Vom 28. Mai 2008
Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 16/9334
16. Wahlperiode 28. 05. 2008
Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht
des Ausschusses für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
(16. Ausschuss)
1. zu dem Antrag der Abgeordneten Michael Kauch, Gudrun Kopp, Angelika
Brunkhorst, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der FDP
– Drucksache 16/8075 –
Vorschlag der EU-Kommission für den Emissionshandel nach 2012 über-
arbeiten – Klima schützen, Stromverbraucher entlasten, Wettbewerb stärken
2. zu der Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung
– Drucksache 16/8455 Nr. A.16 –
Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates
zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG zwecks Verbesserung und Ausweitung
des EU-Systems für den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionszertifikaten
(inkl. 5862/08 ADD 1 bis 5862/08 ADD 3)
KOM(2008) 16 endg.; Ratsdok. 5862/08
A. Problem
Zu Nummer 1
Mit dem Antrag der Fraktion der FDP soll die Bundesregierung insbesondere
aufgefordert werden, sich dafür einzusetzen,
– dass die vollständige Auktionierung der CO2-Zertifikate ab dem Jahr 2013
für jene Bereiche erfolgt, in denen eine Weitergabe von CO2-Kosten ohne
wesentliche negative Wettbewerbseffekte möglich ist oder in denen eine
Einpreisung von CO2-Zertifikaten ohnehin bereits stattgefunden hat,
– dass Anlagen von Unternehmen, die einem hohen internationalen Wettbe-
werbsdruck ausgesetzt sind und einen besonders hohen Energieanteil an den
Produktionskosten aufweisen bzw. erheblich unter sog. prozessbedingten
CO2-Emissionen produzieren, schrittweise in die Versteigerung einbezogen
werden,
– dass diejenigen Anlagen vollständig vom Emissionshandel ausgenommen
werden, bei denen es sich gemessen an der jährlichen Emissionsmenge um
relativ kleine Anlagen handelt und die in einem Basisjahr in der Summe ge-
meinsam für weniger als 5 Prozent der Gesamtemissionen verantwortlich
sind.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 2 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Zu Nummer 2
Die Europäische Kommission hat am 23. Januar 2008 ein Paket vorgestellt, das
die Beschlüsse der Staats- und Regierungschefs vom 7. März 2007 umsetzt. Im
Paket enthalten ist ein Vorschlag für eine Änderungsrichtlinie zur Bearbeitung
der bestehenden EU-Emissionshandelsrichtlinie, mit dem grundlegend neue
Regelungen für das EU-Handelssystem für die Zeit nach 2012 festgelegt wer-
den.
B. Lösung
Zu Nummer 1
Ablehnung des Antrags auf Drucksache 16/8075 mit den Stimmen der Frak-
tionen CDU/CSU, SPD, DIE LINKE. und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
gegen die Stimmen der Fraktion der FDP
Zu Nummer 2
In Kenntnis der Unterrichtung auf Drucksache 16/8455 Nr. A.16
Annahme einer Entschließung mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen der CDU/
CSU und SPD gegen die Stimmen der Fraktionen DIE LINKE. und
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN bei Stimmenthaltung der Fraktion der FDP
C. Alternativen
Keine
D. Kosten
Wurden nicht erörtert.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 3 – Drucksache 16/9334
Beschlussempfehlung
Der Bundestag wolle beschließen,
1. den Antrag auf Drucksache 16/8075 abzulehnen,
2. in Kenntnis der Unterrichtung auf Drucksache 16/8455 Nr. A.16 folgende
Entschließung anzunehmen:
I. Der Deutsche Bundestag stellt fest:
Die Europäische Kommission hat am 23. Januar 2008 ein Paket vorgestellt,
das die Beschlüsse der Staats- und Regierungschefs vom März 2007 um-
setzt. Der Deutsche Bundestag bekennt sich zu den darin enthaltenen Zielen,
die Treibhausgasemissionen in einer unabhängigen Verpflichtung bis 2020
gegenüber 1990 um 20 Prozent bzw. bei Verabschiedung eines internationa-
len Klimaschutzabkommens, in dem sich andere Industrieländer zu ver-
gleichbaren Emissionsreduktionen und die Schwellenländer zu angemesse-
nen Klimaschutzbeiträgen verpflichten, um 30 Prozent abzusenken.
Im Paket enthalten ist ein Vorschlag für eine Änderungsrichtlinie zur Über-
arbeitung der bestehenden EU-Emissionshandelsrichtlinie 2003/87/EG
(Ratsdok. 5862/08), mit dem grundlegend neue Regelungen für das EU-
Handelssystem für die Zeit nach 2012 festgelegt werden.
Der Deutsche Bundestag begrüßt den Richtlinienentwurf grundsätzlich. Er
begrüßt, dass mit dem vorliegenden Richtlinienentwurf die Schwächen des
bestehenden Emissionshandelssystems aufgegriffen und angegangen wer-
den.
Die wesentlichen Schwächen des bisherigen Systems sind:
– Die Verteilung der Zertifikate auf Grundlage nationaler Allokationspläne.
Hierdurch kam es zu erheblichen Wettbewerbsverzerrungen durch unter-
schiedliche Verteilungsmechanismen der Mitgliedstaaten an die Industrie
und Energiewirtschaft.
– Die Verteilung der Zertifikate nach historischen Emissionen. Unterneh-
men, die schon vor 2005 in moderne Technologien investiert hatten, wur-
den so benachteiligt. Weitere Wettbewerbsverzerrungen sind die Folge.
– Die Überausstattung mit Zertifikaten in der ersten Handelsperiode. Durch
diese Überallokation kam es zu einem Preisverfall. Wesentliche Anreize,
mehr in klimaschonende Technologien zu investieren, fehlten.
– Entstehung der „windfall profits“ bei den Energieversorgungsunterneh-
men (EVU). Die EVU haben die ihnen kostenlos zugeteilten Zertifikate
weitgehend eingepreist.
– Die Handelsperioden waren zu kurz für umfassende strategische Unter-
nehmensentscheidungen.
Der Deutsche Bundestag bewertet grundsätzlich positiv, dass die EU-Kom-
mission eine stärkere Harmonisierung der Regelungen vorsieht und als
wesentliches Prinzip bei der Zertifikatszuteilung die Auktionierung anstrebt.
Eine vollständige Versteigerung wie im Elektrizitätsbereich ist dann mög-
lich, wenn es dadurch nicht zu Unternehmensverlagerungen aufgrund des
globalen ungleichen Wettbewerbs kommt.
Es ist notwendig, dass energieintensive Industrien möglichst schnell Pla-
nungssicherheit bekommen. Deshalb ist es problematisch, wenn hier der
Richtlinienentwurf nur grobe Eckpunkte für die zukünftige Ausgestaltung
des Handelssystems festlegt und die konkrete Ausformulierung der für ein
Drucksache 16/9334 – 4 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Funktionieren des Systems wichtigen Regelungen auf das Jahr 2011 ver-
schiebt sowie eine Festlegung im Komitologieverfahren vorsieht.
II. Der Deutsche Bundestag fordert daher die Bundesregierung auf,
– bei der Kommission und im Ministerrat durchzusetzen,
● dass an der Einführung europaweit einheitlicher Allokationsmethoden
festgehalten wird,
● beim effort sharing Verzerrungen für die Mitgliedstaaten zu vermei-
den, d. h. insbesondere sind hohe kohlenstoffbasierte Stromerzeu-
gungsanteile der Mitgliedstaaten und die in der Vergangenheit er-
brachten Vorleistungen zu berücksichtigen,
● dass alle Mitgliedstaaten ihre Kyoto-Ziele einhalten und nicht für un-
terlassenen Klimaschutz belohnt werden,
● an der Zertifikateverteilung durch Auktionierung in der Stromwirt-
schaft festzuhalten und hier eine 100-prozentige Versteigerung ab
2013 vorzusehen,
● dass energieintensive Unternehmen des produzierenden Gewerbes, die
vom Emissionshandel betroffen sind, besonders behandelt werden.
Falls kein internationales Klimaabkommen für den Zeitraum nach
2012 zustande kommen sollte, wäre eine umfassende kostenpflichtige
Zuteilung ein Nachteil im globalen Wettbewerb. Eine Betrachtung der
Belastungen durch Zertifikate deckt aber nur einen Teil der Kosten-
probleme energieintensiver Industrien ab. Klar ist: Eine Abwanderung
der Unternehmen bzw. unterlassene Investitionen dienen nicht dem
Klimaschutz,
● dass die konkrete Ausgestaltung der ab 2013 anzuwendenden Zutei-
lungsmethoden und die Ausnahme des produzierenden Gewerbes hier-
von in der Richtlinie selbst festgelegt werden. Eine Entscheidung vor
2011 ist anzustreben, da so mehr Planungs- und Investitionssicherheit
der betroffenen Industrie gegeben ist,
● dass die Zertifikate, die nicht versteigert werden, anhand von BAT-
Benchmarks verteilt werden. Dies ist gegenüber der Zuteilung nach
historischen Emissionen ein großer Vorteil für Unternehmen, die be-
reits effiziente Technologien einsetzen,
● bestehende Probleme bei CDM- und JI-Projekten, wie z. B. bei der
Zusätzlichkeit, zu lösen, damit Zertifikate aus Emissionsminderungs-
maßnahmen im Ausland in angemessenem Umfang berücksichtigt
werden können,
● dass an Stelle der vorgeschlagenen, vorgeschriebenen Mittelverwen-
dung die Mitgliedstaaten in Bewusstsein der Herkunft der Mittel selbst
über die Verwendung der Auktionseinnahmen entscheiden. Die Mittel
aus den Erlösen fließen dem Staat zu, in dem sie generiert wurden,
● in der EU-Kommission und den Mitgliedstaaten – insbesondere bei
der slowenischen und französischen Ratspräsidentschaft – für diese
Positionen zu werben.
Berlin, den 7. Mai 2008
Der Ausschuss für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
Petra Bierwirth
Vorsitzende
Andreas Jung (Konstanz)
Berichterstatter
Frank Schwabe
Berichterstatter
Michael Kauch Eva Bulling-Schröter
Berichterstatter Berichterstatterin
Bärbel Höhn
Berichterstatterin
Die Europäische Kommission hat am 23. Januar 2008 ein
Es schließe die Vergabe nach effizientem Lobbying aus. Un-
ternehmen, die auf diesem Gebiet besonders wirkungsvoll
Paket vorgestellt, das die Beschlüsse der Staats- und Regie-
rungschefs vom 7. März 2007 umsetzt. Im Paket enthalten
ist ein Vorschlag für eine Änderungsrichtlinie zur Bearbei-
tung der bestehenden EU-Emissionshandelsrichtlinie, mit
arbeiteten, hätten keine marktwirtschaftlichen Vorteile. Er-
forderlich sei aber eine differenzierte Betrachtung. Unter-
nehmen beispielsweise der Stahlindustrie, der Kalkindustrie
oder der Aluminiumindustrie stünden in einem internationa-
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 5 – Drucksache 16/9334
Bericht der Abgeordneten Andreas Jung (Konstanz), Frank Schwabe, Michael
Kauch, Eva Bulling-Schröter und Bärbel Höhn
I. Überweisung
Der Antrag auf Drucksache 16/8075 wurde in der 155. Sit-
zung des Deutschen Bundestages am 11. April 2008 zur
federführenden Beratung an den Ausschuss für Umwelt,
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit und zur Mitberatung an
den Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Technologie, den Aus-
schuss für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucher-
schutz und den Ausschuss für wirtschaftliche Zusammenar-
beit und Entwicklung überwiesen.
Der Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parla-
ments und des Rates – KOM(2008) 16 endg.; Ratsdok.
5862/08 – wurde mit Drucksache 16/8455 Nr. A.16 vom
7. März 2008 zur federführenden Beratung an den Aus-
schuss für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit und
zur Mitberatung an den Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Tech-
nologie, den Ausschuss für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwick-
lung und den Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Euro-
päischen Union überwiesen.
II. Wesentlicher Inhalt der Vorlage
Zu Nummer 1
Mit dem Antrag der Fraktion der FDP soll die Bundesregie-
rung insbesondere aufgefordert werden, sich dafür einzuset-
zen,
– dass die vollständige Auktionierung der CO2-Zertifikate
ab dem Jahr 2013 für jene Bereiche erfolgt, in denen
eine Weitergabe von CO2-Kosten ohne wesentliche ne-
gative Wettbewerbseffekte möglich ist oder in denen
eine Einpreisung von CO2-Zertifikaten ohnehin bereits
stattgefunden hat,
– dass Anlagen von Unternehmen, die einem hohen inter-
nationalen Wettbewerbsdruck ausgesetzt sind und einen
besonders hohen Energieanteil an den Produktionskos-
ten aufweisen bzw. erheblich unter sog. prozessbeding-
ten CO2-Emissionen produzieren, schrittweise in die
Versteigerung einbezogen werden,
– dass diejenigen Anlagen vollständig vom Emissionshan-
del ausgenommen werden, bei denen es sich gemessen
an der jährlichen Emissionsmenge um relativ kleine An-
lagen handelt und die in einem Basisjahr in der Summe
gemeinsam für weniger als 5 Prozent der Gesamtemis-
sionen verantwortlich sind.
Zu Nummer 2
III. Stellungnahmen der mitberatenden
Ausschüsse
Zu Nummer 1
Der Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Technologie hat mit
den Stimmen der Fraktionen CDU/CSU, SPD, DIE LINKE.
und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN gegen die Stimmen der
Fraktion der FDP empfohlen, den Antrag auf Drucksache
16/8075 abzulehnen.
Der Ausschuss für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Ver-
braucherschutz hat mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen CDU/
CSU, SPD, DIE LINKE. und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
gegen die Stimmen der Fraktion der FDP empfohlen, den
Antrag auf Drucksache 16/8075 abzulehnen.
Der Ausschuss für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und
Entwicklung hat mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen CDU/
CSU, SPD, DIE LINKE. und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
gegen die Stimmen der Fraktion der FDP empfohlen, den
Antrag auf Drucksache 16/8075 abzulehnen.
Zu Nummer 2
Der Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Technologie hat emp-
fohlen, die Unterrichtung auf Drucksache 16/8455 Nr. A.16
zur Kenntnis zu nehmen.
Der Ausschuss für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung
hat empfohlen, die Unterrichtung auf Drucksache 16/8455
Nr. A.16 zur Kenntnis zu nehmen.
Der Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Europäi-
schen Union hat empfohlen, die Unterrichtung auf Druck-
sache 16/8455 Nr. A.16 zur Kenntnis zu nehmen.
IV. Beratungsverlauf und Beratungsergebnisse im
federführenden Ausschuss
Der Ausschuss für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicher-
heit hat den Antrag auf Drucksache 16/8075 und die Unter-
richtung auf Drucksache 16/8455 Nr. A.16 in seiner Sitzung
am 7. Mai 2008 beraten.
Die Fraktion der FDP hob hervor, mit der Emissionshan-
delsrichtlinie für die Zeit nach 2012 (dritte Handelsperiode)
unterbreite die EU-Kommission den Vorschlag, Zertifikate
im Stromsektor vollständig zu versteigern. Im Bereich der
Industrie solle es allerdings weiterhin eine kostenfreie Zu-
teilung für bestimmte Branchen geben. Diese Ausnahmere-
gelung unterliege der Überprüfung nach drei Jahren. Die
Allokationsmechanismen zeigten, dass eine Versteigerung
das bessere und überzeugendere Verteilungsverfahren sei.
dem grundlegend neue Regelungen für das EU-Handelssys-
tem für die Zeit nach 2012 festgelegt werden.
len Wettbewerb mit Unternehmen aus Russland, osteuropäi-
schen Ländern, dem Nahen Osten oder auch aus China und
Drucksache 16/9334 – 6 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
den USA. Dementsprechend könne nicht einfach versteigert
und könnten die Unternehmen dann dem internationalen
Wettbewerb überlassen werden. Insbesondere für diejenigen
Branchen, die in einem starken internationalen Wettbewerb
ohne Überwälzungsmöglichkeiten stünden, bedürfe es Son-
derregelungen. Die EU-Kommission schlage eine kosten-
freie Vergabe möglichst nach Benchmarks vor. In Frank-
reich werde die Einführung eines Zolles für Nicht-Kyoto-
Staaten diskutiert. Die Fraktion der FDP schlage vor, die
Versteigerung auch für die Industrie vorzusehen, aber das
Aufkommen über geeignete Mechanismen an die Unterneh-
men, die im besonderen internationalen Wettbewerb stün-
den, zurückzugeben, so dass zwar der Allokationsmechanis-
mus erhalten bleibe, aber den Unternehmen kein Vermögen
im internationalen Wettbewerb entzogen werde. Denkbar
sei die Rückauktionierung nach Wertschöpfungsanteilen, so
dass diejenigen Unternehmen, die besonders effizient arbei-
teten, im Vorteil seien. Die Fraktion der FDP habe den vor-
liegenden Antrag eingebracht, um diesen Weg in die Dis-
kussion zu bringen. Er biete zwar für die Unternehmen
keine unmittelbare Sicherheit, die Zertifikate umsonst zu
bekommen, aber er erweitere die Planungssicherheit von
drei auf acht Jahre. Ein solcher Ausgleich sei attraktiv für
die deutsche Wirtschaft. In der Ausgestaltung der Bagatell-
klausel rege die Fraktion der FDP an, nicht die Anlagen-
größe zu Grunde zu legen, sondern eine flexible Grenze mit
weniger als 5 Prozent der Gesamtemissionen zu wählen.
Zur Lastenteilung unter den EU-Mitgliedstaaten vertrat die
Fraktion der FDP die Auffassung, dass auf diesem Gebiet
nachgearbeitet werden müsse, da insbesondere Spanien un-
gerechtfertigte Vorteile aus der bisherigen Berechnungs-
methode ziehe und Deutschland nicht entsprechend berück-
sichtigt werde. Weniger in der öffentlichen Diskussion sei
die Frage der Vernetzung des EU-Emissionshandelssystems
mit den Emissionshandelssystemen außerhalb der EU, z. B.
in den Bundesstaaten der USA.
Der Entschließungsantrag 16(16)409 (neu) der Fraktionen
der CDU/CSU und SPD enthalte einige sinnvolle Punkte,
die die Fraktion der FDP unterstütze. Das betreffe insbe-
sondere die Festlegung der 100-prozentigen Versteigerung
in der Stromwirtschaft. Ferner sei positiv, dass die EU-Mit-
gliedstaaten selbst über die Verwendung der Auktionie-
rungserlöse bestimmen sollten. Diese Forderung entspre-
che dem Subsidiaritätsgrundsatz. Es bestehe keine Notwen-
digkeit, den EU-Mitgliedstaaten vorzuschreiben, wie sie
ihre Mittel verwendeten. Kritisch beurteilte die Fraktion
der FDP, dass keine deutliche Festlegung getroffen worden
sei, wie energieintensive Unternehmen des produzierenden
Gewerbes behandelt werden sollten. Die Forderung nach
einer besonderen Regelung sei richtig. Es sei auch keine
Letztfestlegung auf ein Modell in dem Entschließungsan-
trag vorgesehen. Der Hinweis auf die kostenpflichtige Zu-
teilung als Wettbewerbsnachteil erlaube aber den Rück-
schluss, dass die Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD auch
an kostenfreie Zuteilung dächten. Die Fraktion der FDP
lehne dies ab.
Der Entschließungsantrag der Fraktion DIE LINKE.
16(16)408 werde ebenfalls, insbesondere wegen der Forde-
rung nach Reduktion der CDM-Projekte sowie der Festle-
gung, dass ein Klimazoll eingeführt werden solle, abge-
Die Fraktion der CDU/CSU begrüßte den Entwurf für die
Richtlinie zum Emissionshandel, insbesondere auch des-
halb, weil etliche Schwächen, die das bisherige System auf-
gezeigt habe, damit angegangen würden. Schwachpunkte
seien in der bisherigen Verteilung über nationale Alloka-
tionspläne mit sehr unterschiedlichen Zuteilungsmechanis-
men zu sehen, die zu Wettbewerbsverzerrungen geführt hät-
ten und des Weiteren in der anfänglichen Verteilung der
Zertifikate nach historischen Emissionen und den damit ein-
hergegangenen Benachteiligungen von Unternehmen, die
schon zuvor Klimaschutzmaßnahmen durchgeführt hätten.
In der ersten Handelsperiode sei europaweit eine Überaus-
stattung mit Zertifikaten erfolgt. Hierdurch seien Mitnah-
meeffekte bei den Energieversorgungsunternehmen entstan-
den. Die Handelsperioden seien zu kurz gewesen, um lang-
fristig Planungssicherheit zu erhalten und die Grundlage für
strategische Entscheidungen in den Unternehmen zu schaf-
fen. Die Bundesregierung werde deshalb aufgefordert, auf
europäischer Ebene wesentlichen Schwächen abzuhelfen.
Von besonderer Wichtigkeit seien einheitliche europäische
Allokationsmethoden als Antwort auf den europäischen
Wirtschaftsraum und die gemeinsamen Klimaschutzanstren-
gungen in der EU. In einheitlichen Methoden sei der Ein-
stieg in tatsächlich einheitliche Regelungen, die nicht zu
Wettbewerbsverzerrungen führten, zu sehen. Deshalb sei
das sog. effort sharing, die gleichmäßige Lastenverteilung
in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten, von besonderer Bedeutung. Es
müsse bei der Verteilung der Reduktionspflichten auf die
EU-Mitgliedstaaten zu einer gerechten Regelung kommen.
Staaten, die sich schon in der Vergangenheit bemüht hätten,
dürften nicht benachteiligt werden. Eine faire Behandlung,
auch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, sei erforderlich.
Windfall profits fielen gerade im Energiebereich bei der
Stromwirtschaft an. Hier solle an der 100-prozentigen Ver-
steigerung festgehalten werden. Zurückhaltung sei geboten,
was die Auktionierung im Bereich des produzierenden Ge-
werbes bei energieintensiven Unternehmen angehe, weil ge-
rade diese Unternehmen im globalen Wettbewerb stünden.
Eine Auktionierung bei diesen Unternehmen könnte zu ihrer
Schwächung im Wettbewerb mit Unternehmen außerhalb
der EU führen. Deshalb solle davon abgesehen werden, zu-
mindest schon jetzt eine Auktionierung vorzusehen. Hin-
sichtlich der Verwendung der Erlöse aus der Auktionierung
im Strombereich sei die Fraktion der CDU/CSU dagegen,
die Mittel dem EU-Haushalt zukommen zu lassen. Im Sinne
der Subsidiarität sei es, dass die Nationalstaaten über die
Verwendung der Mittel bestimmen könnten. Was von deut-
schen Unternehmen an Auktionierungserlösen erzielt
werde, müsse auch in deutscher nationaler Verantwortung
wieder verwendet werden können. Die Fraktion der CDU/
CSU trete dafür ein, diese Mittel einzusetzen, um energiein-
tensive Unternehmen zu entlasten. In Fällen der kostenlosen
Zuteilung solle diese nicht nach historischen Emissionen,
sondern nach Benchmarks erfolgen. Die Fraktion der CDU/
CSU betrachte CDM und JI als ausbaufähige Zukunftsberei-
che. Diese Projekte müssten tatsächlich dem Klimaschutz
dienen. Es gelte dies sicherzustellen, damit diese Instru-
mente bei Weitem stärker berücksichtigt würden als derzeit.
Zusammenfassend betonte die Fraktion der CDU/CSU, sie
fordere die Bundesregierung auf, eine Grundlage dafür zu
schaffen, dass der Emissionshandel ein wichtiges Instru-
lehnt. Die Fraktion der FDP sei der Auffassung, dass dies
eine Protektionismusspirale nach sich zöge.
ment in der Klimaschutzpolitik der EU bleibe und Vorbild-
charakter für andere Regionen der Welt entfalte.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 7 – Drucksache 16/9334
Die Fraktion der SPD bewertete den Richtlinienentwurf
der Europäischen Kommission als gut und konsequent. Er
bilde eine Grundlage für die Orientierung der Unternehmen
innerhalb Europas in Richtung auf Klimaschutz und auf
Energieeffizienz. Der Richtlinienentwurf bilde zudem eine
solide Basis für internationale Verhandlungen, weil Europa
progressive Ideen für den europäischen Emissionshandel
entwickele. Begrüßenswert seien ein gemeinsames europa-
weites CAP, die Orientierung an Benchmarks, statt der his-
torischen Orientierung an historischen Emissionen und eine
längere Handelsperiode. Von dem Entschließungsantrag der
Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD gingen zwei wichtige
Signale aus: Erstens werde das Ziel, eine 30-prozentige Re-
duktion innerhalb Europas mit Hilfe eines internationalen
Abkommens anzustreben, bekräftigt. Ein weiteres wichtiges
Ziel sei, die windfall profits durch eine vollständige Verstei-
gerung beim Strom auszuschließen. Im Gegensatz zur Auf-
fassung der Fraktion der FDP sei eine Deckelung für
Deutschland unproblematisch. Die Fraktion der SPD stellte
klar, es sei notwendig, die Integrität von CDM und JI zu ver-
bessern. Bei der Verwendung der Mittel der Einnahmen aus
der Auktionierung müsse man berücksichtigen, woher die
Mittel eigentlich stammten. Eine hohe Kohlenstoffintensität
in der Energiewirtschaft, wie es in Deutschland der Fall sei,
müsse bei der Frage Berücksichtigung finden, wer die Mittel
aus der Auktionierung erhalte. Wenn Deutschland einen ho-
hen Beitrag leiste, müsse es auch einiges zurückbekommen.
Zur Frage der Mittelverwendung habe die Fraktion der SPD
das Ziel, diese im Bereich von Klimaschutz auf nationaler
und internationaler Ebene, aber auch zur Entlastung von
Verbraucherinnen und Verbrauchern einzusetzen.
Die Frage des Basisjahres werde anders als nach Auffas-
sung der Bundesregierung als nicht so entscheidend gewer-
tet. Schwierig sei der Umgang mit den energieintensiven
Unternehmen. Nicht alle Unternehmen des produzierenden
Gewerbes fielen hierunter. Es gebe gute Gründe frühzeitig
klarzumachen, welche Belastungen auf diese Unternehmen
zukämen, damit Planungssicherheit für Investitionen be-
stehe. Es gebe aber auch gute Argumente für die EU-Kom-
mission, nicht zu früh zu entscheiden, sondern erst im Rah-
men internationaler Verhandlungen zu einer Verabredung zu
kommen, international energieintensive Unternehmen ein-
zubeziehen. Möglicherweise werde es notwendig, früher zu
Entscheidungen zu kommen, als nach der bisherigen Zeit-
planung im Jahr 2011. In jedem Fall sei eine intensive De-
batte über die Abgrenzung zwischen energieintensiven Un-
ternehmen und nichtenergieintensiven Unternehmen erfor-
derlich. Ausschlaggebend müsse eine Gesamtbetrachtung
bei den energieintensiven Unternehmen sein. Dabei gehe es
nicht nur um die Frage der Zertifikate, sondern auch um
weitere Belastungen für energieintensive Unternehmen, die
sich z. B. aus den Energiepreisen ergäben. Es gelte, einen
Mechanismus zu finden, der der Wettbewerbssituation der
Unternehmen im internationalen Wettbewerb eher gerecht
werde, aber gleichzeitig eine Lenkungswirkung im Bereich
CO2 entfalte. Die Fraktion der SPD werde einer Strom-
steuer nicht zustimmen. Hinsichtlich der Kleinemittenten
sei die Haltung der Bundesregierung und der Fraktionen der
CDU/CSU und SPD, dass die Grenze von 10 000 Tonnen
auf 25 000 Tonnen heraufgesetzt werden solle. Das entspre-
Der Entschließungsantrag der Fraktion DIE LINKE. auf
Drucksache 16(16)408 setze sich mit der eigentlichen Pro-
blematik nicht auseinander. Mit dem Entschließungsantrag
der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD auf Drucksache
16(16)409 (neu) werde der Bundesregierung der Rücken in
den Verhandlungen gestärkt.
Die Fraktion DIE LINKE. verwies auf einen Artikel der
„Süddeutschen Zeitung“ vom 22. März 2008, der die deut-
sche Verhandlungsposition zum Klimaschutzpaket der EU-
Kommission zum Inhalt habe. Dass dieser Artikel zutref-
fend sei, belege die hartnäckige Bitte des Wirtschaftsaus-
schusses, die Vorlage zu vertagen. Die Position des Bundes-
ministers für Wirtschaft und Technologie, wie sie in seinen
Änderungen zum Eckpunktepapier der deutschen Verhand-
lungsposition deutlich würden, sei die Infragestellung der
Versteigerung der Emissionsrechte ab 2013. Damit wolle er
an dem bestehenden Zustand der windfall profits festhalten.
Bislang seien die Zertifikate den Unternehmen geschenkt
worden. Die Stromkonzerne hätten in der ersten Handels-
periode europaweit bis zu 24 Mrd. Euro windfall profits ein-
gefahren. In Phase 2 bis 2012 würden sie nach Schätzungen
noch einmal 14 bis 34 Mrd. Euro Profite einstreichen. Die-
ser Betrag lasse sich sinnvoller einsetzen. Versorger sollten
keine öffentlichen Gelder für CCS-Pilotprojekte erhalten,
da sie über ausreichend Finanzmittel verfügten. Der Bun-
desminister für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Michael Glos,
fordere zusätzliche Zertifikate für Unternehmen, die AKW
stilllegten. Dies bedeute offenbar, dass an die Stelle der
AKW Kohlekraftwerke treten sollten. Dies lehne die Frak-
tion DIE LINKE. ab. Studien belegten, dass bei dem
Atomausstieg keine zusätzlichen Kohlekraftwerke benötigt
würden. Erforderlich seien aber wirksame Energieeffizienz-
maßnahmen und ein deutlicher Ausbau der Kraft-Wärme-
Kopplung und der erneuerbaren Energien. Bei dem produ-
zierenden Gewerbe fordere der Bundesminister für Wirt-
schaft und Technologie einen vollständigen Verzicht auf die
Auktionierung. Die EU werde über entsprechende Sonder-
oder Schutzregelungen erst dann beraten, wenn klar sei,
dass es ein anspruchsvolles, internationales Kyoto-Nachfol-
geabkommen geben werde. Dies sei sinnvoll. Gebe es ein
solches Abkommen, so werde die außereuropäische Kon-
kurrenz vergleichbare Lasten zu tragen haben. Wenn es kein
Nachfolgeabkommen geben werde, könne darüber beraten
werden, in welcher Weise den betroffenen Branchen gehol-
fen werden solle, beispielsweise durch einen Klimazoll oder
durch teilweise kostenlose Vergabe der Zertifikate. Voraus-
setzung sei eine präzise Definition der energieintensiven
Unternehmen. Diese produzierten trotz fortschrittlicher
Technik sehr energieintensiv und stünden auch tatsächlich
in größerem Umfang im Wettbewerb mit Unternehmen au-
ßerhalb der EU. Das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und
Technologie und offenbar auch das Bundesministerium für
Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit forderten im
Eckpunktepapier eine Ausweitung der Anrechenbarkeit von
CDM- und JI-Zertifikaten. Die Fraktion DIE LINKE. be-
grüßte, dass die Anrechenbarkeit nunmehr offenbar stärker
begrenzt werde. CDM sei sehr anfällig für Manipulationen.
Die ökologische Integrität sei nicht immer gewährleistet.
Dazu werde versucht, fraktionsübergreifend ohne die Frak-
tion DIE LINKE. einen Antrag zu formulieren. Die Frak-
che etwa 2,5 Prozent der Emissionen. 5 Prozent sei eindeu-
tig zu viel. Damit drohe dem Gesamtsystem ein Schaden.
tion DIE LINKE. wende sich strikt gegen eine Aufwei-
chung des Klima- und Energiepakets der EU-Kommission
Ausdruck, dass der Richtlinienvorschlag der EU für die
Ausgestaltung der nächsten Handelsperiode vom Grundsatz
her sehr gut sei. Sie stimme mit zahlreichen Punkten über-
ein. Bei der Emissionsmenge werde von einer 20-prozen-
tigen Reduktion ausgegangen. Dies sei nicht ausreichend.
Die Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN habe ehrgeizige
Ziele, und zwar unabhängig davon, ob andere Länder mit-
zögen oder nicht. Grundsätzlich seien einheitliche Regeln
auf EU-Ebene sinnvoll. Die 100-prozentige Auktionierung
im Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD sei be-
grüßenswert. Bei den energieintensiven Bereichen sei eine
treffsichere Definition vonnöten, weil es anderenfalls eine
unerwünschte Ausweitung gäbe. Interessant sei der Vor-
schlag der Fraktion der FDP, Anreize auch für energieinten-
sive Betriebe zu schaffen, Energie zu reduzieren. Dies sei
weit sinnvoller als eine 100-prozentige Schenkung der Zer-
tifikate. Es müsse in Deutschland möglich sein, Aluminium
herzustellen, was energieintensiv sei, aber trotzdem anzu-
streben, Energie zu reduzieren. Die Unternehmen müssten
aber bald Klarheit haben, was auf sie zukomme. Eine Fest-
legung in 2010/2011 sei recht spät. Die Einnahmen sollte
jedes Land für sich bekommen. Innerhalb Deutschlands sei
eine Vereinbarung anzustreben, einen großen Teil der Ein-
nahmen zu nutzen, in Effizienzmaßnahmen zu fördern, um
eine doppelte Lenkungswirkung zu erzielen. Eine Steuer-
sungen. Zunehmend sei darauf zu achten, wer das Kyoto-
Protokoll erfülle. Bei Ländern, die das Kyoto-Protokoll
nicht erfüllten, dürfe das nicht ohne Auswirkung bleiben.
Dass man ihnen schlicht weniger Reduktionsziele zuteile,
gehe nicht. Länder wie Spanien müssten sich an den Vorga-
ben der Kyoto-Ziele orientieren.
Der Ausschuss für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktor-
sicherheit beschloss mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen CDU/
CSU, SPD, DIE LINKE. und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
gegen die Stimmen der Fraktion der FDP, dem Deutschen
Bundestag zu empfehlen, den Antrag auf Drucksache 16/
8075 abzulehnen.
Der Ausschuss beschloss mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen
der CDU/CSU und SPD gegen die Stimmen der Fraktionen
DIE LINKE. und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN bei Stimm-
enthaltung der Fraktion der FDP, den Entschließungsantrag
der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD auf Ausschuss-
drucksache 16(16)409 (neu) anzunehmen.
Der Ausschuss beschloss mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen
CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
gegen die Stimmen der Fraktion DIE LINKE., den Ent-
schließungsantrag der Fraktion DIE LINKE. auf Ausschuss-
drucksache 16(16)408 abzulehnen.
Berlin, den 7. Mai 2008
Andreas Jung (Konstanz)
Berichterstatter
Frank Schwabe
Berichterstatter
Michael Kauch
Berichterstatter
Eva Bulling-Schröter
Berichterstatterin
Bärbel Höhn
Berichterstatterin
Drucksache 16/9334 – 8 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
durch das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technolo-
gie und fordere den Bundesminister für Wirtschaft und
Technologie auf, eine konstruktive Haltung im Sinne des
Klimaschutzes einzunehmen. Im Entschließungsantrag der
Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD sei das Bekenntnis zur
100-prozentigen Versteigerung im Energiesektor begrü-
ßenswert. Jedoch werde die Bestimmung angegriffen, wo-
nach 20 Prozent der Auktionseinnahmen für Klimaschutz-
maßnahmen und zur Abfederung des Strukturwandels zu
verwenden seien. Genau dies aber unterstütze die Fraktion
DIE LINKE. Erwägenswert sei, ob dieser Anteil nicht er-
höht werden solle. Der Antrag der Fraktion der FDP stoße
auf Ablehnung. Die Einnahmen sollten nicht vollständig zur
Entlastung des privaten Sektors verwandt werden. Erforder-
lich seien vielmehr zusätzliche Klimaschutzmaßnahmen.
Die Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN brachte zum
senkung sei nicht die richtige Lenkungsmaßnahme. Unver-
ständlich sei die Passage im Entschließungsantrag der Frak-
tionen der CDU/CSU und SPD, dass bei der Aufteilung
besondere Rücksicht auf kohlenstoffbasierte Stromerzeu-
gungsanteile genommen werden müsse. Dies sei gerade
Wirkung des Handelns, dass nicht alle Kohlekraftwerke
bestehen bleiben müssten, sondern, dass es zu einer Verän-
derung komme. Auch die energieintensiven Betriebe müss-
ten gedrängt werden, etwas zu ändern. Zur Problematik der
CDM-Projekte werde ein gemeinsamer Antrag angestrebt.
Über den Punkt soziale Abfederung müsse intensiv beraten
werden. Ökologische und soziale Frage gehörten zusam-
men, gerade auch deshalb, weil die soziale Energiearmut
zunehme. Sozialtarife seien aber die falsche Lösung. Sinn-
voller sei durch Energieeffizienz gerade auch in armen
Stadtteilen, Energiekosten zu senken, statt eines Zuschusses
zu den hohen Energiepreisen. Klimazölle böten keine Lö-
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 9 – Drucksache 16/9334
Anlage 1
Deutscher Bundestag
Ausschuss für Umwelt,
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
Entschließungsantrag
der Abgeordneten Eva Bulling-Schröter, Lutz Heilmann,
Hans-Kurt Hill und der Fraktion DIE LINKE.
zum Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parla-
ments und des Rates zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/87 EG
zwecks Verbesserung und Ausweitung des EU-Systems für
den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionszertifikaten
(inkl. 5682/08 ADD 1 bis 5862/08 ADD 3)
– Ratsdok. 5862/08 –
Der Bundestag wolle beschließen:
I. Der Bundestag stellt fest:
Bei den gegenwärtig laufenden Verhandlungen zwischen
den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union um die Ausge-
staltung des Emissionshandels ab 2013 nehmen die Vertre-
ter Deutschlands, insbesondere die des Bundeswirtschafts-
ministeriums, eine äußerst destruktive Haltung ein. Dies
geht aus einem Bericht der Süddeutschen Zeitung vom
22. März 2008 und dem Positionspapier von Bundesumwelt-
ministerium und Bundeswirtschaftsministerium „Klima-
paket. Eckpunkte der D Position“ hervor.
Die in diesem Eckpunktepapier enthaltenen Forderungen
des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums, weitreichende Ände-
rung an dem Richtlinienvorschlag der EU-Kommission für
das Emissionshandelssystem ab 2013 zugunsten der Strom-
wirtschaft vorzunehmen, würde dem Emissionshandel er-
neut seine ökologischen Lenkungsfunktion berauben. Laut
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium sei die vollständige Auktio-
nierung der Emissionsrechte an die Stromversorger „im
Hinblick auf die Strompreisentwicklung und die Investition-
sentscheidungen für Kraftwerksneubauten kritisch zu se-
hen“. Das Bundeswirtschaftsministerium hat entweder aus
den ersten beiden Handelsperioden nichts gelernt oder ver-
steht seine Rolle in Brüssel ausschließlich als Lobbyist der
Stromkonzerne. Schließlich ist es in Wissenschaft und wei-
ten Teilen der Politik – nicht zuletzt auch aufgrund der er-
nüchternden Erfahrungen der ersten beiden Handelsperio-
den – mittlerweile Konsens, dass die bisherige kostenlose
Vergabe der Zertifikate an die Stromwirtschaft die wirt-
schaftlichen Anreize zum Brennstoffwechsel und zur Emis-
sionsminderung weitgehend neutralisiert. Dies würde zu-
dem den Energieversorgern weiterhin zusätzliche Milliar-
dengewinne („windfall profits“) zu Lasten der öffentlichen
Haushalte sowie der Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher er-
möglichen. Denn die Energieversorgern preisen die ihnen
derprofite. Nur durch eine vollständige Versteigerung der
Emissionsrechte sind solchen fatalen Folgen ausgeschlos-
sen.
Das Bundeswirtschaftsministerium plädiert im Eckpunkte-
papier ferner dafür, den Stromkonzernen für das Abschalten
der Atomkraftwerke kostenlose Emissionsberechtigungen
zukommen zu lassen. Auch dieser Vorstoß würde einem
konsequenten Versteigerungssystem und einer Energie-
wende weg von fossilen Rohstoffen entgegenstehen.
Im Hinblick auf das produzierende Gewerbe sei laut Bundes-
wirtschaftsministerium „ein vollständiger Verzicht auf die
Auktionierung erforderlich“. Dies steht dem Vorschlag der
EU-Kommission entgegen, nach dem über entsprechende
Sonder- oder Schutzregelungen für das produzierende Ge-
werbe erst dann beraten werden soll, wenn klar ist, ob es ein
anspruchsvolles internationales Kyoto-Nachfolgeabkom-
men geben wird. Gäbe es ein solches Abkommen, so würde
die außereuropäische Konkurrenz vergleichbare Lasten zu
tragen haben. Dementsprechend wäre die Auktionierung
kein Nachteil im internationalen Wettbewerb. Sie würde le-
diglich eine Internalisierung externer Umweltkosten in die
betriebliche Rechnung energieintensiver Unternehmen be-
deuten. Demgegenüber will das Bundeswirtschaftministe-
rium mit der Forderung nach einer sofortigen Festlegung
auf eine kostenlose Vergabe der Zertifikate an emissions-
handelspflichtige Anlagen des produzierenden Gewerbes
verhindern, dass die Warenpreise in Europa auch Umwelt-
kosten widerspiegeln.
Die EU-Kommission schlägt eine deutliche Einschränkung
der Anrechenbarkeit von Emissionsberechtigungen aus
den projektbasierten Mechanismen des Kyoto-Protokolls
– Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) und Joint Imple-
mentation (JI) – vor. Bundesumwelt- und -wirtschaftsmi-
nisterium fordern hingegen im Eckpunktepapier eine Aus-
weitung der Anrechenbarkeit von CDM- und JI-Zertifika-
ten. Angesichts der enormen Missbrauchspotentiale beim
CDM und der erforderlichen „heimischen“ Klimaschutzer-
fordernisse zur Einhaltung des 2 Grad-Ziels sind die Vor-
schläge der EU-Kommission ein Schritt in die richtige
Richtung. Eine noch restriktivere Anrechenbarkeit wäre
begrüßenswert.
II. Der Bundestag fordert die Bundesregierung auf,
1. Bundeswirtschaftminister Michael Glos im Kabinett auf
eine aktive Klimaschutzpolitik zu verpflichten und ihn
auf seine bisherige destruktive Rolle bei den Beratungen
des EU-Klima- und Energiepakets hinzuweisen.
2. sich in den Verhandlungen um die Vorschläge der EU-
Kommission zur künftigen Ausgestaltung des EU-Emis-
sionshandels dafür einzusetzen, dass
– die EU sich auf eine bedingungslose Minderungsver-
pflichtung in Höhe von minus 30 Prozent bis 2020
gegenüber 1990 festlegt;
– entsprechend des –30-Prozent-Ziels die Minderungs-
ziele der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten für den Emissionshan-
dels- und Nichtemissionshandelsbereich neu festge-
legt werden, wobei der prozentuale Anteil des
Emissionshandelsbereiches und der Energieversorger
Ausschuss für Umwelt,
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
16. WP
Ausschussdrucksache 16(16)408
zu TOP 11 der TO am 07. 05. 2008
06. 05. 2008
kostenlos zugeteilten Zertifikate als Opportunitätskosten in
den Strompreis ein und erzielen dadurch leistungslose Son-
an der Gesamtminderungsleistung nicht wesentlich
verändert wird;
Drucksache 16/9334 – 10 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
– die Emissionsberechtigungen für den Stromsektor ab
2013 vollständig versteigert werden;
– die vorgeschlagene begrenzte Anrechenbarkeit von
Emissionsberechtigungen aus CDM- und JI-Projek-
ten nicht weiter erhöht, sondern gesenkt wird;
– mindestens 50 Prozent der Einahmen aus der Verstei-
gerung zweckgebunden für Klimaschutzmaßnahmen
und zur sozialen Abfederung höherer Energiepreise
eingesetzt werden;
– die Option von Ausgleichszahlungen für in die EU
eingeführte Produkte aus Ländern, die sich internati-
onalen Klimaschutzbemühungen verweigern, („Kli-
mazoll“) geprüft wird, um beim Scheitern der Ver-
handlungen um ein Kyoto-Nachfolgeabkommen
Wettbewerbsnachteile für emissionshandelspflich-
tige Anlagen des produzierenden Gewerbes zu ver-
mindern.
Berlin, den 5. Mai 2008
Eva Bulling-Schröter, Lutz Heilmann, Hans-Kurt Hill
und Fraktion
Anlage 2
Entschließungsantrag
der Fraktionen CDU/CSU und SPD
zum Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parla-
ments und des Rates zu Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG
zwecks Verbesserung und Ausweitung des Treibhausgas-
emissionszertifikaten und
zum Vorschlag für eine Entscheidung des Europäischen
Parlamentes und des Rates über die Anstrengungen der Mit-
gliedsstaaten zur Reduktion ihrer Treibhausgasemissionen
mit Blick auf die Erfüllung der Verpflichtungen der Gemein-
schaft zur Reduktion der Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2020
Ratsdrucksachen 5862/08 und 5849/08
Der Deutsche Bundestag wolle nach Artikel 23 Abs. 3 GG
beschließen:
I. Der Deutsche Bundestag stellt fest:
Die Europäische Kommission hat am 23. Januar 2008 ein
Paket vorgestellt, das die Beschlüsse der Staats- und Regie-
rungschefs vom März 2007 umsetzt. Der Deutsche Bundes-
tag bekennt sich zu den darin enthaltenen Zielen, die Treib-
hausgasemissionen in einer unabhängigen Verpflichtung bis
2020 gegenüber 1990 um 20 Prozent bzw. bei Verabschie-
dung eines internationalen Klimaschutzabkommens, in dem
sich andere Industrieländer zu vergleichbaren Emissionsre-
Im Paket enthalten ist ein Vorschlag für eine Änderungs-
richtlinie zur Überarbeitung der bestehenden EU-Emis-
sionshandelsrichtlinie 2003/87/EG (Ratsdok.-Nr. 5862/08),
mit dem grundlegend neue Regelungen für das EU-Han-
delssystem für die Zeit nach 2012 festgelegt werden.
Der Deutsche Bundestag begrüßt den Richtlinienentwurf
grundsätzlich. Er begrüßt, dass mit dem vorliegen Richtli-
nienentwurf die Schwächen des bestehenden Emissionshan-
delssystems aufgegriffen und angegangen werden.
Die wesentlichen Schwächen des bisherigen Systems sind:
– Die Verteilung der Zertifikate auf Grundlage nationaler
Allokationspläne. Hierdurch kam es zu erheblichen
Wettbewerbsverzerrungen durch unterschiedliche Ver-
teilungsmechanismen der Mitgliedstaaten an die Indus-
trie und Energiewirtschaft.
– Die Verteilung der Zertifikate nach historischen Emissi-
onen. Unternehmen, die schon vor 2005 in moderne
Technologien investiert hatten, wurden so benachteiligt.
Weitere Wettbewerbsverzerrungen sind die Folge.
– Die Überausstattung mit Zertifikaten in der ersten Han-
delsperiode. Durch diese Überallokation kam es zu ei-
nem Preisverfall. Wesentliche Anreize, mehr in klima-
schonende Technologien zu investieren, fehlten.
– Entstehung der „windfall profits“ bei den Energieversor-
gungsunternehmen. Die EVU haben die ihnen kostenlos
zugeteilten Zertifikate weitgehend eingepreist.
– Die Handelsperioden waren zu kurz für umfassende stra-
tegische Unternehmensentscheidungen.
Der Deutsche Bundestag bewertet grundsätzlich positiv,
dass die EU-Kommission eine stärkere Harmonisierung der
Regelungen vorsieht und als wesentliches Prinzip bei der
Zertifikatszuteilung die Auktionierung anstrebt. Eine voll-
ständige Versteigerung wie im Elektrizitätsbereich ist dann
möglich, wenn es dadurch nicht zu Unternehmensverlage-
rungen aufgrund des globalen ungleichen Wettbewerbs
kommt.
