Bereich
führen, wenn alle es unterzeichnet und ratifiziert haben.
Jede Regelung in diesem Bereich, die Fragen betrifft, die sich im Grenzbereich zwischen der
rechtmäßigen Ausübung von Freiheitsrechten (wie der Meinungs-, Vereinigungs- oder
Religionsfreiheit) und kriminellem Verhalten bewegen, wirkt sich zwangsläufig direkt auf die
Grundrechte aus. Bei der Begründung eines neuen Straftatbestands und der Einführung
entsprechender Straf- und Durchführungsbestimmungen muss den Grundrechten Rechnung
getragen werden und damit auch dem Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip, wonach jede Maßnahme,
die in Grundrechte eingreift, in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft einen legitimen
öffentlichen Zweck verfolgen und erforderlich sein muss; jede Form willkürlicher,
diskriminierender oder rassistischer Behandlung ist ausgeschlossen1.
1 Siehe Erläuternder Bericht zum Übereinkommen des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus, Ziff.
143-151.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 133 – Drucksache 16/7769
TEIL 3: ZIELE
Wirksame Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung von über das Internet verbreiteten Aufforderungen
zur Begehung terroristischer Straftaten sowie zur Anwerbung und Ausbildung für
terroristische Zwecke könnten verhindern helfen, dass sich eine stärkere und breitere
Plattform für terroristische Aktivisten und Sympathisanten entwickelt. Derartige Maßnahmen
sollten neben Rechtsvorschriften, mit denen die vorerwähnte Sicherheitslücke zu schließen
ist, auch praxisbezogene Maßnahmen zur Stärkung der Kapazitäten und des Fachwissens der
Strafverfolgungsbehörden umfassen. Mit diesen Maßnahmen ließe sich das Risiko
terroristischer Anschläge verringern und die Möglichkeiten der Radikalisierung und
Rekrutierung reduzieren.
Die Rechtsvorschriften sollten ganz eindeutig vorsehen, dass die Strafverfolgungsbehörden
berechtigt sind, Ermittlungen wegen Verbreitung terroristischer Propaganda und
terroristischen Wissens, auch über das Internet, zu führen und terroristische Aktivisten und
Sympathisanten, die hinter derartigen Inhalten stecken, unionsweit zu verfolgen. Außerdem
sollten die Strafverfolgungsbehörden die auf dem Gebiet der Terrorismusbekämpfung bereits
erzielte Rechtsangleichung und die zur Verfügung stehenden Kooperationsinstrumente wie
den Europäischen Haftbefehl beim Vorgehen gegen diese neuen Formen kriminellen
Handelns anwenden dürfen.
Im Rahmen der praxisbezogenen Maßnahmen sollten geeignete Fortbildungsmaßnahmen und
eine ausreichende materielle Ausstattung der Strafverfolgungsbehörden vorgesehen werden
sowie eine qualifizierte Unterstützung durch IT-Fachleute und Experten mit
Sprachkenntnissen, mit deren Hilfe Gewaltinhalte im Internet aufgespürt und analysiert und
die Verantwortlichen, die hinter der Verbreitung solcher Inhalte stecken, identifiziert werden
können.
TEIL 4: POLITISCHE OPTIONEN
Das angestrebte Ziel lässt sich durch folgende Optionen erreichen:
(1) Beibehaltung der bisherigen Politik. Die Beibehaltung des Status quo erscheint
angesichts des Übereinkommens des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus und
des laufenden Unterzeichnungs- und Ratifizierungsprozesses fragwürdig.
(2) Internetanbietern wird untersagt, Zugang zu Inhalten zu gewähren, die auf eine
öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat, Anwerbung oder
Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke gerichtet sind. Diese Option führt eine neue
Verpflichtung ein, die für Diensteanbieter allgemein gilt, und ändert damit die E-
Commerce-Richtlinie ganz beträchtlich.
(3) Die Strafverfolgungsbehörden werden in die Lage versetzt, sich mehr Kapazitäten und
Fachkenntnisse anzueignen, mit denen sie dem Missbrauch des Internets für
terroristische Zwecke entgegenwirken können. Diese Option sieht die Finanzierung
geeigneter Schulungen, einer leistungsfähigen Ausrüstung und der Mitarbeit von
Experten vor, damit die Strafverfolgungsbehörden Inhalte, die auf eine öffentliche
Aufforderung zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat, Anwerbung oder
Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke gerichtet sind, schneller erkennen und
Drucksache 16/7769 – 134 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
analysieren und die verantwortlichen terroristischen Aktivisten und Sympathisanten
verfolgen können.
(4) Die Mitgliedstaaten werden nachdrücklich aufgefordert, das Übereinkommen des
Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus zu unterzeichnen bzw. zu ratifizieren. Bei
dieser Option handelt es sich um eine politische Erklärung, durch die die
Unterzeichnung und Ratifikation des Übereinkommens beschleunigt werden soll.
(5) Der Rahmenbeschluss zur Terrorismusbekämpfung wird geändert, um im Einklang
mit dem Übereinkommen des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus
Straftatbestände aufzunehmen, die die öffentliche Aufforderung zur Begehung einer
terroristischen Straftat sowie die Anwerbung und Ausbildung für terroristische
Zwecke, einschließlich über das Internet, unter Strafe stellen.