Es ist notwendig, dass energieintensive Industrien möglichst
schnell Planungssicherheit bekommen. Deshalb ist es pro-
blematisch, wenn hier der Richtlinienentwurf nur grobe
Eckpunkte für die zukünftige Ausgestaltung des Handels-
systems festlegt und die konkrete Ausformulierung der für
ein Funktionieren des Systems wichtigen Regelungen auf
das Jahr 2011 verschiebt sowie eine Festlegung im Komito-
logie-Verfahren vorsieht.
II. Der Deutschte Bundestag fordert daher die Bundesregie-
rung auf:
– bei der Kommission und im Ministerrat durchzusetzen,
● dass an der Einführung europaweit einheitlicher Al-
lokationsmethoden festgehalten wird;
● beim effort-sharing Verzerrungen für die Mitglied-
staaten zu vermeiden, d. h. insbesondere sind hohe
kohlenstoffbasierte Stromerzeugungsanteile der Mit-
Ausschuss für Umwelt, Naturschutz
und Reaktorsicherheit
16. WP
Ausschussdrucksache 16(16)409 (neu)
zu TOP 11 und 13 der TO am 07. 05. 2008
duktionen und die Schwellenländer zu angemessenen Kli-
maschutzbeiträgen verpflichten, um 30 Prozent abzusenken.
gliedstaaten und die in der Vergangenheit erbrachten
Vorleistungen zu berücksichtigen;
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 11 – Drucksache 16/9334
● dass alle Mitgliedstaaten ihre Kyoto-Ziele einhalten
und nicht für unterlassenen Klimaschutz belohnt wer-
den;
● an der Zertifikateverteilung durch Auktionierung in
der Stromwirtschaft festzuhalten und hier eine
100-prozentige Versteigerung ab 2013 vorzusehen;
● dass energieintensive Unternehmen des produzieren-
den Gewerbes, die vom Emissionshandel betroffen
sind, besonders behandelt werden. Falls kein interna-
tionales Klimaabkommen für den Zeitraum nach
2012 zustande kommen sollte, wäre eine umfassende
kostenpflichtige Zuteilung ein Nachteil im globalen
Wettbewerb. Eine Betrachtung der Belastungen
durch Zertifikate deckt aber nur ein Teil der Kosten-
probleme energieintensiver Industrien ab. Klar ist:
Eine Abwanderung der Unternehmen bzw. unterlas-
sene Investitionen dienen nicht dem Klimaschutz,
● dass die konkrete Ausgestaltung der ab 2013 anzu-
wendenden Zuteilungsmethoden und die Ausnahme
des produzierenden Gewerbes hiervon in der Richt-
linie selbst festgelegt werden. Eine Entscheidung vor
2011 ist anzustreben, da so mehr Planungs- und In-
vestitionssicherheit der betroffenen Industrie gege-
ben ist;
● dass die Zertifikate, die nicht versteigert werden, an-
hand von BAT-Benchmarks verteilt werden. Dies ist
gegenüber der Zuteilung nach historischen Emissio-
nen ein großer Vorteil für Unternehmen, die bereits
effiziente Technologien einsetzen;
● bestehende Probleme bei CDM- und JI-Projekten,
wie z.B. bei der Zusätzlichkeit, zu lösen, damit Zerti-
fikate aus Emissionsminderungsmaßnahmen im Aus-
land in angemessenem Umfang berücksichtigt wer-
den können;
● dass an Stelle der vorgeschlagenen vorgeschriebenen
Mittelverwendung die Mitgliedstaaten in Bewusst-
sein der Herkunft der Mittel selbst über die Verwen-
dung der Auktionseinnahmen entscheiden. Die Mittel
aus den Erlösen fließen dem Staat zu, in dem sie ge-
neriert wurden;
● der EU-Kommission und den Mitgliedstaaten – ins-
besondere bei der slowenischen und französischen
Ratspräsidentschaft – für diese Positionen zu werben.
Berlin, den 7. Mai 2008
Andreas Jung (Konstanz)
Berichterstatter
Frank Schwabe
Berichterstatter
Michael Kauch
Berichterstatter
Eva Bulling-Schröter
Berichterstatterin
Bärbel Höhn
Berichterstatterin
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 13 – Drucksache 16/9334
Anlage
RAT DER
EUROPÄISCHEN UNION
Brüssel, den 29. Januar 2008 (30.01)
(OR. en)
Interinstitutionelles Dossier:
2008/0013 (COD)
5862/08
ENV 52
ENER 29
IND 11
COMPET 31
MI 34
ECOFIN 34
TRANS 22
AVIATION 25
CODEC 105
VORSCHLAG
der: Europäischen Kommission
vom: 28. Januar 2008
Betr.: Vorschlag für eine RICHTLINIE DES EUROPÄISCHEN
PARLAMENTS UND DES RATES zur Änderung der Richt-
linie 2003/87/EG zwecks Verbesserung und Ausweitung des EU-Systems
für den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionszertifikaten
Die Delegationen erhalten in der Anlage den mit Schreiben von Herrn Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU,
Direktor, an den Generalsekretär/Hohen Vertreter, Herrn Javier SOLANA, übermittelten Vorschlag
der Europäischen Kommission.
Anl.: KOM(2008) 16 endgültig
Drucksache 16/9334 – 14 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN
Brüssel, den 23.1.2008
KOM(2008) 16 endgültig
2008/0013 (COD)
Vorschlag für eine
RICHTLINIE DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS UND DES RATES
zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG zwecks Verbesserung und Ausweitung des EU-
Systems für den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionszertifikaten
(von der Kommission vorgelegt)
{KOM(2008) 30 endgültig}
{SEK(2008) 52}
{SEK(2008) 53}
{SEK(2008) 85}
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 15 – Drucksache 16/9334
BEGRÜNDUNG
1. EINLEITUNG
Das europäische Emissionshandelssystem (EU-EHS) trat am 1. Januar 2005 in Kraft. Da mit
seiner Hilfe auf wirtschaftlich effiziente Weise Emissionsreduzierungen in absoluten Zahlen
erzielt werden können, bildet es die Speerspitze und „eines der wichtigsten Instrumente“1 der
EU- Klimapolitik.
In der ersten Phase des EU-EHS (2005 bis 2007) ist es gelungen, den freien EU-weiten
Handel mit Emissionszertifikaten einzuführen und die erforderliche Infrastruktur für die
Überwachung, Berichterstattung und Prüfung (einschließlich Register) zu schaffen, und
bislang wurden zwei Erfüllungszeiträume erfolgreich abgeschlossen. Das System ist zum
weltgrößten einheitlichen Kohlenstoffmarkt geworden, auf den volumenmäßig 67 % und
wertmäßig 81 % des globalen Kohlenstoffmarktes entfallen2. Zudem hat es als Triebfeder des
globalen Marktes für Emissionsgutschriften gewirkt und Investitionen in Emissions-
minderungsprojekte (JI- und CDM-Projekte) ausgelöst, über die derzeit 147 Länder indirekt
mit dem EU-EHS verknüpft sind.
Die Umweltwirksamkeit der ersten Phase des EU-EHS hätte größer sein können, wurde aber
dadurch eingeschränkt, dass in einigen Mitgliedstaaten und Sektoren übermäßig viele
Zertifikate zugeteilt wurden, was größtenteils auf die Zuhilfenahme von Projektionen und das
Fehlen von überprüften Emissionsdaten zurückzuführen ist. Sobald solche Daten vorlagen,
haben sie rasch zu einer Korrektur der Marktpreise für die Zertifikate geführt - ein
überzeugender Beweis dafür, dass der Kohlenstoffmarkt funktioniert.
Die Grundsätze und Mechanismen, die im ersten Handelszeitraum für Probleme sorgten,
kamen in der zweiten Phase in den meisten nationalen Zuteilungsplänen (NAP) der
Mitgliedstaaten erneut zum Tragen. Dank des Vorliegens von überprüften Emissionsdaten
und der gewonnenen Erfahrung konnte die Kommission jedoch viel besser sicherstellen, dass
die nationalen Zuteilungspläne tatsächliche Emissionsminderungen bewirken. Die
genehmigten NAP-Entscheidungen lassen eine Emissionsverminderung gegenüber den über-
prüften Emissionen von 2005 um 6,5 % in absoluten Zahlen erkennen, womit sichergestellt
ist, dass das als System für Deckelung und Handel (Cap-and-Trade-System) konzipierte EU-
EHS tatsächliche Emissionsreduktionen erbringen wird. Die im ersten Zeitraum gewonnenen
Erfahrungen und die Bewertung der NAP des zweiten Zeitraums gaben jedoch guten Grund
zu der Annahme, dass die allgemeine Funktionsweise des EU-EHS in einigen Punkten
verbessert werden könnte.
Vor diesem Hintergrund veröffentlichte die Kommission im November 2006 im Einklang mit
Artikel 30 der EU-EHS-Richtlinie3 eine Mitteilung „Errichtung eines globalen Kohlenstoff-
markts - Bericht nach Maßgabe von Artikel 30 der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG“4, in der sie die
wichtigsten Punkte ermittelte, die im Hinblick auf eine Straffung des EU-EHS überprüft
werden sollten.
1 Emissionshandelssystem – Schlussfolgerungen des Rates vom 26. Juni 2007, abrufbar unter
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/de/07/st11/st11429.de07.pdf
2 Weltbank, State and Trends of the Carbon Market, Mai 2007.
3 Richtlinie 2003/87/EG.
4 KOM(2006) 676 vom 13.11.2006.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 16 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Im März 2007 bekräftigte der Europäische Rat das Ziel der EU, ihre Emissionen von
Treibhausgasen (THG) bis 2020 um 30 % zu reduzieren, sofern sich andere entwickelte
Länder zu vergleichbaren Emissionsreduzierungen verpflichten und wirtschaftlich weiter
fortgeschrittene Entwicklungsländer einen ihren Verantwortlichkeiten und jeweiligen
Fähigkeiten angemessenen Beitrag leisten. Ferner ging der Rat die feste und unabhängige
Verpflichtung ein, die THG-Emissionen bis 2020 – unabhängig von einem etwaigen
internationalen Übereinkommen - um mindestens 20 % zu reduzieren. Längerfristig, d. h. bis
2050, sollten die Industrieländer dem Europäischen Rat zufolge ihre Emissionen gegenüber
1990 gemeinsam um 60-80 % verringern5.
Vor diesem Hintergrund und um die Sicherheit und Berechenbarkeit des Emissionshandels-
systems zu verbessern, sollten in der Richtlinie automatische, berechenbare Anpassungen bei
Abschluss eines künftigen internationalen Übereinkommens vorgesehen werden. Diese
Anpassungen sollten den Beitrag des EU-EHS zu einer Emissionsreduzierung von 30 %
erhöhen und den Zuteilungsmechanismus, die Anpassung der für die EU als Ganzes geltenden
Obergrenze sowie die Verwendung von Gutschriften aus JI- und CDM-Projekten und
etwaiger weiterer im Rahmen des Übereinkommens vorgesehener Typen von Gutschriften
und/oder Mechanismen betreffen.
In seinen Schlussfolgerungen vom 20. Februar 2007 betonte der Rat die Entschlossenheit der
EU, Europa in einen in hohem Maße energieeffizienten Wirtschaftsraum mit niedrigem
Treibhausgasausstoß umzuwandeln. Außerdem forderte er die Kommission auf, „Vorschläge
vorzulegen, die wirksame Anreize für zukunftsweisende Investitionsentscheidungen
zugunsten kohlenstoffarmer Technologien bieten“6.
Alle diese Punkte wurden in der Arbeitsgruppe „Emissionshandel“ des Europäischen
Programms zur Klimaänderung (ECCP) erörtert, die von März bis Juni 2007 vier Mal für acht
Tage zusammentrat. Die Ergebnisse dieser Sitzungen lieferten einen wichtigen Beitrag zur
Überarbeitung der EU-EHS-Richtlinie7. Mit den vorgeschlagenen Änderungen der Richtlinie
sollen drei allgemeine Ziele erreicht werden:
1. volle Ausschöpfung der durch das EU-EHS gebotenen Möglichkeiten, in wirtschaftlich
effizienter Weise zu den allgemeinen Verpflichtungen der EU zur Treibhausgasreduzierung
beizutragen;
2. Verfeinerung und Verbesserung des EU-EHS im Lichte der gewonnenen Erfahrungen;
3. Beitrag zur Umwandlung Europas in einen Wirtschaftsraum mit niedrigem Treibhaus-
gasausstoß und Schaffung von wirksamen Anreizen für zukunftsweisende Investitions-
entscheidungen zugunsten kohlenstoffarmer Technologien, indem ein deutliches, unverzerrtes
und langfristiges CO2-Preissignal gegeben wird.
5 ibid
6 Ziele der EU für die Weiterentwicklung der internationalen Klimaschutzregelung über das Jahr 2012
hinaus � Schlussfolgerungen des Rates vom 20. Februar 2007, abrufbar unter:
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/de/07/st06/st06621.de07.pdf
7 Die Berichte über die besprochenen Themen und die Ergebnisse der Erörterungen können abgerufen
werden unter: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/review_en.htm
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 17 – Drucksache 16/9334
2. GELTUNGSBEREICH
Den Geltungsbereich des EU-EHS straffen und ausweiten …
Eine Konsolidierung der Auslegung des Begriffs „Feuerungsanlage“, wie sie im zweiten
NAP-Leitliniendokument der Kommission enthalten ist, würde die uneinheitliche Anwendung
des Geltungsbereichs der Richtlinie abstellen und weitgehend dem Vorgehen der Kommission
bei der Bewertung der NAP in Phase 2 entsprechen. Zusammen mit einer expliziten
Definition von „Feuerungsanlage“, die alle ortsfesten Feuerungseinheiten umfasst, bei deren
Betrieb Treibhausgase freigesetzt werden, würde sie die erforderliche rechtliche und
technische Klarheit für eine einheitliche Anwendung der Richtlinie schaffen. Ergänzend sollte
eine explizite Liste von Tätigkeiten (ebenfalls in Anhang I der Richtlinie) aufgestellt werden,
um sicherzustellen, dass auch Prozessemissionen, die mit der Konsolidierung der oben
genannten Auslegung des Begriffs „Feuerungsanlage“ möglicherweise nicht klar erfasst
wurden, mitberücksichtigt werden. Neue Tätigkeiten und Gase, die derzeit nicht unter das
EU-EHS fallen (s. weiter unten), sollten ebenfalls in die Liste von Tätigkeiten aufgenommen
werden.
Eine Ausweitung des Erfassungsbereichs des EU-EHS durch Einbeziehung neuer Sektoren
und Gase würde die Umweltwirksamkeit des Systems verstärken und neue und zusätzliche
Möglichkeiten für Emissionsminderungen im Rahmen des Systems schaffen, wodurch das
Minderungspotenzial erhöht und die Minderungskosten unter Umständen verringert würden8.
Der Umfang des Minderungspotenzials oder der Minderungskosten stellt nicht unbedingt ein
Kriterium für die Einbeziehung eines bestimmten Sektors in das EU-EHS dar, da in das
System bereits Sektoren einbezogen sind, die ein möglicherweise nur begrenztes Minderungs-
potenzial aufweisen, jedoch wichtige THG-Emissionsquellen umfassen. Außerdem ist es
wichtig, der Emission von Treibhausgasen im Lichte der vom Europäischen Rat festgesetzten
neuen Emissionsreduktionsziele einen wirtschaftlichen Wert zuzuordnen. Diese Ziele lassen
sich nur erreichen, wenn durch die erforderlichen wirtschaftlichen Signale, die sich aus einem
eindeutigen, unverzerrten und für möglichst viele Industriezweige geltenden Kohlenstoffpreis
ergeben, zukunftsweisende Investitionsentscheidungen zugunsten kohlenstoffarmer
Technologien ausgelöst werden.
Aus diesen Gründen sollten CO2-Emissionen aus der Herstellung von petrochemischen
Erzeugnissen, Ammoniak und Aluminium in das EU-EHS einbezogen werden. Dasselbe gilt
für N2O-Emissionen aus der Herstellung von Salpetersäure, Adipinsäure und Glyoxalsäure
sowie für PFC-Emissionen aus dem Aluminiumsektor, die alle mit hinreichender Genauigkeit
gemessen und überprüft werden können.
Mit der Einbeziehung dieser Sektoren und Gase würde der Erfassungsbereich des EU-EHS
um bis zu schätzungsweise rund 100 Mio. t CO2 oder 4,6 % der Zertifikate für Phase 2
ausgeweitet. Zusammen mit einer Straffung des Geltungsbereichs des EU-EHS durch eine
konsolidierte Auslegung des Begriffs „Feuerungsanlage“ würde der Gesamterfassungsbereich
8 Es wurde vorgebracht, dass die Erfüllungskosten durch die Einbeziehung neuer Sektoren und Gase um
30-40 % verringert werden könnten, sofern bestimmte Voraussetzungen wie u. a. eine genaue
Überwachung, Berichterstattung und Prüfung erfüllt sind. Siehe Schlussbericht der ersten Sitzung der
ECCP-Arbeitsgruppe „Emissionshandel“ über die Überarbeitung des EU-EHS in Bezug auf den
Geltungsbereich der Richtlinie, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/review_en.htm
Drucksache 16/9334 – 18 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
des EU-EHS um 140 bis 150 Mio. t CO2 oder 6,6 bis 7,1 % mehr Zertifikate gegenüber der
Phase 2 ausgeweitet.9
Das Emissionshandelssystem sollte nur auf Emissionen ausgeweitet werden, für die eine
Überwachung, Berichterstattung und Prüfung mit demselben Maß an Genauigkeit möglich ist,
wie es im Rahmen der Überwachungs-, Berichterstattungs- und Prüfvorschriften nach der
derzeitigen Richtlinie vorgeschrieben ist. Dies ist beim Schiffsverkehr der Fall, die in diesem
Vorschlag nicht mit enthalten ist, jedoch zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt nach einer umfassenden
diesbezüglichen Folgenabschätzung einbezogen werden könnte. Auf Emissionen aus der
Land- und Forstwirtschaft trifft dies nicht zu, wenngleich die Verbrennung von Biomasse im
Rahmen des EU-EHS als emissionsneutral angesehen wird. Das Europäische Parlament und
der Rat haben sich dafür ausgesprochen, dass die Einkünfte aus der Versteigerung von
Zertifikaten im Rahmen des EU-EHS für die Reduzierung von Emissionen, insbesondere
durch Vermeidung des Abholzens von Wäldern, verwendet werden10.
Darüber hinaus wird die Ausweitung des Geltungsbereichs weiter erleichtert, wenn die
Kommission die Möglichkeit erhält, in ihrer Genehmigung von Anträgen auf einseitige
Einbeziehung weiterer, in Anhang I der Richtlinie nicht aufgeführter Tätigkeiten und Gase
andere Mitgliedstaaten zu ermächtigen, ebenfalls solche Tätigkeiten und Gase einzubeziehen.
… die Gesamtkosten des Systems potenziell senken, indem alternative Maßnahmen für
Kleinemittenten ermöglicht werden …
Kleine und große Emittenten tragen in ungleichem Maße zu den unter das EU-EHS fallenden
Gesamtemissionen bei. So entfallen auf die 7 % größten Anlagen 60% der Gesamtemissionen,
während die 1 400 kleinsten Anlagen (rund 14 % aller Anlagen) für nur 0,14 %
verantwortlich sind. Kleinanlagen könnten daher auf kosteneffizientere Weise zu den
Emissionsreduktionen beitragen. Der für Feuerungsanlagen derzeit geltende Schwellenwert
von 20 MW Feuerungswärmeleistung wird zwar beibehalten, sollte aber mit einem
Emissionsschwellenwert von 10 000 t CO2/Jahr (jedoch ohne Emissionen aus Biomasse)
kombiniert werden, sofern die Feuerungswärmeleistung der Anlagen 25 MW nicht
überschreitet. Dies bedeutet, dass Feuerungsanlagen mit einer Feuerungswärmeleistung von
mehr als 20 MW, aber weniger als 25 MW, die in jedem der drei Jahre vor der Antragstellung
weniger als 10 000 t Kohlendioxid emittiert haben, aus dem EU-EHS ausgeschlossen werden
können, sofern
(1) aus Gründen der Fairness und um Verzerrungen des Binnenmarktes zu vermeiden,
Maßnahmen (z. B. steuerlicher Art) existieren, mit denen ein gleichwertiger Beitrag
der aus dem System ausgeschlossenen Anlagen zu den Gesamtreduktionszielen
erreicht wird;
(2) die Mitgliedstaaten bei der Kommission den Ausschluss der Anlagen (mit
Weiterführung solcher Maßnahmen sowie einer Überwachung) beantragen und die
Kommission innerhalb von sechs Monaten keine Einwände erhebt.
Der Schwellenwert von 10 000 t Kohlendioxid bietet relativ gesehen die größten Vorteile in
Bezug auf eine Verringerung der Verwaltungskosten je (potenziell) aus dem System
9 Bei diesen Zahlen handelt es sich um Schätzwerte, die weiter präzisiert werden können.
10 Stellungnahme des Europäischen Parlaments in erster Lesung und politische Einigung des Rates über
den Vorschlag der Kommission zur Einbeziehung des Luftverkehrs in das EU-EHS.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 19 – Drucksache 16/9334
ausgeschlossene Tonne. Auf diese Weise würden im Rahmen des EU-EHS Verwaltungs-
kosten von 4,2 EUR je ausgeschlossene Tonne eingespart, wobei die Verwaltungskosten für
gleichwertige Verwaltungsmaßnahmen nicht bekannt sind. Rund 4 200 Anlagen, die für etwa
0,7 % der gesamten Emissionen im Rahmen des EHS verantwortlich sind, könnten
ausgeschlossen werden.
Eine Änderung der Aggregationsregel entsprechend dem zweiten Leitliniendokument der
Kommission dahingehend, dass Anlagen mit einer Feuerungswärmeleistung von weniger als
3 MW aus dem Anwendungsbereich der Aggregationsklausel ausgeschlossen werden, kann
zum Ausschluss von schätzungsweise 800 weiteren derzeit unter das System fallenden
Kleinstanlagen führen.
… mit neuen Möglichkeiten durch CO2-Abscheidung und –speicherung …
Angesichts des langfristigen Potenzials für Emissionsreduktionen durch CO2-Abscheidung
und –speicherung und in Abwartung des Inkrafttretens der Richtlinie 2008/xx/EG über die
Speicherung von CO2 in geologischen Formationen sollten Anlagen, die Treibhausgas-
emissionen abscheiden, befördern und speichern, in das Gemeinschaftssystem einbezogen
werden. Während Artikel 24 bis zum Inkrafttreten der genannten Richtlinie den geeigneten
Rechtsrahmen für die einseitige Einbeziehung solcher Anlagen bildet, sollten Tätigkeiten, die
die Abscheidung, Beförderung und geologische Speicherung von Treibhausgasemissionen
betreffen, in Anhang I der Richtlinie explizit aufgeführt werden, um Klarheit zu schaffen.
Um die nötigen Anreize für die geologische Speicherung von Emissionen zu schaffen,
brauchen keine Zertifikate für gespeicherte Emissionen zurückgegeben zu werden. Allerdings
sollte keine kostenfreie Zuteilung für die Abscheidung, Beförderung und geologische
Speicherung von Treibhausgasemissionen erfolgen.
… ohne aber andere Maßnahmen im Verkehrsbereich zu ersetzen …
Obwohl die Treibhausgasemissionen aus dem Straßen- und Schiffsverkehr weiter zunehmen,
ist eine eingehendere Analyse einschließlich einer Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse erforderlich, damit
die Kommission entscheiden kann, ob der Emissionshandel der beste Weg ist, um hier etwas
zu erreichen. Emissionen aus dem Straßen- und Schiffsverkehr sind in diesem Vorschlag
daher nicht mitberücksichtigt.
3. ÜBERWACHUNG, BERICHTERSTATTUNG, PRÜFUNG
Verbesserung der Bestimmungen für die Überwachung und Berichterstattung …
Die bisherigen Erfahrungen bei der Überwachung und Berichterstattung haben gezeigt, dass
die Praktiken der Mitgliedstaaten teilweise voneinander abweichen. Um die Gesamtleistung
des Überwachungs- und Berichterstattungssystems in der EU zu verbessern, sollte eine im
Ausschussverfahren erlassene Verordnung die derzeitigen Leitlinien ersetzen.
… in Kombination mit harmonisierten Vorschriften für die Prüfung und
Akkreditierung …
Die derzeitige Richtlinie und ihre Anhänge regeln lediglich einige grundlegende Erfordernisse
und Aspekte des Prüfverfahrens. Infolgedessen weichen die Prüfpraktiken in den
Mitgliedstaaten voneinander ab und gewährleisten nicht unbedingt die für die allgemeine
Drucksache 16/9334 – 20 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Glaubwürdigkeit der Prüfung erforderlichen gleichen Ausgangsbedingungen. Eine im
Ausschussverfahren erlassene Verordnung sollte gemeinsame Anforderungen an die Prüfung
vorsehen, um eine gewisse Qualität des Prüfverfahrens zu gewährleisten, während durch
Änderungen der Anhänge IV und V der Richtlinie weitere Verbesserungen ermöglicht werden
sollten.
Diese Verordnung sollte zudem im Interesse des Binnenmarktes eine gemeinschaftsweite
Akkreditierung der Prüfstellen ermöglichen.
… und überarbeitete Einhaltungsvorschriften …
Damit sicher ist, dass die bei Nichteinhaltung der Vorschriften geltenden Sanktionen
ausreichend hoch bleiben, um das ordnungsgemäße Funktionieren des Marktes zu
gewährleisten, sollte die bei Emissionsüberschreitung anzuwendende Sanktion an die
jährliche Inflationsrate der Eurozone angepasst werden. Damit würde die abschreckende
Wirkung der derzeitigen Bestimmung auch ohne häufige Überarbeitung sichergestellt.
… stärken das Vertrauen in das EU-EHS und seine Glaubwürdigkeit …
Überwachung, Berichterstattung und Prüfung sind für das Funktionieren und die allgemeine
Glaubwürdigkeit des EU-EHS innerhalb und außerhalb der EU von grundlegender
Bedeutung. Die Umweltwirksamkeit und –integrität des Systems und somit sein allgemeiner
Ruf und seine Akzeptanz hängen in hohem Maße von einem soliden, verlässlichen und
vertrauenswürdigen Überwachungs-, Berichterstattungs- und Prüfsystem ab, das für jede unter
das System fallende Anlage ein hinreichend genaues Emissionsniveau gewährleistet.
Vor diesem Hintergrund hält die Kommission die höheren Verwaltungskosten, die durch eine
Verordnung kurzfristig entstehen könnten, für gerechtfertigt, da die Verwaltungskosten
längerfristig sehr viel niedriger wären. Darüber hinaus würde die Verordnung für mehr
Sicherheit, Transparenz und Verlässlichkeit in Bezug auf die tatsächlichen Emissionsniveaus
sorgen und somit das Vertrauen des Marktes in das System stärken. Längerfristig dürften
diese Vorteile etwaige kurzfristig entstehende höhere Verwaltungskosten weitgehend
aufwiegen, und sie werden die Gesamtkosten der Überwachung, Berichterstattung und
Prüfung für die Betreiber und die nationalen Behörden verringern, sobald elektronische Tools
in stärkerem Maße zum Einsatz kommen.
… mit einem einfachen und soliden Registrierungssystem
Die Zertifikate müssen ohne Einschränkung zwischen Personen innerhalb der Gemeinschaft
übertragbar sein. Aus diesem Grunde und angesichts der technischen, politischen und
administrativen Risiken, die mit dem derzeitigen Registrierungssystem verbunden sind, sowie
aufgrund der Ungewissheit über die künftige Entwicklung des UN-Registrierungssystems
sollten die ab dem 1. Januar 2013 vergebenen Zertifikate im Gemeinschaftsregister erfasst
werden. Dies vereinfacht nicht nur das System, sondern ist auch notwendig, um
sicherzustellen, dass das EU-EHS mit anderen Emissionshandelssystemen in Drittländern und
Verwaltungseinheiten verknüpft werden kann.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 21 – Drucksache 16/9334
4. WEITERE HARMONISIERUNG UND STÄRKERE BERECHENBARKEIT
Eine für die EU als Ganze geltende Obergrenze, mit der das Reduktionsziel von 20 %
erreicht wird, und eine lineare Herabsetzung sorgen für langfristige Berechenbarkeit …
Ein auf der Festsetzung nationaler Obergrenzen basierendes System bietet keine ausreichende
Gewähr, dass die vom Europäischen Rat im März 2007 bestätigten Emissionsreduktionsziele
erreicht werden. Außerdem dürfte ein solches System nicht dazu beitragen, die Kosten der
Emissionsreduktionen zu minimieren. Damit diese Ziele verwirklicht werden können, sollte in
der Richtlinie daher eine für die EU als Ganze geltende Obergrenze festgesetzt werden.
Darüber hinaus werden so eine langfristige Perspektive und eine größere Berechenbarkeit
geboten, die für langfristige Investitionen in eine effiziente Emissionsminderung erforderlich
sind. Am besten lässt sich dies erreichen durch einen Handelszeitraum von acht Jahren (bis
2020) und eine lineare Herabsetzung der Obergrenze, mit der der Reduktionspfad über 2020
hinaus fortgesetzt und den Investoren somit ein klares Signal gesendet wird.
Die Höhe der für die EU als Ganze geltenden Obergrenze für das EU-EHS muss kosten-
effizient und mit der Verpflichtung der EU, die Emissionen bis zum Jahr 2020 um 20 % zu
reduzieren, vereinbar sein. Die lineare Verringerung, die mit diesem Grundsatz vereinbar ist,
beträgt 1,74 % jährlich, womit eine Reduktion um 21 % unter den für 2005 gemeldeten
Emissionen erzielt wird. Dieser Reduktionspfad wurde berechnet beginnend bei der Mitte des
Zeitraums 2008-12 auf Basis der durchschnittlichen jährlichen Gesamtmenge an Zertifikaten,
die von den Mitgliedstaaten nach Maßgabe der Entscheidungen der Kommission über die
nationalen Zuteilungspläne der Mitgliedstaaten für den Zeitraum 2008-2012 vergeben
wurden.
… während die Versteigerung das Grundprinzip für die Zuteilung ist, wobei die
Verlagerung von CO2-Emissionen („carbon leakage“) verhindert werden muss …
Mit der Versteigerung werden Effizienz, Transparenz und Einfachheit des EHS am besten
gewährleistet und unerwünschte Verteilungseffekte vermieden. Zudem entspricht die
Versteigerung am besten dem Verursacherprinzip und macht frühzeitige Maßnahmen zur
Emissionsminderung lohnend. Aus diesen Gründen sollte die Versteigerung das Grundprinzip
für die Zuteilung sein. Damit die Reduktionsziele für 2020 erreicht werden, wird die
europäische Wirtschaft jedoch größere Anstrengungen unternehmen müssen, als sie ihr für die
Zeit bis 2012 abverlangt werden, und ohne vergleichbare Auflagen für die Industrie in
Drittländern könnte es zu Verlagerungseffekten kommen, d.h. zur Verlagerung von Treib-
hausgase emittierenden Tätigkeiten aus der EU in Drittländer und damit zu einer Erhöhung
der globalen Emissionen.
Vor diesem Hintergrund sollte die vollständige Versteigerung der Zertifikate ab 2013 für den
Stromsektor und für die Abscheidung und Speicherung von CO2 zur Regel werden, wobei die
Fähigkeit dieser Sektoren, die Opportunitätskosten abzuwälzen, berücksichtigt wird. Zur
Förderung einer effizienteren Stromerzeugung könnten für die von Stromgeneratoren erzeugte
Fernwärme oder die von ihnen an Industrieanlagen gelieferte Wärme jedoch kostenfreie
Zertifikate vergeben werden.
Für Anlagen in anderen Sektoren sollte ein allmählicher Übergang gelten, beginnend mit
kostenfreien Zuteilungen in Höhe von 80 % ihres Anteils an der Gesamtmenge der zu
Drucksache 16/9334 – 22 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
vergebenden Zertifikate. Dieser Anteil würde jedes Jahr um einen gleichen Prozentsatz
gesenkt werden, und 2020 würde es keine kostenfreien Zuteilungen mehr geben.
Sollten sich andere Industrieländer und andere große Emittenten an einem internationalen
Übereinkommen, mit dem das Ziel einer Begrenzung der globalen Erderwärmung auf 2°C
erreicht werden soll, nicht beteiligen, so könnte es in bestimmten energieintensiven Sektoren
und Teilsektoren in der Gemeinschaft, die im internationalen Wettbewerb stehen, zur
Verlagerung von CO2-Emissionen kommen. Dies könnte die Umweltintegrität und den
Nutzen von Gemeinschaftsmaßnahmen untergraben. Der europäischen Industrie muss
deutlich gemacht werden, dass die Gemeinschaft geeignete Maßnahmen ergreifen wird. Die
Kommission wird die Lage bis spätestens Juni 2011 überprüfen, sich mit allen relevanten
Sozialpartnern ins Benehmen setzen und unter Berücksichtigung der Ergebnisse der
internationalen Verhandlungen einen Bericht zusammen mit geeigneten Vorschlägen
vorlegen. In diesem Zusammenhang wird die Kommission bis 30. Juni 2010 ermitteln, in
welchen energieintensiven Sektoren oder Teilsektoren Emissionsverlagerungen stattfinden
dürften. Sie wird als Grundlage für ihre Analyse untersuchen, wieweit die Kosten der
erforderlichen Zertifikate nicht ohne einen erheblichen Verlust von Marktanteilen an Anlagen
außerhalb der EU, die keine vergleichbaren Maßnahmen zur Emissionsminderung
unternehmen, in die jeweiligen Produkte eingepreist werden können. Energieintensive
Sektoren, für die ein erhebliches Risiko einer Verlagerung von CO2-Emissionen ermittelt
wurde, könnten bis zu 100 % kostenfreie Zuteilungen erhalten, oder es könnte ein wirksames
„CO2-Ausgleichssystem“ eingeführt werden, um eine vergleichbare Grundlage für Anlagen
aus der Gemeinschaft, bei denen ein erhebliches Risiko von Verlagerungen besteht, und
Anlagen aus Drittländern zu schaffen. Mit einem solchen System könnten Importeuren
Vorschriften auferlegt werden, die nicht weniger günstig wären als diejenigen, die für
Anlagen in der Gemeinschaft gelten (z. B. indem die Rückgabe von Zertifikaten
vorgeschrieben wird). Alle getroffenen Maßnahmen müssten mit den Grundsätzen der
UNFCCC - insbesondere mit dem Grundsatz der gemeinsamen, aber unterschiedlichen
Verantwortlichkeiten und der jeweiligen Fähigkeiten – im Einklang stehen und der
besonderen Situation der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder Rechnung tragen. Zudem
müssten die Maßnahmen mit den Verpflichtungen der Gemeinschaft, einschließlich
derjenigen im Rahmen des WTO-Übereinkommens, im Einklang stehen.
Insgesamt wird davon ausgegangen, dass 2013 mindestens zwei Drittel der Gesamtmenge von
Zertifikaten versteigert werden.
In der Richtlinie ist festgelegt, welchen Anteil an der Gesamtmenge von Zertifikaten die
Mitgliedstaaten versteigern werden. Nach dem Vorschlag werden 90 % der insgesamt zu
versteigernden Zertifikate auf Basis des relativen Anteils an den Emissionen von 2005 im
Rahmen des EU-EHS aufgeteilt11. Aus Gründen der Fairness und der Solidarität und zur
Berücksichtigung nationaler Gegebenheiten sollten 10 % der insgesamt zu versteigernden
Zertifikate zu Lasten derjenigen Mitgliedstaaten mit einem durchschnittlichen Pro-Kopf-
Einkommen von mehr als 20 % über dem EU-Durchschnitt umverteilt werden. Bei dieser
Umverteilung werden Mitgliedstaaten mit niedrigem Pro-Kopf-Einkommen und guten
Wachstumschancen mehr erhalten.
11 Sobald vollständige Zahlen für 2006 vorliegen, ist die Kommission bereit in Erwägung zu ziehen, dass
die durchschnittlichen Emissionen aus den Jahren 2005 und 2006 als Grundlage für diese Aufteilung
herangezogen werden.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 23 – Drucksache 16/9334
Die Versteigerung von Zertifikaten sollte ohne Wettbewerbsverzerrungen auf dem
Binnenmarkt und ohne Verzerrungen des Zertifikatsmarktes erfolgen. Mit der Richtlinie wird
daher die Rechtsgrundlage für eine Verordnung über die Konzipierung und Durchführung der
Versteigerungen geschaffen.
Mit den Versteigerungen werden signifikante Einkünfte erzielt. Gemäß dem in Artikel 174
Absatz 2 des Vertrags zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft niedergelegten
Vorsorgeprinzip sollte ein bestimmter Anteil der Einkünfte aus der Versteigerung von
Zertifikaten verwendet werden zur Reduzierung der Treibhausgasemissionen, zur Anpassung
an die Folgen des Klimawandels, zur Finanzierung von Forschung und Entwicklung im
Bereich der Emissionsminderung und Anpassung, zur Entwicklung von erneuerbaren
Energieträgern, damit die EU ihre Verpflichtung, bis 2020 20 % der Energie aus erneuerbaren
Quellen zu gewinnen, einhalten kann, zur Abscheidung und geologischen Speicherung von
Treibhausgasen, zur Finanzierung von Beiträgen zum Dachfonds für Energieeffizienz und
erneuerbare Energien, für Maßnahmen zur Vermeidung des Abholzens von Wäldern und zur
Erleichterung der Anpassung in Entwicklungsländern sowie zur Regelung sozialer Fragen wie
einem etwaigen Anstieg der Strompreise in Haushalten mit niedrigen und mittleren
Einkommen.
Im Dezember 2006 legte die Kommission einen Rechtsvorschlag vor, der darauf abzielt, die
Klimaauswirkungen des Luftverkehrs zu verringern, indem die CO2-Emissionen aus Luft-
verkehrstätigkeiten in das Gemeinschaftssystem für den Handel mit Treibhausgas-
emissionszertifikaten einbezogen werden. Die Kommission stellte in ihrer Folgenabschätzung
fest, dass die Luftfahrtindustrie in der Lage sein dürfte, die Kosten der Teilnahme an dem
System weitgehend oder gar vollständig an ihre Kunden weiterzugeben, legte sich in der
Frage, welcher Anteil der Zertifikate nach 2012 versteigert werden sollte, aber nicht fest und
erklärte stattdessen, für künftige Zeiträume solle bei dem zu versteigernden Anteil die
allgemeine Überarbeitung der Richtlinie berücksichtigt werden. Diese Überarbeitung ist nun
abgeschlossen. Der Luftverkehr sollte wie andere Industrien, die übergangsweise kostenfreie
Zuteilungen erhalten – und nicht wie Stromgeneratoren - behandelt werden, d. h. ab 2013
sollte die Zuteilung von Zertifikaten für den Luftverkehr so erfolgen, dass im Jahr 2013 80 %
der Zertifikate kostenfrei zugeteilt werden und anschließend die kostenfreie Zuteilung für den
Luftverkehr jährlich um die gleiche Menge zurückgeführt wird, bis 2020 ein Nullstand
erreicht ist. Die Gemeinschaft und ihre Mitgliedstaaten sollten sich weiterhin um ein
Übereinkommen über globale Maßnahmen zur Verringerung der Treibhausgasemissionen aus
dem Luftverkehr bemühen.
…eine übergangsweise erfolgende kostenfreie Zuteilung, auch für neue Marktteil-
nehmer, muss nach harmonisierten gemeinschaftsweiten Vorschriften vorgenommen
werden …
Um Wettbewerbsverzerrungen zu vermeiden, sollte die übergangsweise erfolgende
kostenfreie Zuteilung von Zertifikaten nach harmonisierten gemeinschaftsweiten Vorschriften
vorgenommen werden. Diese Vorschriften sollten den Techniken mit der größten
Treibhausgas- und Energieeffizienz, den effizientesten Substituten und alternativen
Herstellungsprozessen, der Verwendung von Biomasse sowie der Abscheidung und
Speicherung von Treibhausgasen Rechnung tragen, und sie dürfen keine falschen Anreize zu
einer Steigerung der Emissionen bieten.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 24 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Anlagen, die geschlossen wurden, werden keine Zertifikate mehr kostenfrei erhalten. Der
Vorschlag sieht die Schaffung einer gemeinschaftlichen Reserve für neue Marktteilnehmer
vor. Die Zuteilungen aus dieser Reserve sollten den Zuteilungsregeln für bestehende Anlagen
folgen.
5. VERKNÜPFUNG MIT EMISSIONSHANDELSSYSTEMEN IN DRITTLÄNDERN UND
GEEIGNETE WEGE ZUR EINBEZIEHUNG VON ENTWICKLUNGS- UND
SCHWELLENLÄNDERN
Verknüpfung mit anderen Emissionshandelssystemen zwecks Schaffung eines globalen
Kohlenstoffmarktes …
Das EU-EHS sollte über Vereinbarungen und Abkommen mit anderen verbindlichen
Emissionshandelssystemen, die in Drittländern oder Verwaltungseinheiten Gesamtober-
grenzen für Emissionen festsetzen, verknüpft werden können, damit die Zertifikate im
Rahmen des EU-EHS und des mit ihm zu verknüpfenden Emissionshandelssystems
gegenseitig anerkannt werden.
Entsprechend den Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rates vom März 2007 hat sich die
EU verpflichtet, ihre Treibhausgasemissionen im Falle eines internationalen Übereinkommens
um 30 % zu reduzieren. Die Bedingungen eines solchen Übereinkommens werden sich auf
die kombinierte Zahl von Zertifikaten auswirken, die im Rahmen des mit anderen
Emissionshandelssystemen verknüpften EU-EHS zur Verfügung stehen. Infolgedessen sind
Bestimmungen vorzusehen, damit gegebenenfalls die erforderlichen Anpassungen
vorgenommen werden können.
… der in Bezug auf Projektgutschriften bereits existiert, aber einer Harmonisierung
bedarf …
Projektgutschriften ermöglichen es den Betreibern in der EU, den Verpflichtungen im
Rahmen des EHS nachzukommen, indem sie in Emissionsminderungsprojekte außerhalb der
EU investieren. Dies kann ein Anreiz für Länder sein, sich einem internationalen
Übereinkommen anzuschließen, und für die Unternehmen eine kurzfristig kostengünstige
Möglichkeit zur Erfüllung ihrer Verpflichtungen darstellen.
Gemäß den Bedingungen für die Phase 2 dürfen Gutschriften für etwa 1 400 Mio. t (oder im
Schnitt 280 Mio. t jährlich) in das EU-EHS einbezogen werden. Bezogen auf die Emissionen
von 2005 bedeutet die geschätzte Obergrenze von Phase 2 eine Verringerung um rund 130
Mio. t. Werden die Gutschriften von den Betreibern in vollem Umfang verwendet, so würden
in der Gemeinschaft nur in geringem Maße Reduzierungen vorgenommen und könnten die
Emissionen im Rahmen des EU-EHS im Extremfall sogar ansteigen, was es der EU
erschweren würde, ihre Gesamtreduktionsziele für 2020 zu erreichen. Daher sollten die
restlichen für den zweiten Handelszeitraum (2008-2012) genehmigten CDM-Gutschriften im
dritten Handelszeitraum noch verwendet werden können. Dementsprechend sollte den
Betreibern die Möglichkeit zugesichert werden, diese Gutschriften nach 2012 zu verwenden,
indem die Mitgliedstaaten den Betreibern gestatten müssen, bestimmte CER, die für vor dem
Jahr 2012 erfolgte Emissionsreduktionen vergeben wurden, gegen ab 2013 gültige Zertifikate
einzutauschen. Dasselbe sollte auch für CER aus hochwertigen, vor 2013 aufgestellten
Projekten für Emissionsminderungen in der Zeit nach 2013 gelten.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 25 – Drucksache 16/9334
Um gleiche Wettbewerbsbedingungen innerhalb der Gemeinschaft zu gewährleisten, sollte
die Verwendung von Gutschriften für Emissionsminderungen durch die Betreiber im Rahmen
des gemeinschaftlichen Emissionshandelssystems harmonisiert werden. Sobald die Gemein-
schaft ein zufrieden stellendes internationales Übereinkommen geschlossen hat, sollte der
Zugang zu Gutschriften aus Projekten in Drittländern parallel zur Steigerung des Emissions-
reduktionsniveaus, das mit dem Gemeinschaftssystem erreicht werden soll (d.h. von 20 % auf
30 %), erhöht werden. Bei Ausbleiben eines solchen Abkommens würde die Möglichkeit der
weiteren Verwendung von CER diesen Anreiz untergraben und die Verwirklichung der Ziele
der Gemeinschaft in Bezug auf die verstärkte Verwendung erneuerbarer Energien erschweren.
Während ab 2013 vor Inkrafttreten eines künftigen internationalen Klimaschutzüberein-
kommens keine ERU mehr vergeben werden können, könnten Projekte, die zuvor bereits
ERU generiert haben, im Rahmen bilateraler oder multilateraler Abkommen mit Drittländern
weiter anerkannt werden. Sobald ein internationales Klimaschutzübereinkommen in Kraft ist,
sollten CDM-Gutschriften nur dann im Rahmen des EU-EHS akzeptiert werden, wenn die
betreffenden Drittländer das internationale Übereinkommen ratifiziert haben. Es sollten
Bestimmungen aufgenommen werden, um unternehmerisches „Trittbrettfahren“ in Ländern
zu verhindern, die nicht Mitglied eines internationalen Übereinkommens sind, es sei denn, die
betreffenden Unternehmen sind in Drittländern oder Verwaltungseinheiten ansässig, die mit
dem EU-Emissionshandelssystem verknüpft sind.
Die Verwendung von CER muss mit dem Ziel der EU im Einklang stehen, bis 2020 20 % der
Energie aus erneuerbaren Quellen zu gewinnen sowie Energieeffizienz, Innovation und die
technologische Entwicklung zu fördern. Soweit mit der Verwirklichung dieser Ziele
vereinbar, sollte die Möglichkeit vorgesehen werden, mit Drittländern Abkommen zu
schließen, um in diesen Ländern Investitionen zu mobilisieren, die echte zusätzliche
Reduzierungen von Treibhausgasemissionen bewirken und zugleich die Innovationstätigkeit
in europäischen Unternehmen sowie die technologische Entwicklung in Drittländern anregen.
Solche Abkommen können von mehr als einem Land ratifiziert werden.
Für Projekte zur Reduzierung der Treibhausgasemissionen in der Gemeinschaft sollten
Zertifikate vergeben werden dürfen, sofern bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllt sind, die
erforderlich sind, um das ordnungsgemäße Funktionieren des EU-EHS zu gewährleisten. Als
Bedingung wäre es notwendig, auf Gemeinschaftsebene harmonisierte Vorschriften für solche
Projekte zu erlassen, die doppelte Anrechnung von Emissionsreduzierungen sowie etwaige
Einschränkungen des Anwendungsbereichs des Systems für den Handel mit Emissions-
zertifikaten in der Gemeinschaft auszuschließen und weitere politische Maßnahmen zur
Reduzierung von nicht unter das EU-EHS fallenden Emissionen zu treffen. Zu guter Letzt
dürfen diese Projekte keinen übermäßigen Verwaltungsaufwand mit sich bringen, sondern
sollten auf einfachen und leicht handhabbaren Vorschriften basieren.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 26 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
6. INKRAFTTRETEN
Mit Inkrafttreten dieses Vorschlags wird die vorgeschriebene Vorlage von nationalen
Zuteilungsplänen entfallen. Sollte sich das Inkrafttreten verzögern, so müssen die
Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen des EU-EHS in seiner derzeitigen Form bis Juni 2011 nationale
Zuteilungspläne für den Zeitraum 2013-17 erstellen und übermitteln. Ab 2013 dürfen gemäß
der derzeitigen Richtlinie sämtliche Zertifikate versteigert werden. Die kostenfreie Zuteilung
von Zertifikaten würde eine staatliche Beihilfe darstellen, die gemäß den Artikeln 87 und 88
EG-Vertrag begründet werden muss. Im Hinblick auf eine größere Sicherheit und Berechen-
barkeit ist die Kommission zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt der Ansicht, dass die nationalen
Zuteilungspläne nur akzeptiert werden könnten, wenn die Gesamtmenge zumindest in einem
diesem Vorschlag entsprechenden Maße abnimmt und die vorgeschlagenen kostenfreien
Zuteilungen die in diesem Vorschlag festgesetzte oder in seinem Rahmen noch festzusetzende
Menge nicht überschreiten.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 27 – Drucksache 16/9334
2008/0013 (COD)
Vorschlag für eine
RICHTLINIE DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS UND DES RATES
zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG zwecks Verbesserung und Ausweitung des EU-
Systems für den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionszertifikaten
(Text von Bedeutung für den EWR)
DAS EUROPÄISCHE PARLAMENT UND DER RAT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION -
gestützt auf den Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, insbesondere auf
Artikel 175 Absatz 1,
auf Vorschlag der Kommission12,
nach Stellungnahme des Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschusses13,
nach Stellungnahme des Ausschusses der Regionen14,
nach dem Verfahren des Artikels 251 des Vertrags15,
in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe:
(1) Mit der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom
13. Oktober 2003 über ein System für den Handel mit Treibhausgas-
emissionszertifikaten in der Gemeinschaft und zur Änderung der Richtlinie
96/61/EG16 wurde ein System für den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionszertifikaten
in der Gemeinschaft eingeführt, um die Verringerung von Treibhausgasemissionen in
einer kostenwirksamen und wirtschaftlich effizienten Weise zu fördern.
(2) Das Hauptziel der Klimarahmenkonvention der Vereinten Nationen (United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC), die mit Beschluss 94/69/EG
des Rates vom 15. Dezember 1993 über den Abschluss des Rahmenübereinkommens
der Vereinten Nationen über Klimaänderungen17 im Namen der Gemeinschaft
angenommen wurde, besteht darin, Treibhausgaskonzentrationen in der Atmosphäre
auf einem Niveau zu stabilisieren, das eine gefährliche anthropogene Interferenz mit
dem Klimasystem verhindern würde. Um dieses Ziel zu verwirklichen, sollte die
12 ABl. C vom , S. .
13 ABl. C vom , S. .
14 ABl. C vom , S. .
15 ABl. C vom , S. .
16 ABl. L 275 vom 25.10.2003, S. 32. Geändert durch die Richtlinie 2004/101/EG (ABl. L 338 vom
13.11.2004, S. 18).
17 ABl. L 33 vom 7.2.1994, S. 11.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 28 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
globale jährliche Oberflächenmitteltemperatur gegenüber den vorindustriellen Werten
um nicht mehr als 2°C zunehmen. Der jüngste Sachstandsbericht des Weltklimarates
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC)18 zeigt, dass die globalen
Treibhausgasemissionen ihren Höchststand 2020 erreicht haben müssen, wenn dieses
Ziel verwirklicht werden soll. Dies setzt voraus, dass die Gemeinschaft ihre
Bemühungen verstärkt und Industrieländer rasch einbezogen werden und dass die
Einbindung von Entwicklungsländern in den Prozess der Emissionsverringerung
gefördert wird.
(3) Der Europäische Rat19 ist die feste Verpflichtung eingegangen, die
Treibhausgasemissionen der Gemeinschaft bis 2020 gegenüber 1990 insgesamt um
mindestens 20 % bzw. um 30 % zu reduzieren, sofern sich andere Industrieländer zu
vergleichbaren Emissionsminderungen und wirtschaftlich weiter fortgeschrittene
Entwicklungsländer zu einem ihren Verantwortlichkeiten und jeweiligen Fähigkeiten
angemessenen Beitrag verpflichten. Bis 2050 sollten die globalen
Treibhausgasemissionen im Vergleich zu 1990 um mindestens 50 % geringer sein.
Alle Wirtschaftssektoren sollten zur Verwirklichung dieser Reduktionsziele beitragen.
(4) Um diese langfristigen Ziele zu erreichen, empfiehlt es sich, ein berechenbares
Schema vorzugeben, auf dessen Grundlage die Emissionen der unter das
Gemeinschaftssystem fallenden Anlagen verringert werden sollten. Damit die
Gemeinschaft ihre Verpflichtung, die Treibhausgasemissionen gegenüber 1990 um
mindestens 20 % kostenwirksam zu reduzieren, einhalten kann, sollten die diesen
Anlagen zugeteilten Emissionszertifikate bis 2020 um 21 % unter dem
Emissionsniveau dieser Anlagen von 2005 liegen.
(5) Um die Sicherheit und Berechenbarkeit des Gemeinschaftssystems zu verbessern,
sollte der Beitrag des Gemeinschaftssystems zur Erreichung eines allgemeinen
Reduktionsziels von mehr als 20 % erhöht werden, vor allem angesichts der
Zielvorgabe des Europäischen Rates, bis 2020 die Verringerung von 30 % zu
erreichen, die von Forschungskreisen zur Vermeidung gefährlicher
Klimaauswirkungen für erforderlich gehalten wird.
(6) Sobald ein internationales Übereinkommen zwischen der Gemeinschaft und
Drittländern in Kraft ist, das angemessene globale Maßnahmen für die Zeit nach 2012
vorsieht, sollte die Vergabe von Gutschriften für Emissionsreduktionen in diesen
Ländern gefördert werden. Bis es soweit ist, sollte die weitere Verwendung von
Gutschriften aus Ländern außerhalb der Gemeinschaft dennoch besser gewährleistet
werden.
(7) Obgleich die im ersten Handelszeitraum erzielten Erfahrungen zeigen, dass das
Gemeinschaftssystem Potenzial hat, und die nationalen Zuteilungspläne für den
zweiten Handelszeitraum bis 2012 bedeutende Emissionsminderungen gewährleisten
werden, hat die Überprüfung bestätigt, dass ein stärker harmonisiertes
Emissionshandelssystem unerlässlich ist, wenn die Vorteile des Emissionshandels
besser genutzt, Verzerrungen auf dem Binnenmarkt vermieden und die Verknüpfung
18 Vierter Sachstandsbericht des Weltklimarates vom 17. November 2007 in Valencia, Spanien; abrufbar
unter www.ipcc.ch
19 Schlussfolgerungen der Tagung des Europäischen Rates vom 8./9. März 2007 in Brüssel.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 29 – Drucksache 16/9334
mit anderen Emissionshandelssystemen erleichtert werden sollen. Darüber hinaus
sollte mehr Berechenbarkeit gewährleistet und der Anwendungsbereich des Systems
um neue Sektoren und Gase erweitert werden, um einerseits das stärkere CO2-
Preissignal zu senden, das als Anreiz für die erforderlichen Investitionen notwendig
ist, und andererseits neue Minderungsmöglichkeiten zu eröffnen, die zu niedrigeren
allgemeinen Minderungskosten und einer besseren Effizienz des Systems führen
werden.
(8) Die Definition des Begriffs „Treibhausgase“ sollte mit der Definition der UNFCCC in
Einklang gebracht werden, und das Erderwärmungspotenzial einzelner Treibhausgase
sollte näher bestimmt und auf den neuesten Stand gebracht werden.
(9) Das Gemeinschaftssystem sollte auf andere Anlagen ausgedehnt werden, für die eine
Überwachung, Berichterstattung und Prüfung mit demselben Maß an Genauigkeit
möglich ist, wie es im Rahmen der geltenden Überwachungs-, Berichterstattungs- und
Prüfvorschriften vorgeschrieben ist.
(10) Soweit für Kleinanlagen, deren Emissionen einen Schwellenwert von 10 000 Tonnen
CO2/Jahr nicht überschreiten, gleichwertige Maßnahmen zur Reduzierung von
Treibhausgasen, auch steuerlicher Art, existieren, sollten Verfahrensvorschriften
festgelegt werden, wonach die Mitgliedstaaten solche Kleinanlagen aus dem
Emissionshandelssystem ausschließen können, vorausgesetzt, diese Maßnahmen
werden tatsächlich angewandt. Im Interesse eines möglichst geringen
Verwaltungsaufwands bietet dieser Schwellenwert für die Verringerung der
Verwaltungskosten je aus dem System ausgeschlossene Tonne relativ gesehen die
größten Vorteile. Da es künftig keine fünfjährigen Zuteilungszeiträume mehr geben
wird, sollte im Interesse der Sicherheit und Berechenbarkeit des Systems festgelegt
werden, wie häufig die Genehmigungen zur Emission von Treibhausgasen überprüft
werden müssen.
(11) Die der Gemeinschaft als Ganzer zugeteilte Menge an Zertifikaten sollte ab Mitte des
Zeitraums 2008-2012 linear zurückgeführt werden, um zu gewährleisten, dass die
Emissionen durch das Handelssystem im Zeitverlauf schrittweise und berechenbar
verringert werden. Der jährliche Rückgang an Zertifikaten sollte 1,74 % der Zertifikate
entsprechen, die von den Mitgliedstaaten nach Maßgabe der Entscheidungen der
Kommission über die nationalen Zuteilungspläne der Mitgliedstaaten für den Zeitraum
2008-2012 vergeben wurden, damit das Gemeinschaftssystem auf kosteneffiziente
Weise dazu beiträgt, dass die Gemeinschaft ihrer Verpflichtung, bis 2020 einen
Emissionsrückgang von insgesamt mindestens 20 % zu erzielen, nachkommen kann.
(12) Dieser Beitrag entspricht einer im Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems erfolgenden
Emissionsverringerung im Jahr 2020 um 21 % unter den für 2005 gemeldeten Werten
und berücksichtigt auch die Wirkung der Ausweitung des Anwendungsbereichs im
Zeitraum 2008-2012 gegenüber dem Zeitraum 2005-2007 und die Emissionswerte für
den Handelssektor aus dem Jahr 2005, die für die Prüfung der für den Zeitraum 2008-
2012 vorlegten nationalen Zuteilungspläne Bulgariens und Rumäniens zugrunde
gelegt wurden, mit dem Ergebnis, dass im Jahr 2020 maximal 1 720 Millionen
Zertifikate zugeteilt werden. Die genauen Emissionsmengen werden berechnet, sobald
die Mitgliedstaaten nach Maßgabe der Entscheidungen der Kommission über die
nationalen Zuteilungspläne für den Zeitraum 2008-2012 Zertifikate vergeben haben,
da die Genehmigung der Zuteilungen an bestimmte Anlagen voraussetzte, dass die
Drucksache 16/9334 – 30 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Emissionen dieser Anlagen nachgewiesen und geprüft wurden. Nach abgeschlossener
Vergabe der Zertifikate für den Zeitraum 2008-2012 wird die Kommission die für die
Gemeinschaft als Ganze vergebene Menge an Zertifikaten veröffentlichen. Diese
Menge sollte in Bezug auf Anlagen angepasst werden, die im Zeitraum 2008-2012
bzw. ab 2013 unter das Gemeinschaftssystem fallen.
(13) Die der europäischen Wirtschaft abverlangten zusätzlichen Bemühungen setzen unter
anderem voraus, dass das überarbeitete Gemeinschaftssystem in der Gemeinschaft mit
höchstmöglichem Grad an wirtschaftlicher Effizienz und auf Basis vollständig
harmonisierter Zuteilungsbedingungen funktioniert. Die Versteigerung sollte daher das
Grundprinzip für die Zuteilung sein, weil sie das einfachste und nach allgemeiner
Auffassung wirtschaftlich effizienteste System ist. Dadurch dürften auch
Zufallsgewinne wegfallen und neue Marktteilnehmer und Wirtschaftssysteme mit
überdurchschnittlich hohem Wachstum von denselben Wettbewerbsbedingungen
profitieren wie existierende Anlagen.
(14) Alle Mitgliedstaaten werden beträchtlich investieren müssen, um die CO2-Intenstität
ihrer Wirtschaftssysteme bis 2020 zu verringern, und Mitgliedstaaten, deren Pro-Kopf-
Einkommen noch immer weit unter dem Gemeinschaftsdurchschnitt liegt und deren
Wirtschaftssysteme dabei sind, die wohlhabenderen Mitgliedstaaten einzuholen,
werden viel unternehmen müssen, um ihre Energieeffizienz zu verbessern. Angesichts
der Ziele, die Wettbewerbsverzerrungen im Binnenmarkt zu eliminieren und beim
Übergang der EU zu einem Wirtschaftsraum mit niedrigem CO2-Ausstoß das höchste
Maß an wirtschaftlicher Effizienz zu gewährleisten, ist es nicht zweckdienlich, die
Wirtschaftssektoren im Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems von zu Mitgliedstaat zu
Mitgliedstaat unterschiedlich zu behandeln. Daher ist es notwendig, andere
Mechanismen zu entwickeln, um die Bemühungen jener Mitgliedstaaten mit relativ
niedrigem Pro-Kopf-Einkommen und besseren Wachstumschancen zu unterstützen.
90 % der Gesamtmenge der zu versteigernden Zertifikate sollten auf Basis ihres
relativen Anteils an den Emissionen von 2005 im Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems
unter den Mitgliedstaaten aufgeteilt werden. 10 % dieser Menge sollten im Interesse
der Solidarität und des Wachstums in der Gemeinschaft zugunsten der vorgenannten
Mitgliedstaaten verteilt und zur Reduzierung von Emissionen und zur Anpassung an
die Klimaauswirkungen verwendet werden. Bei der Verteilung dieser 10 % sollten die
Pro-Kopf-Einkommen im Jahr 2005 und die Wachstumschancen von Mitgliedstaaten
berücksichtigt werden, d. h. Mitgliedstaaten mit niedrigem Pro-Kopf-Einkommen und
guten Wachstumschancen sollten mehr erhalten. Mitgliedstaaten mit einem
durchschnittlichen Pro-Kopf-Einkommen, das mehr als 20 % über dem
Gemeinschaftsdurchschnitt liegt, sollten bei dieser Verteilung einen Beitrag leisten, es
sei denn, die im Dokument SEK(2008) 85 geschätzten Direktkosten des
Gesamtpaketes überschreiten 0,7% des BIP.
(15) Angesichts der beträchtlichen Bemühungen, die zum Klimaschutz und zur Anpassung
an die unweigerlichen Folgen des Klimawandels erforderlich sind, empfiehlt es sich,
mindestens 20 % der Einkünfte aus der Versteigerung von Zertifikaten zu folgenden
Zwecken zu verwenden: Reduzierung von Treibhausgasemissionen; Anpassung an die
Klimaauswirkungen; Finanzierung von Forschung und Entwicklung auf dem Gebiet
der Emissionsverringerung und Anpassung; Entwicklung erneuerbarer Energieträger,
damit die EU ihrer Verpflichtung, bis 2020 20 % ihres Energiebedarfs aus
erneuerbaren Energien zu decken, nachkommen kann; Erfüllung der Verpflichtung der
Gemeinschaft, bis 2020 die Energieeffizienz der Gemeinschaft um 20% zu steigern;
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 31 – Drucksache 16/9334
Abscheidung und geologische Speicherung von Treibhausgasen; Beitrag zum
Globalen Dachfonds für Energieeffizienz und erneuerbare Energien20; Maßnahmen zur
Vermeidung des Abholzens von Wäldern und zur Erleichterung der Anpassung in
Entwicklungsländern; Regelung sozialer Fragen wie dem möglichen Anstieg der
Strompreise in Haushalten mit niedrigem oder mittlerem Einkommen. Dieser
Prozentanteil liegt wesentlich unter den von den öffentlichen Behörden erwarteten
Nettoversteigerungseinkünften und berücksichtigt potenzielle Einkommenswegfälle
aus Körperschaftssteuern. Einkünfte aus der Versteigerung von Zertifikaten sollten
außerdem verwendet werden, um die administrativen Kosten der Verwaltung des
Gemeinschaftssystems zu finanzieren. Die Verwendung von Versteigerungsgeldern zu
den genannten Zwecken sollte überwacht werden. Eine diesbezügliche Mitteilung
befreit die Mitgliedstaaten nicht von ihrer Verpflichtung gemäß Artikel 88 Absatz 3
EG-Vertrag, die Kommission über bestimmte nationale Beihilfemaßnahmen zu
unterrichten. Diese Richtlinie greift dem Ergebnis etwaiger Verfahren über staatliche
Beihilfen gemäß den Artikeln 87 und 88 des Vertrags nicht vor.
(16) Folglich sollte die vollständige Versteigerung der Zertifikate ab 2013 für den
Stromsektor zur Regel werden, wobei die Fähigkeit dieses Sektors, die CO2-
Kostensteigerung abzuwälzen, berücksichtigt wird, und für die Abscheidung und
Speicherung sollten Zertifikate nicht kostenfrei zugeteilt werden, weil der Anreiz für
diese Maßnahmen in Zertifikaten besteht, die in Bezug auf gespeicherte Emissionen
nicht zurückgegeben werden müssen. Um Wettbewerbsverzerrungen zu vermeiden,
können Stromgeneratoren kostenfreie Zertifikate für durch hocheffiziente Kraft-
Wärme-Kopplung im Sinne der Richtlinie 2004/8/EG erzeugte Wärme erhalten, sofern
für solche von Anlagen in anderen Sektoren erzeugte Wärme kostenfreie Zertifikate
vergeben werden.
(17) Für andere Sektoren im Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems sollte eine
Übergangsregelung vorgesehen werden, wonach im Jahr 2013 80 % der Menge
kostenfrei zugeteilt würden, die dem Prozentanteil der gemeinschaftsweiten
Gesamtemissionen im Zeitraum 2005-2007 entspricht, die die betreffenden Anlagen
im Rahmen der in der Gemeinschaft jährlich zugeteilten Gesamtmenge an Zertifikaten
ausgestoßen haben. Danach sollte die kostenfreie Zuteilung bis 2020 Jahr für Jahr in
gleicher Höhe auf Null reduziert werden.
(18) Um Wettbewerbsverzerrungen in der Gemeinschaft zu minimieren, sollte die kosten-
freie Zuteilung von Zertifikaten an Anlagen im Wege harmonisierter Gemeinschafts-
vorschriften („Benchmarks“) übergangsweise gestattet werden. Diese Vorschriften
sollten den Techniken mit der größten Treibhausgas- und Energieeffizienz, den
effizientesten Substituten und alternativen Herstellungsprozessen, der Verwendung
von Biomasse, erneuerbaren Energien sowie der Abscheidung und Speicherung von
Treibhausgasen Rechnung tragen. Sie sollten keinen Anreiz zur Emissionssteigerung
bieten und gewährleisten, dass ein zunehmender Anteil der betreffenden Zertifikate
versteigert wird. Im Interesse des reibungslosen Funktionierens des Marktes müssen
Zuteilungen vor Beginn des Handelszeitraums festgesetzt werden. Die Vorschriften
sollten auch gewährleisten, dass ungerechtfertigte Wettbewerbsverzerrungen auf den
Märkten, die Industrieanlagen mit Strom und Wärme versorgen, vermieden werden.
Sie sollten auch für neue Marktteilnehmer gelten, die denselben Tätigkeiten nachgehen
20 KOM(2006) 583 vom 6.10.2006.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 32 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
wie existierende Anlagen, denen Zertifikate übergangsweise kostenfrei zugeteilt
werden. Zur Vermeidung von Wettbewerbsverzerrungen auf dem Binnenmarkt sollten
für die Stromerzeugung neuer Marktteilnehmer keine Zertifikate kostenfrei zugeteilt
werden. Zertifikate, die im Jahr 2020 noch in der Reserve für neue Marktteilnehmer
sind, sollten versteigert werden.
(19) Die Gemeinschaft wird bei der Aushandlung eines ehrgeizigen internationalen
Übereinkommens, mit dem das Ziel der Begrenzung des Anstiegs der Erdtemperatur
auf 2°C erreicht wird, weiterhin Vorreiter sein und fühlt sich angesichts der auf Bali21
erzielten Fortschritte in dieser Richtung besonders bestärkt. Sollten andere Industrie-
länder und andere Großemittenten von Treibhausgasen diesem internationalen
Übereinkommen nicht beitreten, so könnte dies einen Anstieg von Treibhausgas-
emissionen in Drittländern bewirken, deren Industrien nicht an vergleichbare CO2-
Auflagen gebunden sind („carbon leakage“), und zugleich einen wirtschaftlichen
Nachteil für bestimmte energieintensive, im internationalen Wettbewerb stehende
Sektoren und Teilsektoren in der Gemeinschaft bedeuten. Dies könnte die
Umweltintegrität und den Nutzen von Gemeinschaftsmaßnahmen untergraben. Um der
Gefahr von Verlagerungseffekten zu begegnen, wird die Gemeinschaft für Sektoren
oder Teilsektoren, die die einschlägigen Kriterien erfüllen, Zertifikate in Höhe von bis
zu 100 % kostenfrei zuteilen. Die Ermittlung dieser Sektoren und Teilsektoren und die
erforderlichen Maßnahmen werden überprüft, um sicherzustellen, dass gegebenenfalls
Maßnahmen getroffen werden, und um einen Überausgleich zu vermeiden. In
Sektoren oder Teilsektoren, bei denen feststeht, dass das Risiko der CO2-Verlagerung
auf andere Weise nicht vermieden werden kann und in denen der Strom einen großen
Teil der Produktionskosten ausmacht und effizient erzeugt wird, können die
getroffenen Maßnahmen dem Stromverbrauch des Produktionsprozesses Rechnung
tragen, ohne dass die Gesamtzertifikatmenge geändert werden muss.
(20) Die Kommission sollte daher die Lage bis Juni 2011 überprüfen, sich mit allen
relevanten Sozialpartnern ins Benehmen setzen und unter Berücksichtigung der
Ergebnisse der internationalen Verhandlungen einen Bericht zusammen mit
geeigneten Vorschlägen vorlegen. In diesem Zusammenhang sollte die Kommission
bis spätestens 30. Juni 2010 ermitteln, in welchen energieintensiven Industriezweigen
oder Teilsektoren CO2-Emissionsverlagerungen stattfinden dürften. Sie sollte als
Grundlage für ihre Analyse untersuchen, wieweit die Kosten der erforderlichen
Zertifikate nicht ohne einen erheblichen Verlust von Marktanteilen an Anlagen
außerhalb der Gemeinschaft, die keine vergleichbaren Maßnahmen zur
Emissionsminderung unternehmen, in die jeweiligen Produkte eingepreist werden
können. Energieintensive Industrien, für die ein erhebliches Risiko einer Verlagerung
von CO2-Emissionen ermittelt wurde, könnten eine größere Menge kostenloser
Zuteilungen erhalten, oder es könnte ein wirksames „CO2-Ausgleichssystem“
eingeführt werden, um eine vergleichbare Grundlage für Anlagen aus der
Gemeinschaft, bei denen ein erhebliches Risiko von Verlagerungen besteht, und
Anlagen aus Drittländern zu schaffen. Mit einem solchen System könnten Importeuren
Vorschriften auferlegt werden, die nicht weniger günstig wären als diejenigen, die für
Anlagen in der Gemeinschaft gelten (z. B. indem die Rückgabe von Zertifikaten
vorgeschrieben wird). Alle getroffenen Maßnahmen müssten mit den Grundsätzen der
21 13. Konferenz der UNFCCC-Vertragsparteien und dritte Tagung der Vertragsparteien des Kyoto-
Protokolls vom 3.-14. Dezember 2007 auf Bali, Indonesien.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 33 – Drucksache 16/9334
UNFCCC und insbesondere mit dem Grundsatz der gemeinsamen, aber
unterschiedlichen Verantwortlichkeiten und der jeweiligen Fähigkeiten, im Einklang
stehen; die besondere Situation der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder würde dabei
ebenfalls berücksichtigt. Zudem müssten die Maßnahmen mit den internationalen
Verpflichtungen der Gemeinschaft, auch den Verpflichtungen aus dem WTO-
Übereinkommen, in Einklang stehen.
(21) Um in der Gemeinschaft gleiche Wettbewerbsbedingungen zu gewährleisten, sollte
auf harmonisierte Weise festgelegt werden, wie die Gutschriften für außerhalb der
Gemeinschaft erzielte Emissionsreduktionen von den Betreibern im Rahmen des
Gemeinschaftssystems zu verwenden sind. Das Kyoto-Protokoll zum UNFCCC gibt
quantifizierte Emissionsziele für Industrieländer vor, die im Zeitraum 2008-2012
erreicht werden sollten, und sieht Gutschriften für erzielte Emissionsreduktionen
(Certified Emission Reductions, CER) und Emissionsreduktionseinheiten (Emission
Reduction Units, ERU) aus Projekten zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung (Clean
Development Mechanism, CDM) bzw. aus Projekten zur gemeinsamen Umsetzung
von Klimaschutzprojekten (Joint Implementation, JI) vor, die von Industrieländern zur
Erreichung eines Teils ihrer Emissionsziele verwendet werden können. Obgleich nach
der Kyoto-Rahmenregelung ab 2013 keine ERU generiert werden können, ohne dass
neue Emissionsziele für Gastländer quantifiziert werden, können CDM-Gutschriften
potenziell weiter generiert werden. Sobald ein internationales Klimaschutzüberein-
kommen in Kraft ist, sollte die weitere Verwendung von CER und ERU aus Ländern,
die Vertragspartner dieses Übereinkommens sind, möglich sein. Bei Ausbleiben eines
solchen Übereinkommens würde die Möglichkeit der weiteren Verwendung von CER
und ERU diesen Anreiz untergraben und die Verwirklichung des Ziels der
Gemeinschaft, verstärkt erneuerbare Energien einzusetzen, erschweren. Die
Verwendung von CER und ERU dürfte mit dem Ziel der Gemeinschaft, bis 2020 20 %
der Energie aus erneuerbaren Energieträgern zu erzeugen, in Einklang stehen und
Energieeffizienz, Innovation und technologische Entwicklung fördern. Soweit dies mit
der Erreichung der genannten Ziele vereinbar ist, sollte die Möglichkeit vorgesehen
werden, Abkommen mit Drittländern zu schließen, um Anreize für
Emissionsreduktionen in diesen Ländern zu schaffen, die zu echten zusätzlichen THG-
Emissionsreduktionen führen und gleichzeitig Innovationsmaßnahmen seitens
gemeinschaftsansässiger Unternehmen und die technologische Entwicklung von
Drittländern fördern. Derartige Abkommen können von mehreren Ländern ratifiziert
werden. Sobald die Gemeinschaft ein zufrieden stellendes internationales
Übereinkommen ausgehandelt hat, sollte der Zugang zu Gutschriften aus Projekten in
Drittländern parallel zur Steigerung des Emissionsreduktionsniveaus erhöht werden,
das mit dem Gemeinschaftssystem erreicht werden soll.
(22) Im Interesse der Berechenbarkeit sollte es den Betreibern zugesichert werden, dass sie
für den Zeitraum 2008-2012 genehmigte, aber nicht verwendete CER und ERU aus
Projekttypen, die im Zeitraum 2008-2012 von allen Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen des
Gemeinschaftssystems anerkannt wurden, auch nach 2012 noch verwenden dürfen. Da
die Mitgliedstaaten im Besitz von Betreibern befindliche CER und ERU nicht vor
2015 zwischen Verpflichtungszeiträumen im Rahmen internationaler Übereinkommen
übertragen dürfen (so genanntes Ansparen von Gutschriften für die Nutzung in
künftigen Verpflichtungszeiträumen oder ‚banking’), und dann auch nur, wenn die
Mitgliedstaaten beschließen, das Ansparen dieser CER und ERU im Rahmen
diesbezüglich begrenzter Rechte zu gestatten, sollte diese Zusicherung in der Form
Drucksache 16/9334 – 34 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
erfolgen, dass die Mitgliedstaaten es Betreibern gestatten müssen, CER und ERU, die
für vor dem Jahr 2012 erfolgte Emissionsreduktionen vergeben wurden, gegen ab
2013 gültige Zertifikate einzutauschen. Da die Mitgliedstaaten jedoch nicht
verpflichtet werden sollten, CER und ERU zu akzeptieren, bei denen nicht sicher ist,
dass sie sie zur Erfüllung ihrer geltenden internationalen Verpflichtungen verwenden
können, sollte diese Auflage nicht über das Datum des 31. Dezember 2014
hinausgehen. Betreiber sollten für CER aus Projekten, die vor 2013 zur Verringerung
von Emissionen in der Zeit nach 2013 aufgestellt wurden, dieselbe Zusicherung
erhalten.
(23) Für den Fall, dass sich der Abschluss eines internationalen Übereinkommens
verzögert, sollte über Abkommen mit Drittländern die Möglichkeit vorgesehen
werden, Gutschriften aus hochwertigen Projekten im Rahmen des Gemeinschafts-
systems zu verwenden. Derartige Abkommen, die bilateral oder multilateral sein
können, könnten es gestatten, im Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems weiterhin
Projekte anzuerkennen, die bis 2012 ERU generierten, nach der Kyoto-
Rahmenregelung dazu jedoch nicht mehr in der Lage sind.
(24) Die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder sind gegenüber den Auswirkungen des
Klimawandels besonders anfällig und nur zu einem sehr geringen Prozentsatz für
Treibhausgasemissionen verantwortlich. Daher sollte den Bedürfnissen dieser Länder
besondere Priorität eingeräumt werden, wenn zur Erleichterung der Anpassung von
Entwicklungsländern an die Klimaauswirkungen Einkünfte aus Versteigerungen
verwendet werden. Da in diesen Ländern bisher nur sehr wenige CDM-Projekte
aufgestellt wurden, sollte zugesichert werden, dass Gutschriften aus Projekten, die
nach 2012 in diesen Ländern anlaufen, selbst bei Ausbleiben eines internationalen
Übereinkommens akzeptiert werden. Dieser Anspruch sollte den am wenigsten
entwickelten Ländern bis 2020 zuerkannt werden, vorausgesetzt, sie haben bis zu
diesem Zeitpunkt entweder ein internationales Klimaschutzübereinkommen oder ein
bilaterales bzw. multilaterales Abkommen mit der Gemeinschaft ratifiziert.
(25) Sobald das künftige internationale Klimaschutzübereinkommen in Kraft ist, sollten
CDM-Gutschriften aus Drittländern nur im Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems
akzeptiert werden, wenn diese Länder das internationale Übereinkommen ratifiziert
haben.
(26) Die Gemeinschaft und ihre Mitgliedstaaten sollten Projekttätigkeiten nur genehmigen,
wenn alle Projektteilnehmer ihren Sitz in einem Land haben, das in Bezug auf diese
Projekte Vertragspartner des internationalen Übereinkommens ist, um unter-
nehmerisches „Trittbrettfahren“ in Ländern zu verhindern, die nicht Mitglied eines
internationalen Übereinkommens sind, es sei denn, die betreffenden Unternehmen sind
in Drittländern oder in subföderalen oder regionalen Verwaltungseinheiten ansässig,
die mit dem EU-Emissionshandelssystem verknüpft sind.
(27) Angesichts der bisherigen Erfahrungen sollten die Vorschriften des Gemeinschafts-
systems für die Überwachung und Prüfung von Emissionen und die diesbezügliche
Berichterstattung verbessert werden.
(28) Um die Erfassung aller Arten von Heizkesseln, Brennern, Turbinen, Erhitzern,
Industrieöfen, Verbrennungsöfen, Brennöfen, Öfen, Trocknern, Motoren, Fackeln und
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 35 – Drucksache 16/9334
thermischen bzw. katalytischen Nachbrennern zu regeln, sollte diese Richtlinie um die
Definition des Begriffs der Feuerungsanlage erweitert werden.
(29) Um sicherzustellen, dass Zertifikate zwischen Personen innerhalb der Gemeinschaft
uneingeschränkt übertragen werden können und dass das Gemeinschaftssystem ab
Januar 2013 mit Emissionshandelssystemen in Drittländern und in subföderalen und
regionalen Verwaltungseinheiten verknüpft werden kann, sollten alle Zertifikate in
dem nach Maßgabe der Entscheidung Nr. 280/2004/EG des Europäischen Parlaments
und des Rates vom 11. Februar 200422 angelegten Gemeinschaftsregister geführt
werden. Diese Maßnahme sollte unbeschadet der Führung von nationalen Registern
für Emissionen erfolgen, die nicht unter das Gemeinschaftssystem fallen.
(30) Ab 2013 sollte die Abscheidung, Beförderung und geologische Speicherung von
Treibhausgasen in harmonisierter Weise im Gemeinschaftssystem erfasst sein.
(31) Es ist angezeigt, die gegenseitige Anerkennung von Zertifikaten im Rahmen des
Gemeinschaftssystems und von Zertifikaten zu regeln, die im Rahmen anderer
verbindlicher THG-Emissionshandelssysteme mit Obergrenzen für absolute
Emissionen vergeben werden, die in Drittländern oder in subföderalen oder regionalen
Verwaltungseinheiten bestehen.
(32) Unter Berücksichtigung der Erfahrungen mit dem Gemeinschaftssystem sollte es
möglich sein, Zertifikate für Projekte zu vergeben, die Treibhausgasemissionen
reduzieren, vorausgesetzt, diese Projekte werden nach auf Gemeinschaftsebene
harmonisierten Vorschriften durchgeführt und führen nicht dazu, dass Emissions-
reduzierungen doppelt angerechnet oder der Anwendungsbereich des Systems für den
Handel mit Emissionszertifikaten in der Gemeinschaft bzw. weitere politische
Maßnahmen zur Reduzierung von nicht unter das EU-EHS fallenden Emissionen
verhindert werden.
(33) [Was die Vorgehensweise bei der Zuteilung anbelangt, so sollte der Luftverkehr wie
andere Industrien, die übergangsweise kostenfreie Zuteilungen erhalten – und nicht
wie Stromgeneratoren - behandelt werden. Dies bedeutet, dass im Jahr 2013 80 % der
Zertifikate kostenfrei zugeteilt werden sollten und anschließend die kostenfreie
Zuteilung für den Luftverkehr jährlich um die gleiche Menge zurückgeführt werden
sollte, bis 2020 ein Nullstand erreicht ist. Die Gemeinschaft und ihre Mitgliedstaaten
sollten sich weiterhin um ein Übereinkommen über globale Maßnahmen zur
Verringerung der Treibhausgasemissionen aus dem Luftverkehr bemühen und die
Lage in diesem Sektor im Rahmen der nächsten Überprüfung des Gemeinschafts-
systems prüfen.]
(34) Die zur Durchführung dieser Richtlinie erforderlichen Maßnahmen sollten nach
Maßgabe des Beschlusses 1999/468/EG des Rates vom 28. Juni 1999 zur Festlegung
der Modalitäten für die Ausübung der der Kommission übertragenen
Durchführungsbefugnisse23 festgelegt werden. Die Kommission sollte insbesondere
ermächtigt werden, die Versteigerung von Zertifikaten, die übergangsweise
gemeinschaftsweite Zuteilung von Zertifikaten, die Überwachung und Prüfung von
22 ABl. L 49 vom 19.2.2004, S. 1.
23 ABl. L 184 vom 17.7.1999, S. 23. Geändert durch den Beschluss 2006/512/EG (ABl. L 200 vom
22.7.2006, S. 11).
Drucksache 16/9334 – 36 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Emissionen und die diesbezügliche Berichterstattung, die Akkreditierung von
Prüfstellen und die Umsetzung harmonisierter Projektvorschriften zu regeln. Da es
sich hierbei um Maßnahmen von allgemeiner Tragweite zur Änderung nicht
wesentlicher Bestimmungen bzw. zur Ergänzung dieser Richtlinie durch Hinzufügung
oder Änderung neuer nicht wesentlicher Bestimmungen handelt, müssen sie nach dem
Regelungsverfahren mit Kontrolle gemäß Artikel 5a des Beschlusses 1999/468/EG
erlassen werden.
(35) Die Richtlinie 2003/87/EG sollte in diesem Sinne geändert werden.
(36) Es ist angezeigt, die Vorschriften, auf deren Grundlage das überarbeitete
Gemeinschaftssystem ab 2013 funktionieren wird, frühzeitig umzusetzen.
(37) Im Interesse der ordnungsgemäßen Abwicklung des Handelszeitraums 2008-2012 und
unbeschadet der Möglichkeit, dass die Kommission die für das Funktionieren des
überarbeiteten Gemeinschaftssystems ab 2013 erforderlichen Maßnahmen erlässt,
sollten die Vorschriften der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG in der Fassung der Richtlinie
2004/101/EG weiterhin Anwendung finden.
(38) Die Anwendung dieser Richtlinie erfolgt unbeschadet der Artikel 87 und 88 EG-
Vertrag.
(39) Diese Richtlinie steht im Einklang mit den Grundrechten und Grundsätzen, die
insbesondere mit der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union anerkannt
wurden.
(40) Da die Ziele der vorgeschlagenen Maßnahme von einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten nicht
erreicht werden können und sich angesichts der Tragweite und Wirkung der
vorgeschlagenen Maßnahme auf Gemeinschaftsebene besser verwirklichen lassen,
kann die Gemeinschaft im Einklang mit dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip gemäß Artikel 5
EG-Vertrag Maßnahmen erlassen. Nach dem in dem genannten Artikel vorgesehenen
Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit geht diese Verordnung nicht über das zur
Erreichung des genannten Ziels erforderliche Maß hinaus -
HABEN FOLGENDE RICHTLINIE ERLASSEN:
Artikel 1
Änderungen der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG
Die Richtlinie 2003/87/EG wird wie folgt geändert:
(1) Dem Artikel 1 wird folgender Absatz angefügt:
„Die Richtlinie schreibt auch eine stärkere Reduzierung von Treibhausgasemissionen vor, um
die Verringerungsraten zu erreichen, die aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht zur Vermeidung
gefährlicher Klimaänderungen erforderlich sind.“
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 37 – Drucksache 16/9334
(2) Artikel 3 wird wie folgt geändert:
a) Buchstabe c erhält folgende Fassung:
„c) „Treibhausgase“ die in Anhang II aufgeführten Gase und sonstige sowohl
natürliche als auch anthropogene gasförmige Bestandteile der
Atmosphäre, welche die infrarote Strahlung aufnehmen und wieder
abgeben;“
b) Buchstabe h erhält folgende Fassung:
„h) „neuer Marktteilnehmer“ eine Anlage, die eine oder mehrere der in
Anhang I aufgeführten Tätigkeiten durchführt und der nach Übermittlung
der Liste gemäß Artikel 11 Absatz 1 an die Kommission eine
Genehmigung zur Emission von Treibhausgasen erteilt wurde;“
c) Die folgenden Buchstaben werden angefügt:
„[t)] „Feuerungsanlage“ eine ortsfeste technische Einheit, in der Brennstoffe
zur getrennten oder gekoppelten Erzeugung von Wärme und Kraft
oxidiert und sonstige unmittelbar damit zusammenhängende Tätigkeiten,
einschließlich Abgaswäsche, durchgeführt werden;
[u)] „Stromgenerator“ eine Anlage, die ab 1. Januar 2005 Strom zum Verkauf
an Dritte erzeugt hat und nur unter die Kategorie „Strom- oder
Wärmeversorgung“ in Anhang I fällt.“
(3) Artikel 5 Buchstabe d erhält folgende Fassung:
„d) geplante Maßnahmen zur Überwachung und Berichterstattung betreffend
Emissionen im Einklang mit der Verordnung gemäß Artikel 14.“
(4) Dem Artikel 6 Absatz 1 wird folgender Unterabsatz angefügt:
„Die zuständige Behörde prüft die Genehmigungen zur Emission von Treibhaus-
gasen mindestens alle fünf Jahre und nimmt gegebenenfalls Änderungen vor.“
(5) Artikel 9 erhält folgende Fassung:
„Artikel 9
Menge der für die Gemeinschaft als Ganze zugeteilten Zertifikate
Die Menge der Zertifikate, die ab 2013 jährlich für die gesamte Gemeinschaft vergeben
werden, wird ab Mitte des Zeitraums 2008-2012 linear zurückgeführt. Die Menge wird im
Vergleich zur durchschnittlichen jährlichen Gesamtmenge der Zertifikate, die von den
Mitgliedstaaten nach Maßgabe der Entscheidungen der Kommission über die nationalen
Zuteilungspläne der Mitgliedstaaten für den Zeitraum 2008-2012 zugeteilt wurden, linear um
1,74 % verringert.
Die Kommission veröffentlicht bis 30. Juni 2010 die absolute Menge der Zertifikate für 2013,
die auf der Gesamtmenge der Zertifikate basiert, die von den Mitgliedstaaten nach Maßgabe
Drucksache 16/9334 – 38 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
der Entscheidungen der Kommission über die nationalen Zuteilungspläne der Mitgliedstaaten
für den Zeitraum 2008-2012 vergeben wurden.
Die Kommission überprüft den linearen Koeffizienten spätestens im Jahr 2025.“
(6) Folgender Artikel 9a wird eingefügt:
„Artikel 9a
Anpassung der Menge der für die Gemeinschaft als Ganze zugeteilten Zertifikate
1. Für Anlagen, die im Zeitraum 2008-2012 gemäß Artikel 24 Absatz 1 in das
Gemeinschaftssystem einbezogen waren, wird die Menge der ab dem 1. Januar 2013
zu vergebenden Zertifikate nach Maßgabe der durchschnittlichen jährlichen Menge
der Zertifikate angepasst, die für diese Anlagen während des Zeitraums ihrer
Einbeziehung vergeben wurden, ihrerseits angepasst um den linearen Koeffizienten
gemäß Artikel 9.
2. Für die Anlagen, die erst ab 2013 unter das Gemeinschaftssystem fallen, sorgen die
Mitgliedstaaten dafür, dass deren Betreiber der betreffenden zuständigen Behörde
von unabhängiger Stelle geprüfte Emissionsdaten vorlegen können, damit diese mit
Blick auf die Menge der zu vergebenden Zertifikate berücksichtigt werden können.
Diese Angaben sind der betreffenden zuständigen Behörde bis spätestens 30. April
2010 im Einklang mit den gemäß Artikel 14 Absatz 1 erlassenen Vorschriften zu
übermitteln.
Sind die Angaben hinreichend belegt, so teilt die zuständige Behörde diese der
Kommission bis 30. Juni 2010 mit, und die anhand des linearen Koeffizienten gemäß
Artikel 9 angepasste Menge der zu vergebenden Zertifikate wird entsprechend
angepasst.
3. Die Kommission veröffentlicht die angepassten Mengen gemäß den Absätzen 1
und 2.“
(7) Artikel 10 erhält folgende Fassung:
„Artikel 10
Versteigerung von Zertifikaten
1. Ab dem Jahr 2013 versteigern die Mitgliedstaaten sämtliche Zertifikate, die nicht
gemäß Artikel 10a kostenfrei zugeteilt werden.
2. Die Gesamtmenge der von jedem Mitgliedstaat zu versteigernden Zertifikate setzt
sich zusammen aus
a) 90 % der Gesamtmenge der zu versteigernden Zertifikate, die unter den
Mitgliedstaaten in Anteilen aufgeteilt wird, die dem Anteil des betreffenden
Mitgliedstaats an den im Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems geprüften
Emissionen des Jahres 2005 entsprechen;
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 39 – Drucksache 16/9334
b) 10 % der Gesamtmenge der zu versteigernden Zertifikate, die im Interesse der
Solidarität und des Wachstums in der Gemeinschaft unter bestimmten
Mitgliedstaaten aufgeteilt wird, wodurch sich die Zahl der von diesen
Mitgliedstaaten jeweils versteigerten Zertifikate gemäß Buchstabe a um die in
Anhang IIa aufgeführten Prozentsätze erhöht.
Für die Zwecke von Buchstabe a wird der Anteil der Mitgliedstaaten, die 2005 nicht
am Gemeinschaftssystem teilgenommen haben, auf Basis ihrer im Rahmen des
Gemeinschaftssystems geprüften Emissionen des Jahres 2007 berechnet.
Gegebenenfalls werden die in Unterabsatz 1 Buchstabe b genannten Prozentsätze
anteilig angepasst, um sicherzustellen, dass die Umverteilung 10 % entspricht.
3. Mindestens 20 % der Einkünfte aus der Versteigerung von Zertifikaten gemäß
Absatz 2, einschließlich sämtlicher Versteigerungseinkünfte gemäß Buchstabe b des
genannten Absatzes, sind für folgende Zwecke zu verwenden:
a) Reduzierung von Treibhausgasemissionen, einschließlich des Beitrags zum
Globalen Dachfonds für Energieeffizienz und erneuerbare Energien,
Anpassung an die Klimaauswirkungen und Finanzierung von Forschung und
Entwicklung auf dem Gebiet der Emissionsminderung und Anpassung,
einschließlich der Beteiligung an Initiativen im Rahmen des Europäischen
Strategieplans für Energietechnologie;
b) Entwicklung erneuerbarer Energieträger, damit die Gemeinschaft ihren
Verpflichtungen nachkommen kann, bis 2020 zum einen 20 % ihres
Energiebedarfs aus erneuerbaren Energien zu decken und zum anderen die
Energieeffizienz um 20% zu steigern;
c) Abscheidung und geologische Speicherung von Treibhausgasen, insbesondere
aus Kohlekraftwerken;
d) Maßnahmen zur Vermeidung des Abholzens von Wäldern, insbesondere in den
am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern;
e) Erleichterung der Anpassung der Entwicklungsländer an die Auswirkungen des
Klimawandels;
f) Regelung sozialer Fragen von Haushalten mit niedrigem oder mittlerem
Einkommen, z. B. durch Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Energieeffizienz
und Isolierung und
g) Deckung der Kosten für die Verwaltung des Gemeinschaftssystems.
4. Die Mitgliedstaaten nehmen in die Berichte, die sie gemäß der Entscheidung
280/2004/EG vorlegen, Angaben über die für jeden dieser Zwecke verwendeten
Einkünfte auf.
5. Die Kommission erlässt bis zum 31. Dezember 2010 eine Verordnung über den
zeitlichen und administrativen Ablauf sowie sonstige Aspekte der Versteigerung, um
ein offenes, transparentes und nicht diskriminierendes Verfahren sicherzustellen. Die
Versteigerungen werden so konzipiert, dass die Betreiber, und insbesondere kleine
Drucksache 16/9334 – 40 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
und mittlere unter das Gemeinschaftssystem fallende Unternehmen, uneingeschränkt
Zugang haben und etwaige andere Teilnehmer den Auktionsbetrieb nicht
beeinträchtigen. Diese Maßnahme zur Änderung von nicht wesentlichen
Bestimmungen dieser Richtlinie durch Hinzufügung wird nach dem in [Artikel 23
Absatz 3] genannten Regelungsverfahren mit Kontrolle erlassen.“
(8) Folgende Artikel 10a und 10b werden eingefügt:
„Artikel 10a
Gemeinschaftsweite Übergangsvorschriften zur Harmonisierung der kostenfreien
Zuteilung
1. Die Kommission erlässt bis zum 30. Juni 2011 gemeinschaftsweite und vollständig
harmonisierte Durchführungsmaßnahmen im Hinblick auf eine harmonisierte
Zuteilung der in den Absätzen 2 bis 6 und Absatz 8 genannten Zertifikate.
Diese Maßnahmen zur Änderung von nicht wesentlichen Bestimmungen dieser
Richtlinie durch Hinzufügung werden nach dem in Artikel [23 Absatz 3] genannten
Regelungsverfahren mit Kontrolle erlassen.
Die Maßnahmen gemäß Unterabsatz 1 stellen soweit wie möglich sicher, dass durch
die Art der Zuteilung Anreize für treibhausgas- und energieeffiziente Techniken und
die Reduzierung von Emissionen geboten werden, indem sie den effizientesten
Techniken, Substituten, alternativen Herstellungsprozessen, der Verwendung von
Biomasse sowie der Abscheidung und Speicherung von Treibhausgasen Rechnung
tragen, und bieten keine Anreize zu einer Steigerung der Emissionen. Für die
Stromerzeugung erfolgt keine kostenfreie Zuteilung.
Die Kommission überprüft diese Maßnahmen, sobald die Gemeinschaft ein
internationales Klimaschutzübereinkommen geschlossen hat, das Reduktionsziele für
Treibhausgasemissionen vorschreibt, die mit denen der Gemeinschaft vergleichbar
sind, um sicherzustellen, dass eine kostenfreie Zuteilung nur erfolgt, wenn dies in
Anbetracht des Übereinkommens voll und ganz gerechtfertigt ist.
2. Vorbehaltlich des Absatzes 3 erfolgt keine kostenfreie Zuteilung für Strom-
generatoren, Abscheidungsanlagen, Pipelines für die Beförderung oder Speicher-
stätten von Treibhausgasemissionen.