TEILE 5 UND 6: VERGLEICH UND FOLGEN DER OPTIONEN
Es wurde sorgfältig geprüft, welche Folgen mit den einzelnen Optionen für die Sicherheit, die
Wirtschaft und die Menschenrechte verbunden sind. Die Folgen für die Sicherheit kommen
im Wesentlichen in Form einer Stärkung der Strafverfolgungsbehörden in rechtlicher oder
operativer Hinsicht zum Tragen. Die Folgen für die Wirtschaft umfassen Kosten für die
Behörden und den privaten Sektor; es ist zwischen direkten und indirekten Auswirkungen zu
unterscheiden. Die Folgen für die Menschenrechte umfassen direkte Auswirkungen auf die
Freiheit der Meinungsäußerung und indirekte Auswirkungen auf das Recht auf Leben und das
Recht auf körperliche und geistige Unversehrtheit. Nach sorgfältiger Prüfung der Folgen, die
mit jeder einzelnen Option für die Sicherheit, die Wirtschaft und die Menschenrechte
verbunden sind, wurden die jeweiligen Vor- und Nachteile ermittelt.
Bei Option 1 wird das Übereinkommen des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus
positive Auswirkungen auf die Sicherheit haben und dazu beitragen, den Missbrauch des
Internets für terroristische Zwecke anzugehen. Diese Option impliziert eine Stärkung der
Kapazitäten der Strafverfolgungsbehörden mit dem Ziel, gegen die neuen Vorgehensweisen
der Terroristen, einschließlich gegen über das Internet begangene Straftaten, bei
uneingeschränkter Achtung der Menschenrechte vorzugehen. Sie impliziert außerdem, dass
eine weitere Regelung auf EU-Ebene nicht erforderlich ist. Eine umfassende
Rechtsangleichung wird allerdings erst erreicht sein, wenn alle Mitgliedstaaten das
Übereinkommen unterzeichnet und ratifiziert haben. Dieser Prozess kann sich über viele Jahre
hinziehen.
Option 2 ist die extremste der geprüften Optionen. Sie bietet den Vorteil, dass die Verbreitung
des betreffenden Materials über das Internet direkt an der Quelle unterbunden wird.
Allerdings sind mit dieser Option schwerwiegende Nachteile verbunden. So wird das
Verhalten der Personen, die terroristische Propaganda und terroristisches Wissen produzieren,
nicht unter Strafe gestellt, und auch die Einhaltung der Menschenrechte ist nicht in vollem
Umfang gewährleistet.
Option 3 sieht praxisbezogene Maßnahmen vor, mit denen die Strafverfolgungsbehörden in
die Lage versetzt werden, die Botschaften aufzuspüren und zu analysieren, mit denen
terroristische Propaganda und terroristisches Fachwissen über das Internet verbreitet werden.
Diese Maßnahmen sind auch bei der Identifizierung der Autoren derartiger Botschaften
hilfreich. Die auf diese Weise gesammelten Informationen ermöglichen es, terroristische
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 135 – Drucksache 16/7769
Trends zu verstehen, terroristische Straftaten zu antizipieren und Terroranschläge zu
verhindern. Allerdings mangelt es an den erforderlichen Rechtsvorschriften, und so sieht diese
Option weder vor, dass gegen die Verbreitung terroristischer Propaganda und terroristischen
Wissens ermittelt werden darf, noch dass terroristische Aktivisten und Sympathisanten, die
hinter derartigen Inhalten stecken, verfolgt werden können. Da die rechtliche Komponente
fehlt, führt Option 3 nur zu einer teilweisen Stärkung der Strafverfolgungsbehörden.
Die Vor- und Nachteile von Option 4 decken sich weitgehend mit denen von Option 1.
Option 5 weist hinsichtlich der Auswirkungen auf die Menschenrechte Ähnlichkeiten mit
Option 1 auf, da auch diese Option Bedingungen und Garantien des Übereinkommens des
Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus umfasst, die auf den Schutz der Menschenrechte
und Grundfreiheiten zielen. Gleichzeitig sind mit dieser Option große Vorteile verbunden,
z. B. die Anwendung der im Rahmenbeschluss enthaltenen Straf- und
Zuständigkeitsvorschriften auf die in diesen Rahmenbeschluss neu eingeführten
Straftatbestände. Auch würde diese Option bei den neuen Straftatbeständen die Anwendung
des Europäischen Haftbefehls garantieren und die Nutzung spezieller Instrumente der EU-
Kooperation ermöglichen, die mit dem Rahmenbeschluss zur Terrorismusbekämpfung
verknüpft sind. Darüber hinaus weist sie alle Vorteile auf, die EU-Rechtsvorschriften
gegenüber internationalen Übereinkommen und Verträgen auszeichnen.
Ausgehend von dieser Analyse erscheint eine Kombination der Optionen 3 und 5 die
wirksamste Strategie zu sein, um gegen den neuen Operationsmodus der Terroristen,
insbesondere den Missbrauch des Internets für öffentliche Aufforderungen zur Begehung
terroristischer Straftaten sowie für die Anwerbung und Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke
vorzugehen, ohne bei den Menschenrechten Abstriche zu machen.
TEIL 7: ÜBERWACHUNG UND BEWERTUNG
Die Überwachung und Bewertung der unter Option 5 vorgesehenen rechtlichen Maßnahmen
würde – in Bezug auf die Änderung des Rahmenbeschlusses des Rates zur
Terrorismusbekämpfung – durch die Bewertung der auf nationaler Ebene getroffenen
Durchführungsmaßnahmen nach Artikel 11 des Rahmenbeschlusses gewährleistet.
Die Überwachung und Bewertung der unter Option 3 vorgesehenen nichtlegislativen
Maßnahmen würde durch die Artikel 13 und 15 des Programms „Kriminalprävention und
Kriminalitätsbekämpfung“ gewährleistet. In Artikel 13 sind die Bestimmungen für die
Überwachung der im Rahmen dieses Programms finanzierten Maßnahmen festgelegt;
Artikel 15 enthält die Regelungen für die Bewertung des Programms insgesamt.