3. Bei Erzeugung von Wärme durch hocheffiziente Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung im Sinne
der Richtlinie 2004/8/EG zur Deckung eines wirtschaftlich vertretbaren Bedarfs
können Stromgeneratoren Zertifikate kostenfrei zugeteilt werden, um die
Gleichbehandlung gegenüber anderen Wärmeerzeugern zu gewährleisten. Nach 2013
wird die Gesamtzuteilung an solche Anlagen für die Erzeugung dieser Art von
Wärme jährlich anhand des linearen Koeffizienten gemäß Artikel 9 angepasst.
4. Die Höchstmenge an Zertifikaten, die als Grundlage für die Berechnung der
Zuteilungen an Anlagen dient, die im Jahr 2013 Tätigkeiten durchführen und denen
im Zeitraum 2008-2012 Zertifikate kostenfrei zugeteilt wurden, darf im Verhältnis
zur jährlichen Gesamtmenge der Gemeinschaft den prozentualen Anteil der
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 41 – Drucksache 16/9334
entsprechenden Emissionen dieser Anlagen im Zeitraum 2005-2007 nicht
überschreiten. Gegebenenfalls wird ein Berichtigungskoeffizient angewendet.
5. Die Höchstmenge an Zertifikaten, die als Grundlage für die Berechnung der
Zuteilungen an Anlagen dient, die erst ab dem Jahr 2013 in das Gemeinschaftssystem
einbezogen werden, darf im Jahr 2013 die geprüften Gesamtemissionen dieser
Anlagen im Zeitraum 2005-2007 nicht überschreiten. In den darauffolgenden Jahren
wird die Gesamtzuteilung an solche Anlagen jährlich anhand des linearen
Koeffizienten gemäß Artikel 9 angepasst.
6. Fünf Prozent der gemäß den Artikeln 9 und 9a der Gemeinschaft als Ganzer für den
Zeitraum 2013-2020 zugeteilten Zertifikate werden für neue Marktteilnehmer
bereitgehalten als die Höchstmenge, die neuen Marktteilnehmern nach den gemäß
Absatz 1 dieses Artikels erlassenen Vorschriften zugeteilt werden kann.
Die Zuteilungen werden anhand des linearen Koeffizienten gemäß Artikel 9
angepasst.
Für die Stromerzeugung neuer Marktteilnehmer werden keine Zertifikate kostenfrei
zugeteilt.
7. Vorbehaltlich des Artikels 10b entspricht die Zahl der gemäß den Absätzen 3 bis 6
des vorliegenden Artikels [und Artikel 3c Absatz 2] kostenfrei zugeteilten Zertifikate
im Jahr 2013 80 % der Menge, die gemäß den in Absatz 1 genannten Maßnahmen
festgelegt wurde, und danach wird die kostenfreie Zuteilung bis 2020 Jahr für Jahr in
gleicher Höhe auf Null reduziert.
8. Im Jahr 2013 und in jedem der Folgejahre bis 2020 werden Anlagen in Sektoren, in
denen ein erhebliches Risiko der Verlagerung von CO2-Emissionen besteht,
Zertifikate in Höhe von bis zu 100 % der gemäß den Absätzen 2 bis 6 vorgegebenen
Menge kostenfrei zugeteilt.
9. Spätestens bis zum 30. Juni 2010 und danach alle drei Jahre ermittelt die
Kommission die Sektoren gemäß Absatz 8.
Diese Maßnahme zur Änderung von nicht wesentlichen Bestimmungen dieser
Richtlinie durch Hinzufügung wird nach dem in Artikel [23 Absatz 3] genannten
Regelungsverfahren mit Kontrolle erlassen.
Bei der Ermittlung gemäß Unterabsatz 1 berücksichtigt die Kommission, in welchem
Umfang der betreffende Sektor oder Teilsektor die Kosten der erforderlichen
Zertifikate ohne erheblichen Verlust von Marktanteilen an weniger CO2-effiziente
Anlagen außerhalb der Gemeinschaft in die Produkte einpreisen kann, wobei sie
Folgendes berücksichtigt:
a) den Umfang, in dem eine Versteigerung einen erheblichen Anstieg der
Produktionskosten bewirken würde;
b) den Umfang, in dem einzelne Anlagen des betreffenden Sektors die
Emissionswerte, beispielweise durch Einsatz der effizientesten Techniken,
senken können;
Drucksache 16/9334 – 42 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
c) die Marktstruktur, den relevanten geografischen und Produktmarkt und das
Ausmaß, in dem der Sektor dem internationalen Wettbewerb ausgesetzt ist;
d) die Auswirkungen des Klimawandels und der energiepolitischen Maßnahmen,
die außerhalb der EU in dem betreffenden Sektor durchgeführt werden oder
voraussichtlich durchgeführt werden sollen.
Für die Beurteilung, ob der durch das Gemeinschaftssystem bewirkte Kostenanstieg
abgewälzt werden kann, können u. a. Schätzungen der aufgrund des gestiegenen
CO2-Preises entgangenen Verkäufe oder der Auswirkungen auf die Rentabilität der
betreffenden Anlagen herangezogen werden.
Artikel 10b
Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung bestimmter energieintensiver Industrien im Falle der
Verlagerung von CO2-Emissionen
Spätestens im Juni 2011 legt die Kommission unter Berücksichtigung der Ergebnisse der
internationalen Verhandlungen und des Ausmaßes, in dem diese zu globalen Treibhausgas-
emissionsreduktionen führen, nach Konsultation aller relevanten Sozialpartner dem
Europäischen Parlament und dem Rat einen Analysebericht vor, in dem sie die Situation in
Bezug auf energieintensive Sektoren und Teilsektoren untersucht, für die ein erhebliches
Risiko einer Verlagerung von CO2-Emissionen ermittelt wurde. Zusammen mit dem Bericht
werden geeignete Vorschläge unterbreitet, die Folgendes betreffen können:
– Anpassung des Anteils von Zertifikaten, die diesen Sektoren oder Teilsektoren
gemäß Artikel 10a kostenfrei zugeteilt werden,
– Einbeziehung der Importeure von Produkten, die von den gemäß Artikel 10a
ermittelten Sektoren oder Teilsektoren hergestellt werden, in das
Gemeinschaftssystem.
Bei der Prüfung, welche Maßnahmen angemessen sind, werden auch etwaige bindende
sektorspezifische Abkommen berücksichtigt, die zu globalen Emissionsreduktionen führen,
die eine für eine wirksame Bekämpfung des Klimawandels erforderliche Größenordnung
aufweisen, überwacht und überprüft werden können und für die verbindliche Durchsetzungs-
bestimmungen gelten.“
(9) Die Artikel 11 und 11a erhalten folgende Fassung:
„Artikel 11
Nationale Umsetzungsmaßnahmen
1. Jeder Mitgliedstaat veröffentlicht und unterbreitet der Kommission bis
30. September 2011 die Liste der in seinem Hoheitsgebiet unter diese Richtlinie
fallenden Anlagen und alle den einzelnen Anlagen in seinem Hoheitsgebiet
kostenfrei zugeteilten Zertifikate, die im Einklang mit den Vorschriften gemäß
Artikel 10a Absatz 1 berechnet wurden.
2. Bis 28. Februar jeden Jahres vergeben die zuständigen Behörden die gemäß den
Artikeln 10 und 10a berechnete Menge der in dem betreffenden Jahr zu verteilenden
Zertifikate.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 43 – Drucksache 16/9334
Anlagen, die den Betrieb einstellen, erhalten Zertifikate nicht mehr kostenfrei.
Artikel 11a
Nutzung von CER und ERU aus Projektmaßnahmen im Gemeinschaftssystem vor
Inkrafttreten eines künftigen internationalen Klimaschutzübereinkommens
1. Bis zum Inkrafttreten eines künftigen internationalen Klimaschutzübereinkommens
und vor Anwendung von Artikel 28 Absätze 3 und 4 finden die Absätze 2 bis 7 des
vorliegenden Artikels Anwendung.
2. Betreiber können, sofern sie die ihnen von den Mitgliedstaaten für den Zeitraum
2008-2012 zugeteilten CER/ERU nicht ausgeschöpft haben, die zuständige Behörde
darum ersuchen, ihnen im Tausch gegen CER und ERU für bis 2012 erfolgte
Emissionsminderungen aus Projekttypen, die von allen Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen
des Gemeinschaftssystems im Zeitraum 2008-2012 anerkannt wurden, Zertifikate
zuzuteilen, die ab 2013 gültig sind. Die zuständige Behörde nimmt einen solchen
Austausch bis zum 31. Dezember 2014 auf Antrag vor.
3. Sofern die den Betreibern von den Mitgliedstaaten für den Zeitraum 2008-2012
zugeteilten CER/ERU nicht ausgeschöpft worden sind, gestatten die zuständigen
Behörden es den Betreibern, CER aus vor 2013 aufgestellten Projekten für
Emissionsminderungen in der Zeit ab 2013 gegen Zertifikate auszutauschen, die ab
2013 gültig sind.
Unterabsatz 1 gilt für alle Projekttypen, die von allen Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen des
Gemeinschaftssystems im Zeitraum 2008-2012 anerkannt wurden.
4. Sofern die den Betreibern von den Mitgliedstaaten für den Zeitraum 2008-2012
zugeteilten CER/ERU nicht ausgeschöpft worden sind, gestatten die zuständigen
Behörden es den Betreibern, CER, die für die Verringerung von Emissionen ab 2013
vergeben wurden, gegen Zertifikate aus neuen Projekten, die ab 2013 in den am
wenigsten entwickelten Ländern lanciert werden, auszutauschen.
Unterabsatz 1 gilt für CER für alle Projekttypen, die von allen Mitgliedstaaten im
Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems im Zeitraum 2008-2012 anerkannt wurden, bis
die betreffenden Länder ein Abkommen mit der Gemeinschaft ratifiziert haben oder
bis 2020, je nachdem, welches der frühere Zeitpunkt ist.
5. Sofern die den Betreibern von den Mitgliedstaaten für den Zeitraum 2008-2012
zugeteilten CER/ERU nicht ausgeschöpft worden sind und sich der Abschluss eines
internationalen Klimaschutzübereinkommens verzögert, ist es möglich, im Rahmen
des Gemeinschaftssystems Gutschriften aus Projekten oder anderen
emissionsreduzierenden Tätigkeiten, die im Rahmen von Abkommen mit
Drittländern durchgeführt werden, zu verwenden, wobei festgelegt ist, in welchem
Umfang sie genutzt werden können. Gemäß diesen Abkommen dürfen die Betreiber
Gutschriften aus Projekttätigkeiten in diesen Drittländern zur Erfüllung ihrer
Verpflichtungen im Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems verwenden.
6. Die Abkommen gemäß Absatz 5 sehen vor, dass Gutschriften aus Technologien für
erneuerbare Energien oder Energieeffizienz, die den Technologietransfer und die
Drucksache 16/9334 – 44 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
nachhaltige Entwicklung fördern, im Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems verwendet
werden können. Ein solches Abkommen kann auch die Verwendung von
Gutschriften aus Projekten vorsehen, bei denen das Referenzszenario unterhalb des
Niveaus der kostenfreien Zuteilung im Sinne der Maßnahmen von Artikel 10a oder
unterhalb der gemeinschaftsrechtlich vorgeschriebenen Niveaus liegt.
7. Nach Abschluss eines internationalen Klimaschutzübereinkommens werden im
Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems nur CER aus Drittländern zugelassen, die das
Übereinkommen ratifiziert haben.“
(10) Dem Artikel 11b Absatz 1 wird folgender Unterabsatz angefügt:
„Die Gemeinschaft und ihre Mitgliedstaaten genehmigen Projekttätigkeiten nur,
wenn alle Projektteilnehmer ihren Sitz entweder in einem Land, das in Bezug auf
diese Projekte Vertragspartner des internationalen Übereinkommens ist, oder in
einem Land oder in subföderalen oder regionalen Verwaltungseinheiten haben, die
mit dem Gemeinschaftssystems gemäß Artikel 25 verknüpft sind.“
(11) Artikel 13 wird wie folgt geändert:
a) Absatz 1 erhält folgende Fassung:
„(1) Die ab 1. Januar 2013 vergebenen Zertifikate sind gültig für Emissionen in
Achtjahreszeiträumen, beginnend am 1. Januar 2013.“
b) Absatz 2 wird gestrichen.
c) Absatz 3 Unterabsatz 1 erhält folgende Fassung:
„Vier Monate nach Beginn jedes Zeitraums gemäß Absatz 1 werden
Zertifikate, die nicht mehr gültig sind und nicht gemäß Artikel 12 Absatz 3
zurückgegeben und gelöscht wurden, von der zuständigen Behörde gelöscht.“
(12) Artikel 14 erhält folgende Fassung:
„Artikel 14
Überwachung und Berichterstattung betreffend Emissionen
1. Die Kommission erlässt eine Verordnung über die Überwachung von und
Berichterstattung über Emissionen - und gegebenenfalls Tätigkeitsdaten – aus den in
Anhang I aufgeführten Tätigkeiten, die auf den in Anhang IV dargestellten
Grundsätzen für die Überwachung und Berichterstattung basiert und in den
Überwachungs- und Berichterstattungsanforderungen für die einzelnen
Treibhausgase das Erderwärmungspotenzial der betreffenden Gase angibt.
Diese Maßnahme zur Änderung von nicht wesentlichen Bestimmungen dieser
Richtlinie durch Hinzufügung wird nach dem in Artikel [23 Absatz 3] genannten
Regelungsverfahren mit Kontrolle erlassen.
2. Die Verordnung kann den genauesten und aktuellsten wissenschaftlichen
Informationen, insbesondere aus dem IPCC, Rechnung tragen und kann auch
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 45 – Drucksache 16/9334
vorschreiben, dass Betreiber über Emissionen im Zusammenhang mit der
Herstellung von Gütern berichten müssen, die von energieintensiven, potenziell im
internationalen Wettbewerb stehenden Industrien produziert werden, und dass diese
Informationen unabhängig zu überprüfen sind.
Diese Vorschriften können auch die Berichterstattung über die Höhe der unter das
Gemeinschaftssystem fallenden und mit der Herstellung solcher Güter verbundenen
Emissionen aus der Stromerzeugung umfassen.
3. Die Mitgliedstaaten sorgen dafür, dass jeder Betreiber einer Anlage der zuständigen
Behörde nach Ende jedes Kalenderjahres über die Emissionen dieser Anlage in dem
betreffenden Kalenderjahr nach Maßgabe dieser Verordnung Bericht erstattet.“
(13) Artikel 15 wird wie folgt geändert:
a) Die Überschrift erhält folgende Fassung:
„Prüfung und Akkreditierung“
b) Folgende Absätze werden angefügt:
„Die Kommission erlässt eine Verordnung über die Prüfung von Emissionsberichten
und die Akkreditierung von Prüfstellen, in der die Bedingungen für die
Akkreditierung, die gegenseitige Anerkennung und den Entzug der Akkreditierung
von Prüfstellen sowie gegebenenfalls für die Überwachung und gegenseitige
Begutachtung (Peer Evaluation) festgelegt sind.
Diese Maßnahme zur Änderung von nicht wesentlichen Bestimmungen dieser
Richtlinie durch Hinzufügung wird nach dem in Artikel [23 Absatz 3] genannten
Regelungsverfahren mit Kontrolle erlassen.“
(14) Artikel 16 Absatz 4 erhält folgende Fassung:
„(4) Für ab dem 1. Januar 2013 vergebene Zertifikate erhöht sich die Sanktion
wegen Emissionsüberschreitung entsprechend dem Europäischen Verbraucher-
preisindex.“
(15) Artikel 19 wird wie folgt geändert:
a) Absatz 1 erhält folgende Fassung:
„(1) Die ab dem 1. Januar 2013 vergebenen Zertifikate werden im Gemeinschafts-
register erfasst.“
b) Folgender Absatz 4 wird angefügt:
„(4) Die Verordnung über ein standardisiertes und sicheres Registrierungssystem
enthält geeignete Modalitäten, nach denen das Gemeinschaftsregister die zur
Durchführung der Vereinbarungen gemäß Artikel 25 Absatz 1b erforderlichen
Transaktionen und sonstigen Vorgänge vornimmt.“
Drucksache 16/9334 – 46 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
(16) Artikel 21 wird wie folgt geändert:
a) Absatz 1 Satz 2 erhält folgende Fassung:
„Besonders berücksichtigt werden in dem Bericht die Regelungen für die
Zuteilung der Zertifikate, die Führung der Register, die Anwendung der
Durchführungsmaßnahmen für die Überwachung und Berichterstattung, die
Prüfung und die Akkreditierung sowie Fragen im Zusammenhang mit der
Einhaltung dieser Richtlinie und der steuerlichen Behandlung der Zertifikate,
falls zutreffend.“
b) Absatz 3 erhält folgende Fassung:
„(3) Die Kommission trifft Vorkehrungen für einen Informationsaustausch
zwischen den zuständigen Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten über Entwicklungen
in Bezug auf die Zuteilung, die Nutzung von ERU und CER im Rahmen des
Gemeinschaftssystems, die Führung der Register, die Überwachung,
Berichterstattung, Prüfung, Akkreditierung, Informationstechnologien und die
Einhaltung der Vorschriften dieser Richtlinie.“
(17) Artikel 22 erhält folgende Fassung:
„Artikel 22
Änderungen der Anhänge
Unter Berücksichtigung der in Artikel 21 vorgesehenen Berichte und der bei der Anwendung
dieser Richtlinie gesammelten Erfahrungen kann die Kommission die Anhänge dieser
Richtlinie mit Ausnahme von Anhang I ändern. Die Anhänge IV und V können geändert
werden, um die Überwachung und Prüfung der Emissionen und die diesbezügliche
Berichterstattung zu verbessern.
Diese Maßnahmen zur Änderung von nicht wesentlichen Bestimmungen dieser Richtlinie
durch Hinzufügung werden nach dem in Artikel [23 Absatz 3] genannten Regelungsverfahren
mit Kontrolle erlassen.“
(18) Artikel 24 Absätze 2 und 3 erhalten folgende Fassung:
„(2) Genehmigt die Kommission die Einbeziehung zusätzlicher Tätigkeiten und
Gase, so kann sie gleichzeitig anderen Mitgliedstaaten die Einbeziehung
solcher Tätigkeiten und Gase gestatten.
(3) Die Kommission kann aus eigener Initiative oder auf Ersuchen eines Mitglied-
staats eine Verordnung über die Überwachung von und Berichterstattung über
Emissionen aus Tätigkeiten, Anlagen und Treibhausgasen, die in Anhang I
nicht in Kombination miteinander aufgeführt sind, erlassen, wenn die
betreffende Überwachung und Berichterstattung mit ausreichender Genauigkeit
erfolgen kann.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 47 – Drucksache 16/9334
Diese Maßnahme zur Änderung von nicht wesentlichen Bestimmungen dieser
Richtlinie durch Hinzufügung wird nach dem in Artikel [23 Absatz 3]
genannten Regelungsverfahren mit Kontrolle erlassen.“
(19) Folgender Artikel 24a wird eingefügt:
„Artikel 24a
Harmonisierte Vorschriften für Projekte zur Emissionsminderung
1. Zusätzlich zu der in Artikel 24 vorgesehenen Einbeziehung kann die Kommission
Durchführungsmaßnahmen für die Vergabe von Zertifikaten in Bezug auf Projekte
erlassen, die von Mitgliedstaaten verwaltet werden und Minderungen von
Treibhausgasemissionen außerhalb des Gemeinschaftssystems bewirken.
Diese Maßnahmen zur Änderung von nicht wesentlichen Bestimmungen dieser
Richtlinie durch Hinzufügung werden nach dem in Artikel [23 Absatz 3] genannten
Regelungsverfahren mit Kontrolle erlassen.
Solche Maßnahmen dürfen nicht zur doppelten Anrechnung von Emissions-
minderungen führen und der Durchführung anderer politischer Maßnahmen zur
Verringerung von nicht unter das Gemeinschaftssystem fallenden Emissionen nicht
im Wege stehen. Vorschriften werden nur erlassen, wenn eine Einbeziehung gemäß
Artikel 24 nicht möglich ist, und bei der nächsten Überprüfung des
Gemeinschaftssystems wird untersucht, ob die Erfassung dieser Emissionen
gemeinschaftsweit harmonisiert werden kann.
2. Die Kommission kann Durchführungsmaßnahmen erlassen, die die Vergabe von
Gutschriften für Projekte auf Gemeinschaftsebene im Sinne von Absatz 1 regelt.
Diese Maßnahmen zur Änderung von nicht wesentlichen Bestimmungen dieser
Richtlinie durch Hinzufügung werden nach dem in Artikel [23 Absatz 3] genannten
Regelungsverfahren mit Kontrolle erlassen.“
(20) In Artikel 25 werden die folgenden Absätze 1a und 1b eingefügt:
„(1a) Es können Abkommen geschlossen werden, die die gegenseitige Anerkennung
von Zertifikaten im Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems und von Zertifikaten
vorsehen, die im Rahmen anderer verbindlicher Handelssysteme für Treibhaus-
gasemissionen mit Obergrenzen für absolute Emissionen vergeben werden, die
in Drittländern oder in subföderalen oder regionalen Verwaltungseinheiten
bestehen.
(1b) Mit Drittländern oder subföderalen oder regionalen Verwaltungseinheiten
können nicht bindende Vereinbarungen getroffen werden, um eine
administrative und technische Koordinierung in Bezug auf Zertifikate im
Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems oder anderer Handelssysteme für Treib-
hausgasemissionen mit Obergrenzen für absolute Emissionen vorzusehen.“
Drucksache 16/9334 – 48 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
(21) Die Artikel 27 und 28 erhalten folgende Fassung:
„Artikel 27
Ausschluss von Kleinfeuerungsanlagen vorbehaltlich der Durchführung gleichwertiger
Maßnahmen
1. Die Mitgliedstaaten können Feuerungsanlagen mit einer Feuerungswärmeleistung
von weniger als 25 MW, die der zuständigen Behörde in jedem der drei
vorangegangenen Jahre Emissionen von weniger als 10 000 t CO2-Äquivalent (ohne
Emissionen aus Biomasse) gemeldet haben und für die Maßnahmen gelten, mit
denen ein gleichwertiger Beitrag zur Emissionsminderung erreicht wird, aus dem
Gemeinschaftssystem ausschließen, wenn der betreffende Mitgliedstaat die
folgenden Bedingungen erfüllt:
a) Er teilt der Kommission jede dieser Anlagen mit, unter Angabe der
bestehenden gleichwertigen Maßnahmen;
b) er bestätigt, dass durch Überwachungsvorkehrungen geprüft wird, ob eine
Anlage in einem beliebigen Kalenderjahr 10 000 t CO2-Äquivalent oder mehr
(ohne Emissionen aus Biomasse) emittiert;
c) er bestätigt – für den Fall, dass eine Anlage in einem beliebigen Kalenderjahr
10 000 t CO2-Äquivalent oder mehr (ohne Emissionen aus Biomasse) emittiert
oder die gleichwertigen Maßnahmen nicht mehr Kraft sind -, dass die
betreffende Anlage wieder in das System aufgenommen wird;
d) er veröffentlicht die Informationen gemäß den Buchstaben a, b und c, damit die
Öffentlichkeit Stellung nehmen kann.
2. Wenn die Kommission innerhalb von sechs Monaten nach Ablauf einer Dreimonats-
frist ab dem Tag, an dem die Mitteilung zwecks Stellungnahme der Öffentlichkeit
erfolgt ist, keine Einwände erhebt, so gilt die Mitteilung als angenommen.
Nach der Rückgabe von Zertifikaten für den Zeitraum, in dem die Anlage in das
Emissionshandelssystem einbezogen war, wird die betreffende Anlage aus dem
System ausgeschlossen und der Mitgliedstaat vergibt für sie keine weiteren
kostenfreien Zertifikate gemäß Artikel 10a.
Artikel 28
Anpassungen nach Abschluss eines internationalen Klimaschutzübereinkommens
1. Sobald die Gemeinschaft ein internationales Klimaschutzübereinkommen
geschlossen hat, das verbindliche Reduktionen von Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2020
vorsieht, die über die vom Europäischen Rat vereinbarten Mindestreduktionsziele
hinausgehen, gelten die Absätze 2, 3 und 4.
2. Ab dem Jahr, das auf den Abschluss des internationalen Übereinkommens gemäß
Absatz 1 folgt, wird der lineare Koeffizient angehoben, so dass sich die für die
Gemeinschaft im Jahr 2020 zugeteilte Menge gegenüber der gemäß Artikel 9
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 49 – Drucksache 16/9334
festgelegten Menge um eine Menge an Zertifikaten verringert, die der Gesamt-
reduktion der Treibhausgasemissionen der Gemeinschaft über 20 % hinaus, zu der
das internationale Übereinkommen die Gemeinschaft verpflichtet, entspricht; diese
Menge wird multipliziert mit dem Anteil an den gesamten Treibhausgasemissions-
reduktionen für das Jahr 2020, den das Gemeinschaftssystem gemäß den Artikeln 9
und 9a beiträgt.
3. Die Betreiber dürfen CER, ERU oder sonstige gemäß Absatz 4 genehmigte
Gutschriften aus Drittländern, die das internationale Übereinkommen geschlossen
haben, bis zur Hälfte der gemäß Absatz 2 vorgenommenen Reduktionen nutzen.
4. Die Kommission kann Maßnahmen erlassen, die es den Betreibern gestatten,
gegebenenfalls im Rahmen des Gemeinschaftssystems zusätzlich zu den in
Artikel 11a Absätze 2 bis 5 genannten Projekttypen weitere Projekttypen zu
verwenden oder andere im Rahmen des internationalen Übereinkommens
geschaffene Mechanismen zu nutzen.
Diese Maßnahmen zur Änderung von nicht wesentlichen Bestimmungen dieser
Richtlinie durch Hinzufügung werden nach dem in Artikel [23 Absatz 3] genannten
Regelungsverfahren mit Kontrolle erlassen.“
(22) Anhang I wird gemäß Anhang I dieser Richtlinie geändert.
(23) Anhang II dieser Richtlinie wird als Anhang IIa angefügt.
(24) Anhang III wird gestrichen.
Artikel 2
Umsetzung
1. Die Mitgliedstaaten erlassen die erforderlichen Rechts- und Verwaltungs-
vorschriften, um dieser Richtlinie bis spätestens 31. Dezember 2012 nachzukommen.
Sie teilen der Kommission unverzüglich den Wortlaut dieser Rechtsvorschriften mit
und fügen eine Entsprechungstabelle dieser Rechtsvorschriften und der vorliegenden
Richtlinie bei.
Die Mitgliedstaaten erlassen jedoch die Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften, die
erforderlich sind, um dem mit Artikel 1 Nummer 6 dieser Richtlinie eingefügten
Artikel 9a Absatz 2 der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG und dem mit Artikel 1 Nummer 9
dieser Richtlinie geänderten Artikel 11 der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG bis spätestens
[31. Dezember 2009] nachzukommen.
Die Mitgliedstaaten wenden die Vorschriften gemäß Unterabsatz 1 ab dem 1. Januar
2013 an. Bei Erlass der Vorschriften gemäß den Unterabsätzen 1 und 2 wird in den
Vorschriften selbst oder durch einen Hinweis bei ihrer amtlichen Veröffentlichung
auf diese Richtlinie Bezug genommen. Die Mitgliedstaaten regeln die Einzelheiten
dieser Bezugnahme.
2. Die Mitgliedstaaten teilen der Kommission den Wortlaut der wichtigsten
Rechtsvorschriften mit, die sie auf dem unter diese Richtlinie fallenden Gebiet
erlassen. Sie unterrichten die Kommission davon.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 50 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Artikel 3
Übergangsbestimmung
Die Richtlinie 2003/87/EG in der geänderten Fassung der Richtlinie 2004/101/EG gilt
weiterhin bis zum 31. Dezember 2012.
Artikel 4
Inkrafttreten
Diese Richtlinie tritt am zwanzigsten Tag nach ihrer Veröffentlichung im Amtsblatt der
Europäischen Union in Kraft.
Artikel 5
Adressaten
Diese Richtlinie ist an die Mitgliedstaaten gerichtet.
Brüssel, den […].
Im Namen des Europäischen Parlaments Im Namen des Rates
Der Präsident Der Präsident
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 51 – Drucksache 16/9334
ANHANG I
Anhang I der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG wird wie folgt geändert:
1. Nummer 1 erhält folgende Fassung:
„1. Anlagen oder Anlagenteile, die für Zwecke der Forschung, Entwicklung und
Prüfung neuer Produkte und Prozesse genutzt werden, sowie Feuerungsanlagen, die
ausschließlich Biomasse verwenden, fallen nicht unter diese Richtlinie.“
2. In Nummer 2 wird folgender Satz angefügt:
„Bei der Berechnung der Gesamtkapazität von Feuerungsanlagen werden Einheiten
mit einer Feuerungswärmeleistung von weniger als 3 MW für die Zwecke dieser
Berechnung nicht mitberücksichtigt.“
3. Die Tabelle wird wie folgt geändert:
a) Die erste Reihe von Tätigkeitskategorien erhält folgende Fassung:
„
Strom- und Wärmeversorgung
Feuerungsanlagen mit einer Feuerungswärmeleistung von über
20 MW (ausgenommen Anlagen für die Verbrennung von
gefährlichen oder Siedlungsabfällen)
Sonstige Anlagen zur Energieumwandlung und -umformung
Mineralölraffinerien
Kokereien
Kohlendioxid
Kohlendioxid
Kohlendioxid
“
b) Die zweite Reihe von Tätigkeitskategorien wird wie folgt geändert:
i) In der Überschrift wird das Wortglied „Eisen“ gestrichen.
ii) Die folgenden Absätze werden hinzugefügt:
„
Herstellung und Verarbeitung von Eisenmetallen (einschließlich
Eisenlegierungen) bei Betrieb von Feuerungsanlagen mit einer
Feuerungswärmeleistung von über 20 MW, einschließlich
Walzwerke, Nachbrenner, Glühöfen, Schmiedewerke, Gießereien,
Beschichtungs- und Beizanlagen
Herstellung von Aluminium (Primäraluminium, und
Sekundäraluminium bei Betrieb von Feuerungsanlagen mit einer
Feuerungswärmeleistung von über 20 MW)
Herstellung und Verarbeitung von Nichteisenmetallen, einschließlich
der Herstellung von Legierungen, Raffinationsprodukten,
Gussprodukten usw. bei Betrieb von Feuerungsanlagen mit einer
Kohlendioxid
Kohlendioxid und per-
fluorierte Kohlen-
wasserstoffe (PFC)
Kohlendioxid
Feuerungswärmeleistung von über 20 MW
“
Drucksache 16/9334 – 52 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
c) Die dritte Reihe von Tätigkeitskategorien wird wie folgt geändert:
i) Absatz 1 erhält folgende Fassung:
„Anlagen zur Herstellung von Zementklinker in Drehrohröfen mit einer
Produktionskapazität über 500 t pro Tag oder von Kalk, einschließlich
Brennen von Dolomit und Magnesit, in Drehrohröfen mit einer
Produktionskapazität über 50 t pro Tag oder in anderen Öfen mit einer
Produktionskapazität über 50 t pro Tag“;
ii) in Absatz 3 werden folgende Worte gestrichen:
„und/oder einer Ofenkapazität über 4 m³ und einer Besatzdichte über
300 kg/m³“;
iii) folgende Absätze werden hinzugefügt:
„
Anlagen zur Herstellung von Steinwolle mit einer
Produktionskapazität von über 20 t/Tag
Anlagen zum Trocknen oder Brennen von Gips oder zur Herstellung
von Gipskartonplatten und sonstigen Gipserzeugnissen bei Betrieb
von Feuerungsanlagen mit einer Feuerungswärmeleistung von über
20 MW
Kohlendioxid
Kohlendioxid
“
4. Die folgenden Reihen von Tätigkeitskategorien werden hinzugefügt:
„
Chemische Industrie
Herstellung von Industrieruß durch Verbrennung organischer Stoffe
wie Öle, Teere, Crack- und Destillationsrückstände bei Betrieb von
Feuerungsanlagen mit einer Feuerungswärmeleistung von über
20 MW
Herstellung von Salpetersäure
Herstellung von Adipinsäure
Herstellung von Glyoxal und Glyoxylsäure
Kohlendioxid
Kohlendioxid und
Stickoxid
Kohlendioxid und
Stickoxid
Kohlendioxid und
Stickoxid
24 Richtlinie xxxx/xx/EG über die geologische Speicherung von Kohlendioxid.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 53 – Drucksache 16/9334
Herstellung von Ammoniak
Herstellung von organischen Grundchemikalien durch Cracken,
Reformieren, partielle oder vollständige Oxidation oder ähnliche
Verfahren, mit einer Produktionskapazität von über 100 t/Tag
Herstellung von Wasserstoff (H2) und Synthesegas durch
Reformieren oder partielle Oxidation mit einer
Produktionskapazität von über 25 t/Tag
Herstellung von Sodaasche (Na2CO3) und Natriumbicarbonat
(NaHCO3)
Abscheidung, Beförderung und geologische Speicherung von
Treibhausgasemissionen
Anlagen zur Abscheidung von Treibhausgasen zwecks Beförderung
und geologischer Speicherung in einer gemäß der Richtlinie
xxxx/xx/EG24 zugelassenen Speicherstätte
Pipelines für die Beförderung von Treibhausgasen zwecks
geologischer Speicherung in einer gemäß der Richtlinie
xxxx/xx/EG zugelassenen Speicherstätte
Gemäß der Richtlinie xxxx/xx/EG zugelassene Speicherstätten für
die geologische Speicherung von Treibhausgasen
Kohlendioxid
Kohlendioxid
Kohlendioxid
Kohlendioxid
Alle in Anhang II
aufgelisteten
Treibhausgase
Alle in Anhang II
aufgelisteten
Treibhausgase
Alle in Anhang II
aufgelisteten
Treibhausgase
“
Drucksache 16/9334 – 54 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
ANHANG II
Der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG wird folgender Anhang IIa angefügt:
„ANHANG IIa
Erhöhung - im Interesse der Solidarität und des Wachstums in der Gemeinschaft - des
Prozentsatzes der von den Mitgliedstaaten gemäß Artikel 10 Absatz 2 Buchstabe a zu
versteigernden Zertifikate zwecks Emissionsminderung und Anpassung an die Folgen des
Klimawandels
Anteil des
Mitgliedstaats
Belgien 10%
Bulgarien 53%
Tschechische Republik 31%
Estland 42%
Griechenland 17%
Spanien 13%
Italien 2%
Zypern 20%
Lettland 56%
Litauen 46%
Luxemburg 10%
Ungarn 28%
Malta 23%
Polen 39%
Portugal 16%
Rumänien 53%
Slowenien 20%
Slowakei 41%
10%
Schweden
“
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 55 – Drucksache 16/9334
FINANZBOGEN
1. BEZEICHNUNG DES VORGESCHLAGENEN RECHTSAKTS
Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur
Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG zwecks Verbesserung und Ausweitung des
Systems für den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionszertifikaten in der Gemeinschaft
2. ABM/ABB-RAHMEN
Politikbereich(e) und damit zusammenhängende Tätigkeit(en):
Politikbereich: 07 Umwelt
Tätigkeit ABB-Code 0703: Umsetzung der Umweltpolitik und der
Umweltvorschriften der Gemeinschaft
3. HAUSHALTSLINIEN
3.1. Haushaltslinien (operative Linien sowie Linien für entsprechende technische
und administrative Unterstützung (vormalige BA-Linien)), mit Bezeichnung:
Artikel 07 03 07 - LIFE+ (Finanzierungsinstrument für die Umwelt — 2007 bis
2013)
3.2. Dauer der Maßnahme und ihrer finanziellen Auswirkungen:
Für den Zeitraum 2009-2013 werden die erforderlichen Mittel aus den für das
LIFE+-Programm bereits vorgesehenen Ressourcen bereitgestellt. Da die
überarbeiteten Rechtsvorschriften erst ab 2013 gelten und es keinen Zeitpunkt für das
Ende der Maßnahme gibt, wird sich der Vorschlag auch danach - zumindest in Bezug
auf die regelmäßige Überwachung des Funktionierens des Systems - auf den EU-
Haushalt auswirken. Der größte Unsicherheitsfaktor ist der Zeitpunkt des
Abschlusses eines internationalen Klimaschutzübereinkommens, das Änderungen
des Systems erforderlich machen könnte.
3.3. Haushaltstechnische Merkmale (erforderlichenfalls sind weitere Zeilen
anzufügen):
Haushalts
linie Art der Ausgaben Neu EFTA-Beitrag
Beiträge von
Bewerber-
ländern
Rubrik der
Finanziellen
Vorausschau
07 03 07 NOA GM NEIN NEIN NEIN NEIN 2
Drucksache 16/9334 – 56 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
4. RESSOURCEN IM ÜBERBLICK
4.1. Mittelbedarf
4.1.1. Überblick über die erforderlichen Verpflichtungsermächtigungen (VE) und
Zahlungsermächtigungen (ZE)
in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)
Art der Ausgaben
Ab-
schnitt
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
und
Folge
jahre
Insge-
samt
Operative Ausgaben25
Verpflichtungsermächti-
gungen (VE) 8.1. a
0,900 1,850 0,150 0,150 0,000 0,000 3,050
Zahlungsermächtigungen
(ZE)
b 0,270 1,185 0,815 0,675 0,105 0,000 3,050
Im Höchstbetrag enthaltene Verwaltungsausgaben26
Technische und administra-
tive Unterstützung (NGM) 8.2.4. c
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
HÖCHSTBETRAG INSGESAMT
Verpflichtungsermächti-
gungen
a+c 0,900 1,850 0,150 0,150 0,000 0,000 3,050
Zahlungsermächtigungen b+c 0,270 1,185 0,815 0,675 0,105 0,000 3,050
Im Höchstbetrag nicht enthaltene Verwaltungsausgaben27
Personal- und Nebenkosten
(NGM) 8.2.5. d
1,170 1,813 1,287 0,819 0,819 0,819 6,727
Sonstige im Höchstbetrag
nicht enthaltene Verwal-
tungskosten, außer Personal-
und Nebenkosten (NGM)
8.2.6. e
0,250 0,287 0,341 0,395 0,277 0,331 1,881
Geschätzte Gesamtkosten für die Finanzierung der Maßnahme
VE insgesamt, einschließ-
lich Personalkosten
a+c
+d
+e
2,320 3,950 1,778 1,364 1,096 1,150 11,658
ZE insgesamt, einschließ-
lich Personalkosten
b+c
+d
+e
1,690 3,285 2,443 1,889 1,201 1,150 11,658
25 Ausgaben, die nicht unter Kapitel xx 01 des betreffenden Titels xx fallen.
26 Ausgaben, die unter Artikel xx 01 04 des Titels xx fallen.
27 Ausgaben, die unter Kapitel xx 01 fallen, außer solche bei Artikel xx 01 04 oder xx 01 05.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 57 – Drucksache 16/9334
Angaben zur Kofinanzierung
Sieht der Vorschlag eine Kofinanzierung durch die Mitgliedstaaten oder sonstige
Einrichtungen vor (bitte auflisten), so ist in der nachstehenden Tabelle die
voraussichtliche Höhe der entsprechenden Beiträge anzugeben (beteiligen sich
mehrere Einrichtungen an der Kofinanzierung, so können Zeilen in die Tabelle
eingefügt werden):
in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)
Kofinanzierung durch
Jahr
n
n + 1
n + 2
n + 3
n + 4
n + 5
und
Folge
jahre
Insge-
samt
…………………… f 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
ZE insgesamt, einschließlich
Kofinanzierung
a+c
+d
+e
+f
4.1.2. Vereinbarkeit mit der Finanzplanung
X Vorschlag ist mit der derzeitigen Finanzplanung vereinbar.
� Der Vorschlag macht eine Anpassung der betreffenden Rubrik der Finanziellen
Vorausschau erforderlich.
� Der Vorschlag erfordert möglicherweise eine Anwendung der Interinstitu-
tionellen Vereinbarung28 (z. B. Inanspruchnahme des Flexibilitätsinstruments
oder Änderung der Finanziellen Vorausschau).
4.1.3. Finanzielle Auswirkungen auf die Einnahmen
X Der Vorschlag hat keine finanziellen Auswirkungen auf die Einnahmen.
� Folgende finanzielle Auswirkungen auf die Einnahmen sind zu erwarten:
Anmerkung: Einzelheiten und Anmerkungen zur Berechnungsmethode sind diesem
Finanzbogen als Anhang beizufügen.
28 Siehe Nummer 19 und 24 der Interinstitutionellen Vereinbarung.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 58 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
in Mio. EUR (1 Dezimalstelle)
Stand nach der Maßnahme
Haushaltslinie Einnahmen
Stand
vor der
Maß-
nahme
[Jahr
n-1]
[Jahr
n]
[n+1] [n+2] [n+3
]
[n+4] [n+5]
29
a) Einnahmen nominal
b) Veränderung �
(Beschreibung für jede einzelne Einnahmenlinie; falls sich die Auswirkungen auf mehrere
Linien erstrecken, ist die Tabelle um die entsprechende Zeilenzahl zu verlängern.)
4.2. Personalbedarf (Vollzeitäquivalent - Beamte, Zeitbedienstete und externes
Personal) - Einzelheiten hierzu siehe Abschnitt 8.2.1.
Jährlicher Bedarf
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
und
Folge-
jahre
Personalbedarf insgesamt 10
A*/AD
15,5
A*/A
D
11
A*/A
D
7
A*/A
D
7
A*/A
D
7
A*/A
D
5. MERKMALE UND ZIELE
5.1. Kurz- oder längerfristig zu deckender Bedarf
Das EU-Emissionshandelssystem ist eines der wichtigsten Instrumente, mit dem die
EU zur Erzielung der signifikanten Emissionsreduktionen beiträgt, die erforderlich
sind, um einen gefährlichen Klimawandel zu vermeiden.
Aufgrund der im ersten Handelszeitraum gewonnenen Erfahrungen und nach
ausführlichen Konsultationen mit Interessenträgern wurde deutlich, dass das System
verstärkt und auf weitere große Verursacher von Industrieemissionen ausgeweitet
werden muss, damit es zu einem soliden Baustein für einen globalen
Kohlenstoffmarkt und ein künftiges internationales Klimaschutzübereinkommen
werden kann. Zu diesem Zweck werden finanzielle Mittel benötigt, damit die
Kommission die ihr mit der Richtlinie zugeteilten Aufgaben erfüllen kann, d.h.:
– Ausarbeitung von Verordnungen mit Durchführungsbestimmungen für die
Überwachung und Berichterstattung, die Überprüfung der Emissionsberichte und
die Akkreditierung der Prüfstellen sowie für die Versteigerung;
29 Wenn die Dauer der Maßnahme mehr als 6 Jahre beträgt, sind weitere Spalten anzufügen.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 59 – Drucksache 16/9334
– Ausarbeitung von Regeln für die Zuteilung für die Gemeinschaft als Ganzes;
– Ausarbeitung von Vorschriften für Emissionsminderungsprojekte innerhalb und
außerhalb der Gemeinschaft;
– gegebenenfalls Ausarbeitung von bis zum Abschluss eines internationalen
Klimaschutzübereinkommens geltenden Methoden und Bestimmungen;
– gegebenenfalls Anpassung der Bestimmungen der Richtlinie, sobald ein
internationales Klimaschutzübereinkommen geschlossen wurde;
– Ausarbeitung von Vereinbarungen und Abkommen zur gegenseitigen
Anerkennung von Zertifikaten zwischen dem Gemeinschaftssystem und mit
diesem System kompatiblen, obligatorischen THG-Emissionshandelssystemen in
anderen Teilen der Welt;
– Vergabe von Studien und anderer technischer Hilfe im Zusammenhang mit der
Durchführung;
– Informationsmaßnahmen und Maßnahmen zum Aufbau von Kapazitäten.
Die verbesserte Sicherheit und Berechenbarkeit sowie die stärkere Harmonisierung
des Systems kommen in erster Linie den Betreibern von Anlagen zugute, die derzeit
unter das System fallen oder deren künftige Einbeziehung vorgeschlagen wird.
Indirekt werden auch Handelsvermittler von der verbesserten Transparenz und
Berechenbarkeit profitieren.
5.2. Durch die Gemeinschaftsintervention bedingter Mehrwert, Kohärenz des
Vorschlags mit anderen Finanzinstrumenten sowie mögliche Synergieeffekte
Maßnahmen zur Reduzierung von Treibhausgasemissionen lassen sich am besten
durch Rechtsvorschriften und eine Koordinierung auf Gemeinschaftsebene erreichen.
In der ersten Phase des EU-EHS (2005-2007) wurde deutlich, dass eine stärkere
Harmonisierung, beispielsweise des Geltungsbereichs der Richtlinie sowie der
Deckelungs- und der Zuteilungsbestimmungen erforderlich ist, um Wettbewerbs-
verzerrungen auf dem Binnenmarkt zu vermeiden.
Die operativen Ausgaben sind unter dem einer zentralen Direktverwaltung
unterliegenden Teil des LIFE+-Haushalts vorgesehen.
5.3. Ziele, erwartete Ergebnisse und entsprechende Indikatoren im Rahmen der
ABM-Methodik
Der Europäische Rat bekräftigte auf seiner Tagung vom 8.-9. März 2007 das Ziel der
EU, die Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2020 gegenüber 1990 um 20 % und unter
bestimmten Umständen, als Beitrag zu einer globalen und umfassenden
Vereinbarung für die Zeit nach 2012, um 30 % zu verringern, sofern sich andere
Industrieländer zu vergleichbaren Emissionsreduktionen und die wirtschaftlich
weiter fortgeschrittenen Entwicklungsländer zu einem ihren Verantwortlichkeiten
und jeweiligen Fähigkeiten angemessenen Beitrag verpflichten.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 60 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Darüber hinaus bestätigte der europäische Rat, dass das Emissionshandelssystem der
Europäischen Union (EU-EHS) heute und in Zukunft eines der wichtigsten
Instrumente für den Beitrag der EU zur Verwirklichung der erheblichen
Emissionsreduktionen ist, deren es bedarf, um das strategische Ziel zu erreichen, den
Anstieg der globalen Durchschnittstemperatur auf höchstens 2°C gegenüber dem
vorindustriellen Niveau zu begrenzen.
In diesem Zusammenhang ist es unerlässlich, das EU-EHS anhand der in der ersten
„praktischen Lernphase“ von 2005 bis 2007 gewonnenen Erfahrungen zu verbessern
und auszuweiten und es auf die Verknüpfung mit anderen kompatiblen Cap-and-
Trade-Systemen in anderen Teilen der Welt vorzubereiten. Die Ziele des Vorschlags
sind in der Begründung dargestellt.
Ziel Indikator
Straffung und Ausweitung des
Geltungsbereichs des EU-EHS
Weniger Beschwerden aus der Industrie
und den Mitgliedstaaten wegen unter-
schiedlicher Anwendung des Geltungs-
bereichs in den Mitgliedstaaten und
unverhältnismäßiger Verwaltungskosten
für die kleinsten Anlagen.
Verbesserung der Harmonisierung und
Berechenbarkeit des Systems
Keine Wettbewerbsverzerrungen auf
dem Binnenmarkt aufgrund einer
unterschiedlichen Umsetzung in den
Mitgliedstaaten
Ausreichende Rechtssicherheit für die
Unternehmen, damit diese über mittel-
bis langfristige Investitionen in kohlen-
stoffarme Technologien entscheiden
können
Robuste Erfüllung und Durchsetzung Starkes Vertrauen in das EU-EHS, auch
auf internationaler Ebene
Verknüpfung mit geeigneten Emissions-
handelssystemen in Drittländern und
geeignete Mittel zu Einbeziehung von
Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern
Geleisteter Beitrag zur Entwicklung von
Emissionshandelssystemen in Drittlän-
dern oder Verwaltungseinheiten im
Hinblick auf deren Verknüpfung mit
dem EU-EHS, ohne dass dessen
Umweltintegrität gefährdet wird
5.4. Durchführungsmodalitäten (vorläufige Angaben)
X Zentrale Verwaltung
X direkt durch die Kommission
� indirekt im Wege der Befugnisübertragung an:
� Exekutivagenturen
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 61 – Drucksache 16/9334
� die in Artikel 185 der Haushaltsordnung bezeichneten von den
Gemeinschaften geschaffenen Einrichtungen
� innerstaatliche öffentliche Einrichtungen bzw. privatrechtliche
Einrichtungen, die im öffentlichen Auftrag tätig werden
� Geteilte oder dezentrale Verwaltung
� auf Ebene der Mitgliedstaaten
� mit Drittländern
� Gemeinsame Verwaltung mit internationalen Organisationen (bitte
auflisten)
Bemerkungen:
6. ÜBERWACHUNG UND BEWERTUNG
6.1. Überwachungssystem
Die Mitgliedstaaten berichten über alle Aktionen und Maßnahmen, die sie zur
Umsetzung dieser Richtlinie erlassen (Artikel 1 Absatz 7 und Artikel 2 des
Vorschlags).
Die von der Kommission zum Zwecke der Umsetzung der Richtlinie geschlossenen
Verträge müssen die Überwachung und Finanzkontrolle durch die Kommission
(bzw. von ihr bevollmächtige Personen) und die Rechnungsprüfung durch den
Rechnungshof, die erforderlichenfalls auch Kontrollen vor Ort umfassen,
gewährleisten.
6.2. Bewertung
6.2.1. Ex-ante-Bewertung
Siehe die diesem Vorschlag beiliegende Folgenabschätzung. Die Auswirkungen der
vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen wurden unter wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, gesundheit-
lichen und ökologischen Gesichtspunkten bewertet. Diese Bewertung erfolgte 2007
teils intern und teils durch externe Berater.
6.2.2. Maßnahmen im Anschluss an Zwischen-/Ex-post-Bewertungen (unter
Zugrundelegung früherer Erfahrungen)
Die vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen und die beiliegende Folgenabschätzung tragen den
bisherigen Erfahrungen mit dem Funktionieren des Gemeinschaftssystems im
Zeitraum 2005 bis 2007 Rechnung.
6.2.3. Modalitäten und Periodizität der vorgesehenen Bewertungen
Der Fortgang der Arbeiten zur Umsetzung des Vorschlags und die Angemessenheit
der zugewiesenen Mittel werden jährlich in Verbindung mit dem Managementplan
bewertet.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 62 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
7. BETRTRUGSBEKÄMPFUNGSMASSNAHMEN
Umfassende Anwendung der internen Kontrollnormen Nr. 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 und
21 sowie der Grundsätze der Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 des Rates
über die Haushaltsordnung für den Gesamthaushaltsplan der Europäischen
Gemeinschaft.
D
eutscher B
undestag – 16. W
ahlperiode
– 63 –
D
ru
cksach
e 16/9334
8
8
igungen, in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)
2013 2014 und
Folgejahre
INSGESAMT
Zahl der
Outputs
Ge-
samt-
kosten
Zahl der
Outputs
Ge-
samt-
kosten
Zahl der
Outputs
Ge-
samt-
kosten
1 1,500
1 0,750
. RESSOURCEN IM EINZELNEN
.1. Ziele des Vorschlags und Finanzbedarf
Verpflichtungsermächt
2009 2010 2011 2012 (Ziele, Maßnahmen und
Outputs (bitte angeben)
Art der
Outputs
Durch-
schnitts
kosten
Zahl der
Outputs
Ge-
samt-
kosten
Zahl der
Outputs
Ge-
samt-
kosten
Zahl der
Outputs
Ge-
samt-
kosten
Zahl der
Outputs
Ge-
samt-
kosten
OPERATIVES ZIEL Nr. 2 1
Stärkere Harmonisierung
und Berechenbarkeit
Maßnahme 1
Erlass von Regeln für die
Zuteilung für die
Gemeinschaft als Ganzes
- Output 1
Zuteilungs-
regeln
0 0,400 1 1,100
Maßnahme 2
Erstellung und Führung
eines gemeinschaftsweiten
Registers
- Output 1 Software 1 0,750
Maßnahme 3
Bestimmungen für Projekte
in der EU außerhalb des EU-
D
ru
cksach
e 16/9334
– 64 –
D
eutscher B
undestag – 16. W
ahlperiode
1 0,150
1 0,350
5 2,750
1 0,100
EHS
- Output 1 Bestimmun-
gen für die
Vergabe von
Zertifikaten
1 0,150
Bis zum Abschluss eines
internationalen Überein-
kommens
Maßnahme 7
Vorgehen gegen Verlage-
rungseffekte (carbon
leakage)
- Output 1 Bericht über
mögliche
Verlagerungs
effekte
1 0,350
Teilbetrag Ziel 2 1 0,750 2 1,850 1 0,150
OPERATIVES ZIEL Nr. 3 1
Solide Erfüllung und Durch-
setzung
Maßnahme 1
Verbesserung und
Aktualisierung von
Leitlinien
- Output 1 Verordnung
über die
Überwa-
chung und
Berichterstat-
tung
1 0,100
D
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undestag – 16. W
ahlperiode
– 65 –
D
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e 16/9334
1 0,050
2 0,150
1 0,150
1 0,150
9 3,050
- Output 2 Verordnung
über die
Überprüfung
und Akkre-
ditierung
1 0,050
Teilbetrag Ziel 3 2 0,150
OPERATIVES ZIEL Nr. 4 1
Verknüpfung und Einbezie-
hung von Drittländern
Nach Abschluss eines inter-
nationalen Übereinkommens
Maßnahme 1
Bestimmungen für die
Verwendung von neuen
Gutschriften/Mechanismen
- Output 1 Bestimmun-
gen
1 0,150
Teilbetrag Ziel 4 1 0,150
GESAMTKOSTEN 4 0,900 2 1,850 1 0,150 2 0,150
Drucksache 16/9334 – 66 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
8.2. Verwaltungskosten
8.2.1. Art und Anzahl des erforderlichen Personals
Art der
Stellen
Zur Verwaltung der Maßnahme einzusetzendes, vorhandenes und/oder
zusätzliches Personal (Stellenzahl/Vollzeitäquivalent)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014+
A*/AD 9 14,5 10 6 6 6 Beamte oder
Bedienstete
auf Zeit30
(XX 01 01)
B*,
C*/AST
1 1 1 1 1 1
Aus Artikel XX 01 02
finanziertes Personal31
Sonstiges, aus Artikel
XX 01 04/05 finanziertes
Personal32
INSGESAMT 10 15,5 11 7 7 7
8.2.2. Beschreibung der Aufgaben, die im Zuge der vorgeschlagenen Maßnahme
auszuführen sind
– Ausarbeitung von Verordnungen über die Versteigerung, Überwachung und
Berichterstattung sowie über die Überprüfung und Akkreditierung
– Ausarbeitung von Regeln für die Zuteilung für die Gemeinschaft als Ganzes und
Erstellung eines gemeinschaftsweiten elektronischen Registers
– Analyse der Notwendigkeit eines für bestimmte energieintensive Anlagen
geltenden Mechanismus, bis ein internationales Klimaschutzübereinkommen in
Kraft ist
– Gegebenenfalls Anpassung des Systems nach Maßgabe eines internationalen
Klimaschutzabkommens
– Überwachung der Umsetzung in den Mitgliedstaaten
– Aufbau von Kapazitäten und Informationsmaßnahmen
8.2.3. Zuordnung der Stellen des damit betrauten Statutspersonals
� derzeit für die Verwaltung des Programms, das ersetzt oder verlängert werden
soll, zugewiesene Stellen
� im Rahmen des JSP/HVE-Verfahrens für das Jahr n vorab zugewiesene Stellen
30 Die Kosten hierfür sind NICHT im Höchstbetrag enthalten.
31 Die Kosten hierfür sind NICHT im Höchstbetrag enthalten.
32 Die Kosten hierfür sind im Höchstbetrag enthalten
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 67 – Drucksache 16/9334
X im Rahmen des anstehenden neuen JSP/HVE-Verfahrens anzufordernde
Stellen
� innerhalb des für die Verwaltung zuständigen Dienstes neu zu verteilende
vorhandene Stellen (interne Personalumsetzung)
� für das Jahr n erforderliche, jedoch im Rahmen des JSP/HVE-Verfahrens für
dieses Jahr nicht vorgesehene neue Stellen
8.2.4. Sonstige im Höchstbetrag enthaltene Verwaltungsausgaben (XX 01 04/05 –
Verwaltungsausgaben)
in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)
Haushaltslinie
(Nummer und Bezeichnung) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014
und
Folge-
jahre
INSGE-
SAMT
1 Technische und administrative
Unterstützung (einschließlich
Personalkosten)
Exekutivagenturen33
Sonstige technische und administrative
Unterstützung
- intra muros
- extra muros
Technische und administrative
Unterstützung insgesamt
8.2.5. Im Höchstbetrag nicht enthaltene Personal- und Nebenkosten
in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)
Art des Personals 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014 und
Folge-
jahre
Beamte und Bedienstete auf
Zeit (XX 01 01)
1,170 1,813 1,287 0,819 0,819 0,819
Aus Artikel XX 01 02
finanziertes Personal (Hilfs-
kräfte, ANS, Vertragspersonal
usw.)
(Angabe der Haushaltslinie)
33 Hier ist auf den Finanzbogen zum Gründungsrechtsakt der Agenturen zu verweisen.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 68 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Personal- und Nebenkosten
insgesamt (NICHT im
Höchstbetrag enthalten)
1,170 1,813 1,287 0,819 0,819 0,819
BERECHNUNG – Beamte und Bedienstete auf Zeit
Das Standardgehalt für einen A*/AD-Beamten (siehe Abschnitt 8.2.1) beträgt 0,117 Mio.
EUR.
Berechnung– aus Artikel XX 01 02 finanziertes Personal
Entfällt
8.2.6. Sonstige nicht im Höchstbetrag enthaltene Verwaltungsausgaben
in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014
und
Folge
jahre
INSGE-
SAMT
XX 01 02 11 01 – Dienstreisen 0,010 0,010 0,010 0,030
XX 01 02 11 02 – Sitzungen & Konferenzen
XX 01 02 11 03 – Ausschüsse34 0,027 0,081 0,135 0,027 0,081 0,351
XX 01 02 11 04 – Studien & Konsultationen
XX 01 02 11 05 - Informationssysteme
2 Gesamtbetrag der sonstigen
Ausgaben für den Dienstbetrieb
(XX 01 02 11)
0,000 0,037 0,091 0,145 0,027 0,081 0,381
3 Sonstige Ausgaben administrativer
Art (XX.010301 (Ausrüstung des
Datenzentrums, Dienste und
Betriebsausgaben des Daten-
zentrums))
0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 1,500
Gesamtbetrag der Verwaltungsausga-
ben, ausgenommen Personal- und Ne-
benkosten (NICHT im Höchstbetrag
enthalten)
0,250 0,287 0,341 0,395 0,277 0,331 1,881
34 Angabe des jeweiligen Ausschusses sowie der Gruppe, der dieser angehört.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 69 – Drucksache 16/9334
Berechnung - Sonstige nicht im Höchstbetrag enthaltene Verwaltungsausgaben
Im Zeitraum 2010-2012 sind jährlich zehn Dienstreisen von Kommissionsbediensteten
(Einheitskosten: 1000 EUR) vorgesehen, um die neuen Rechtsvorschriften zu erläutern und
ihre Umsetzung in den Mitgliedstaaten zu erleichtern.
Für den Erlass von drei neuen Verordnungen der Kommission, die Änderung einer
bestehenden Kommissionsverordnung und die Annahme von Regeln für die Zuteilung für die
Gemeinschaft als Ganzes sind Sitzungen des Ausschusses für Klimawandel (Einheitskosten:
27 000 EUR) vorgesehen. Sobald ein internationales Klimaschutzübereinkommen
geschlossen wurde, müssen bestimmte Teile des EU-EHS voraussichtlich im Ausschuss-
verfahren angepasst werden. Außerdem können Vereinbarungen oder Abkommen zur
Verknüpfung des EU-EHS mit Systemen in Drittländern zur Annahme im Ausschuss-
verfahren anstehen. Die Sitzungen des Ausschusses für Klimawandel zwecks Annahme der
Kommissionsverordnungen und der Regeln für die Zuteilung für die Gemeinschaft als Ganzes
werden im Zeitraum 2010-2012 benötigt. Der Zeitpunkt der anderen Sitzungen wird von den
internationalen Entwicklungen bestimmt.
Die hier aufgeführten Ausgaben (250 000 EUR/Jahr) betreffen das Hosting des unabhängigen
Transaktionsprotokolls der Gemeinschaft (CITL) / des Gemeinschaftsregisters der
Kommission sowie den Erwerb und die Pflege der IT- und Kommunikationstools, ohne die
das System nicht voll funktionsfähig ist. Das von der Kommission gemäß Artikel 20 der
Richtlinie 87/2003/EG zu führende CITL, das die Vergabe, Übertragung und Löschung von
Zertifikaten aufzeichnet, ist eine IT-Anwendung, die für das Funktionieren des EU-
Emissionshandelssystems von kritischer Bedeutung ist. Gemäß Artikel 68 der Verordnung
(EG) Nr. 2216/2004 mit den Bestimmungen zum Registrierungssystem muss die Kommission
sicherstellen, dass das CITL und das Gemeinschaftsregister (ein gesondertes Register, zu
dessen Führung die Gemeinschaft nach dem Kyoto-Protokoll verpflichtet ist) 7 Tage pro
Woche 24 Stunden täglich zugänglich ist und dass Unterbrechungen der Funktionsfähigkeit
dieser Systeme auf ein Minimum beschränkt werden.
Die Kosten für die Entwicklung und Wartung des Systems werden aus der Haushaltslinie 07
03 07 (LIFE +) finanziert – s. Abschnitt 8.1
Der Bedarf an Humanressourcen und Verwaltungsmitteln wird mit den Mitteln gedeckt, die
der zuständigen GD im Rahmen des jährlichen Haushaltsverfahrens in Abhängigkeit von den
verfügbaren Mitteln zugeteilt wurden.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 70 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Brussels, 29 January 2008
Interinstitutional File:
2008/0013 (COD)
5862/08
ADD 1
ENV 52
ENER 29
IND 11
COMPET 31
MI 34
ECOFIN 34
TRANS 22
AVIATION 25
CODEC 105
ADDENDUM to PROPOSAL
from: European Commission
dated: 28 January 2008
Subject: Commission staff working document accompanying document to the proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the EU greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading system
Impact Assessment
Delegations will find attached Commission document SEC(2008) 52.
________________________
Encl.: SEC(2008) 52
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 71 – Drucksache 16/9334
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Brussels, 23.1.2008
SEC(2007) 52
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Accompanying document to the
Proposal for a
DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the EU greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading system
Impact Assessment
{COM(2008) 16 final}
{SEC(2008) 53}
Drucksache 16/9334 – 72 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Procedural Issues and Consultation of Interested Parties ............................................ 7
2. Identification of overall objectives, lessons learnt and assessment criteria ................. 8
2.1. Overall Objectives........................................................................................................ 8
2.2. Lessons learnt and experience gathered..................................................................... 12
2.3. Identification of Assessment Criteria......................................................................... 15
3. Scope of the Directive................................................................................................ 17
3.1. Streamlining the current scope................................................................................... 17
3.1.1. Identification of Problems.......................................................................................... 17
3.1.2. Identification of Objectives........................................................................................ 18
3.1.3. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................... 18
3.1.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options.............................................................................. 20
3.1.5. Compliance of Options with Objectives .................................................................... 22
3.2. Cost-effectiveness as regards small installations ....................................................... 23
3.2.1. Identification of Problems.......................................................................................... 23
3.2.2. Identification of Objectives........................................................................................ 24
3.2.3. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................... 25
3.2.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options.............................................................................. 27
3.2.5. Alternative Instruments.............................................................................................. 28
3.2.6. Compliance of Options with Objectives .................................................................... 29
3.3. Inclusion of new sectors and gases ............................................................................ 32
3.3.1. Identification of Problems.......................................................................................... 32
3.3.2. Identification of Objectives........................................................................................ 33
3.3.3. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................... 34
3.3.4. Impacts on sectors through inclusion in EU ETS ...................................................... 37
3.3.5. Compliance of options with objectives - summary on inclusion of other sectors and
gases ........................................................................................................................... 46
3.4. Overview of trade-offs emerging from options on streamlining the scope, increasing
cost-effectiveness as regards small installations and inclusion of new sectors and
gases ........................................................................................................................... 47
3.5. Carbon capture and storage........................................................................................ 49
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 73 – Drucksache 16/9334
3.5.1. Identification of Problems.......................................................................................... 49
3.5.2. Identification of Objective ......................................................................................... 49
3.5.3. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................... 49
3.5.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options.............................................................................. 50
3.5.5. Compliance of options with objectives ...................................................................... 52
3.6. Transport .................................................................................................................... 53
3.6.1. Road Transport........................................................................................................... 53
3.6.2. Shipping ..................................................................................................................... 55
3.7. Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) .................................................. 56
3.7.1. Identification of key issues......................................................................................... 56
3.7.2. Identification of Options ............................................................................................ 57
3.7.3. Assessment of Options............................................................................................... 58
3.7.4. Compliance of options with objectives ...................................................................... 61
4. Robust Compliance and Enforcement........................................................................ 62
4.1. Monitoring and reporting ........................................................................................... 62
4.1.1. Identification of Problems.......................................................................................... 62
4.1.2. Identification of Objectives........................................................................................ 63
4.1.3. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................... 63
4.1.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options.............................................................................. 65
4.1.5. Compliance of Options with Objectives .................................................................... 70
4.2. Verification and Accreditation of Verifiers ............................................................... 71
4.2.1. Identification of Problems.......................................................................................... 71
4.2.2. Identification of Objectives........................................................................................ 71
4.2.3. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................... 72
4.2.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options.............................................................................. 74
4.3. Improving cost-effectiveness: .................................................................................... 79
4.3.1. Identification of Problems.......................................................................................... 79
4.3.2. Identification of Objectives........................................................................................ 79
4.3.3. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................... 80
4.3.4. Impact of Options....................................................................................................... 80
4.3.5. Compliance of Options with Objectives .................................................................... 82
Drucksache 16/9334 – 74 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
4.4. Compliance and enforcement..................................................................................... 83
4.4.1. Identification of Problems.......................................................................................... 83
4.4.2. Identification of Objectives........................................................................................ 83
4.4.3. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................... 83
4.4.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options.............................................................................. 84
4.4.5. Compliance of Options with Objectives .................................................................... 87
4.5. Registries.................................................................................................................... 87
4.5.1. Identification of Problems.......................................................................................... 87
4.5.2. Identification of Objectives........................................................................................ 88
4.5.3. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................... 88
4.5.4. Impact of Options....................................................................................................... 88
4.5.5. Compliance of Options with Objectives .................................................................... 89
5. Further Harmonisation and Increased Predictability.................................................. 90
5.1. Identification of Problems.......................................................................................... 90
5.1.1. Problems as regards cap setting ................................................................................. 90
5.1.2. Problems as regards allocation................................................................................... 91
5.2. Identification of objectives......................................................................................... 93
5.2.1. Objectives as regards cap setting ............................................................................... 93
5.2.2. Objectives as regards allocation................................................................................. 94
5.3. Cap-setting: level of harmonisation ........................................................................... 95
5.3.1. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................... 95
5.3.2. Impacts – Comparing the options .............................................................................. 96
5.3.3. Comparing the options with the objectives................................................................ 97
5.4. Cap-setting: level of the cap....................................................................................... 98
5.4.1. Policy options and screening...................................................................................... 98
5.4.2. Impacts – Comparing the Options.............................................................................. 99
5.4.3. Compliance with Objectives .................................................................................... 101
5.5. Cap-setting: design options to increase predictability ............................................. 101
5.5.1. Policy options and screening:................................................................................... 101
5.5.2. Impacts – Comparing the Options............................................................................ 103
5.5.3. Compliance of Options with Objectives .................................................................. 103
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 75 – Drucksache 16/9334
5.6. Allocation: auctioning versus allocation for free ..................................................... 104
5.6.1. Policy Options and Screening: auctioning vs allocations for free ........................... 104
5.6.2. Impacts – Comparing the Options as regards auctioning and allocation for free –
Competitiveness and carbon leakage ....................................................................... 106
5.6.3. Compliance of Options with Objectives .................................................................. 117
5.7. Allocation methods for any remaining allowances allocated for free...................... 120
5.7.1. Options and screening as regards any remaining allocations for free...................... 120
5.7.2. Impacts – comparing of options for allocating for free............................................ 122
5.7.3. Compliance of Options with Objectives .................................................................. 123
5.8. Allocation: new entrants .......................................................................................... 124
5.8.1. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................. 124
5.8.2. Impacts – Comparing the Options............................................................................ 125
5.8.3. Compliance of Options with Objectives .................................................................. 126
5.9. Allocation: closure rules .......................................................................................... 127
5.9.1. Policy Options and Screening .................................................................................. 127
5.9.2. Impacts – comparing the options ............................................................................. 128
5.9.3. Compliance of Options with Objectives .................................................................. 129
6. Linking with Emission Trading Systems in Third Countries, and Appropriate Means
to Involve Developing Countries and Countries in Economic Transition ............... 130
6.1. Linking to other systems .......................................................................................... 130
6.1.1. Introduction.............................................................................................................. 130
6.1.2. Identification of Problems........................................................................................ 131
6.1.3. Identification of Objectives...................................................................................... 132
6.1.4. Criteria for assessing the potential for linking ......................................................... 132
6.1.5. Developing Criteria for linking with other systems................................................. 133
6.1.6. Compliance of options with objectives .................................................................... 135
6.2. Use of offsets............................................................................................................ 137
6.2.1. Entitlements.............................................................................................................. 137
6.2.2. Standards .................................................................................................................. 144
6.2.3. Additional projects into the EU ETS ....................................................................... 150
6.2.4. Transition and predictability .................................................................................... 153
Drucksache 16/9334 – 76 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
7. Conclusions – the Preferred Options........................................................................ 160
7.1. Scope ........................................................................................................................ 160
7.1.1. Streamlining the current scope................................................................................. 160
7.1.2. Cost-effectiveness as regards small installations ..................................................... 161
7.1.3. Inclusion of other sectors and gases......................................................................... 161
7.1.4. Carbon capture and storage...................................................................................... 161
7.1.5. Transport .................................................................................................................. 162
7.1.6. Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) ................................................ 162
7.2. Monitoring, Reporting, Verification ........................................................................ 162
7.3. Further Harmonisation and increased predictability ................................................ 163
7.3.1. Cap-setting: level of harmonisation ......................................................................... 163
7.3.2. Cap-setting: level of the cap..................................................................................... 163
7.3.3. Cap-setting: design options to increase predictability ............................................. 163
7.3.4. Allocation: auctioning versus allocation for free ..................................................... 163
7.3.5. Allocation methods for any remaining allocations for free ..................................... 163
7.3.6. Allocation: new entrants .......................................................................................... 163
7.3.7. Allocation: closure rules .......................................................................................... 164
7.4. Linking and JI/CDM ................................................................................................ 164
7.4.1. Linking to other emission trading systems............................................................... 164
7.4.2. Use of offsets............................................................................................................ 164
8. Overall Assessment of Administrative Costs........................................................... 166
9. Monitoring and Evaluation ...................................................................................... 173
Annex 1: ECCP Report .......................................................................................................... 174
Annex 2: Summary of stakeholder contributions submitted to the Commission................... 227
Annex 3: Description of the E3ME model............................................................................. 233
Annex 5: Table representing the outcome of screening of sectors emitting non-CO2 GHG for
inclusion in the EU ETS........................................................................................... 248
Annex 6: Overview of refineries and chemicals sector and potential sector boundaries....... 249
Annex 7: List of References................................................................................................... 250
Annex 8: Abbreviations ......................................................................................................... 255
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 77 – Drucksache 16/9334
1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES
On 13 October 2003, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 2003/87/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a system for greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive
96/61/EC1 (the Emissions Trading Directive). It has been amended by Directive 2004/101/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 amending Directive
2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the
Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms2. The European Union
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), became effective as from 1 January 2005.
Recognising the first phase as a learning period3 and bearing in mind Article 30 of the ET
(Emissions Trading) Directive foreseeing the Commission drawing up a report on the
application of the ET Directive, the Commission launched a survey among participants and
stakeholders of the EU ETS. The survey was conducted between June and September 2005
and involved 517 companies, government bodies, industry associations, market intermediaries
and NGOs. Almost 60% of the stakeholders addressed responded. The results of the survey,
albeit conducted very soon after the start of the EU ETS, indicated that there are important
areas for improvement of the overall design of the system, but did not derive any clear
recommendations on where to go. The results of the survey are published and available on the
website dedicated to the review of the EU ETS4.
Article 30 of the ET Directive contains a list of issues for the Commission to consider when
drawing up the report on the application of the ET Directive. In responding to Article 30 of
the ET Directive, the Commission adopted a Communication5 (the Review Communication),
where it identified growing consensus on the key strategic issues for review, and that, as more
experience and evaluation is needed to determine solutions on these issues, it would be
premature for the Commission to make legislative proposals at this stage. Therefore, the
Commission decided to consult further by means of a separate Working Group on the Review
of the EU ETS within the framework of the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP).
In the Review Communication, the Commission also identified the four main topics of the
review, namely: (1) scope, (2) robust compliance and enforcement, (3) further harmonisation
and increased predictability and (4) linking with emissions trading systems in third countries,
and appropriate means to involve developing countries and countries in economic transition.
Each of these topics has been dealt with extensively at a dedicated meeting of the above
Working Group6, which, consequently, met four times between March and June 2007. The
1 OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32.
2 OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, p. 18.
3 COM(2005) 703, 22.12.2005.
4 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/review_en.htm
5 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Building a global carbon market –
Report pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 2003/87/EC" - COM(2006) 676, 13.11.2006.
6 The Group consisted of representatives of all interested Member States, the power sector (conventional
and renewable), the energy intensive industry and non-energy ETS sectors, the carbon trading sector,
the oil and gas sector as well as cross sector business associations. Non-governmental organisations,
representatives of the research Community and other relevant institutions/organisations were also
invited and participated actively. A list of participants is available from the EU ETS review website (see
footnote 4).
Drucksache 16/9334 – 78 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
presentations given at these meetings are available from the EU ETS review website7, the
final reports of these meetings reflecting their outcome are annexed to this document (Annex
1). These reports represent a major input to the review of the ET Directive. Furthermore, the
Commission services have established a functional mailbox on the EU ETS review website, in
order to allow all interested parties to submit their view on the review of the EU ETS to the
Commission. Annex 2 contains a summary of these views as well as a list of parties which
have submitted their view.
Seven Commission interservice meetings have been held on 28 February, 7 March, 12 April,
8 May, 8 June, 11 July and 31 July 2007, in order to discuss the outcome of the ECCP
meetings and the issues to be examined in the framework of this impact assessment. One
meeting was exclusively devoted to the work carried out by ENTEC for this impact
assessment.
2. IDENTIFICATION OF OVERALL OBJECTIVES, LESSONS LEARNT AND ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
2.1. Overall Objectives
Fighting climate change is one of the most urgent challenges of mankind8. The latest IPCC
reports9 provided strong evidence on the likelihood and impact of climate change for overall
life on earth highlighting the urgency of effective action. Only a couple of months earlier, Sir
Jonathan Stern had published his report10, in which he confirmed the Commission's stance and
pinpointed the costs of action and non-action in combating climate change. His conclusion
was simple and clear: the benefits of strong early action considerably outweigh the costs.
The European Commission has taken this message seriously. On 10 January 2007, it adopted
a new energy and climate change strategy including the Communication “Limiting Global
Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius”11. The Commission’s central proposal is that, under a
future global agreement, the group of developed countries should cut their emissions of CO2
and other greenhouse gases responsible for warming the planet to 30% below 1990 levels by
2020 and that the EU should take the lead by committing autonomously to reduce its own
emissions by at least 20% by 2020. In the longer term, worldwide emissions need to be cut by
up to half of 1990 levels by 2050.
The European Council, held on 8-9 March 2007 in Brussels, endorsed these objectives12. It
also acknowledged the “central role of emission trading in the EU's long-term strategy for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions” and underlined
7 See footnote 4.
8 See for instance EC 2005b.
9 The reports are available from http://www.ipcc.ch/
10 The report is available from
http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternreview_index.cfm
11 COM(2007) 2 final, available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0002en01.pdf
12 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/93135.pdf
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 79 – Drucksache 16/9334
that the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is and will
remain one of the most important instruments for the EU's contribution towards
achieving the significant emissions reductions which are necessary to meet the
strategic objective of limiting the global average temperature increase to not
more than 2 degrees C above pre-industrial levels.
Against this background, three overall objectives should be aimed at in the framework of the
review of the EU ETS:
First overall objective:
Fully exploiting the potential of the EU ETS to contribute to the EU's overall GHG
reduction commitments in an economically efficient manner.
The European Council, held on 8-9 March 2007 in Brussels, endorsed
an EU objective of a 30% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020
compared to 1990 as its contribution to a global and comprehensive agreement
for the period beyond 2012, provided that other developed countries commit
themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically more
advanced developing countries to contributing adequately according to their
responsibilities and respective capabilities.
and that
until a global and comprehensive post-2012 agreement is concluded, and
without prejudice to its position in international climate negotiations, the EU
makes a firm independent commitment to achieve at least a 20% reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared to 1990.
In the longer term, the European Council envisages reducing GHG of all developed countries
by 60 to 80% by 2050 compared to 199013.
Compared to the Kyoto objectives of reducing GHG emissions by 8% from 1990 levels, the
new targets are further reaching and underline the need to make use of all instruments
available. While the EU ETS should not be considered a panacea to achieve emission
reduction targets across all economic sectors of the EU, it offers a huge potential to trigger
emission reductions in a number of economic sectors in a cost-effective manner.
Implementing the above emission reduction targets will lead to the necessary gradual
restructuring of the European economy towards a less carbon-intensive industry implying the
introduction of less carbon intensive products and processes in the medium and longer term.
Reinforced research and development efforts should take place in parallel, in order to
maintain Europe’s industrial base and competence. They are going to prepare the ground for
new products and markets that can be expected to evolve as a consequence of a stringent
policy to combat climate change.
Since climate change is a global problem, other countries are expected to follow the European
path and commit themselves to the necessary GHG reduction targets. Implementing its
13 see footnote 12.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 80 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
objectives, Europe will gain first mover advantages on these markets in the middle and the
longer term. This can already be observed in some Member States, where the renewable
energy industry is acquiring an increasing market share in, for example, the US and China.
Against this background, it should be noted that the basis of Europe's economic welfare is
likely to be more and more made up by technological achievements in line with the needs of
less-carbon intensive economic activities. They may increasingly determine Europe's
competitive position on the global market. For this reason, starting the restructuring now will
not only reduce the costs of climate change, but will also ensure Europe’s welfare and
competitiveness tomorrow.
In the light of these further reaching objectives, the synergies with relevant aspects of other,
very important objectives of the European Union should be taken into account:
� Competitiveness and the Lisbon objectives: The Spring 2006 European Council has
identified energy and climate change as one of the four priority areas for more growth and
jobs14. It has been acknowledged that the action against climate change and their costs will
bring major opportunities for growth and employment through investment and producing
and disseminating new eco-efficient technologies. Fully exploiting the potential of the EU
ETS as a cost-effective instrument to tap the potential for emissions reductions while
stimulating innovation is fully in line with the Lisbon strategy and its objectives.
� Sustainable development15: The needs of the present generation should be met without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It represents an
overarching objective of the EU set out in the Treaty. A key of objective of the renewed
sustainable development strategy of the EU is to promote a prosperous, innovative,
knowledge-rich, competitive and eco-efficient economy, which provides high living
standards and full and high-quality employment throughout the European Union. In this
respect, the polluter-pays-principle is a policy guiding principle. It aims at ensuring that
prices reflect the real costs to society of consumption and production activities and that
polluters pay for the damage they cause to the environment.
� Cohesion and fairness: In line with the Conclusions of the European Council of March
2007, the national circumstances of Member States should be taken into account in
contributing to the climate policy objectives, in order to reflect fairness and transparency.
Second overall objective:
Refining and improving the EU ETS in the light of experience gathered
Experience gathered during the first years of its operation suggests that there is potential to
reinforce economic efficiency of the system to the benefit of the European economy. In a
number of areas identified in the Review Communication16 improvements can be achieved by
14 COM(2006) 816
15 Commission Communication COM(2005) 658, available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0658en01.pdf As for the renewed strategy of the
Council, please refer to http://ec.europa.eu/sustainable/docs/renewed_eu_sds_en.pdf.
16 COM(2006) 676.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 81 – Drucksache 16/9334
taking the experience of the private and public sector over the first years of the EU ETS into
account. This would allow fully exploiting the potential of the EU ETS.
Third overall objective:
Contributing to transforming Europe into a low greenhouse-gas-emitting economy and
creating the right incentives for forward looking low carbon investment decisions by
reinforcing a clear, undistorted and long-term carbon price signal.
In its conclusions of 20 February 2007, the Council emphasised17
that the EU is committed to transforming Europe into a highly energy efficient
and low greenhouse-gas-emitting economy
and called on the Commission to
review Directive 2003/87/EC in good time and bring forward proposals which
create the right incentives for forward-looking, low-carbon investment
decisions
These stipulations of the Council fully correspond to the objectives identified above. In
addition, they highlight the need for a clear, undistorted and long-term carbon price signal as
an indispensable feature of the EU ETS.
Such a carbon price signal would help achieving the European Council's 20% renewable
target, bring about the necessary incentives for forward-looking, low-carbon investments
including CCS and would provide correct incentives for our partners internationally to
contribute appropriately to emission reduction. A clear, undistorted and long-term carbon
price signal would represent a strong incentive to reward low or no-greenhouse gas emitting
technologies conveying price signals along the whole chain of supply and demand from
production and generation down to the consumer, as the costs of the allowances will be
reflected in the final product offered to consumers. This way, consumers will be made
increasingly aware of the costs of emitting greenhouse gases and as a consequence, demand is
gradually expected to shift away from more carbon intensive products to less carbon intensive
products.
The pressure emerging from a clear, undistorted and long-term carbon price signal to
restructure the economy towards a less carbon intensive economy is thought to arrive from
two different angles:
� On the supply side, the price of allowances under the EU ETS, will gradually rise with a
more and more tightening cap designed to achieve the ambitious, but indispensable
emission reduction targets. On condition that the necessary regulatory framework is set
right, electricity generators and producers of carbon intensive products will factor in the
price of the allowances, which are becoming genuine production costs. In order to
minimise this kind of production costs, operators will in the short-term exploit existing
potential to realise efficiency gains, as long as it is economic to do so (allowance price). In
the medium and longer term, however, they will increasingly turn to less carbon-intensive
17 see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/envir/92864.pdf
Drucksache 16/9334 – 82 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
technologies and investment, as otherwise they face the risk of losing their competitive
position on the market and thus market shares.
� On the demand side, consumers will be made increasingly aware of the costs of carbon
intensive products, which compared to less carbon intensive products will appear as more
expensive and thus less competitive. Consumers’ natural desire to turn to cheaper products
on homogenous markets will trigger demand for less carbon intensive products, thus
reinforcing the trend towards decarbonised production.
A clear and undistorted carbon price signal is necessary to ensure dynamic efficiency, which
is needed, in order to establish a constant incentive in terms of innovation and R&D to move
towards a less-carbon intensive economy.
This mechanism is already laid down in the overall design of the EU ETS, but may need to be
reinforced and more pronounced in the light of the new emission targets. It may, among other
things, also affect allocation methods, as some methods might be more promising in this
respect than others. So far, the EU ETS mainly focused the identification of least cost
abatement measures. As a consequence, companies complied either through making the
necessary investments to comply or through buying more allowances. In order to give a clear
and undistorted, long-term carbon price signal, and thus to ensure dynamic efficiency, the
costs incurred by emitting GHG would need to be reflected too, i.e. from the first tonne
emitted. This happened already in a number of sectors of the EU ETS, albeit in a slightly
different manner: So far, these costs have been taken into account as opportunity costs and
passed on to the consumers, where possible. Conveying a clear, undistorted, long-term carbon
price signal as a fundamental prerequisite of ensuring dynamic efficiency in the EU ETS
would require these costs to be accounted as genuine production costs18 rather than
opportunity costs.
For those sectors already passing opportunity costs to their customers, the difference in terms
of consumer prices would be marginal, if there is any at all19. Sectors that do not have the
possibility to pass through carbon costs on the grounds of international competition for the
supply of the same product may justify the application of transitional measures.
2.2. Lessons learnt and experience gathered
When considering the role of the EU ETS in achieving these objectives, lessons learnt and
experience gathered so far have to be taken into account.
The EU ETS is the largest emission trading system in the world. It comprises 27 states under
a common framework to reduce GHG emissions in an economically efficient manner and in
this respect, is unprecedented in the world. Its first phase from 2005 – 2007 was driven by the
wish to create the critical mass for a liquid and well functioning carbon market, which
appeared most promising by focusing on CO2 emitting sectors and establishing the necessary
infrastructure for trading and MRV. As such, the positive results of the first trading phase
were that:
18 This is also in line with the polluter-pays-principle.
19 The actual difference would depend on the level of pass-through and the level of allowance prices.
100% pass through, as it has been the case with some power generators, would – at the same allowance
price – make no difference at all.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 83 – Drucksache 16/9334
� the first two compliance cycles have been successfully carried out, thereby establishing
overall credibility of the EU ETS based on sound and reliable procedures and
infrastructure to monitor, report and verify emissions from the installations under the EU
ETS.
� free trade of allowances across all parties participating in the EU ETS has been achieved
and a real market trading allowances has evolved. As can be seen from figure 2.1, traded
volumes were steeply rising and exceeded 100 million of allowances traded on a monthly
basis almost each month in 2007.
� it allowed very valuable insight in the functioning of carbon markets; without the EU ETS
being established in 2005 the EU (authorities and companies) would be much worse off in
terms of complying with its Kyoto commitments at least cost;
� due to its size – the EU ETS comprises around 10500 installations from the power and
various industrial sectors accounting for approximately 41%20 of total EU GHG emissions
– it offers new opportunities to implement CO2 abatement measures in a cost-effective
manner across the EU;
� already in 2006, the EU ETS globally accounted for around 81% of the global carbon
market in terms of value and 67% in terms of volume.
Figure 2.1: Monthly volumes traded in the EU ETS
Source: Point Carbon
The first trading period was always intended to be a "learning-by-doing" phase for all parties
involved. The problems that occurred provided valuable lessons on how a carbon market
functions and have been taken into account to the extent possible in the NAP assessment for
20 On the basis of 2005 data.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 84 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
the 2nd trading period. They are also being thoroughly considered for the post-2012 period
with a view to identifying appropriate and effective solutions:
� While emissions trading can only exploit its environmental strength and justification, if
scarcity on the allowance market is maintained, the lack of verified emission data when
setting up the NAPs for the 1st trading period enabled Member States to support their own
industry by relying on overoptimistic projections justifying the issuance of more
allowances than would be allowed to ensure scarcity on the market. Since this behaviour
pattern could be observed in almost all Member States, the environmental effectiveness of
the system was put in question – to the detriment of its overall efficiency and thus to the
detriment of the overall economy of the EU.
� Lack of a level playing field for operators in the EU ETS resulted in different levels of
ambition of the ETS sector in Member States and subsequently different level of ambitions
for sectors and installation allocation. As a consequence, distortions of competition
between Member States' trading sectors and also within sectors occurred entailing a
perception of unfairness.
� Member States have applied widely differing allocation methods entailing among other
things fuel specific benchmarks, which have caused a range of distortions and thus did also
not comply with the requirement of economic efficiency.
� Furthermore, undue distributional effects to those sectors occurred that were able to pass
through the market value of the allowances in the form of opportunity costs thus increasing
operating profits for the companies concerned.
� The approval of NAPs turned out to be a long lasting, cumbersome and complex process
creating a lot of uncertainty on the market with respect to the overall cap of the EU ETS.
Once such data became available in April 2006, it triggered a halving the allowance price
within a couple of days. The swift correction of the market price of allowances demonstrated
convincingly that the carbon market is working. The resulting low level of phase I prices
indeed was not likely in itself to trigger additional or new abatement measures.
Figure 2.2: Price developments of EU ETS allowances
Source: Point Carbon
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 85 – Drucksache 16/9334
In its assessment of the National Allocation Plans for the 2nd trading period, the European
Commission developed a robust approach21 that has been equally applied to all Member
States. It was designed to ensure necessary scarcity on the market and to warrant that Member
States respect Kyoto targets of the EU and its Member States. On the basis of the experience
with NAP I, the Commission had already issued a 2nd guidance document22 with a view to
achieving a more consistent approach on the national allocation plans. Verified emission data
provided a reliable basis for the NAP II assessment and showed that the necessary
infrastructure requirements for a well functioning carbon market are in place.
Following the approval of 27 Member States NAPs , the overall cap for the 2nd trading period
will amount to 2082.68 million tons of CO2. Taking into account the enlarged scope of the
EU ETS in the 2nd trading period23, the EU ETS will deliver emission reductions of 6.5% in
the 2nd trading period compared to 2005 verified emissions.
Against this background, the EU ETS is bringing about the environmental benefits it is
supposed to.
2.3. Identification of Assessment Criteria
In accordance with the Impact Assessment Guidelines of the European Commission, the
options to be assessed will first be screened against the following criteria:
� Effectiveness: the extent to which options can be expected to achieve the
objective of the proposal
� Efficiency: the extent to which objectives can be achieved for a given level of
resources/at least costs
� Consistency: the extent to which options are likely to limit trade offs across the
economic, social and environmental domain
Following the screening, the assessment is mainly based on the following criteria and their
respective interpretation:
Environmental effectiveness: Expanding the coverage/scope of the EU ETS would increase
its environmental effectiveness provided that the overall cap is not undermined, i.e. there is no
carbon leakage. Furthermore, the integrity of the cap is a crucial element of the EU ETS as a
cap-and-trade system, since it does not only determine the level of environmental benefit, but
also represents the guarantee that the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS is ensured.
For these reasons, the options considered will be assessed whether they contribute to the
21 COM(2006) 725.
22 COM(2005) 703.
23 On top of the 2122.16 million tons of CO2 emissions approved by the NAP decisions, another 54.61
million tons of CO2 emissions from installations that come under the coverage of the system in 2008 to
20121 due to an extended scope applied by the Member States. This does not include new installations
entering the EU ETS in sectors already covered in the first trading period. In addition, emissions from
installations that the UK opted to exclude temporarily from the EU ETS in 2005 but that will be
covered in 2008 to 2012 with an estimated amount of around 30 million tons must be added to the
verified emissions, in order to arrive at a comparable scope of the EU ETS in the 1st and 2nd trading
period.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 86 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
integrity of the cap or not and whether the coverage of the EU ETS will be affected. The
criteria are also closely linked to the overall objectives set out above. The global dimension of
climate change also has to be borne in mind when considering the environmental
effectiveness of the different options in question. The need to promote and foster sustainable
development is crucial in this respect.
Economic efficiency: The EU ETS is designed as a system that allows meeting a certain
emission reduction objective at least cost, i.e. the costs incurred by implementing the
objective should not be higher than necessary across the whole EU. Thus, the options
considered will be assessed against their ability whether they contribute to achieving the
objective in question as well as the overall objectives at least cost. An increased scope of the
EU ETS is likely to enhance its economic efficiency, since more sectors/gases/installations
would be able to benefit from the flexibility offered by emission trading without
compromising the overall environmental objectives. This presupposes a well functioning
allowance market including the necessary transparency of the market, which also constitute
relevant elements to be borne in mind. In the light of the long term emission reduction
objectives indicated by the European Council in March 200724, the options should also
promote, or at least not hinder, further reaching emission reduction objectives to be achieved
in the long term. Incorporating an undistorted, clear and strong carbon price signal reflecting
the cost of carbon in the economy is important to ensure least cost measures to be identified.
Such a signal would also convey the necessary incentives to establish dynamic efficiency in
terms of innovation, research and development. These elements will also have to be
considered when assessing the options under consideration.
Administrative costs: For the purpose of the impact assessment, administrative costs are
defined as the costs incurred by operators and regulators to establish and maintain the system.
Administrative costs may, where appropriate, include transaction costs of operators, but do
not include compliance costs incurred by operators under the EU ETS. Compliance costs are
incurred where operators have to buy or sell (negative compliance costs) allowances in order
to surrender the corresponding amount of allowances in line with their verified emissions. A
summary of the administrative cost assessment is available in chapter 8.
Competition and internal market: Where appropriate, the options will also be assessed in
terms of their compatibility with a well functioning internal market ensuring competition
between market participants without any distortion.
Employment: The renewed Lisbon Strategy is refocused on growth and jobs. The regulatory
framework in the EU should contribute to achieving growth and jobs, while continuing to take
into account the social and environmental objectives and the benefits for citizens and national
administrations. The options considered will therefore also be assessed, where appropriate and
relevant, against their impact on employment.
If case may be and relevant, other criteria will be applied as well, such as impact on
consumers, environmental side effects etc. In some cases, the application of all assessment
criteria to the options under consideration does not seem to be applicable. In these cases, the
grounds will be briefly explained and the assessment criteria applied will be introduced.
24 See footnote 12.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 87 – Drucksache 16/9334
Most of the assessment criteria must be seen in the light of the overall objectives, as set out
above: environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency are crucial elements to feature in
the options chosen, as they may best guarantee that the EU ETS results in the expected
outcome, i.e. achieving a certain reduction of emissions at least cost. Achieving the new
emission reduction targets, the need to fully exploit the potential of emissions trading and the
stepwise transformation of the EU into a low carbon economy through a revised EU ETS
would broadly depend on how much these criteria can be enforced. Bearing in mind the
requirements of better regulation, administrative burden at both EU and Member State level
should be kept to the minimum required to achieve the overall and specific objectives.
Finally, competition and internal market requirements go hand in hand with economic
efficiency.
3. SCOPE OF THE DIRECTIVE
3.1. Streamlining the current scope
3.1.1. Identification of Problems
The scope of the EU ETS Directive is defined in Article 2(1):
“This Directive shall apply to emissions from the activities listed in Annex I
and greenhouse gases listed in Annex II.”
Annex I lists a number of activities carried out in certain installations including combustion
installation and certain industrial plants. In phase I of the EU ETS, different interpretations of
combustion installations were used by Member States leading to differences in the coverage
of similar installations under the EU ETS. As a result, competitive distortions on the internal
market of the EU occurred due to the fact that some Member States have included a certain
type of installations, while others had not.
Three different interpretations of the “combustion installations” were applied in the 1st phase:
� a narrow interpretation including only those combustion installations that produce
electricity, heat or steam and supply that to third parties
� a medium interpretation including all combustion installations that produce electricity, heat
or steam, with the purpose of energy production, including those that are process-
integrated, e.g. a steam plant integrated in e.g. chemical industry is included, but certain
process furnaces, such as crackers in the petrochemical industry were excluded.
� a broad interpretation including all combustion installations that produce electricity, heat or
steam, whether or not their main purpose is not energy production, e.g. the production of
ethylene or ammonia (e.g. naphta crackers or ammonia plants).
In its second guidance document (EC 2005a), the Commission made clear that it considered
the broad interpretation as the appropriate one to be applied when setting up the NAP for the
2nd trading period. In close cooperation with Member States through the Climate Change
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Committee25, the Commission established a priority list on installations that should be
included in the EU ETS in the 2nd trading period, while others were left to the discretion of
Member States.
So-called process emissions26 represent a major issue in this respect, as they have not been
consistently included in the EU ETS by all Member States.
Following the agreement in the Climate Change Committee, practically all Member States
included the priority list installations in their NAPs. Some Member States apply a broad
interpretation as advocated by the Commission, while others applied the medium
interpretation plus priority list or stay somewhere between this and the broad interpretation.
As a result, the following problems persist:
– competitive distortions accruing from the different interpretation of the notion “combustion
installation” continue to exist in the 2nd trading period also highlighting the absence of a
level playing field on the internal market;
– incomplete coverage of so-called process emissions, i.e. emissions that do not derive from
combustion processes, but represent the major part of emission in some industrial
sectors/accruing from both energy production for third parties as well as the supply of
energy for a production process with and without using an energy transfer medium; as a
consequence, the environmental effectiveness of the system is compromised;
– lack of legal certainty concerning the scope of the Directive.
3.1.2. Identification of Objectives
In the light of the above problems, the following objectives can be identified:
� Ensuring a consistent application of the scope of the Directive across Member States
resulting in the elimination of currently existing competitive distortions and creation of a
level playing field for all sectors included in the EU ETS.
� This should also bring about full legal certainty on the scope to Member States and entities
operating the installations included in the EU ETS.
� Process emissions should be covered as much consistently and completely as possible.
3.1.3. Policy Options and Screening
The current situation concerning the scope of the Directive has been described above. In order
to improve it and to achieve the objectives identified, the following options are considered
bringing about substantial changes compared to the current situation:
25 Committee established by Council Decision 93/389/EEC of 24 June 1993 for a monitoring mechanism
of Community CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions.
26 For the sake of clarity, process emissions may be described as emissions emerging from an industrial
process, the purpose of which is energy production for the supply of energy to a production process, no
matter, whether an energy transfer medium (radiation or heat conduction) is used or not. However, it is
important to note that this does not represent an agreed or commonly accepted definition of process
emissions, mainly due to the broad meaning of process emissions.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 89 – Drucksache 16/9334
(1) Option 3.1: Codifying a broad interpretation of combustion installation
by defining more precisely the scope of the Directive. A definition of
combustion installation would be introduced implying that all installations
combusting fuel are included, irrespective of the purpose of fuel combustion.
Energy production for third parties as well as the supply of energy for a
production process with and without using an energy transfer medium would
be covered. Such an approach would aim to effectively codify the broad
combustion interpretation (as has already happened to some degree under
Phase II)and would provide for a consistent coverage of process emissions, so
that any ambiguity about whether process emissions associated with a
‘combustion installation’ should be included is removed.
(2) Option 3.2: Activity list: Defining the scope of the Directive in Annex I by
extending the list of all covered activities, including the power sector by
means of more precise definitions and moving away from the notion of
“combustion installations” with a view to also including process emissions
from relevant activities. Activities not explicitly included in this list would
therefore be excluded from the system.
(3) Option 3.3: Economic classification: Defining the scope of the Directive in
Annex I by sectors using a 3 or 4 digit ISIC (International Standard Industrial
Classification of all economic activity)27 or alternative (e.g. CPC) code
delivering the same or a similar scope as an approach based on combustion
installations.
In accordance with the Impact Assessment Guidelines of the European Commission,
screening the proposed options against the criteria28 of
� Effectiveness: the extent to which options can be expected to achieve the
objective of the proposal
� Efficiency: the extent to which objectives can be achieved for a given level of
resources/at least costs
� Consistency: the extent to which options are likely to limit trade offs across the
economic, social and environmental domain
leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: With respect to a consistent application of the scope of the Directive, option
3.1 would effectively codify the guidance of the Commission for the 2nd period and build
upon the work undertaken in the Climate Change Committee. It would provide legal clarity
and benefit from the discussions between the Commission and the Member States held in
the past with a view to streamlining the scope of the Directive. However, a full and
consistent inclusion of process emissions can not be achieved by following this option
alone. Option 3.2 has the potential to arrive at a consistent application of the Directive
27 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/family2.asp?Cl=27
28 See SEC(2005) 791 available from
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/sec_2005_0791_en.pdf. These criteria with the
meaning indicated will be applied for screening across the whole document.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 90 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
provided that a common understanding on the activities covered can be ensured. As it is
likely that a broad list of activities would need to be agreed, in order to maintain the
current environmental effectiveness of the system and avoid ambiguity, a consistent
application of the Directive might be more difficult to achieve compared to option 3.1. On
the other hand, the issue of process emissions would be solved, since the kind of emissions
would not matter anymore. Option 3.3 would be likely to bring some ambiguities partly
due to the existing level of disaggregation, which may capture activities currently not
foreseen for inclusion in the system, partly due to operators which would fall under several
codes. Another serious issue would be the fact that the various international codes (ISIC,
CPC) cannot be legally enforced, definitions of categories would be necessary, in order to
determine which operator falls under which category. Like option 2, process emissions
would automatically be covered.
– Efficiency: Achieving the objectives at lowest costs compared to the current situation is
best ensured by option 3.1, as it is largely a clarification and partly a continuation of
current practice, but with enhanced legal clarity. For this reason, administrative costs for
public authorities would not differ much to the current situation. This might be different
for option 3.2 and 3.3, which would require some further efforts for all public authorities
involved to ensure common understanding of the activity list or the codes respectively.
– Consistency: None of the options is likely to have any negative impact on any other
Community policies, while options 3.1 and 3.2 might contribute to improving competition
on the internal market.
All three options also have to be seen in the light of other outstanding issues in the review of
the EU ETS, such as the cost effectiveness for small installations. All three options entail the
potential to increase the number of small installations in the system although there are no
concrete numbers available due to lack of data. They also would offer the potential to
eliminate existing distortions of competition, however, option 3.2 and 3.3 may risk creating
new problems.
The following table summarises these considerations:
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
3.1: Codifying broad interpretation �/0 0 �/0 Retained
3.2: Activity list �/0 - �/0 Retained
3.3: Economic classification - - 0 Discarded
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
Option 3 is discarded on the grounds that it scores worse compared to options 1 and 2.
3.1.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options
The assessment criteria are applied as set out above, but supplemented by some .
Environmental effectiveness: Both selected options will result in an expansion of the EU
ETS, as they will cover more installations than under the current scope. It will increase
environmental effectiveness of the system bringing another 40-50 MtCO2 under the EU ETS.
Legal clarity of the scope across all Member States, however, seems to be indispensable, in
order to ensure an increased and consistent coverage of the system. Again both options
provide useful elements in that respect, but none of them would allow a sufficient solution on
a stand alone basis: Codifying a broad interpretation through implementation of option 3.1 is
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 91 – Drucksache 16/9334
likely to encompass all kind of combustion installations, however, without necessarily capture
all process emissions emerging from specific activities. This could result in compromising the
environmental effectiveness of the system. In order to provide full legal clarity to Member
States, it might also be recommendable to set up a definition of combustion installation that
comprises all relevant technical apparatuses the operation of which would result in GHG
emissions.
By including a list of activities in Annex I of the Directive (Options 3.2.), process emissions
from certain activities could be effectively captured. However, the list of activities to be
included is likely to become very long and thus difficult to handle and to implement in
practice.
In terms of environmental effectiveness, option 1 might be preferable, because it brings a
currently ambiguous situation to an end. It would include more installations in the EU ETS
including larger ones, which so far are left to the discretion of Member States29. On the other
hand, option 3.2 represents a more tailor made approach, as it would exclude everything not
explicitly mentioned and thus is likely to result in a large list of activities to be covered to
ensure a comparable coverage to option 1. It also means involving a risk that imperfections in
coverage under a large list of covered activities could be exploited.
An important consideration is the capability of both options to capture process emissions.
Process emissions are not defined in the Directive due to, among other things, the diversity of
industrial processes rendering any definition of process emissions very complex, most likely
incomplete and subject to legal challenges. For the sake of environmental integrity, however,
it does not matter whether emissions are released to the atmosphere as a consequence of
combustion for the purpose of generating electricity and/or heat or as a consequence of
another chemical process. For this reason, emissions accruing from both combustion and
processes are intended to be covered by the Directive.
The current approach of the Directive to deal with emissions from both combustion and
processes is based on two pillars and comprises combustion emissions (resulting from
combustion activities in all listed activities) and a list of activities that especially exhibit CO2
from processes. This list allows avoiding a definition of process emission, as it does not
matter whether emissions from these activities are generated by combustion or processes.
Economic efficiency: This criterion does not seem relevant in this respect.
Administrative costs: It is not possible to accurately indicate the number of new installations
captured by the implementation of one of the said options, until Member States have
scrutinised the respective sectors. For this reason, it is also not possible to indicate an absolute
number of administrative costs incurred by the two options. There is also a wide range of
estimated administrative costs for operators varying from €2000 to €15.000 per year and
authorities lying between €3.000 and €10.000 per site and year (ENTEC 2007b). However, as
an illustrative indication only, extrapolating from the UK expansion figures to the total EU
number of Phase I installations and verified 2006 emissions could lead to an inclusion of
approximately 1500-2000 additional installations and 40-50 MtCO2 under option 130. Based
29 For a list of likely coverage of sectors/types of installation under a broad interpretation of combustion,
refer to ENTEC 2007b.
30 This assumes that the UK change from the medium interpretation to medium + priority installations also
applies at the EU level, because the Phase I installation and emissions data does not (with the exception
Drucksache 16/9334 – 92 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
on a range of €5000-€25000 per installation per year (covering both operators’ and regulators
annual costs but excluding one-off costs) this would add administrative costs of very
approximately €7.5-50 million / year at EU level compared to the current situation. (ENTEC
2007b).
However, it is expected that the overall level of these administrative costs will decrease due to
both the new monitoring and reporting guidelines designed, among other things, to relief the
burden of administrative costs to small operators, and due to increased experience acquired
from the 1st and 2nd phase31. The final costs of the options at stake must also be seen in the
light of the solution identified to increase the cost-effectiveness of small operators (see
below).
Competition and impacts on consumer: Both options would contribute to creating a level
playing field for installations within their specific sector across the internal market. As a
consequence, competition on the internal market between competing products will be
reinforced by ensuring a more complete coverage of these products and potential market
distortions will be eliminated. For instance, gypsum, which is a competitor to cement and lime
in the construction industry, is only included in some Member States, but not in all, while the
cement and lime industry are participating in the EU ETS throughout the EU. Consumers
might therefore benefit from reinforced competition, although the impacts are not expected to
be very pronounced.
Impacts on employment, health, innovation and research: Generally, impacts on all these
criteria are considered to be very minor due to the relatively small number of companies
concerned. Positive effects on innovation and research might be strengthened with more
complete sectors facing a carbon price signal.
Table 3.1.4. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Economic
Efficiency
Administrative
Costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
Employment
3.1: codifying
broad
interpretation
0/+ 0 - + 0
3.2: activity
list
0/+ 0 - + 0
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
3.1.5. Compliance of Options with Objectives
In the following, it is evaluated to which extent the options assessed would comply with the
objectives defined:
– Consistent application of the scope: Codifying one of the two options is expected to
ensure a consistent application of the scope eliminating existing competitive distortions to
of the limited number of MSs already applying the broad interpretation in this phase) cover the priority
installations.
31 Some Member States, such as the Netherlands and Sweden have pointed this out (ENTEC 2007b).
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 93 – Drucksache 16/9334
a considerable extent. However, it cannot be excluded that implementing option 3.2 would
ensue new inconsistencies and competitive distortions, since the list of activities required
might not address the full range of competitive relations on the market.
– Full legal certainty on the scope: Both options would provide legal clarity for Member
States. However, this might be more efficient in the event that option 3.1 is implemented,
as its scope and implementation had been extensively discussed in the Climate Change
Committee32. Option 3.2 might in some cases decrease a Member States’ coverage of
emissions, if it has already rigorously implemented the broad interpretation of combustion
installation, since the option specifically requires the exclusion of any non-mentioned
activities. However, given that only few Member States pursued this interpretation under
Phase I (of the 15 Member States surveyed under the Ecofys (2006) work the Netherlands,
Ireland and Belgium (Wallonia) used the broad interpretation) the effect might be limited.
– Consistent and most complete coverage of process emissions: While option 3.1 would not
necessarily capture process emissions to an extent which can be expected from an activity
based approach, a new and broader definition of "combustion installation" covering all
possible technical apparatus the operation of which would release emissions might offset
this drawback to a considerable extent. Emissions not captured by this approach (i.e. using
a technical apparatus not included in the definition of "combustion installation") are
supposed to be small, but could be addressed through a list of activities supplementing
what is covered under option 3.1. The most consistent and most complete coverage of
process emissions can therefore be achieved by a combination of option 3.1 and 3.2.
3.2. Cost-effectiveness as regards small installations
3.2.1. Identification of Problems
Currently, there are approximately 10800 installations included in the EU ETS in accordance
with
� the capacity thresholds laid down in Annex I of the Directive
� the aggregation clause
� opt-in of Member States
Installations within the EU ETS represent a large range of emitters with annual emissions
varying from less than 5000 tCO2 (ca. 3.000 installations) to more than 5.000.000 tCO2 (ca.
70 installations). The contribution of small and large emitters to the overall emissions covered
by the EU ETS is very uneven: the largest 7% of installations in the EU ETS represent 60% of
total emissions, while the smallest 14% of installations only account for 0.14% (Ecofys
2007a). The disproportionate relation between the number of installations and their
contribution to the overall emissions under the EU ETS points to higher transactions costs33
per ton emitted for small installations. The cost-benefit ratio for including small emitters may
therefore appear unbalanced, i.e. the costs are higher compared to the benefits of their
32 See minutes of the Climate Change Committee – 12th Session, 31 May 2006 (not published).
33 In this context, costs of participating in the scheme arising from monitoring, reporting and verification
requirements, but not compliance costs (need to buy allowances) are meant.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 94 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
participation. For this reason, there might be a need to ensure or improve the cost-
effectiveness as regards small installations, as indicated by the Commission in its second NAP
guidance document (EC 2005a).
An exclusion of small emitters from the EU ETS on the grounds of cost-effectiveness cannot
mean, however, that these installations do not need to contribute to the overall emission
reduction targets of the EU. It would just mean that there would need to be other more cost-
effective measures to ensure the same objective. It is also important to bear in mind that the
entry-into-force of the new Monitoring and Reporting Guidelines adopted by the Commission
in July 200734 (see also below) is likely already to bring about considerable improvements in
this respect.
The table below provides an overview of the number of installations and their share in total
emissions.
Source: Ecofys 2007a
3.2.2. Identification of Objectives
� Improving cost-effectiveness to small emitters through identification of an appropriate
threshold to include/exclude installations in/from the EU ETS. Installations excluded must
be subject to alternative, equivalent measures, since all parties have to contribute to
emission reductions. The overall issue should also be seen in the context of including new
sectors and gases and must not diminish the overall environmental effectiveness and
integrity of the EU ETS, i.e. the share of GHG emissions covered by the system.
34 Commission Decision of 18 July 2007 establishing guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of
greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council, available from
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32007D0589:EN:NOT
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 95 – Drucksache 16/9334
3.2.3. Policy Options and Screening
A number of options have been identified, in order to increase cost-effectiveness of the EU
ETS for small emitters35:
(4) Option 3.4: Emissions threshold only: inclusion of installations based on a
minimum threshold for annual emissions or exclusion based on a threshold
for maximum emissions. This could be a threshold of 10kt CO2 or 25ktCO2 /
annum.
(5) Option 3.5: Production threshold only: specifying production thresholds
instead of capacity thresholds. This option entails the replacement of capacity
data with annual production data.
(6) Option 3.6: Combination of capacity and emissions threshold: introducing a
combination of capacity thresholds and emission thresholds. This option
entails keeping the 20 MW capacity threshold whilst additionally adding
either a 10 kt CO2 or 25 kt CO2/year emissions threshold.
(7) Option 3.7: MS opt-out: introducing a specific and conditional opt-out
provision for small installations covered by the ETS, where equivalent
measures are in place. Under this option MSs would be allowed the flexibility
of giving special treatment to small installations provided that they could
demonstrate that the installations were subject to ‘equivalent environment
effort’. The final decision would rest with the EC (role of approving MS
proposals), or a supervisory role could be foreseen at Community level.
Certain measures will automatically qualify.
(8) Option 3.8: Introducing a change of the aggregation clause:
– Option 3.8a: Aggregation capacity threshold: formalised minimum
threshold for the application of the aggregation clause. Under this
option only combustion installations with a capacity of over 3 MW each
would be counted towards the 20 MW threshold as part of the
aggregation rule. This would lead to the removal from the system of
sites with a large number of very small sources, the costs of monitoring
for which are high compared to annual emissions.
– Option 3.8b: Multiple of aggregation threshold: Inclusion in the ETS
only if application of the aggregation clause sums up to a multiple (e.g.
150%, 200%) of the capacity threshold, but keep all installations in the
system if the threshold is reached by a single unit. Under this option,
the aggregation rule would apply only if the total capacity of all
installations on a single site aggregates to 30 MW or 40 MW. This
provision would lead to the exclusion of sites that include a number of
small installations adding up to a total of 20 MW. Such installations are
likely to have proportionately higher monitoring and verification costs
due to the complexity ensuing from large numbers of units per site.
35 see EC 2005a and Ecofys 2007a.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 96 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
(9) Option 3.9 Installation-type exclusions: adding a list of installations to
Annex I that should be excluded from the scope of the Directive. This could
be installations such as combustion units of hospitals-, universities and
nuclear back-up equipment.
(10) Option 3.10 Alternative instruments: under this option measures for small
installations alternative to EU ETS inclusion are assessed, and their impacts
contrasted with the ETS in general and with the specific options above. The
alternatives considered are energy taxation and CO2 taxation.
Screening the options leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: With the exception of option 3.4 and 3.5, all other options would be
effective in that they remove a number of small installations from the scope of the EU
ETS. Opposed to this, option 3.4 and 3.5 would cast doubts on their effectiveness: an
emission threshold only, as proposed in option 3.4, might also capture installations below
20 MW under certain circumstances (e. g. coal fired combustion with a high load factor),
but would exclude installations used only temporary or as back-up or emergency facilities.
A production threshold (option 3.5) does not seem to be feasible due to the lack of relevant
production figures. Therefore, its effectiveness cannot be decided.
– Efficiency: A number of options could be implemented without incurring new costs
compared to the current situation (options 3.6 if the current capacity threshold is
maintained, options 3.8a and b). The efficiency of option 3.7 would depend on the concrete
provisions in Member States and at the EU level to allow the opt-out, while option 3.9 may
require some research, in order to establish a complete list of installations to be excluded
including their definition (e.g. definition of back-up unit). Option 3.4 is considered less
efficient than the current situation, as it would require keeping the current MRV
requirements and supplement them with those installations that are below to the emissions
threshold. Similarly, option 3.6 would not relieve operators of the excluded installations
from monitoring emissions (including verification of reports). Option 3.5 seems technically
very difficult, as the definition of production levels targeting specific emission levels
would generally be very difficult resulting in increasing costs for both operators and
regulators.
– Consistency: Most options do not create a problem. Option 3.7, however, would require
some Commission scrutiny and either approval or some degree of oversight of opt-out
applications, in order to avoid competitive distortions coming up. Option 3.9 may imply
some gaming with definitions resulting in unwanted exclusion of installations and thus
compromising the environmental effectiveness of the system.
The following table summarises these considerations:
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
3.4: Emission threshold - - � Discarded
3.5: Production threshold - - � Discarded
3.6: Combination of capacity and emission � 0 � Retained
3.7: Opt-out � � 0 Retained
3.8a: Aggregation capacity threshold � � � Retained
3.8b: Multiple of aggregation threshold � � � Retained
3.9: Installation type exclusion � - - Retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 97 – Drucksache 16/9334
Options 3.4 and 3.5 are therefore discarded and will not be further pursued. Since option 3.9
might be effective, it is retained at this stage, although it scores as bad as options 3.4 and 3.5.
3.2.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options
Based on the information available from ENTEC 2007b, the impacts of the different options
on various impact areas can be described as follows:
Environmental effectiveness: Option 3.6 with an emission threshold of 10ktCO2/yr would
cut down the overall emission coverage by 15MtCO2/yr or 0.75% or, in the event of an
emission threshold of 25ktCO2/yr by 50MtCO2/yr or 2.5%. Option 3.8a would lead to less
than 1MtCO2 or the exclusion of 0.05%. As for options 3.8b and 3.9, the level of emissions
excluded is unknown, but may be higher than under option 3.6, as in particular some
moderate or medium sized emitters (40MW limit may lead to emitters in the range of 50-
100ktCO2/yr) may be concerned. It is worth noting that a combination of options 3.6 and 3.7
is likely to deliver the best environmental effectiveness: small installations would be excluded
on request of Member States (opt-out) provided adequate alternative measures are in place.
Such an approach would raise the cost-effectiveness of the EU ETS without compromising its
environmental effectiveness.
Economic efficiency: This criterion is not considered relevant.
Administrative costs: under the current situation, there is a large range of administrative
costs incurred by operators included in the EU ETS varying from €2.000 to €15.000 per
installation and year depending on the size and complexity of the installation concerned. Due
to the new MRG and a learning-by-doing effect, administrative costs for small emitters are
likely to be at the lower end. Option 3.6 (and also option 3.7 if combined with option 3.6)
may reduce the annual overall amount of administrative costs by approximately €8 – 60
million or €13 – 95 million in the case of 10kt or 25kt emission threshold. However, due to
the fact that continued monitoring of emissions remains necessary (in order to prove the
emission threshold is not reached), part of these savings will be offset. A smaller reduction of
costs, possibly in the order of €2 – 12 million, can be expected from option 3.8a, however,
these savings would be net, because further monitoring would not be required. While the
overall amount of cost reductions emerging from the other options are unknown, since the
number of small installations excluded would be unknown, the savings per installation are
likely to be higher than under option 3.6.Costs incurred by regulators under the current system
vary from €3.000 to €10.000 per installation and year. Option 3.6 would bring about the
highest reduction of these costs, in the order of approximately €12.6 – 40 million and €20 –
60 million respectively. The same observations as above would apply to the regulatory costs.
Impact on competitiveness, competition and internal market: transaction costs per ton of
CO2 are considerably higher for small installations than for their larger counterparts. In the
form of administrative costs they amount to €0.5 – 3/tCO2 for small and medium sized
emitters dropping to less than €0.01/tCO2 for the largest emitters. This means that in an
extreme case, a small emitter incurs 300 times higher administrative or transaction costs per
ton of CO2 than the large emitters. While such an extreme case is not likely to have any effect
in reality, because the emitters concerned may not be in the same sector, it points to potential
distortions of competition between different operators in a given sector. On condition that an
alternative system would require equivalent environmental efforts from the operators
excluded, option 3.6 would result in an improvement compared to the current situation, as
competitiveness of small operators might be strengthened without resulting in competitive
Drucksache 16/9334 – 98 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
distortions on the internal market. This would also go for option 3.8a, albeit to a smaller
extent, and 3.8b. No impact on competitiveness and the internal market is likely to accrue
from option 3.9, because many sites excluded might be in the public sector. Option 3.7 may
lead to competitive distortions between ETS and non-ETS installations, unless the
Commission is put in the position to assess the impacts on the basis of information provided
by Member States. Employment: The sector most concerned might be the verification
business. Impacts for other sectors are negligible.
Table 3.1.4. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Economic
Efficiency
Administra-
tive Costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
Employment
3.6:Combination
of capacity and
emission
+ 0 0/+ + 0
3.7: Opt-out + 0 + -/0 0
3.8a: Aggrega-
tion capacity
threshold
+ 0 + + 0
3.8b: Multiple of
aggregation
threshold
+ 0 + 0/+ 0
3.9: installation
type exclusion
0/+ 0 + 0 0
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
3.2.5. Alternative Instruments
In the light of the EU's climate change policy in general and the emission reduction targets in
particular, all emitters of GHG irrespective of their size have to contribute to these policy
objectives. Usually, operators often referred to as small emitters can be characterised as
compliance companies in the sense that they strive for compliance within the EU ETS, but do
not have the potential to fully exploit commercial opportunities emerging from emissions
trading. While their administrative costs per ton of emission are thought to be
disproportionately high compared to larger emitters, there may be alternative instruments
available which might be more cost-effective for small emitters than is emissions trading. For
this reason, a qualitative analysis of alternative measures is presented in the following. Two
instruments, a CO2 tax and an energy tax, have been included in this analysis. Their impacts
on the assessment criteria are briefly compared with the respective impacts to be observed in
the EU ETS:
– Cost-effectiveness of emissions reduction: in theory, a CO2 tax could be as cost-effective
as the ETS in terms of emissions reductions. In practice, however, it is difficult to
determine the appropriate tax level to achieve the desired reduction of emissions. An
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 99 – Drucksache 16/9334
energy tax will not lead to cost-effective emission reductions, since it is not directly based
on the level of emissions produced but rather energy consumed.
– Administrative costs to emitters are expected to decrease significantly in the event of
both CO2 tax and energy tax, although in the case of the former, costs from monitoring
emissions will not disappear.
– Production costs to emitters (emissions trading with little auctioning): In theory, a
CO2 tax could be set to provide an equivalent impact, but it is difficult to implement due to
fluctuating ETS allowance price and level of free allocation. Compared to the EU ETS, a
CO2 tax would impact on production costs from the first ton emitted, possibly reinforcing
incentives to reduce emissions, while under emission trading with free allocation this
might not necessarily be the case in practice. A CO2 tax, however, would provide more
certainty to the emitting companies. Setting an impact equivalent to the ETS, but based on
an energy tax might be even more difficult, since an energy tax is not differentiated by
carbon intensity.
– Innovation and research: A CO2 tax potentially provides greater long term price
certainty and dynamic efficiency, unless the ETS cap is tightened over time. While an
energy tax is similar to a CO2 tax in this respect, the lack of carbon differentiation reduces
incentives to innovate.
– Budget effects on public authorities: A CO2 tax, and to a smaller extent also an energy
tax, would lead to revenue increases for the state budget, as long as allowances are
allocated for free under the ETS. Auctioning would provide similar impacts.
– Administrative costs of public authorities: Regulator's costs could decrease in particular
with an energy tax due to simplified monitoring and verification requirements. This is,
however, unlikely to be the case with a CO2 tax. Provided equivalent tax systems are
already in place, implementation costs would only increase slightly.
– Functioning of the internal market: Harmonisation of CO2 and energy taxes at EU level
may be problematic. Non-harmonised tax rates may lead to competitive distortions
between Member States and also between ETS and non-ETS installations.
– Direct and indirect employment effects may be marginal to negligible in all cases.
3.2.6. Compliance of Options with Objectives
On the basis of the above analysis, a combination of options 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8a score best and
would comply most with the objective to increase cost-effectiveness to small emitters. They
would bring about considerable overall reductions of administrative costs to both operators
and regulators and would, on condition that exclusion of small operators is made conditional
to the existence of alternative measures in Member States, lead to an improvement of the
competitiveness of small operators without distorting competition or the well functioning of
the internal market.
In order to decide which emission threshold should be applied, the following considerations
should be taken into account:
Drucksache 16/9334 – 100 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
� Excluding installations from the scope of the system means by definition reducing its
environmental effectiveness.
� This would only be justifiable, if operators excluded would be subject to equivalent
measures undertaken at national level ensuring that they contribute their appropriate share
to the overall reduction efforts of the EU.
� As set out above, the objective is to increase cost-effectiveness to small emitters through
identification of an appropriate threshold. Since small emitters are usually compliance
companies, i.e. they do not trade allowances, but ensure that the number of allowances
surrendered complies with their emissions, cost-effectiveness is mainly a matter of
administrative costs36.
� Consequently, the threshold should be chosen, in order to allow the maximum gain in
terms of reduction of administrative costs for each ton excluded from the system.
Against this background, table 3.2.6 demonstrates that choosing a threshold of 10.000 tonnes
brings about the best relative ratio between a "ton lost vs. reduction of administrative costs".
Table 3.2.6: Comparison of a 10.000 and 25.000 tonnes threshold for optional exclusion of small installations with
respect to the reduction of administrative costs
No Subject 10.000
tonnes/yr
25.000
tonnes/yr
1 Number of installations 4200 6300
2 Emissions excluded from the EU ETS* 15 mio t 50 mio t
3 Emissions excluded from the EU ETS in % of NAP II
allocation
0.7 2.4
4 Administrative costs on average**
- per regulator/yr
- per operator/yr
€ 6500
€ 8500
5 Total administrative costs on average per installation/yr € 15000
6 Overall reduction of administrative costs*** € 63 mio € 94.5 mio
7 Reduction of administrative costs per tonne excluded**** € 4.2 € 1.89
Legend and explanations:
* estimates from ENTEC 2007b
** average of administrative costs for operators ranging between € 2000 and € 15.000 and for regulators ranging between € 3000 and € 10.000
*** [5]*[1]
****[6]/[2]
36 This is in contrast to the issue of compliance costs, which would matter in the case of a command-and-
control approach.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 101 – Drucksache 16/9334
Source: ENTEC 2007b, PWC
As can be seen from row 7 in table 3.2.6, the reduction of administrative costs per tonne
excluded amounts to €4.2 in the case of a 10.000 tonnes threshold, while the corresponding
figure for a threshold of 25.000 tonnes would only be €1.89. This means that in the former
case the gain or economisation of administrative costs is 222% higher per tonne than in the
latter. Against this background, the variant with 10.000 tonnes looks much more promising in
terms of striking the right balance between reducing the scope of the EU ETS and improving
the cost-effectiveness of small installations.
This result is not surprising, as is demonstrated by figure X below. The graph, which is based
on figures from the European Environment Agency and using the same administrative cost
indications and method as above, confirms that indeed an emission threshold of 10.000 tonnes
scores much better than that of 25.000 tonnes.
Figure 3.2.6: Gains in administrative cost reduction per tonne excluded
Gains in administrative cost reduction per tonne excluded
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
<5000 <10000 <25000 <50000 <100000 <250000 <500000 <1000000 >1000000
Emission categories
G
ai
ns
in
€
p
er
to
nn
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
gains in adm reduction
Source: EEA 2006a and own calculations
For any of the other options, compliance with the objective could only be assumed to a lesser
extent, if at all:
– Option 3.8b could potentially lead to a quite high level of emissions excluded from the
system and would not comply with the overall objective to fully exploit the potential of the
EU ETS to contribute to the EU's overall GHG reduction commitments in an economically
efficient manner.
– This would also hold for option 3.9.
The issue should also be considered in the context and in connection with options accruing
from section 3.1 and 3.3. An overview is provided in section 3.4.
With respect to alternative instruments, a CO2 tax might be preferable to the EU ETS in the
case of small emitters excluded from the EU ETS.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 102 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
3.3. Inclusion of new sectors and gases
3.3.1. Identification of Problems
The first trading period of the EU ETS from 2005 – 2007 was very much designed as a
learning-by-doing phase. It focussed on creating the critical mass for a liquid trading market
and establishing the necessary monitoring, reporting and verification infrastructure. For this
reason, the Directive focussed, like all successful applications of cap-and-trade systems in
various environmental domains have done, mainly on large stationary sources and only on
CO2 emitters, while in principle it covers all greenhouse gases (see Annex II of the
Directive).
Based on available NAP II decisions and relevant GHG monitoring reports submitted to the
UNFCCC37, the EU ETS covers a share of 37% of total GHG emissions of the European
Union. This means that the balance of GHG emissions is subject to no measures or measures,
which are most likely, less cost-effective. Expanding its coverage by inclusion of new sectors
and gases would have two effects:
� it would enhance the environmental effectiveness of the system, since it would cover a
larger share of total EU GHG emissions;
� it would introduce new and additional abatement opportunities to the system, thereby
offering a higher abatement potential and lower abatement costs38, which may ultimately
lead to lower allowance prices. It would thus render the system more efficient.
The question of whether new sectors and gases can be included would depend on whether
certain criteria can be met. This would first and above all apply to criteria assessing the
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) requirements, as the implementation of robust
MRV must be considered a "conditio sine qua non" for the inclusion of new sectors and gases.
Otherwise, the environmental integrity of the EU ETS would be jeopardised.
Experience gathered so far has enabled the Commission to revise the initial monitoring and
reporting guidelines (MRG) with a view to both improving the monitoring, reporting and
37 See Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990-2005 and inventory report 2007,
available from http://reports.eea.europa.eu/technical_report_2007_7/en and "Climate Change:
Commissioner Dimas welcomes 2005 reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions and calls for further
action", Press release IP/07/835, available from
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/835&format=HTML&aged=0&languag
e=EN&guiLanguage=fr as well as press release on the Commission Decision on the Danish NAP,
available from
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1274&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en
38 It has been suggested that compliance costs could potentially be reduced by up to 30-40% through the
inclusion of new sectors and gases provided, however, that certain conditions including accurate
monitoring, reporting and verification issues are met (see Final Report of the 1st meeting of the ECCP
working group on emissions trading on the review of the EU ETS on the scope of the Directive,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/report_1st_meeting.pdf).
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 103 – Drucksache 16/9334
verification process and making the rules clearer and more cost-effective39. The new rules
may also lay the ground to include new CO2 emitting sectors.
Some Member States have announced their intention to make use of Article 24 of the EU ETS
Directive with a view to opting in N2O. The Commission is currently elaborating the
necessary MRG for N2O, which enables a Community-wide inclusion of N2O and might be
used as an example for the inclusion of other sectors and gases.
When deciding on the inclusion of new sectors and gases, the objective of contributing to
transforming Europe into a low greenhouse-gas-emitting economy entailing the need for
reinforcing a clear, undistorted and long-term carbon price signal has to be taken into account.
While the potential and costs of abatement may also play a role in this respect, its non-
availability must not constitute a reason not to include a given sector within the EU ETS.
Otherwise, emergence of a non-distorted carbon price signal may be slowed down and thus
jeopardise dynamic efficiency, which is an indispensable requirement to achieve the above
mentioned objective. In this context, it is worth recalling the reference of the Presidency
conclusions of the European Council in June 2007 to emission reduction targets by 2050.40
In the event that inclusion of a sector in the EU ETS should raise serious problems with
respect to international competitiveness of this sector, measures related to other elements of
the EU ETS are thought to remedy these problems.
In the light of the above, there is reason to believe that further efficiency gains for the system
as a whole could be achieved by the inclusion of new sectors and gases.
3.3.2. Identification of Objectives
� Enhancing the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS by including new sectors in the
EU ETS either emitting CO2 or other GHG, which would also help to reduce the climate
change impacts of these sectors. The role of a clear, un-distorted, long-term carbon price
signal, however, has to be taken into account as well as the fact that the availability of
reduction potential should not play a role in the longer run, as there are already sectors
included in the EU ETS with a limited reduction potential. A harmonised approach across
Europe including robust MRV rules, clear legal definitions, recognizing technology and
the international dimension (i.e. international competitiveness and the ability to pass or not
pass through costs) should also be taken into account. However, the matter of international
competitiveness as such should not constitute a reason not to include a sector, as long as
alternative means are available to address the issue.
� Reduce existing intra-EU competitive distortions between competing products/sectors
39 The revised MRG have been adopted by the Commission and will already be applied in the 2nd trading
period.
40 "The European Council recalls its conclusions of March 2007 on an integrated climate and energy
policy. It welcomes the important signal sent by the G8 Summit at Heiligendamm. The clear reference
to at least halving emissions by 2050, the commitment to the UNFCCC process (UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change) and to achieving a comprehensive post-2012 agreement by 2009
provide an encouraging basis for the upcoming UNFCCC negotiations which should be launched in
Bali in December 2007." Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 10/11 June 2007,
paragraph 40.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 104 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Criteria designed to reach these objectives are considered to represent the criteria to be used
when deciding on inclusion of new sectors and gases, as requested by the Council41.
3.3.3. Policy Options and Screening
3.3.3.1. Criteria for inclusion of new sectors and gases
In line with the requirements to ensure effectiveness, efficiency and consistency of the policy
options, the following criteria will be applied in the screening process:
– Significance of the source
– The share of the source in EU GHG emissions. However, it is important to note
that this criterion does not necessarily preclude smaller sources, if their inclusion
would comply with the overall objectives of the review, in particular the need to
reinforce an undistorted carbon price signal. Furthermore, it would need proof if it
was technically feasible to bring them into the system as the most cost-effective
way to achieve emissions reductions relative to alternative measures outside of
ETS;
– The trend of the sector/GHG in the EU2542, because fast growing sources of
emissions mean that they will be more significant in later years if not adequately
controlled.
– Feasibility to monitor the emissions
– Achievable level of uncertainty (low <10%, medium 10-20%, high >20%), which
is important for the environmental effectiveness of the system as well as the
functioning of the allowance market in relation to the number of allowances
needed for compliance. This is best achieved where similarly robust levels of
accuracy are available across all participating installations.
– Data collection: above if it is not possible to easily collect information on
emissions this could undermine the environmental effectiveness of the system as
well as the functioning of the allowance market.
– Installation boundaries: where it is difficult to define them, it is not clear what
emissions are covered by the system, potentially impacting upon its environmental
integrity.
– Proportionality of transaction costs
– Number and size of emitters: smaller more complex emitters can be subject to
disproportionate administrative burden under the ETS and hence reducing
emissions from sectors, which contain a large number of them, may be more cost-
effectively achieved via alternative measures outside of the ETS. This issue,
however, has already been addressed under section 3.3.2.
41 see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/envir/92864.pdf
42 Data for EU-27, i.e. including Romania and Bulgária, are not available.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 105 – Drucksache 16/9334
– Complexity of MRV requirements: Where complexity is high this will entail
higher administrative costs and hence emissions reductions may be achieved in a
more cost-effective via alternative measures.
– Interaction with existing policies and regulation
– Existing regulation: If the source is subject to sufficient emissions reductions
under alternative measures then there is little need to bring it within the scope of
EU ETS as they could entail a double burden.
– Competition: If there is competition with sectors already covered, there is a desire
to bring the sector into the system to reduce competitive distortions between those
who are currently subject to a carbon price within the system and those outside
who are not.
– Compliance costs
– Abatement availability: in general, if would be preferred to include sectors with a
large amount of remaining abatement potential as the mechanism under the ETS
provides a cost-effective way of unlocking this. However, sectors with small
remaining potential should not be precluded purely because of this due to the
desire to provide a clear long-term carbon price across as much of the EU
economy as possible.
The level of abatement costs may not strictly represent a criterion for exclusion or inclusion,
but may be considered more for information on the likely response of the sector (e.g. net
buyer or seller) within the system: Given that sectors are still assumed to be subject to
alternative emissions reduction measures outside of ETS and that abatement costs only help
determine the carbon price within the system itself (with all participants exposed to the same
marginal price of CO2) the level of abatement costs should not be an essential criterion on the
inclusion or exclusion of a given sector.
3.3.3.2. Options to include CO2 sectors not yet included in the EU ETS and result of
screening
Annex 5 provides a table indicating the results of the screening exercise against the criteria
mentioned above. Consequently, the following sectors emitting CO2 are considered further
for inclusion in the EU ETS:
– Petrochemicals and other chemicals: Some CO2 emissions are already included via
combustion installations and the explicit types of activity mentioned in the Phase II NAP
guidance43. However, due to the complexity of the sector further examination surrounding
a more formal inclusion under Annex I is warranted.
– Ammonia production: This is technically part of the chemicals sector, but because of its
reasonably clear installation boundary and high level of process emissions, this ‘sector’ is
examined separately in terms of the potential for a more formal inclusion under Annex I.
43 Of relevance are petrochemical crackers and carbon black production
Drucksache 16/9334 – 106 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
– Aluminium production: Direct CO2 emissions associated with primary aluminium
production are only covered via combustion installations if auto-generation is used.
However, this is only estimated to be around 3% of the sector’s energy consumption in the
EU, primarily because production uses electricity rather than heat and steam and there is
no inherent benefit to having electricity generation on-site as opposed to importing it from
a dedicated producer. Process emissions of both CO2 and PFCs (the latter of which are not
effectively impacted on by the F-gas regulation) from primary aluminium production are
significant and would need to be formally included in Annex I of the Directive.
There are some sectors, which are already covered to some degree or which will be covered
automatically in a move to a broad interpretation of combustion – and for which more explicit
coverage is not needed within Annex I:
– Food and drink (CO2) This sector generally contains a large number of small sources,
some of which are brought into the system via the definition of combustion installation, if
they are above the 20MW threshold. In addition, the move to a broad interpretation of
combustion will bring in a greater number of types of installation in this sector, again
provided that the thresholds are met. Given the negligible process emissions and the fact
that most significant sources are captured via combustion installations in Annex I of the
Directive this sector is not considered further.
– Production of rockwool and oil/gas flaring – are already included in the EU ETS, as they
were explicitly required by the additional NAP 2 guidance. They would be covered by a
broad interpretation of combustion installation.
– Gyspum (CO2) This sector has already been included by some MSs in Phase II and is
automatically covered by the move to a broad interpretation of combustion installation
(where the relevant thresholds are met). Given the negligible process emissions there is no
need to bring this sector in more explicitly under annex I.
A CO2 emitting sector not yet covered and not deemed suitable for inclusion at this stage is:
– Waste incineration (CO2): This sector is already covered by both the Waste Incineration
Directive and IPPC as there is a need for careful control of other pollutants from waste
incineration. In addition, MRV requirements are likely to be complex due to the high
variability in the composition of the waste stream.
3.3.3.3. Options to include other GHG emissions
Annex 6 provides a table indicating the results of the screening exercise against the criteria
mentioned above. Consequently, the following sectors emitting other GHG are considered
further for inclusion in the EU ETS:
– Nitric acid and adipic acid production (N2O) as it is a non-CO2 greenhouse gas the
sector would need to be formally included as a separate Annex I activity under the
Directive. Following an opt-in request furthermore the inclusion of N2O from the
production of glyoxalic acid and glyoxal should be considered.
The following sectors are not deemed suitable for inclusion:
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 107 – Drucksache 16/9334
– Natural gas distribution (CH4): High levels of uncertainty and difficulties in defining the
installation mean there are technical issues with bringing this sector into the system. In
addition, the choice of abatement options is limited, and so other direct regulatory
measures may be more appropriate.
– Semiconductors (PFCs): The F-Gas Regulation (842/2006) already tightly covers the use
of PFCs in the semiconductor industry, and it is also subject to a worldwide voluntary
agreement. Hence inclusion under ETS would impose a double burden.
– Magnesium foundries (SF6): Under the F-Gas Regulation (842/2006), the use of sulphur
hexafluoride (above 850kg per year) in magnesium foundries will be prohibited from 1
January 2008. Hence it is already tightly covered by existing regulation and inclusion
under ETS would impose a double burden.
Coalmine methane (CH4) is already effectively captured by the EU ETS where it is used as a
fuel in combustion installations (>20 MW). The remaining emissions are more appropriately
considered as domestic offset projects and hence are examined in chapter 6.
3.3.4. Impacts on sectors through inclusion in EU ETS
3.3.4.1. Some general remarks
The following analysis is carried out sector by sector due to specificities of sectors. It is also
based on the assumption that the screening process (see above) has proven the overall
feasibility of including the sector from a technical point of view (i.e. possibility of MRV,
reasonable complexity etc).
Against this background, specific features of the various sectors will be looked at with a view
to determining the impacts possibly accruing from their inclusion in the EU ETS. The
assessment criteria applied are environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency,
administrative costs, competition and competitiveness and employment. Potential impacts on
competitiveness of the sectors concerned may depend on the degree of allocating allowances
for free and on the effectiveness of other measures to address potential competitiveness
concerns. This as well as other aspects related to the matter of competitiveness are discussed
in more detail in section 5.6. For this reason, and in order to avoid duplication, only some
specific aspects are mentioned in this section, while general considerations are presented in
chapter 5.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 108 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
3.3.4.2. CO2 emissions from petrochemicals production and other chemicals
General remarks: This paper refers to the “chemical sector”44 when a broader view is
needed than only petrochemicals. However, as this chapter explains, it is possible to focus
mainly on petrochemicals. Most chemical processes need significant energy input (at least for
starting the reaction) and as a consequence, combustion installations can be found in most
chemical production plants. However, respective considerations are already addressed in
chapter 3.1. In the current chapter only chemicals are considered where significant process
emissions occur and which therefore would not necessarily be covered under the activity
“combustion installation”. As a result of a first screening, relevant45 chemicals productions
can be summarized under the heading “petrochemicals”, as the only other chemicals sector
coming out of the screening is ammonia synthesis, which is treated separately (see chapter
3.3.4.3.). In order to roughly define the petrochemicals sector, it is useful to classify organic
chemical sectors into
� upstream mineral oil refineries
� mid-stream petrochemical processes, which can be divided into a narrow
petrochemical sector and a wider petrochemical sector and
� downstream other chemicals, often referred to as “large volume organic
chemicals” (LVOC)
Annex 7 contains an illustration of this division of the chemicals sector. Of the named sectors,
mineral oil refineries are not further discussed, as they are already covered by the current
scope of the directive (through Annex I). Furthermore, carbon black production and emissions
from crackers are covered for inclusion in the ETS by the NAP II guidance. All other
combustion installations in the chemicals sector with a capacity of 20 MW and more are
already included in the EU ETS or at least will be under the broad scope (see chapter 3.1.). A
44 This is only a very small part of all chemical industry regarding the number of substances produced, but
still the major part regarding CO2 emissions. Several (not completely precise) definitions of chemical
sub-sectors exist, which often distinguish partly the input, the output, certain production processes or
the scale of the production. E.g. the BREF documents are classified into LVOC (large scale organic
chemistry, which is roughly comparable in coverage to “petrochemicals”), OFC (organic fine
chemicals, which also include pharmaceuticals, biocides, dyes and pigments as well as explosives),
LVIC (large volume inorganic chemicals, two documents: AAF (ammonia, acids and fertilizers), S
(solids and others)) and SIC (speciality inorganic chemicals), Polymers (with some overlap to
petrochemicals), Chlor-alkali manufacturing industry. Refineries are usually considered not to be
chemical industry, but still petrochemical processes (especially cracking) are found there. Note that
most of the activities under IPPC can be considered to a certain extent to be chemical processes, but by
common understanding they are treated separately, e.g. all metals production and mineral industries.
45 Because of its sheer diversity (several thousands of chemicals are produced at industrial scale), it is not
useful to focus on single substances (with the exception of some large volume chemicals), but on
(groups of) processes which are commonly used in the chemical industry. By this approach it becomes
obvious that all processes using carbon in some form as input can be preliminarily included in the
screening. Either carbon is used in its carbonate form, or as hydrocarbon. As relevant large scale
processes of the first group of inputs is already covered by the ETS under the heading “mineral
industry”, all chemical processes which use hydrocarbons would be possible to include in this analysis.
Hydrocarbon chemistry is generally called “organic chemistry”, with the exception of ammonia
production, as the latter is no hydrocarbon and consequently an inorganic chemical.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 109 – Drucksache 16/9334
broad interpretation of combustion would also add a number of further activities to the scope
of the EU ETS46
Table 3.3.4.2.A
Share MtCO2
narrow petrochemicals 66% 87
wider petrochemicals 9% 12
other chemicals 25% 33
total 100% 132
Source: ENTEC 2007b
Environmental effectiveness: Due to the complexity of the chemical processes concerned in
combination with a lack of data, it is not possible to accurately indicate the emissions that
would be captured by including the chemical sector in the EU ETS on top of a consistent
application of a broad interpretation of combustion installation. The following figure is based
on information provided by ENTEC 2007b.
Figure 3.3.4.2.A
Share of narrow and wider petrochemicals and
other chemicals in the chemical sector
66%
9%
25%
narrow petrochemicals wider petrochemicals other chemicals
vast majority automatically
covered through requirement to
include crackers in Phase II
50-75% of remaining 34% likely to be covered
by broad interpretation
Source: ENTEC 2007b
Although the figures must be strongly caveated due to the fact that they are based on UK data
extrapolated to the EU, the figure shows that the bulk of emissions from the chemical sector
would already be covered through the inclusion of crackers in Phase II and under a broad
interpretation of combustion installation. Only 9-17% of total emissions from the chemical
sector amounting to approximately 11 – 22 MtCO2 might not be included, but would mainly
consist of small emitters with less than 20 MW rated thermal capacity. However, for the sake
of legal clarity, it would nevertheless be useful to include the chemicals sector in Annex I of
46 ENTEC 2007b.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 110 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
the Directive. In order to target the large emitters, this inclusion should preferably aim at
petrochemical production processes, as a broad definition of combustion installations would
cover the rest of the chemical industry, while ensuring through the 20MW threshold that the
smallest emitters stay outside the ETS.
Economic efficiency: Reduction or abatement potential might amount to 20% of the sector’s
total emission, however at relatively high cost as many lower cost abatement measures have
already been taken to help reduce energy costs.
Competition and competitiveness: While the inclusion of petrochemical crackers within
Phase II has helped to sort out some competitive distortions on the internal market, including
the chemical sector more widely would also help reduce competitive distortions with
installations producing similar materials on sites already covered by the EU ETS (e.g.
petrochemical installations inside refineries).
With respect to the competitive situation with non-EU competitors, modelling47 suggests that
whilst there may be some impact on the chemical sector, it is not likely to be too significant at
an aggregate level. This is in line with another study, which looked at the chemical sector in
one Member State48 and according to which the impact of inclusion of the chemicals sector in
the EU ETS on operator profitability and competitiveness appears relatively limited49.
Administrative costs: Since petrochemical installations tend to be large and are already
extensively monitored (IPPC and LCP Directive), the overall administrative burden accruing
from inclusion in the EU ETS should not be disproportionate. Consistent coverage of the
sector may even remove some regulatory complication.
While monitoring and reporting requirements of the sector may create some additional burden
to public authorities, the overall approach to be applied in this respect will not be different
from the approaches used in other ETS sectors.
Employment: So far, there is no evidence that negative employment effects would occur
which can be attributed to the inclusion of the chemicals sector in the EU ETS.
3.3.4.3. Ammonia
Environmental effectiveness: The estimated share of emissions released from the production
of ammonia amounts to approximately 2.25% of GHG emissions covered by the EU ETS in
phase II. It roughly corresponds to 45 Mt CO2 and is split between emissions from
combustion (appr. 15 MtCO2) and process emissions (30 MtCO2). It is worth noting that a
broad interpretation of combustion installation, as discussed in section 3.1 would include the
combustion share of ammonia related emissions, but not necessarily the process emissions.
Increasing the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS, but also because there are
considerable possibilities to shift parts of the energy input (and thus the emissions) between
the combustion part and the reaction part of the installation, the regulatory clarity and the
47 Using the GEM-E3 model, see LETS Update: Sustainability Appraisal Report, cited in ENTEC 2007b
and available from http://e3mlab.ntua.gr/reports/LetsUpdate_Report.pdf, where also a short description
of the GEM-E3 model and the results of the modelling can be found.
48 Potential Expansion of the EU ETS in the UK to the Petrochemicals Sector, report by Defra by NERA
and ENTEC UK Ltd, 2005.
49 Further details see ENTEC 2007b.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 111 – Drucksache 16/9334
avoidance of possible “cheating” (i.e. optimize the combustion/process shift after allocation
and consider it emission reduction) demands the inclusion of the whole emissions.
Economic efficiency: The results of the screening exercise (see Annex 5) showed that
emissions from ammonia production would be well suited for inclusion in the EU ETS: low
uncertainty in terms of monitoring the emissions, good data collection possibilities, clearly
defined installation boundaries (only in the case of full inclusion instead of combustion only),
good abilities to identify the operators and easy verification possibilities are promising in this
respect. In addition, the small number of companies, which all operate large plants, low
complexity of MRV matters also support this finding as does the medium to high abatement
potential.
The main abatement techniques for ammonia production are related to process changes. 23%
of the CO2 emissions in ammonia production can be reduced across both combustion and
process emissions50. Total abatement costs are referred to as “reasonable”.
Administrative costs: Costs for operators in terms of MRG would not be excessive due to the
relatively low complexity of the process and the high level of existing regulation. There are
generally large plants with about 76% of production based in Germany, Netherlands, France,
Belgium and the UK. Costs for public authorities are considered to be similar to other sectors
with large and less complex installations, i.e. relatively low.
Competition and competitiveness: In the Netherlands, ammonia producers were initially
included, but have been opted out, as other EU-based competitors were not included in the
system. Inclusion at EU level would therefore be beneficial for the functioning of the internal
market and remove currently existing competitive distortions emerging from an inconsistent
interpretation of combustion in Member States.
With respect to the competitive situation in comparison with non-EU competitors, it has to be
noted that there are competitive advantages of non-EU competitors located in Russia and the
Middle-East due to access to cheaper natural gas. Imports of ammonia from outside the EU
rose from 12% in 2005 to 17% in 2006 (ENTEC 2007b). High gas prices have caused several
ammonia plants in the EU to shut down. However, in the longer term, increasing demand
from Asia may alleviate the competitive pressure on European producers. Also costs of
logistics (handling and transportation of the product for imports from outside the EU) play
already an important role51 and may, in the longer term, partially offset competitive
advantages of non-EU producers52. Against this background, it cannot be fully excluded that,
in the short term, EU ammonia producers may have to cope with increasing competitive
pressure from non-EU producers, if included in the EU ETS. In the longer term, however,
additional pressure accruing from inclusion in the EU ETS may decrease, thus providing a
more level-playing field like competition between EU and non-EU producers.
Employment: Bearing in mind competitive advantages of external production sites (cheap
energy prices, almost no transportation costs for energy) and continuing demand from
emerging economies in Asia, negative effects on employment cannot be fully excluded in the
50 ENTEC 2007b.
51 According to ENTEC 2007b, the cost of logistics may represent over 20% of the price paid by farmers
for European manufactured fertilisers and substantially more when the product is imported from other
sources produced outside the EU.
52 In particular, if transportation costs may also contain an appropriate carbon component.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 112 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
future, however, can most likely not be attributed to the carbon constraint accruing from the
EU ETS, but to a whole bunch of considerations, among which the EU ETS may figure, but
not very prominently.
3.3.4.4. Aluminium (CO2 and PFC emissions)
Aluminium contains a number of desired properties and is therefore widely used in
transportation, packaging and the construction industries, as it combines light weight with
high strength. Carbon fibres and other composite materials are increasingly used to substitute
for aluminium in certain applications. There is primary and secondary aluminium production,
which are different in many respects: all direct CO2 and PFC emissions from aluminium
come from primary production, while secondary aluminium production only accounts for 6%
of indirect CO2 emissions and does not entail any PFC emissions. In addition, primary
aluminium production is carried out in a small number of large installations, while there are
many more smaller installations producing secondary aluminium.
Since the production of primary aluminium requires a large amount of electricity53,
aluminium production is already affected by the EU ETS through indirect price effects,
although usually aluminium producers enjoy long-term electricity supply contracts, which
may alleviate the overall price effects on aluminium. However, this would depend on the
respective provisions of the contract concerned.
Environmental effectiveness: Including the aluminium sector in the EU ETS would increase
its scope and thus its environmental effectiveness. Low uncertainty in terms of monitoring the
emissions, good data collection possibilities, clearly defined installation boundaries and a
limited number of large installations provide sufficient evidence that emissions can be
adequately monitored, reported and verified and thus safeguard the environmental integrity
and effectiveness of the system. Furthermore, the limited number of installations and their
relatively large amount of emissions compared to the average emissions of EU ETS
installations also advocate including the aluminium sector in the EU ETS.
The overall share of aluminium production in EU GHG emissions corresponds to 0.4% or 8
MtCO2 plus another 0.2% or 4 MtCO2eq in the form of PFC on the basis of EU ETS Phase II
allocations. These figures represent direct emissions in the form of process emissions54. Based
on these figures, average annual emissions of primary aluminium installations would amount
to 0.5 MtCO2, which is 219% of the average emission of all installations under the EU ETS.
A specific feature of the aluminium sector emerges from the fact that it does not only emit
CO2, but also PFC, which is a very powerful GHG with a global warming potential of
approximately 650055. Since the emission of PFC points to flaws in the production process,
there is a general incentive for the aluminium industry to avoid creating PFC emissions.
According to the European Aluminium Association (EAA), the abatement potential for PFC is
greater than for CO2. For this reason, EAA advocates including PFC, too, if CO2 from the
aluminium industry is to be included.
53 According to McKinsey 2006, but also other sources, one tonne primary aluminium requires 15 MWh
of electricity.
54 The share of indirect emissions through the consumption of electricity is on average higher. It accounts
for 55% of total average emissions per ton aluminium produced.
55 This means that 1 kg of PFC corresponds to 6500 kg of CO2 in terms of global warming potential.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 113 – Drucksache 16/9334
Economic efficiency: Including the aluminium sector would contribute to the overall
economic efficiency of the system, as it broadens the scope of the system. Due to the
relatively low abatement potential in the aluminium sector estimated at 7.5% and resulting in
relatively high abatement costs, the sector is expected to be a net buyer on the allowance
market. In 2008, 90% of aluminium plants will be BAT plants following significant
reductions in the past years. However, new abatement technologies are under development,
but are not thought to be commercially available before ten years from now56. Including the
sector in the EU ETS could promote research and development of less carbon intensive
technologies. Most of the direct emissions from aluminium production are process emissions,
which cannot be avoided. Exceptions to this rule are PFC emissions (see above).
Due to the specific features of the production process, aluminium is thought to be exposed to
indirect effects accruing from rising electricity prices. Bearing in mind the huge amount of
electricity used to produce one tonne of aluminium, this seems comprehensible. It also means
that, albeit not yet included in the EU ETS, the aluminium sector had to cope with these
effects in the past. Rising demand for the product underpinned by constantly growing prices
from $1800 (2005) to $2800 (2007) per tonne on the global aluminium market have certainly
helped the European aluminium industry in this respect.
A specific feature of the aluminium sector emerges from the fact that it does not only emit
CO2, but also PFC, which is a very powerful GHG with a global warming potential of
approximately 650057. Since the emission of PFC points to flaws in the production process,
there is a general incentive for the aluminium industry to avoid creating PFC emissions. This
objective, however, has not been reached yet. According to the European Aluminium
Association (EAA), the abatement potential for PFC is greater than for CO2. For this reason,
EAA advocates including PFC, too, if CO2 from the aluminium industry is to be included.
Administrative costs to the operators are considered to be medium, since the sector (primary
aluminium) consists of large installations with clear boundaries. The process is complex, but
highly controlled. Due to the small number of installations, the impact on public authorities is
not likely to be significant, at least concerning the primary production. Secondary aluminium
production concerns a larger number of smaller plants, which may lead to slightly increased
costs of regulation relative to primary aluminium.
Operators may face some one-off administrative costs when setting up the necessary
monitoring and reporting facilities. However, due to the relatively large emission quantities,
the average costs per ton emitted are expected to be very low and would further decrease over
time due to efficiency gains, which can reasonably be expected.
Competition and competitiveness: On the EU internal market, aluminium competes with
several other materials (such as steel) in transportation, the construction sector and as
packaging material. As most of these competing materials are already included in the system,
full inclusion of the aluminium sector could reduce the existing distortion of competition as
this would better reflect the full carbon costs of competing products. For reasons of
consistency it is better to include both primary and secondary aluminium, although the latter
is composed of a larger number of smaller plants. Secondary Aluminium would already be
56 The use of inert anode cells replaces carbon anodes thus eliminating emissions of PFC and CO2 from
electrolysis process (ENTEC 2007b).
57 This means that 1 kg of PFC corresponds to 6500 kg of CO2 in terms of global warming potential.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 114 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
covered by broad combustion definition. Inclusion of primary Aluminium (which is higher
polluting) seems environmentally appropriate.
Aluminium produced in Europe is thought to be exposed to strong international competition,
because production costs can be significantly cheaper outside of the EU. This is demonstrated
by the table below, showing rising imports (in relative and absolute terms) from outside the
EU in 2003 and 2004, i.e. before entering into force of the EU ETS.
Table 3.3.4.4: International exposure of European aluminium market
Year Production (Mt) Imports (Mt) Exports (Mt) IPR ER
2003 1.96 2.54 0.02 0.57 1%
2004 1.92 2.60 0.04 0.58 2%
Source: LETS (2006) (from ENTEC 2007b)
Notes: Figures are for production and trades of unwrought, non-alloy aluminium for EU25 countries. Import
Penetration Ratio (IPR) is the proportion of home consumption that is made up of imports. Export Ratio (ER),
which represents the proportion of home production that is exported.
The competitive intensity of the global aluminium sector does usually not allow passing
through costs to customers without losing market shares, or, in the case of the aluminium
market dominated by a small number of global players58 avoiding carbon leakage. ENTEC
2007b provides an example showing that aluminium production in the EU may experience
cost increases exceeding the average earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) by 1.4% of
total costs, even if the aluminium sector was not included in the EU ETS. They would arise
from EU ETS related indirect costs increases (pass through of opportunity costs) from power
generation. In the event of including the aluminium sector in the EU ETS, another 5.6% may
come on top of it due to the direct emissions from alumina smelting and carbon anode baking.
However, it is important to note that the above example is based on full auctioning (zero free
allocation) to the EU ETS sector. While it may be assumed that a large proportion of the
carbon costs for power generation have been passed through and has affected the cost base of
aluminium producers, although the extent of these effects remain disclosed, measures to
address the specific situation of the aluminium sector in a transitional period to a global
carbon market may, if justified, alleviate potential pressure to the European aluminium sector.
Employment: In the light of the above, it should not be excluded that the EU ETS may have
negative effects on employment in the aluminium sector. In this respect it is very important to
bear in mind, however, that decisions to close down factories or plants or to reduce the
employment are extremely unlikely to be affected by only one factor. In particular, in the case
of aluminium other reasons than the EU ETS impact may prevail. Access to cheap energy, but
also other relevant geographical factors may certainly play an important role, as has been
demonstrated by the move of aluminium producers to Island, long before the EU ETS became
operational.
To summarise: the aluminium sector – primary and secondary production – is very well suited
for inclusion in the EU ETS from a technical point of view. Its inclusion would also eliminate
58 E.g. Alcan accounts for about 27% of production, Alcoa about 16% and Norsk Hydro about 10%
(ENTEC 2007b).
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 115 – Drucksache 16/9334
some competitive distortions on the internal market and could provide incentives for new
abatement measures. Bearing in mind the longer-term objective of establishing an undistorted
and clear carbon price signal would also strongly advocate including the aluminium sector in
the EU ETS. On the other hand, it can not be excluded that concerns on competitiveness of
certain aluminium plants would result in relocation, and possibly, carbon leakage. This,
however, may happen irrespective of the inclusion of the aluminium sector in the EU ETS.
3.3.4.5. Nitric, adipic and glyoxalic acid production emitting N2O
Environmental effectiveness: N2O emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and
glyoxalic acid production amount to approximately 55 MtCO2eq, which roughly corresponds
to 2.5% Phase II allocations with a slightly declining trend of 0.1% per year between 2010
and 2020.
The screening turns out to advocate including production of nitric, adipic and glyoxylic acid
in the EU ETS (see Annex 6). Low uncertainty, good data collection possibilities, clear
installation boundaries and abilities to identify the operator as well as good verification
possibilities to be carried out at a small number of sizes in combination with low to medium
complexity of MRV and a medium to high abatement potential underline the technical
feasibility of including the sector in the EU ETS.
Economic efficiency: The relatively low abatement costs for both nitric and adipic acid
production very much support inclusion of the sector also from an economic point of view.
As for nitric acid production, the average European plant emits 6 kg of N2O per tonne of
HNO3, corresponding to about 2 tonnes CO2eq per tonne of 100% HNO3 (ENTEC 2007b).
The BAT requirement under the IPPC Directive59 is to emit less than 1.8 kg of N2O per tonne
of HNO3. Any emission reductions beyond this threshold would be additional and could be
traded on the ETS. According to EFMA60, the cost of reducing emissions from 2.5 kg to 1 kg
N2O/tHNO3 is between €1 and €5/tCO2 equivalent. This would be possible on the basis of
existing technology. EFMA also suggests that approximately 10 MtCO2 equivalent can be
reduced in addition to IPPC-related reductions.
Under a free allocation method based on additionality to the BAT split view (i.e. reductions
beyond 2.5 kg/HNO3) and depending on the carbon price on the market, the inclusion of N2O
from nitric acid production can allow operators not only to recover the costs of ETS-related
abatement but also pay for IPPC compliance. The IEEP study of 2005 suggests that under a
price of €20/tCO2, and an allocation based on a 2.5 kg benchmark, with average in-house
abatement costs below €20/tonne of abatement of CO2 equivalent, the nitric acid producers
could gain significant net revenue from abatement. LETS 2006a concludes that under prices
of €10/tCO2 the industry would incur no net gains from entering the ETS, but would not suffer
major costs either.
Overall abatement costs for adipic acid production are considerable lower than those for nitric
acid producers and are estimated to amount to 0.5€/tCO2eq.
59 Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and
control (OJ L 257, 10.10.1996, p. 26).
60 European Fertilisers Manufacturers Association
Drucksache 16/9334 – 116 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Administrative costs: The outcome of the screening implies relatively low administrative
costs for both operators and regulators, since clear installation boundaries, low uncertainty
and good data collection possibilities in connection with a limited amount of installations
facilitate their inclusion. The necessary monitoring and reporting guidelines are currently
being developed due to the planned opt-in of N2O in accordance with Article 24 of the
Directive. As a consequence, almost no additional costs would be incurred at Community
level.
Competition and competitiveness: Some Member States are planning to opt in N2O
emissions unilaterally already for the second trading period. This may result in competitive
distortions and inconsistency across the EU and for this reason, formal inclusion of the sector
concerned in the EU ETS may promote well functioning of the EU internal market.
Due to the above initiative of some Member States, MRG are already under development. The
full inclusion of the sector would thus not create any additional administrative costs. Also the
impact on public authorities is expected to be minimal, as there are only few sites that would
be affected.
There is no particular competitive pressure in comparison with non-EU competitors, as the
exposure to international competition is relatively low. The IPR of adipic acid production
went down from 5 to 3% between 2003 and 2004 and that of nitric acid production from 0.5
to 0.1% at the same period.
Employment: There are no indications that inclusion of nitric, adipic and glyoxalic acid
production would affect employment in the industry concerned.
3.3.5. Compliance of options with objectives - summary on inclusion of other sectors and
gases
In relation to the objective of expanding the scope of the EU ETS to other sectors and gases,
the inclusion of the sectors and gases discussed will help to enhance the environmental
coverage of the system, provide a clear long-term carbon price signal across a larger part of
the EU economy and reduce intra-EU competitive distortions with sectors/products already
covered. In addition, given the types of activities contained within the sectors, emissions
reductions are likely to be achieved in a more cost-effective manner under the EU ETS
relative to alternative systems.
Petrochemicals and ammonia: The inclusion of these chemicals appears technically feasible
and warranted given the potential for abatement, relatively low administrative costs of
inclusion and significant CO2 emissions. An explicit recognition as an Annex I activity may
be necessary to fully include process emissions.
Aluminium: The primary aluminium sector gives rise to a significant level of direct process
emissions (both CO2 and PFCs) that are technically and administratively possible to include
within the ETS. A key issue for this sector is international competitiveness, as primary
aluminium is already exposed to the impact of the EU ETS through indirect effects on
electricity prices, and it has limited potential to pass through increased costs. Secondary
aluminium is far less carbon intensive and the cost-impact is far more marginal, and emissions
are covered automatically via the move to a broad interpretation of combustion installation.
Given the importance of an undistorted carbon price signal for the overall objectives of the
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 117 – Drucksache 16/9334
EU ETS, and the need to ensure dynamic efficiency, inclusion of the sector would be in line
with the objectives of the review of the EU ETS.
N2O emissions from nitric and adipic acid production are (relatively) technically and
administratively straightforward to include in the system. International competitiveness issues
are relatively limited. The main issue is how to allocate to the sector within the ETS due to a
high proportion of low cost abatement options (particularly from nitric acid plants) and strict
benchmarking methods are likely to be necessary.
International competitiveness is a key issue for aluminium but, at least in the short term less
so for the other sectors considered. It is, however, important to bear in mind that overall
competitiveness of EU industries depends on a number of factors, among which the EU ETS
may figure, but may not play a decisive role in the short and medium term.
Table 3.3.5. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Economic
Efficiency
Administra-
tive Costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
Employment
Petrochemicals
and chemicals
+ + 0/+ 0/+ 0
Ammonia + + 0 -/0 -/0
Aluminium + 0/+ 0 -/0 -/0
N2O emissions + + 0/+ + 0
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
3.4. Overview of trade-offs emerging from options on streamlining the scope,
increasing cost-effectiveness as regards small installations and inclusion of new
sectors and gases
Streamlining the scope via the move to a broad interpretation of combustion installation in
combination with an activity based approach along with the specific inclusion of the
abovementioned other sectors and gases will help to expand the scope of the ETS relative to
Phase II, whilst the implementation of rules to exclude small emitters will help to render the
overall system more cost-effective.
Expansion will help to achieve the EU’s key objectives of enhancing the environmental
coverage of the system, provide a clear long-term carbon price signal across a larger part of
the EU economy and reduce intra-EU competitive distortions with sectors/products already
covered. Exclusion of a number of small emitters from the system does not offset its
expansion, but will render it more efficient in administrative terms.
Whilst there is a high level of uncertainty within some aspects of the data, the table below
shows that, on balance, the scope of emissions covered under the ETS is likely to be expanded
under the options considered above.
Overview table: Trade-offs between streamlining the scope, cost-effectiveness for small
installations and inclusion of other sectors and gases
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Option Impact on coverage of EU ETS Comments
Estimated
emissions covered
(MTCO2eq)
share of Phase
II allowances
Current situation: Phase II
allowances
2083 100% on the basis of 24
NAPs approved
Streamlining the scope
Broad interpretation of combustion
installation of which
40 – 50 2 – 2.5%
- petrochemicals and other chemicals 20 – 25
- gypsum unknown
- ammonia up to 15
- other remaining
Potential additional inclusion from
streamlining the scope
40 – 50 2 – 2.5%
Inclusion of other sectors and gases
- adipic, nitric and glyoxylic acid
production
up to 55 2.5%
- aluminium (CO2 and PFC) up to 12 0.6%
- ammonia up to 30 1.5%
Potential additional inclusion from
inclusion of other sectors and gases
up to 97 up to 4.6%
Potential additional total inclusion up to 137 - 147 up to 6.6 –
7.1%
Cost-effectiveness of small installations
- option 3: combination of capacity
and emission threshold
20 MW plus 25 kt
20 MW plus 10 kt
- 50
- 15
- 2.5%
- 0.7%
no of installations excluded
(2006 verified emissions):
appr. - 6300
appr. - 4200
- option 5a: 3 MW aggregation
threshold
- 1 > 0.1% appr – 800 (most, but not
all of them may already be
excluded by combination of
capacity and emission
threshold)
Combination of option 3.6 and 3.8a:
Potential exclusion from the EU ETS
20 MW plus 25 kt
20 MW plus 10 kt
- 50 to 51
- 15 to 16
up to – 2.6%
up to – 0.8%
no. of installations excluded
appr. – (6300 + ~800)
appr. – (4200 + ~800)
Potential impact of combined policy options
MtCO2 share of Phase
II allowances
Potential total inclusion minus no of installations excluded
exclusion based on combination of
option 3.6 and 3.8a:
(2006 verified emissions):
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 119 – Drucksache 16/9334
20 MW plus 25 kt up to 86 - 96 up to 4 – 4.5% appr – (6300 + ~800)
20 MW plus 10 kt up to 121 - 131 up to 5.8 –
6.3%
appr. – (4200 + ~800)
Implementation of a broad interpretation of combustion installation, the inclusion of other
sectors and gases as discussed as well as increased cost-effectiveness for small installations by
a combined implementation of options 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8a would lead to an additional net gain
in terms of coverage of the EU ETS in the case of a 25 kt emission threshold of 4 – 4.5% with
approximately 60% less installations without compromising the environmental effectiveness
of the system, as regards installations excluded from the system. In the case of a 10 kt
emission threshold the corresponding figures would be 5.8 – 6.3% with appr 40% less
installations.
3.5. Carbon capture and storage
Directive 2003/87/EC, which lays down the provisions governing the EU Emissions Trading
System (EU-ETS), does not explicitly refer to carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a potential
option to curb greenhouse gases from European industries. However, CCS projects can be
recognised through Member State inclusion under Article 24 of the Emissions Trading
Directive ("opt-in"). Inclusion of CCS beyond 2012 is particularly important given the long-
term potential for emissions reductions from CCS. While estimates vary widely and are
subject to considerable uncertainty it is thought that capacity exists to store several decades
worth of current global CO2 emissions (approximately 30 GtCO2/year). The IPCC gives an
estimated range of the economic potential for the cumulative global reduction of emissions
from CCS in this century of 220-2200 GtCO2 - by comparison current EU ETS emissions are
of the order of 2 GtCO2/year.
3.5.1. Identification of Problems
In the light of the great potential offered by CCS, the technology should contribute to
achieving overall GHG reduction targets of the EU. However, the current state of technology
does not yet allow making widespread use of CCS, which is still under development.
In order to exploit the potential of CCS in the longer term, the further development of CCS to
contribute to mitigating GHG emissions under economic conditions is necessary. Economic
incentives have to be provided, which help to advance CCS in a technology neutral manner.
3.5.2. Identification of Objective
– Contributing to the exploitation of the long-term potential offered by Carbon Capture and
Storage to achieve the GHG emission reductions set by the EU Heads of State and
Government by including CCS in the EU ETS, thereby providing necessary financial
incentives to promote and use CCS, in particular in the long term.
3.5.3. Policy Options and Screening
Beside the current situation characterised by unilateral opt-in on initiative of Member States
on the basis of Article 24 of the Directive, there are two options to be explored:
Drucksache 16/9334 – 120 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
(11) Option 3.11: Opt-in of classes of project: Admit classes of projects one by
one, through the current opt-in procedure, but with a harmonised generic
approval possible for any opt-in, applicable throughout the EU.
(12) Option 3.12: Mandatory inclusion of all CCS: Include all CCS projects up
front, by explicit reference to CCS in Annex I of the Directive
3.5.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options
Effectiveness
– Coverage: Most expanded coverage in terms of installations and emissions might be
achieved by option 3.12, although the economic incentive for CCS provided by emission
trading would be expected to result in full uptake under option 3.11. However, only few
projects will be operational by 2020 (according to modelling based on PRIMES, baseline
suggests by 2020 <0.5% of CO2 from power and steam are captured), so, in real terms,
there is probably no difference in effect between both options.
– Transparency: In the long run, a consistent harmonised approach for CCS is needed for
the sake of transparency. This consideration clearly advocates option 3.12: Explicit
inclusion of CCS in Annex I would provide a clearer positive signal to the market with
regard to the future of CCS in the ETS. However, a fundamental prerequisite of option
3.12 would be that suitable MRGs can be prepared for all CCS projects and all
environmental and liability issues of CCS can be managed.
– Environmental integrity: The latter might be in particular important, if unsuitable storage
sites are used, which in the long and longer-term would release CO2. A solution of this
problem depends on an appropriate legal framework laid down in proposal XXXX. If
acceptance of all classes of CCS projects were restricted to projects permitted under the
proposed framework, there should be no risk of inclusion of projects that possess poor
long-term storage integrity.
– Innovation: Depending on the regulatory framework, recognition of CCS under the ETS
will have a major impact on CCS deployment and thus on relevant research and
development. Recognition of CO2 captured and stored as not emitted will incentivise the
operator to deploy CCS where it is cheaper to do so than to surrender allowances.
Although at present market prices, the currently high costs of CCS mean that it is unlikely
to be deployed on market grounds alone, this will change as the carbon market matures and
CCS becomes cheaper.
The different ways of recognising CCS may only have a limited differential impact on CCS
innovation. Full inclusion of CCS projects up front (option 3.12) might induce a higher
amount of CCS projects than a case by case inclusion of CCS (option 3.11), due to the
increased certainty and transparency for developers and investors, which might bring about a
broader range of CCS technologies in the case of the former. For this reason, there might be a
change in innovation induced by option 3.11, which might not occur in the event of option
3.12, which would entail a higher degree of regulatory uncertainty to the investment.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 121 – Drucksache 16/9334
Efficiency
– Technical feasibility/simplicity: With a case by case inclusion of classes of projects into
the ETS (Option 1) and the relevant application of Article 24(3), the appropriate
monitoring and verification guidelines best suited to certain classes of projects would
likely be harmonised and implemented across the EU. The question is whether the MRGs
adopted for opt-in would be likely to apply to all potential CCS projects robustly. For
capture and transport, this is likely to be the case, but for storage it might be different. If
the recently launched MRG project61 of the Commission proves the technical feasibility of
robust MRG also for storage, then there is no reason from this point of view speaking
against option 3.12. Otherwise, option 3.11 would be preferable.
– Transaction and administrative costs: Keeping the current situation is likely to incur
only limited additional administrative costs, however, using the potential of CCS would
depend on Member States. Option 3.12 is more costly in the short term for the
Commission, but a harmonised approach, as emerging from option 3.12, would decrease
these costs in the long-term. Opting in classes of projects (option 3.11) would likely also
require additional upfront costs, although to a lesser degree than option 3.12 as only
individual classes of projects need to be assessed. Option 3.11 also implies a learning-by-
doing and hence, may allow for a more streamlined implementation for subsequent classes
of project reducing transaction costs over the longer-term. In addition, a more limited but
harmonised approach under option 3.11 may reduce administrative costs overall compared
to the ad-hoc opt-in approach under the baseline, where projects are assessed on an
individual basis.
– Functioning of the allowance market: Due to the fact that only a small number of CCS
projects are likely to be operational up to 2020, the impact on the carbon price due to the
introduction of CCS is expected to be small. However, representatives of the energy
intensive industry have expressed concern about the impact on electricity prices over the
longer-term (see Annex 1), in particular, if the EU ETS is solely thought to provide the
necessary financial mechanisms for funding CCS projects.
Consistency
– Competitive distortion: Both options would tend to reduce competitive distortions, which
may not be the case under the current situation.
– Energy security: The availability of commercial CCS will have an effect on energy
security, since it would allow coal to remain an integral part of the energy mix in a carbon-
constrained world. Inclusion of CCS in the ETS will have a positive effect on promoting
CCS commercialisation, and hence on energy security in the longer term. However, since
the number of projects included in the ETS before 2020 is likely to be similar under all
three options, the options would not have differential impacts on energy security.
Summary
The following table summarises the results:
61 The project launched by the competent Commission services is supposed to deliver its result by mid
2008.
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Option 3.11 (opt-in classes
of projects)
Option 3.12 (include all
CCS projects)
Effectiveness
Coverage 0 0
Transparency 0 +
Environmental integrity 0 0
Impact on innovation 0 0+
Efficiency
Technical feasibility/simplicity 0 ?
Transaction and administration costs 0 0
Functioning of the allowances market 0 0
Consistency
Competitive distortions + +
Energy security 0 0
Legal issues among Member States 0 0
Note: Analysis is structured comparatively, i.e. + (improvement), 0 (negligible impact), - (deterioration) ?
unknown/lack of information
3.5.5. Compliance of options with objectives
In the long term (i.e. beyond 2020), the inclusion of all CCS projects in the ETS (Option 2)
appears like a promising approach – harmonised coverage, reduced carbon prices, increased
energy security and an improved functioning of the internal market would be expected.
However, up to 2020, only a few CCS projects will be operational. Therefore, the positive
effects of option 3.12 will be more in terms of investor confidence in the technology, since it
provides a clearer signal as to the future of CCS under the ETS.
Environmental integrity is fundamental to the ETS, and so questions of liability and
accountability must be addressed before allowances are allocated to CCS projects. However,
all of these issues are being addressed in the enabling legal framework for CCS, and so do not
impact on the choice between options.
The main choice between options 3.11 and 3.12 depends on whether Monitoring and
Reporting Guidelines (MRGs) can be established that are sufficiently robust to cover all
potential CCS projects. If not, then option 3.12 would potentially jeopardise the
environmental integrity of the ETS. For capture and transport, there seems to be no doubt that
suitable MRGs can be established. The question whether there is any potential issue for
storage will be assessed separately. If there is no issue for storage, there is no real obstacle to
option 3.12.
Thus the decision between option 3.11 and option 3.12 depends on the possibility of
establishing suitable MRGs. If it is confirmed that suitable MRGs can be established, option
3.12 is preferable because it provides a clearer signal as to the future of CCS under the ETS.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 123 – Drucksache 16/9334
For this reason, the actual choice of the option must be taken in the light of the approach and
the decision laid down in the an extra proposal to be adopted by the Commission.
3.6. Transport
3.6.1. Road Transport
3.6.1.1. Identification of Problems
Road transport has significant impacts on climate change, with about 19% of the overall EU
emissions of CO2 coming from the fuel consumed by passenger cars and heavy vehicles.
While the EU as a whole has reduced its emissions of GHG by just under 5% over the 1990-
2004 period, the CO2 emissions from road transport have increased by 26%. This proves that
road transport represents one of the fastest growing GHG emission sources at all. Attempts to
reduce these emissions did not turn out to be successful so far.
In its conclusions on the “Review of the EU Emissions Trading System”, the Council
(Environment) invited the Commission “to consider a possible extension of the scope of the
EU ETS to … surface transport, thereby exploring all necessary implementation aspects as
well as advantages and disadvantages and questions of practicability”62.
3.6.1.2. Identification of Objectives
Pending further analysis by the Commission services, the objective of the following section is
to provide a preliminary exploration of the pros and cons of including the emissions from road
transport in the EU ETS (including ways to actually implement this inclusion) against the
achievement of the objective of reducing the climate change impacts of road transport.
3.6.1.3. Options and screening the options
There are two options, which will be explored against a number of relevant assessment
criteria:
(13) Option 3.13 Downstream approach: The road transport sector is considered
one virtual installation under the ETS through which the registered owners of
vehicles will receive an account for allowances in accordance with a formula
decided upfront. For every fuel purchase an amount of allowances is deducted
from the registered owner’s account that corresponds to the emissions
released when the fuel is burned. This implies that fuel purchases in the EU
will only be possible if the buyer has a covered account for allowances and
that all fuel purchases will be electronically traced. The option would
correspond to the polluter-pays-principle and be compatible with the design
of the EU ETS as regards the principle of direct emissions (the recipient of
allowances is the one that actually responsible for the emissions).
62 Council of the European Union, Document 11429/07.
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(14) Option 3.14 Upstream approach: Fuel suppliers are defined as participants
in the ETS. They have to hand in allowances according to the total emissions
emitted by the fuel they sell to road transport. Monitoring can be based on the
well-established system for energy taxation.63 An alternative upstream
approach could be that vehicle producers become the accountable entity.
Under this approach, when selling a vehicle, producers would have to
surrender allowances corresponding to the total lifetime emissions of the
vehicle.
Screening the options delivers the following findings:
– Environmental effectiveness and cap: Including the road transport sector in the EU ETS
would imply an additional coverage of another 875 MtCO264 and would increase the share
of the EU ETS in total EU GHG emissions from currently 37% to 54%. Various options
exist to set the cap: a possible cap could be to reduce emissions from road transport by
20% compared to 1990 levels. Alternatively, a "low ambition" cap could be set at current
emission levels, but the less ambitious the cap, the more burden would be left to other
sectors more sensitive to international competition. In both cases, continued growth in
transport usage would require measures addressing transport demand (including
infrastructure charging, promotion of modal shift, public transport etc) combined with
more efficient or less carbon intensive vehicles (e.g. via the EU CO2 and cars strategy and
the use of biofuels taking into account the proposed greenhouse gas reduction mechanism
introduced in the fuel quality directive in order to avoid any double counting of savings)
or, otherwise to purchase credits either from the ETS itself (i.e. from domestic reductions)
or by use of the CDM and JI market. The implications of such an approach, however,
would need to be further scrutinised, in order to avoid adverse effects on the EU ETS
and/or the credit market. In terms of environmental effectiveness, an assessment would
need to be carried out to see whether emissions would actually be delivered in the road
transport sector or in other sectors, due to relatively higher abatement costs for road
emissions.
– Efficiency: Under both options, emissions could in principle be technically monitored.
Under the downstream approach (Option 3.13) all fuel sales at gasoline stations in the EU
would be automatically monitored - upfront free allocation of allowances to car owners by
means of a formula would allow the car owner to “pay” through emission rights, an
approach that is easy to monitor electronically, provided the necessary infrastructure
facilities are in place. Under the upstream approach (Option 3.14), the total quantity of fuel
sold from fuel traders (e.g. to petrol stations) must be monitored. The practical
implementation of an upstream ETS approach for road transport was the subject of a study
on behalf of the German Federal Environmental Agency. One finding of this study was
that monitoring will be very easy and effective if it is based on the already mandatory
monitoring of fuel trades for energy taxation (see ENTEC 2007b). Transaction costs for
market participants are likely to be considerably lower under the upstream approach due to
the new infrastructure facilities that are required under the downstream approach. While
63 This approach is discussed in a study by UBA 2005. In Germany, for example, energy taxes for fuel
need to be paid when fuel is taken from bonded warehouses.
64 See Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990-2005 and inventory report 2007,
available from http://reports.eea.europa.eu/technical_report_2007_7/en
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 125 – Drucksache 16/9334
these costs would be born by a much higher number of participants (number of vehicle
(cars and trucks) owners), they would result in very high aggregated administrative costs.
– Consistency: A number of other instruments are already in place, or are proposed, in the
transport sector. There are also questions relating to multiple instruments, which need to be
addressed when considering bringing road transport into the EU ETS - in particular in view
of the existing fuel excise duty system, which already constitutes an instrument to address
demand for road transport fuels. The use of multiple policy instruments, such as fuel taxes,
efficiency standards (CO2 and cars strategy), the proposed greenhouse gas reduction
mechanism (review of the fuel quality directive) and ETS in the road sector, may not
necessarily constitute a double burden if properly designed, but would in any case require
further analysis, in order to establish the best cost-benefit ratio in relation to the objective
to cope with GHG emissions from the transport sector. In particular, taking into account
the Commission proposal to regulate life cycle greenhouse gas emissions from fuel,
inclusion of road transport into the ETS could contradict the aim of the proposed fuel
system, or introduce a dual regulatory system for the same emissions.
The upstream approach would require a change in the underlying design of the current ETS
system, since it would not follow the principle of direct emissions where allowance
recipients have a direct control over the actual emissions (especially in the case of
inclusion at the level of vehicle producers, where monitoring needs would be based on
expected emissions).
In the light of these results, it is too early to take a decision on the options identified at this
stage bearing in mind that the Commission is working on a solution to the problems identified
in the framework of ongoing initiatives.
3.6.1.4. Compliance of options with objectives
None of the options examined can be recommended for implementation at the current stage.
Further investigation and detailed analysis, in particular as far as a comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis including comparison with alternative measures, is concerned, will be carried out, in
order to arrive at a well-founded and substantiated conclusion on whether the road transport
sector should be included in the EU ETS or not.
3.6.2. Shipping
3.6.2.1. Identification of Problems
Estimates on shipping emissions vary, but indicate that CO2 emissions from shipping may
contribute between 2-5% to anthropogenic CO2 emissions and rise in line with the growth in
international trade. The IMO estimates ship CO2 emissions will rise between 37% and 72%
by 202065.
65 IMO Study of GHG emissions from Ships (2000), growth compared to year 2000.
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In its conclusion on the review of the EU ETS, the Council (Environment) invited the
Commission "to consider a possible extension of the scope of the EU ETS to … surface
transport"66.
In the 2nd ECCP meeting on the review of the EU ETS67, the Commission indicated that with
respect to the ETS and shipping, there are currently a number of European policy options
under consideration. One of these options is including shipping in the EU ETS.
However, shipping by its very nature is very much an international industry. The international
dimension of shipping is highlighted by the fact that shipping delivers 90% of European
external trade. For these reasons, it would be most appropriate to tackle the problem of CO2
emissions from ships in the framework of a global agreement rather than employing a
regional approach.
There are currently no international rules to reduce CO2 emissions from ships. Under the 1992
UNFCCC, all Parties committed to promote reductions in transport emissions. The Kyoto
Protocol to the UNFCCC calls on Annex I parties to pursue reductions of GHG emissions
from ships through the International Maritime Organisation. Despite discussing the issue
since 1992 there has been little progress and to date there has been no meaningful discussion
of measures to actually reduce emissions. The EU also see the opportunity to address the
problem of emissions from international maritime transport as part of the post 2012
negotiations within the framework of the UNFCCC.
However, as announced in the 6th Environmental Action Plan (2002), in the absence of
progress towards a global agreement, the EU will take action. However, the scope and timing
of such European action will depend on the progress of the on-going international
negotiations.
Against this background, the option of including CO2 emissions from ships within the EU
ETS is not further pursued in the framework of this impact assessment.
3.7. Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF)
3.7.1. Identification of key issues
Terrestrial ecosystems play a crucial role in the global carbon cycle. Land use, land-use
change, and forestry (LULUCF) activities can lead to emissions of greenhouse gases and their
removal from the atmosphere, and the contribution of such activities to net anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions has been recognised under the Kyoto Protocol. Roughly 20% of
global greenhouse gas emissions can be attributed to deforestation. The EU recognises that
tackling these emissions is a crucial element in the overall strategy to limit global warming to
maximum 2°C above pre-industrial levels.
The key issue is whether under the current circumstances inclusion of LULUCF activities in
the EU ETS can be envisaged or whether alternative instruments outside the EU ETS are
more appropriate to tackle emissions from LULUCF. For example, auction revenues could
66 Council of the European Union, Document 11429/07,
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st11/st11429.en07.pdf
67 See Annex 1.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 127 – Drucksache 16/9334
contribute towards LULUCF activities that increase carbon sequestration or avoid them being
a source of emissions.
A number of factors render it difficult over time to measure the precise evolution in net
carbon balances of terrestrial ecosystems. First of all, emissions and removals under LULUCF
are inherently reversible, as carbon stored can at some point be released. Much scientific
uncertainty remains about the nature of GHG balances of terrestrial systems, especially on the
long run in the light of climate change. For example, the capacity of carbon sequestration by
forests diminishes with time, and climate change may have further negative influence on the
natural carbon uptake by the terrestrial biosphere. The terrestrial carbon balance depends on
several complex and interrelated factors such as temperature, precipitation rates, fires, the
effects of past management, the use of fertilisers, air pollution, etc., and the net balance over a
certain time therefore is hard to estimate with a high level of certainty. On top of this, in the
case of project-based activities there is a significant risk of leakage when changes in land use
practices in one area are annihilated by displaced LULUCF activities in another area.
Due to some of the complexities mentioned above, the current accounting framework for
LULUCF under the Kyoto Protocol is incomplete, inconsistent and contains arbitrary
elements. Despite the significant methodological advances in the past years, some key issues
(like the separation of natural and management effects) are still not resolved and modalities
are subject to change after 2012.
For afforestation and reforestation activities under the CDM, two particular types of credit
have been created, temporary certified emission reductions (tCERs) and long-term certified
emission reductions (lCERs), which Parties may use towards their international commitments
under the Kyoto Protocol. The modalities also re-iterate that the treatment of LULUCF under
the CDM in future commitment periods shall be decided as part of the negotiations on the
second commitment period. No such modalities have been developed in relation to JI projects.
Modalities for accounting under Articles 3(3) and 3(4) of the Kyoto Protocol have been
developed for the national level, and cannot be automatically applied to the level of individual
land holdings and operations.
Global annual emissions from deforestation account for roughly 6 billion tons of CO2eq. This
is three times higher than the amount of emissions regulated under the EU ETS. As long as
the EU ETS is the only major functioning trading system in the world, allowing credits from
avoided deforestation into the EU ETS could result in serious imbalances between supply and
demand for credits. In addition, the rules and modalities for estimating emission reductions
from deforestation are not yet agreed upon. For these reasons, avoided deforestation is not
considered any further in the options assessed.
3.7.2. Identification of Options
There are several potential options for the inclusion of LULUCF in the ETS. They should be
explored in light of the issues identified above.
(15) Option 3.15: maintain the status quo, i.e. no use of LULUCF related
activities in the EU ETS. This is without prejudice to the proposal that
proceeds from the auctioning of allowances within the EU ETS be used to
Drucksache 16/9334 – 128 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, in particular to fund measures to avoid
deforestation68
(16) Option 3.16: allowing the use of credits (and debits) from LULUCF CDM
and JI project activities in to the ETS. In this respect it is important to note
that in the event of an international agreement post 2012 the types of
LULUCF activities that will exist under the CDM could be subject to
important changes.
(17) Option 3.17: Providing for domestic offsetting projects (DOPs). These could
generate credits (or debits) tradable in the ETS market, or they could be
activities done by installations covered by the ETS, and counted towards their
own compliance (but not tradable), e.g., a power company would do a major
afforestation scheme, that would be assessed and counted solely towards their
own compliance.
(18) Option 3.18: Including the LULUCF sector (forestry, agriculture etc.) in the
ETS for all lands or for holdings over a certain size, by analogy to other
installations.
3.7.3. Assessment of Options
Environmental effectiveness All options to include LULUCF in the EU ETS (via JI/CDM
(option 3.16) as well as via domestic projects (3.17) or by including the entire sector (3.18))
pose problems concerning the temporary and reversible nature of LULUCF activities. As
forests and cultivated land are dynamic ecosystems, changes in carbon capture are not only
linked to the developer’s influence, but are subject to environmental factors and calamities
like pest outbreaks and fires69. Thus liability for carbon losses inherent in LULUCF activities
is as much an issue as is the uncertainties with respect to monitoring and verification
processes.
Indeed, the use of temporary credits creates significant liability risks. For example, companies
that consider closing down might be tempted to sell their permanent credits and replace them
with cheaper temporary credits. If the company ceases to exist, it can no longer replace the
temporary credits with permanent ones. As a result, the Member State in which the company
operated would have to cover for the expired credits. These liability risks were a major reason
for not allowing the use of credits from LULUCF in Phase I and II. Council and Parliament
also excluded any possible JI credits relating to LULUCF from the EU ETS because, as
mentioned above, no modalities have been developed in relation to the non-permanence and
other issues arising in relation to JI LULUCF projects. As long as these liability problems
persist, including LULUCF credits in the EU ETS (be it through option 3.16, 3.17 or 3.18)
could potentially undermine the system's environmental integrity.
Furthermore, if the environmental effectiveness of the ETS is to be retained, any inclusion of
LULUCF must be backed by reliable monitoring and verification of the carbon emissions
avoided through LULUCF projects. All options considered to include LULUCF activities in
the EU ETS suffer from the same difficulties of adequately measuring the amount of carbon
sequestered through LULUCF activities. While this is technically feasible doing it to a
68 COM(2006) 818.
69 This has been demonstrated by the recent huge forest fires in Greece.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 129 – Drucksache 16/9334
precision comparable to that in other sectors (necessary for fair trading) would involve
disproportionate transaction costs. This problem is further enhanced through the risks of
leakage when a LULUCF sequestration activity results in the displacement of emitting
activities outside the boundaries of the project. Lack of additionality and double-counting of
LULUCF projects is a serious issue which can undermine the environmental credibility of
emissions trading systems. Finally, high inter-annual variability of LULUCF emissions and
removals pose a monitoring challenge and can pose a significant compliance risk. All in all,
whereas emissions reductions in industry can be quantified by precise measured input and
output values,70 this is not the case for LULUCF activities.
Finally, some concerns have also been raised with respect to the way LULUCF projects could
be implemented. The potential use of faster growing non-native or genetically modified
species could pose threats to local ecosystems. Furthermore, there are concerns that
indigenous or local populations could be denied access to their traditional land resources due
to LULUCF projects71.
Against the criteria of environmental effectiveness, option 3.15 that continues the exclusion of
LULUCF activities from company-level trading seems most appropriate. All other options
suffer from problems of non-permanence, high uncertainty or leakage that could undermine
the environmental integrity of the EU ETS.
Economic efficiency
Allowing the use of CDM credits from LULUCF in the EU ETS (Option 3.16) would increase
the abatement options for operators under the EU ETS and thus could drive down short term
compliance costs. However, ultimately these temporary credits would need to be replaced by
permanent credits, and over time compliance costs could rise again. What's more is that
LULUCF projects could delay the development in carbon-efficient technologies and thus
increase the long term costs to achieve more ambitious emission reductions throughout the
economy. Hence there seems to be possible trade-off between short-term and long term cost-
effectiveness.
The liability issue caused by the use of temporary credits in fact comes down to an indirect
subsidy from the State to LULUCF developers, as they would receive the benefits of cheaper
compliance costs, while a share of the liability risk would be borne by the public.
Domestic offset projects (DOPs, option 3.17) from LULUCF could increase the abatement
possibilities for operators and thus increase short-term compliance costs. But this would come
with substantial administrative costs and require the creation of a new currency, the
establishment of monitoring and reporting guidelines, and a clear delineation of what type of
LULUCF activities would be eligible. Monitoring and reporting guidelines could be taken
from those existing for CDM projects but these only exist for afforestation and reforestation,
and do not cover the multitude of other possible LULUCF activities. To retain the integrity of
the system, the non-permanence risk will have to be managed by monitoring of the projects
indefinitely (even after the installations using the credits closed down), or through other
means.
70 ibid
71 http://unfccc.int/methods_and_science/lulucf/items/3064.php
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Including LULUCF activities as a sector in the EU ETS (Option 3.18) would increase the
coverage of the EU ETS but generate major monitoring and reporting costs. Monitoring and
reporting would need to be carried out on a very large number of land holdings. Few, if any,
Member States have appropriate monitoring capabilities, and the cost of developing them
would have to be covered by all participants. Inclusion would also come with important
economic liabilities for the owners if for any reason (e.g. droughts or forest fires) their carbon
stocks would be converted into carbon sources. It should be noted that LULUCF inventories
leave a lot to be desired even at the Member State level (especially as they relate to soil
carbon), and they are not harmonised across the EU. The EU ETS should use consistent
methodologies across the EU and it would be reasonable to expect holding-level inventories
to be consistent with national systems. Therefore, a coherent LULUCF inventory consistent
across the EU and at the level of holdings, Member States and the Community does not seem
to be attainable in the foreseeable future.
The Commission emphasised in its guidance on allocation plans for the 2008 to 2012 trading
period of the EU ETS72 that both simplicity and transparency of the Community trading
system are important, in particular with respect to possible future links to other trading
systems. The inclusion of temporary credits (option 3.16) and the creation of new types of
credits (option 3.17 and 3.18) would substantially reduce the simplicity and transparency of
the EU ETS for all market participants by masking real supply and demand patterns.
Furthermore, uncertainties about the way LULUCF activities will be treated in a future
climate regime remain high. Currently, the use of LULUCF credits for compliance with
Kyoto targets is only acceptable in the first Kyoto period. Pre-empting an international
decision on the use of LULUCF activities by recognising their use in the EU ETS now could
result in the need to review the rules in a later stage to make them coherent again with what
was agreed internationally. This would increase uncertainty in the system and contradicts the
aim to maximise predictability of carbon credit demand and supply dynamics. It should also
be noted that for the same reasons (replacement liability and uncertainty of international rules)
temporary credits do not guarantee a secure revenue for the project owners either, so they are
not ideal for the promotion of long-term practices, although most of the desirable LULUCF
activities require long-term, sustainable management practices.
Because of trade-offs between short- and longer term compliance costs and a lack of long
term certainties about project revenues (option 3.16), potentially high administrative costs of
options 3.17 and liability costs of option 3.18, it seems that the benefits of the inclusion of
LULUCF in the EU ETS in terms of economic efficiency are not clear cut. If, furthermore,
inclusion of avoided deforestation activities would be envisaged the inequalities in supply and
demand of credits that this could entail could result in the collapse of the EU ETS.
Consistency
It is desirable that allowance prices be sufficiently high for the EU ETS to contribute
substantially to achieving the EU's internal renewable energy and energy efficiency targets.
Besides behavioural change, innovation, new technologies and additional research in carbon-
efficient ways of production and consumption are needed to allow reaching even deeper
global emission reductions beyond 2020.
72 COM(2005) 703.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 131 – Drucksache 16/9334
Introduction of tCER and lCER type credits in the EU ETS would create a two-tiered carbon
market comprising both of permanent reductions and more uncertain and volatile temporary
reductions. The latter can be interpreted as a right to delay permanent reductions.
Consequently, temporary credits increase the uncertainty about future demand for permanent
emissions reductions. The greater the circulation of temporary credits today, the higher the
demand for permanent credits will be in the future. If in future commitment periods temporary
credits are no longer accepted, then the legacy of tCER and lCER used earlier would have a
considerable impact on the carbon market, leading to increases in prices of EUAs on the ETS
market. Consequently, firms overall compliance costs could increase regardless of whether or
not they actually employ temporary credits.
The introduction of LULUCF activities in the EU ETS be it through the CDM (option 3.16) or
through domestic activities (options 3.17 or 3.18) therefore seems to create potential
inconsistencies with the aim for greater transparency and predictability, and with the
achievement of the EU's domestic renewable energy and energy efficiency targets.
3.7.4. Compliance of options with objectives
In the light of the above, broadening the scope of the Directive with a view to recognising
LULUCF activities cannot be recommended. The main reasons are:
� There are considerable risks related to the temporary and reversible nature of LULUCF
activities in a company-based trading system. Insufficient modalities have been developed
in relation to the non-permanence, uncertainties and potential leakage problems arising in
relation to LULUCF projects, jeopardising the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS.
� LULUCF projects cannot physically deliver permanent emissions reductions. Applying
these in a company-based trading system would impose great liability risks on Member
States and is contrary to the intentions of the EU ETS to steer the EU towards a low-carbon
economy.
� Simplicity, transparency and predictability of the ETS would be reduced considerably;
� The inclusion of LULUCF projects in the ETS would require a quality of monitoring and
reporting that is comparable to the monitoring and reporting of emissions from the
installations currently covered by the system. This is not available at present and is likely
to incur costs which would substantially reduce their attractiveness of reducing short-term
compliance costs.
� Because of the sheer quantity of potential credits entering the EU ETS the functioning of
the carbon market might be undermined (unless their role in the ETS is limited, which
would make the potential benefits marginal).
� Further research should identify other instruments to tackle global deforestation and create
incentives to increase the carbon content of terrestrial ecosystems. Using part of the
proceeds from auctioning allowances in the EU ETS could generate means to invest in
LULUCF activities both inside and outside the EU, and may provide a model for future
expansion. This will also allow least developed countries to benefit from the carbon value
of their forests without undermining the environmental integrity of the EU ETS.
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4. ROBUST COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) matters of the EU ETS are indispensable for
the environmental integrity of the EU ETS. The plant installations' monitoring plans and the
verified emission reports are crucial as they determine the amount of allowances which have
to be surrendered each year and thereby establish whether an operator is able to sell excess
allowances or, for compliance reasons, needs to buy missing allowances or acquire equivalent
carbon credits. In order to allow the market function properly, market players must have trust
and confidence in the overall performance of the MRV system. Moreover with respect to
linking with other emissions trading systems, the role of monitoring, reporting and
verification must be considered key for the reputation of the EU ETS.
4.1. Monitoring and reporting
4.1.1. Identification of Problems
Monitoring and reporting of emissions is currently implemented by the Monitoring and
Reporting Guidelines (MRG)73 established in accordance with Article 14 of the EU ETS
Directive. Consistent implementation of the MRG is required in order to guarantee that “a ton
is a ton”, no matter where and by whom it has been emitted.
Current practice of Member States (MS) and Competent Authorities (CAs), however, shows a
range of different implementation and application of MRG requirements, such as for
monitoring:
– A range of different interpretations and definitions used at national level for permitting
concepts like ‘combustion activity’, ‘site’, ‘installation boundary’, ‘de minimis source’,
‘installation’ and ‘standby generation’;
With respect to reporting the following issues have been found by recent evaluation projects:
– Inconsistent approaches between annually reported and baseline data, but also inconsistent
reporting templates or different treatment of critical problems such as the issue of
“transferred CO2”74;
– Varying reporting requirements mean that some operators put more effort into reporting
than others, potentially leading to concerns over ‘fairness’ with the current system.
Moreover some competent authorities (CAs) reporting systems are more efficient than
others e.g. paper based through to online reporting. This situation would remain with the
status quo option.
73 EU ETS Monitoring and Reporting Guidelines 2007/589/EC. Commission Decision of 18 July 2007
establishing guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
74 “transferred CO2” is CO2 that is not released to the atmosphere, as laid down in the EU ETS Directive,
but transferred to other installations, from which it is vented to the atmosphere, but not accounted for
under the EU ETS. For most Member States, there is no information available on transferred CO2, but
eleven Member States presented some information on transferred CO2 in their Article 21 report on
2006 (see EEA 2007a).
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 133 – Drucksache 16/9334
In general several implementation problems affect the application of the MRG:
– Differences in the way in which CAs enforce the MRG through inspection activities (in
addition to the independent verification process) and the nature of any penalties imposed
for non-compliance.
For these reasons, there is no level playing field across the EU in terms of monitoring and
reporting implying different levels of accuracy. This jeopardises the environmental integrity
and the credibility of the system and is likely to incur higher costs than necessary.
Evaluation projects on behalf of the Commission and several Member States have identified a
lack of transparency, information on quality and consistency, possibly leading to a trust issue,
as well as costs as the main challenges for the further development of compliance.
In addition, the current system is relatively complex with varying monitoring and reporting
regulations and responsibilities in Member States.
4.1.2. Identification of Objectives
Against this background, the main objectives can be identified as:
– Ensuring a common approach with respect to monitoring and reporting in order to
guarantee environmental effectiveness and integrity of the system and improving cost-
effectiveness;
– Seeking higher consistency and transparency, which, in the long-run, can lead to savings
for all stakeholders involved;
– Improving cost effectiveness of monitoring and reporting standards, since they are
assumed to enhance the trust in the reports to the market and would thereby positively
albeit indirectly affect the efficiency of the market.
4.1.3. Policy Options and Screening75
4.1.3.1. Options for Monitoring and screening of options
(19) Option 4.1: keep system as it is (status quo)
(20) Option 4.2: Keep system as it is, but provide further guidance for MS
authorities
(21) Option 4.3: Broaden the legal basis in the Directive to include guidelines
for permitting (including installation definition), inspection and enforcement
measures (penalties)
(22) Option 4.4: Use a Regulation instead of a Commission decision
Screening the options leads to the following conclusions:
75 Screening criteria are meant to be the same as used in Chapter 3 "Scope", see footnote 28.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 134 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
– Effectiveness: Options 4.1 and 4.2 are not likely to achieve the objectives, as they do not
address the broad variance of practices currently applied in Member States for the same
purpose. Options 4.3 and 4.4 would offer the potential to ensure a level playing field in
terms of monitoring, thereby providing an essential precondition for the overall
environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS.
– Efficiency: Implementation of options 4.3 and 4.4 would, in the short term, incur higher
costs in comparison to options 4.1 and 4.2. In the longer term, however, the higher costs
would pay off through higher consistency and transparency of the system.
– Consistency: None of the options is likely to adversely impact on other Community
policies. However, with a view to the international dimension, credibility and
trustworthiness of the EU ETS vis-à-vis third countries/regions would be reinforced by
option 4.4 through its drive for harmonisation, thus underlining the leading role of the EU
in GHG emission reduction policies.
The table below summarises the results of the screening:
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
4.1: Keep current system - 0 0 Discarded
4.2: Current system with further guidance - 0 0 Discarded
4.3: Legal basis for guidelines � 0/- � Retained
4.4. Regulation � 0/- � Retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
As a result of the screening, options 4.1 and 4.2 are discarded and will not be further analysed.
4.1.3.2. Options for Reporting and screening the options
(23) Option 4.5: Keep system as it is: This option would involve retaining the
current reporting requirements in the MRG 2007 through Phase III.
(24) Option 4.6: Broaden the reporting requirements, e.g. reporting of
production data. This option involves making changes to the MRG 2007 to
require operators to report additional data and information, such as production
data and nature of activities on sites relating to benchmarked allocations.
(25) Option 4.7: Promotion of higher reporting frequency for large
installations
(26) Option 4.8: Improvement of reporting by an IT based common reporting
format defined by a Commission decisions
Screening these options would deliver the following results:
– Effectiveness: Option 4.5 may not reach the objectives identified despite the new MRG
adopted in 2007, as it does not effectively address the problems occurred. In addition, it
would not ensure the necessary collection of data, in case allocation through benchmarks
will be implemented in Phase III. This deficit would not occur with option 4.6. Higher
reporting frequency, as implied by option 4.7, does not necessarily ensure higher quality
and consistency, unless it is taken into account whether or not the data released have been
verified, their coverage and the process for submitting the data. On condition that this is
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 135 – Drucksache 16/9334
ensured, it might increase transparency on the market and help to avoid unnecessary
volatility of allowance prices. An IT based common reporting format (option 4.8) could
have the potential to successfully achieve the objectives and ensure better comparability of
the reports. This could help to increase transparency and to identify inconsistencies, which
so far cannot be excluded.
– Efficiency: Bearing in mind the new MRG, option 4.5 might bring about some
improvements, as experience grows. Option 4.6 is likely to entail higher costs, which
however, should be justified in the light of possible needs for benchmarking allocation as
well as more effective and reliable reporting. Higher reporting costs will certainly be
involved, if option 4.7 is implemented. This has to be measured against the benefits of this
option. IT based reporting formats may incur high one-off costs, but in the longer term
may turn out to incur considerably less costs.
– Consistency: None of the options would create any problems in terms of consistency, but
option 4.7 could increase market transparency and alleviate price volatility.
The table below summarises the results of the screening:
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
4.5: Keep current system - � 0 Discarded
4.6: Broaden reporting requirements � 0 0 Retained
4.7: Higher reporting frequency � - � Retained
4.8. IT based reporting format � � 0 Retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
Consequently, option 4.5 will not be further pursued.
4.1.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options
The assessment criteria used in the following chapter remain the same as in the preceding
chapter, i. e. environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, administrative costs and
competition. However, impacts on economic efficiency and administrative costs are often
jointly considered, since in terms of monitoring and reporting economic efficiency is closely
related to the relevant administrative costs incurred by regulators and operators. Impacts on
competition are mainly considered in terms of ensuring a level playing field across the
internal market, but are not assessed in terms of competitiveness with non-EU competitors, as
they do not seem to be relevant in this respect.
4.1.4.1. Monitoring
Environmental effectiveness: Option 4.3 would harmonise the way GHG permits are issued
and the sources covered at sites to varying degrees. In turn, this will reduce competition
issues, improve consistency of coverage of the System and strengthen its environmental
integrity. Commission guidelines or regulations on compliance activities would improve
consistency in CA performance and seek to ensure that any non-complying installations are
found and dealt with consistently across the EU. A benefit of greater guidance/regulation on
compliance includes increasing the ability to find and penalise installations that have made
purposeful misstatements in their emissions reporting or are not monitoring as required (if
these were not picked up by the verifier). This will add integrity to the System and provide an
additional check on the performance of verifiers. However, if established as Guidelines they
Drucksache 16/9334 – 136 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
would need to be transposed into national legislation and there would be room for
inconsistencies and interpretation under this approach. It may therefore be more effective to
include requirements for permitting and compliance within regulations, particularly if
regulations on M&R are promulgated.
Option 4.4 would allow for the highest level of consistency in implementation. Greater
consistency provides more comparable and reliable monitoring results. There will be greater
trust in the emissions reports so that participants can be more confident that one tonne CO2
monitored equals one tonne CO2 emitted, i.e. that operators will report and surrender the
‘right’ number of allowances for their type of installation improving the environmental
effectiveness and integrity of the System. Despite regulations making the requirements
consistent across the EU, there could still be differences in the interpretation of these
requirements if any details are ambiguous or unclear. Therefore, in common with the status
quo scenario, any areas of likely ‘interpretational’ differences need to be considered during
the development of the regulations, and, where necessary, one set of guidance on the
regulations provided with examples and further explanations. Reviews of M&R from Phase I
and Phase II will assist with understanding where the key interpretational issues lie and how
best to resolve them. However, it is recognised that this may be relatively difficult and time-
consuming to achieve.
Administrative costs: Option 4.3 will entail broadening the legal basis in the Directive for
the MRG to include guidelines or a regulation on permitting and compliance. This firstly
requires amendments to the Directive. The Commission would then need to scope out a work
programme, which will require a certain amount of EC staff time. The programme may also
involve the use of a consultant (estimated at €100,000-200,000 depending on complexity) and
considerable time of commission staff for negotiations and discussions in workshops and
working group meetings, as well as costs for translation into 22 languages (Commission
internal), and publication. MS and CAs would first need to have input into developing the
guidelines and regulations on permitting and compliance. If developed as Guidelines, MS
would then need to amend national regulations/legislation. The total costs of doing this across
the EU are very difficult to estimate. If developed as Regulations, MSs incur lower costs since
they will not be required to amend existing legislation, but repeal any contrary existing
legislation. Some of the installation GHG permits and M&R Plans may need to be reviewed
and modified to deal with additional requirements in any new guidelines/regulations not
currently implemented by MSs. Assuming permit variations cost operators (or in some cases
the CA) around €600 each76 (costs involved in applying for the variation, checking the
application and reissuing the permit) then the costs of reissuing permits could potentially
reach up to a maximum € 6million,77 but this figure will depend on the number of existing
permits that will not need to be re-issued as they already meet the new requirements (it can be
assumed that e.g. all smaller gas-fired combustion installations would not be affected, which
cover approximately 50% of all installations).
According to option 4.4, i.e. if the Directive is amended to enable the Commission to establish
a regulation on M&R for Phase III, the Commission would need to outline how the regulation
will be developed, consulted on and then implemented, with projects to undertake any
necessary evaluations/assessments. Based on previous costs or review of
Monitoring&Reporting Guidelines, this is likely to involve the use of consultants
76 The UK charges £240 (€360) for a variation to a permit, and the operator has to apply for the variation.
77 Based on 10,000 installations requiring a revised GHG permit.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 137 – Drucksache 16/9334
(approximately € 50,000-100,000) and would require EC staff time. Firstly, MS and CAs
would need to spend time inputting into the regulation development and consultation. As a
rough estimate, if each of the 27 MSs spends 15 to 20 days attending meetings, assessing
drafts and commenting on the regulation, this would equate to around 400 to 550 working
days (costing in the range of €0.2-0.3 million, excluding travel and expenses costs). Secondly,
MSs will also need to repeal existing legislation, the costs of which are very difficult to
determine on an EU wide basis. However, assuming it takes 10 to 20 working days to repeal
legislation (as opposed to amending or developing it), this would equate to between 250 - 500
days over the 27 MS (around €0.15 to €0.3 million). Therefore total costs to the 27 MS and
CAs of this option would be in the vicinity of €0.3 to 1m.
Efficiency of the trading system: With respect to option 4.3, broadening the legal basis to
allow for guidelines or regulations on permitting and compliance aspects would ensure that
any definitions used and enforcement actions are more consistent, potentially reducing
inefficiencies in time-consuming CA determinations. However, on the other hand they may
adversely affect the ability for MS to integrate permitting/compliance requirements with
existing national legislation and well established approaches to issues such as enforcement of
environmental laws, potentially reducing current efficiencies. A M&R regulation as proposed
by option 4.4, would make the requirements consistent and there would be one common
‘system for all’, by streamlining the rules for all operators and CAs.
Competition on the internal market: Within option 4.3 the broad range of approaches to
permitting within different MSs has the potential to cause competitiveness concerns. New
guidelines, and to a greater extent regulations, covering permitting/compliance could provide
greater certainty, leaving MS, operators and verifiers less leeway for variations. For example,
comparable installations in different MS are then either both in or both out of the System, and
should be subject to the same inspections and fines for non-compliance. The broad range of
approaches to permitting and compliance within different MSs has the potential to cause
competitiveness concerns. A new Regulation, as mentioned in option 4.4, could provide
greater certainty, leaving MS, operators and verifiers less leeway for variations. For example,
comparable installations in different MS are then either both in or both out of the System, and
should be subject to the same inspections and fines for non-compliance.
Table 4.1.4.1 Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Economic
Efficiency
Administra-
tive Costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
4.3: Legal basis for
guidelines
0/+ 0/+ -/0 -/0
4.4: Regulation + + -/0 +
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
4.1.4.2. Reporting
Environmental effectiveness: Option 4.6 would look at expanding the reporting
requirements. As allocation methods for some sectors may move towards using benchmarking
rather than historical emissions, more information is needed to support the development of
appropriate benchmarks for different activities across the EU and then subsequently
check/verify that the correct benchmarks have been used at particular installations (e.g. to
Drucksache 16/9334 – 138 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
pick up any process changes that would make application of a particular benchmark
incorrect). This information is therefore needed to ensure that comprehensive and comparable
data is used to develop environmentally and economically effective benchmarks that take into
account the relevant aspects of the process and plant characteristics.
With respect to option 4.7 higher reporting frequency would help to:
� improve transparency and knowledge of likely long and short positions within installations,
sectors and MS;
� help to avoid end of year ‘surprises’ and sudden impacts on the carbon price;
� be useful for timely assessments of the key influences on carbon emissions such as fuel
prices, temperatures, seasons, economic cycles etc.;
� enable more regular reporting of the system’s aim to reduce emissions.
Option 4.8: There is strong support for harmonising monitoring and reporting through IT
sysstems. This option is covered further with others in section 4.3.
Administrative costs: With respect to option 4.6 the design of the mechanism to measure
additional metrics to annual emissions can be complex. Therefore sufficient resources need to
be allocated for the preliminary research and design of this option. There would be costs
involved in including extra reporting fields in CA reporting systems etc. and to receive and
check the additional information. However, this should be relatively easy with minor costs for
most installations and their products, if the existing system can handle changes. Issues such as
batch operations, intermediate holding of partially finished stock and reformulation of product
in response to market demand may lead to high implementation costs for the CAs. Operators
would need to ensure additional information is collected and reported in accordance with any
requirements. Overall costs of reporting such additional information are likely to be low for
most installations since most of the information is already monitored by the operator.
With respect to option 4.7, Voluntary - operators that volunteer to report more frequently
would need to decide whether to have data verified before releasing them, if so, there would
be an increase in costs. Otherwise, voluntary quarterly or six monthly reporting is unlikely to
substantially increase costs for larger installations, since the data are collected on a relatively
continuous basis and should be available. There may however be additional costs for smaller
installations that don’t calculate emissions on such a regular basis and would have to spend
extra time and money on interim reporting.
Compulsory for larger installations – Requiring six monthly reporting of verified emissions
data by large installations, could involve, on average, an additional three to four days of a
verifier’s time per year. At €840 per day,78 this would equate to a total of around €2 – 2.5m
per year for the 719 installations emitting >500ktCO2 in Phase I, this number may change for
Phase II and III.79 There will also be costs involved in the operator transferring the verified
figure to the registry, and the co-ordination of the release of such market sensitive information
to the public e.g. through the CITL.
78 PWC (2007) uses daily rates of €600 for competent authority and operator staff and €840 for
verification staff.
79 Based on 2006 data of 716 installations emitting more than >500ktCO2 per year (EEA, 2007).
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 139 – Drucksache 16/9334
Obviously these costs would be avoided if verification is not required. However, there will be
concerns over the accuracy of unverified data being released into a financial market.
Therefore if this option is pursued and data are publicly released they should be properly
verified. Mid-year verification may reduce the year end verification costs only marginally
since most of the verification work will have to be done for each period with a comparable
level of assurance, independently of the duration of the period.
An additional reporting system for receiving and checking such interim reports may be
needed, or the existing registry system would need to be changed. Such a change to the CITL
registry system would entail associated costs. There may be some technical problems with
reporting the data more regularly such as where fuel use bills are not provided in time for a
six month report. The problem would be magnified by the adoption of quarterly reporting.
Compulsory regular reporting of unverified emissions data by all installations may increase
costs for smaller installations that do not regularly calculate emissions. However, this should
not pose a significant extra cost for operators of larger installations that already keep a regular
account of emissions to understand their trading needs. There will need to be a system
developed for collating and reporting the unverified data, which would incur additional costs
for CAs and MS.
Option 4.8: There is strong support for harmonising monitoring and reporting through IT
projects. This option is covered further with others in Section 4.3.
Efficiency of the trading system: Option 4.6 will be implemented in conjunction with the
benchmarking method of allocation and on the basis of the benchmarking methodology.
Assuming that benchmarking would add to the efficiency of the ETS, the use of appropriate
reporting would contribute to the enhanced efficiency.
With respect to option 4.7, voluntary reporting for all: Promoting more regular voluntary
reporting is unlikely to improve the efficiency of the System. Companies can already report
emissions data more frequently. Since this has not happened to any great extent, it is unlikely
to have any specific benefits for the operator. Under this option, some installations might
report and others might not, giving rise to incomplete and potentially biased information
about emissions which would probably hinder rather than help the market to function.
Compulsory reporting for >500k emitters: Compulsory reporting by larger emitters could
have useful benefits. Around 7% (approx. 700) of the total number of installations emit more
than 500ktCO2 per year and are responsible for over 80% of the emissions. Therefore, more
regular reporting from these installations would cover the majority of emissions in the system.
However, to maintain integrity of the data and any market decisions made on the data, they
would need to be verified, potentially adding costs (see below for further discussion).
Compulsory reporting for all but only annual verification: Requiring all installations to report
unverified data more regularly poses risks that incorrect information will be released and
decisions will be made using incorrect data. This may undermine trust in the carbon price and
therefore the System. It would also be an additional requirement on smaller to medium
installations for which the review is attempting to reduce costs. It’s therefore unlikely to
improve the efficiency of the System.
Option 4.8: There is strong support for harmonising monitoring and reporting through IT
projects. This option is covered further with others in Section 4.3.
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Competition: Within option 4.6 the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information
will need to be protected by the existing provisions, otherwise some operators may be
materially affected, which would cause competition or distributional equity problems.
With respect to option 4.7, voluntary reporting for all installations is unlikely to improve
fairness for installations since some will report and others will not, giving an incomplete
picture of emissions at different times, based on unverified and potentially erroneous data,
which may also affect the level playing field for the internal market.
Compulsory regular reporting by larger installations would lead to greater transparency for
the market, provided the information is released at the same time to all market participants,
taking into account that the information is market sensitive and can affect the carbon price.
Compulsory reporting for all installations may be considered unfair for the smaller
installations that contribute only 20% of the emissions and whose data may not significantly
affect the carbon market, in comparison to much larger installations.
As for option 4.8, there is strong support for harmonising monitoring and reporting through IT
projects. This option is covered further with others in Section 4.3.
Table 4.1.4.2. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Economic
Efficiency
Administra-
tive Costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
4.6: Broaden reporting
requirements
+ + - -/0
4.7: Higher reporting frequency + 0/+ -/0 -/0
4.8: IT based reporting format + + + +
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
4.1.5. Compliance of Options with Objectives
Ensuring a common approach in order to guarantee environmental effectiveness and integrity
of the system and improving cost-effectiveness; The option of using a Regulation instead of a
decision will result in higher harmonisation. This objective will lead to higher distributional
equity among installations across the EU. It is likely that there will also be less discretion for
CAs in considering monitoring and reporting plans and therefore greater equity in the way
operators are treated and requirements are imposed upon them.
Seeking higher consistency and transparency, which, in the long-run, can lead to savings for
all the stakeholders involved, thereby justifying short-run design costs of more complex
options such as a regulation; Under the status quo option for monitoring, inconsistent
approaches developed under the Guidelines will continue to advantage installations in some
MS over similar installations in other MS, potentially affecting their competitiveness.
Therefore improving the way the guidelines are applied across similar sized and types of
installation is very important to ensure equity in the treatment of installations. The broad
range of approaches to permitting and compliance within different MSs has the potential to
cause competitiveness concerns. New guidelines, and to a greater extent regulations, covering
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 141 – Drucksache 16/9334
permitting/compliance could provide greater certainty, leaving MS, operators and verifiers
less leeway for variations.
Improving cost effectiveness of monitoring and reporting standards, since they are assumed to
enhance the trust in the reports to the market and would thereby positively albeit indirectly
affect the efficiency of the market. Varying reporting requirements mean that some operators
put more effort into reporting than others, potentially leading to concerns over ‘fairness’ with
the current system. Some CA reporting systems are more efficient than others e.g. paper based
through to online reporting. This situation would remain with the status quo option.
4.2. Verification and Accreditation of Verifiers
4.2.1. Identification of Problems
Verification of monitoring reports is important; otherwise, operators underestimating their
emissions would not only benefit (surrendering less allowances than required), but would also
undermine the environmental integrity of the system. The EU ETS Directive and the MRG
only regulate some fundamental requirements and aspects of the verification process. Details
are left to Member States. Most, but not all Member States developed specific national
verification guidance often based on internationally acknowledged criteria. Quality checks of
verification reports are also carried out in many Member States, but not in all (EEA 2007a). A
level playing field concerning the quality of verification does therefore not exist.
The same goes with respect to Community-wide accreditation of verifiers, where Member
States show a very diverse picture with a wide range of standards for accreditation of verifiers
(EEA 2007a). This is not deemed to comply with the requirements of the internal market and
might incur higher costs than necessary, if qualified verifiers are not able to do their job
across the internal market.
As a result of the described lack of binding guidance on verification and accreditation in the
ETS Directive of 2003 a plurality of 27 systems across Member States has evolved. Some
Member States developed detailed national legislation and/or guidance on accreditation and
verification while others have preferred to make reference to EA Guidance EA 6/03 and
appoint the national EA member with the task to accredit verifiers. It is worth noting that even
some of the former systems – making reference to EA 6/03 and assigning the responsibility
for accreditation to the national EA member – yield a range of diverse results.
4.2.2. Identification of Objectives
The specific objectives for verification and accreditation are:
– Consistent and comparable level of verification and accreditation;
– Harmonised internal market for verification and accreditation services;
– Improving cost-effectiveness.
Improved verification standards are assumed to enhance the trust in the reports to the market
and would thereby affect positively albeit indirectly the efficiency of the market. This
criterion is not addressed separately in the remainder of this section.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 142 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
4.2.3. Policy Options and Screening
4.2.3.1. Verification process
(27) Option 4.9: Keep system as it is. This means retaining the current MRG
2007 through Phase III and implementing any potential changes through
subsequent reviews.
(28) Option 4.10: Provide legal basis (Article 15) for verification (and
accreditation) guidelines like the MRG;
(29) Option 4.11: Provide legal basis (Article 15) for a Regulation on
verification (and accreditation): This option would allow the Commission
to develop a regulation on verification in consultation with verifiers,
operators, MS and CAs and pass it through comitology to the Climate Change
Committee.
(30) Option 4.12: Provide legal basis (Article 15) for MS to use existing
guidelines and frameworks for dealing with verification (EA 6/03 and/or
ISO 14064/14065): According to this option the Directive would be amended
to require verifiers and CAs to apply existing guidelines on verification such
as EA 6/03 and/or ISO 14064/14065.
(31) Option 4.13: Initiate a CEN working group on verification and
accreditation standards, which take into account more EU ETS specific
circumstances than the ISO standards to serve as a link between the
Directive’s basis and the need of CAs and accreditators
Screening the options leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: Option 4.9 would not result in achieving the objectives identified and risks
keeping inconsistent verification practices in Member States. Options 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12
offer the potential to ensure consistent application of verification measures, thus increasing
reliability and credibility of the system. With respect to option 4.13, it is very doubtful,
whether a CEN standard developed by a CEN working group would have a stronger impact
than the currently existing ISO standards.
– Efficiency: Options 4.9 and 4.13 are not likely to achieve the objectives at least costs due
to the uncertainties involved (see above), when pursuing the options, while option 4.10,
4.11 and 4.12 would need to be further analysed, in order to determine the least cost
approach.
– Consistency: None of the options is likely to raise any consistency concerns.
The table below summarises the results of the screening:
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
4.9: Keep current system - - 0 Discarded
4.10: Legal basis for guidelines � � 0 Retained
4.11: Legal basis for regulation � � 0 Retained
4.12: Legal basis to use existing guidelines � � 0 Retained
4.13: CEN working group - - 0 Discarded
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 143 – Drucksache 16/9334
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
Consequently, options 4.9 and 4.13 are discarded, while options 4.10, 4.11. and 4.12 will be
further analysed.
4.2.3.2. Accreditation
Due to the limited harmonisation with regards to accreditation of verification, the trust in the
information verified is ultimately affected, which can have an impact on the efficiency of the
trading system.
(32) Option 4.14: Keep system as it is (only Annex V as legal basis)
(33) Option 4.15: Provide legal basis (Article 15) for accreditation (and
verification) guidelines like the MRG: This option would allow the
Commission to promulgate guidelines on accreditation in consultation with
MS, operators, CAs, accreditation bodies and verifiers.
(34) Option 4.16: Provide legal basis (Article 15) for a regulation on
accreditation (and verification)
(35) Option 4.17: Provide legal basis (Article 15) for MS to use the framework
of EA for accreditation and mutual recognition of foreign verifiers.
(36) Option 4.18: Add extensive requirements for accreditation including
competency requirements and procedures of accreditation of verification
bodies as well as individual verifiers, supervision, mutual acceptance and
peer review directly to the Directive (comparable to the EMAS regulation)
The screening leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: In principle, the same arguments would apply as to verification. The current
situation (option 4.14), which gives rise to certain problems in the framework of the
internal market, is not promising in terms of achieving the objective. All other options
clearly offer the potential to improve the current situation and achieve the objectives in
question, although the approach implied by option 4.18 may appear quite cumbersome.
– Efficiency: All options except 4.14 are likely to entail higher costs compared to the current
situation. These costs, however, have to be seen in the light of the objectives to be
achieved.
– Consistency: Achieving the objective would have a positive impact on the well
functioning of the internal market.
The table below summarises the results of the screening:
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
4.14: Keep current system - 0 - Discarded
4.15: Legal basis for guidelines � - � Retained
4.16: Legal basis for regulation � - � Retained
4.17: Legal basis to use existing CA frame � - � Retained
4.18: Adding requirements to Directive 0 - � Discarded
Drucksache 16/9334 – 144 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
Consequently, options 4.14 and 4.18 are discarded, while options 4.15, 4.16. and 4.17 will be
further analysed.
4.2.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options
4.2.4.1. Verification
The assessment criteria used in the following chapter remain the same as in the preceding
chapter, i. e. environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, administrative costs and
competition. However, impacts on economic efficiency and administrative costs are jointly
considered, since in terms of verification economic efficiency is closely related to the relevant
administrative costs incurred by verifiers, regulators and operators. Impacts on competition
are mainly considered in terms of ensuring a level playing field across the internal market, but
are not assessed in terms of competitiveness with non-EU competitors, as they do not seem to
be relevant in this respect.
Environmental effectiveness: Option 4.10 would look at amendments to the Directive
(Article 15) to enable the Commission to implement a Decision containing specific guidelines
on verification. More comprehensive guidelines on verification transposed into MS legislation
will enhance transparency, clarify requirements and should improve the consistency with
which verification is performed across the EU. This in turn would improve the environmental
integrity of the System and ‘trust’ in the verification process itself. However, guidelines on
verification could still be subject to interpretation and variations by MSs as they are
transposed into national legislation. They may lead to inconsistencies and therefore may not
achieve a fully harmonised approach to verification in the long run generally sought by
verifiers, operators and MS. In addition, Guidelines take time to be turned into national
legislation, potentially causing delays in harmonisation.
With respect to option 4.11 a regulation on verification could entail direct requirements to the
relevant individuals themselves (verifiers, verification bodies, CAs etc) without being
interpreted 27 times and applied differently in 27 national legislations. Consistent
requirements applied in this way would improve the quality of verifications and their ability
to determine and correct errors and misstatements, thus ensuring better data quality. Data
integrity would therefore be improved and maintained in the longer term. Promulgating
regulations on verification only once at EU level, that apply directly within MS is arguably
the most efficient way to achieve a harmonised approach to verification since once passed
they apply directly to individuals and there is no need to turn the requirements into national
legislation and no delays in their application.
Regarding option 4.12 existing systems have proven track records. They have been developed
and redesigned based on experience by volunteer technical experts from sectors and
competent authorities. However, they may not cover all the aspects required to deal with all
the various aspects of the EU ETS and may not ensure the quality of verifications sought for
the EU ETS. This is likely to be a relatively efficient option since it does not entail developing
new regulations or guidelines. It would simply provide greater legal weight to existing
frameworks and guidance documents prepared by already established organisations. Many
MS already use existing frameworks (applied in the absence of more detailed EU
requirements) and therefore this option could be applied relatively efficiently. However,
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 145 – Drucksache 16/9334
efficiencies from streamlining requirements may not be realised under this option since such
existing systems are already reasonably diverse and difference may perpetuate.
Efficiency and administrative costs: According to option 4.10 MS and CAs would need to
have input into any new Guidelines on verification. Although difficult to determine, this could
take around 10 to 20 days per MS in terms of attending meetings and preparing responses to
consultation. Across 27MS this would constitute around 300 to 600 working days (up to
around €0.4m). New Guidelines as a Commission Decision will then require changes to
current MS processes and regulations. Potential costs of these changes are again difficult to
determine, but could be considerable in total across 27 MSs. Assuming it takes roughly
around 30 to 40 working days for a MS to make changes to existing legislation/guidance, this
would equate to around 800 to 1000 days (€0.5-€0.6m) across the 27 MS when new
Guidelines on verification are issued. The development of one set of EU wide guidelines on
verification could have significant cost savings for MS after an initial period of revising
national guidance/regulations. Therefore a consistent set of requirements set at a European
level would avoid each MS going through the process again (depending on timing of the new
guidelines).
With respect to option 4.11, it is safe to say that the development costs of a regulation on
verification alone would require a certain amount of EC staff time. However, costs would be
reduced if the regulation is built on existing frameworks and is developed alongside other
regulations such as for MR (if the option is chosen). There would then be ongoing costs from
reviewing the effectiveness of the regulation and making any changes over time. As for any
new Guidelines, MS would be required to have input into a new regulation on verification.
Given the stronger legal weight of a regulation, MS might take a more active role in its
development than for Guidelines. Assuming each MS would spend 20 to 40 days being
involved in developing a regulation, this would be around 500 to 1000 working days equating
to up to €1.0 million. Cost savings for CAs may come from the regulation applying directly to
the verifier and other parties named. There would be no need to subsequently amend national
legislation if the regulation is amended since it applies directly. There would also be no delays
in achieving improved harmonisation of requirements since they would apply immediately.
With respect to operators if the regulation leads to additional verification requirements
compared with processes currently used then verification costs will increase. The reverse may
also be true. Overall, there should be a more uniform cost to verifications fluctuating more
with the scale and complexity of the plant and time taken to perform the necessary checks,
and less with the ability of the verifier or requirements set by CAs.
Option 4.12 is likely to be a relatively cost-effective option for the Commission since much of
the guidance material and frameworks are prepared and run by other organisations. Building
on existing frameworks such as the EA 6/03 Guidance will almost certainly be more cost-
effective than preparing them separately as for option 2.1.3 above. There will be potential
costs for MS if the proposed legal basis requires them to change already established
regulations and processes. However, given that many of the existing organisations already
play a significant role in many of the MS, costs of formalising their involvement and existing
guidance should not be very great. For operators the costs of this option are likely to be
relatively minor since many verifiers already adhere to ISO and EA6/03 requirements, and
therefore the overall costs of verifications is not likely to change significantly.
Competition: With respect to option 4.10 increasing regulatory density on EU level with
Guidelines would ensure more streamlined processes in each MS, reducing current variations
and treating installations more consistently. But given MS transposition is still required, it
Drucksache 16/9334 – 146 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
may not successfully harmonise requirements and achieve sufficient equity across all
participants.
Regarding option 4.11, the major advantages of a regulation on verification are improved
quality, consistency and harmonisation of requirements. Roles and responsibilities will be
clearly spelt out. Time spent and quality of verification should become more consistent.
Consistent rules regarding site visits could be established and competitiveness issues reduced.
Finally there would be consistent expectations of what the verification will cover/involve and
verifiers would perform verifications throughout the EU in a consistent manner.
Option 4.12 would clarify roles and responsibilities, and delegate much of the system to other
organisations and guidance material. It would enhance consistency in verifications, but there
may still be significant variations in how the requirements are applied, particularly if more
than one organisation’s approach is applied. CA, MS, operators and verifiers will need to be
represented on working groups responsible for developing the existing guidance and
frameworks so that they are fair for all operators/CAs in the EU ETS.
Table 4.2.4.1. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Efficiency &
administrative. costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
4.10: Legal basis for guidelines 0/+ -/0 -/0
4.11: Legal basis for regulation + -/0 +
4.12: Legal basis to use existing
guidelines
0/+ 0/+ 0/+
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
4.2.4.2. Accreditation
The assessment criteria used remain the same as in the preceding chapter, i. e. environmental
effectiveness, economic efficiency, administrative costs and competition. Again, impacts on
economic efficiency and administrative costs are jointly considered, since in terms of
accreditation economic efficiency is closely related to the relevant administrative costs
incurred by verifiers, regulators and operators. Impacts on competition are mainly considered
in terms of ensuring a level playing field across the internal market, but are not assessed in
terms of competitiveness with non-EU competitors, as they do not seem to be relevant in this
respect.
Environmental effectiveness: Option 4.15 proposes a Commission Decision containing
guidelines on accreditation transposed into MS legislation/regulations they would provide a
more solid legal basis for accreditation requirements and reduce inconsistencies. However, the
Guidelines would still be subject to interpretation by each MS and turned into national
legislation. They therefore would not necessarily achieve a fully harmonised approach. There
would also be delays in harmonisation caused by the time taken for MS to transpose any
requirements.
With respect to option 4.16, providing a legal basis for accreditation through Article 15 and a
regulation on accreditation would lead to strengthening and harmonising the requirements for
accreditation throughout the EU. In turn, this should enhance the quality and consistency with
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 147 – Drucksache 16/9334
which verifiers/verification bodies perform their work and provide a more level playing field
for verifiers, such as when it comes to quoting for verification work and facing competition.
More robust verifications, by better qualified and scrutinised verifiers will ensure that
emissions data is more accurate and has fewer misstatements. This will help to protect the
environmental integrity of the System.
Option 4.17 would strengthen the legal requirements for accreditation and make good use of
existing frameworks with proven effectiveness. Organisation/s such as the European
Cooperation for Accreditation (EA) would be able to support the accreditation bodies (ABs).
This common umbrella would allow for higher harmonisation. It is likely that it would be an
efficient option for EA Members to be established as the ABs for the EU ETS since the
majority of MS accreditation bodies are already members of the EA and since all MS have an
EA member. This would help increase uniformity since there are cases where MS that have
EA members don’t use an AB that is an EA member for the EU ETS.
Efficiency and administrative costs: According to option 4.15 one set of comprehensive
guidelines on accreditation established and agreed at an EU level are likely to be more
efficient, than guidelines and rules promulgated a number of times across 27 MS.
Amendments to Article 15 could be made relatively cost effectively through this review of the
Directive. However, the guidelines would then need to be developed and implemented.
Potential costs of developing guidelines would require a certain amount of EC staff time.
Costs would be incurred from inputting into the guidelines and transposing the guidelines into
national legislation or amending existing national legislation. As for the MRG, MS may also
need to prepare guidance on the Guidelines. Many verifiers are already accredited (under
fixed or temporary arrangements) to perform verifications for the EU ETS. Therefore, any
additional requirements to improve the quality and consistency of their performance should
not be overly onerous or expensive.
With respect to option 4.16 costs of a regulation on accreditation will be relatively similar to
formal guidelines in the form of a Commission decision. A regulation on accreditation is
unlikely to significantly influence verification costs for operators, particularly since the
majority of verifiers are already accredited and would simply be required to upgrade and/or
enhance their current systems, qualifications and procedures. Verifiers would tend to pass on
any costs to the operators.
Regarding option 4.17, its costs may be lower than those for developing Guidelines on
accreditation since it makes use of existing organisations and frameworks.
Competition: With respect to option 4.15 guidelines on accreditation would improve the
abilities of verifiers, consistency with which they perform verifications and provide a more
level playing field for verifiers in terms of the expectations and requirements of the
accreditation process. They would be subject to more consistent scrutiny, and costs of
accreditation would even out. However, since guidelines still need to be transferred into
national legislation, there may be inconsistencies in application and therefore may not
necessarily achieve the harmonisation in accreditation generally sought by participants
Regarding option 4.16, a regulation on accreditation with reference to existing Guidelines is
likely to provide the most consistent and fair approach across the EU. However, under
regulations referring directly to verifiers there is a potential risk that verifier accountability
may become too onerous (i.e. missing misstatements or errors may make them liable for
enforcement actions etc. threatening some of them out of the market).
Drucksache 16/9334 – 148 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
With respect to option 4.17, more consistent accreditation may reduce MS concerns that
verifiers in some MS do not meet the same standards as those accredited by their own
accreditation body. This would in turn free up the market and allow for verifiers to operate
throughout the EU (subject to language requirements). This also relies on greater
harmonisation of verification requirements across MSs (options considered above), greater
communication between MS and assurance that poor performing verifiers will be dealt with
by MS accreditation agencies.
Table 4.2.4.2. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Efficiency &
administrative. costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
4.16: Legal basis for guidelines 0/+ -/0 -/0
4.17: Legal basis for regulation + -/0 +
4.18: Legal basis to use existing CA
frame
0/+ 0/+ 0/+
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effectCompliance of Options with Objectives
Consistent and comparable level of verification and accreditation: A regulation on verification
and accreditation would provide the highest level of certainty with regards to the uniformity
of implementation at MS level, but would also require significant design efforts. If this option
is unfeasible, the next highest level of consistency across the EU can be achieved through
verification guidelines. More comprehensive guidelines on verification transposed into MS
legislation will enhance transparency, clarify requirements and should improve the
consistency with which verification is performed across the EU. This in turn would improve
the environmental integrity of the System and trust in the verification process itself. In both
cases, the policy design process can rely on existing frameworks. The policy implementation
process could aösp rely on a CEN working group as options are not entirely mutually
exclusive, although combinations would require some adjustments.
Harmonised internal market for verification and accreditation services: A regulation on
verification could entail direct requirements to the relevant individuals themselves (verifiers,
verification bodies, CAs etc) without being interpreted 27 times and applied differently in 27
national legislations. Consistent requirements applied in this way would improve the quality
of verifications and their ability to determine and correct errors and misstatements, thus
ensuring better data quality. Data integrity would therefore be improved and maintained in the
longer term. Promulgating regulations on verification only once at EU level, that apply
directly within MS is arguably the most efficient way to achieve a harmonised approach to
verification since once passed they apply directly to individuals and there is no need to turn
the requirements into national legislation and no delays in their application.
More consistent accreditation may reduce MS concerns that verifiers in some MS do not meet
the same standards as those accredited by their own accreditation body. This would in turn
free up the market and allow for verifiers to operator throughout the EU (subject to language
requirements). This also relies on greater harmonisation of verification requirements across
MSs, greater communication between MS and assurance that poor performing verifiers will
be dealt with by MS accreditation agencies.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 149 – Drucksache 16/9334
4.3. Improving cost-effectiveness:
The development of one set of EU wide rules on verification and accreditation could have
significant cost savings for MS after an initial period of revising national
guidance/regulations. For example, many MS are now looking to update their
guidance/regulations (PWC, 2007) and therefore a consistent set of requirements set at a
European level would avoid each MS going through the process again (depending on timing
of the new guidelines). Cost savings for CAs may come from the regulation applying directly
to the verifier and other parties named. There would be no need to subsequently amend
national legislation if the regulation is amended since it applies directly. There would also be
no delays in achieving improved harmonisation of requirements since they would apply
immediately.Exploring options of using advanced IT applications
4.3.1. Identification of Problems
Since the earliest phases of the review of the compliance system of the EU ETS it has been
recognised that the use of common IT systems or at least the application of common IT
standards for the exchange of information between different actors has an important role to
play in the drive towards harmonisation of verification across the 27 Member States. In the
first trading period no respective legal mandate existed. Consequently, a significant number of
national IT systems has been set up with varying coverage of the compliance chain and a lack
of comparability of data. Under the current situation, CAs would continue to use different
data management solutions for different aspects of the compliance system (excluding registry
software) – varying from reporting templates and databases for storing general installation
information to simple workflow systems and basic tools for running checks on emissions
reports and verifications. Fully integrated IT solutions are rare, and some do not use databases
to store all the relevant information and must refer to filed paperwork for assessments. Only a
few MS use the same or similar software.
As a result of this diversity, the quality and comparability of information from each member
state can be expected to vary. Furthermore, on an aggregated level it is hard to manage and
compare the information. The way in which the data are stored may mean they are not directly
comparable (e.g. units/coverage might differ) and further data manipulation is required,
possibly leading to errors. This could lead to a lack of reliability of and trust in the system.
Without changes to this situation there may be limited improvements to the trust in the
certainty of the compliance information provided, which can affect the efficiency of the
market.
4.3.2. Identification of Objectives
Against this background, the main objectives can be identified as:
– Ensuring a common approach in order to guarantee environmental effectiveness and
integrity of the system
– Improving cost-effectiveness
Drucksache 16/9334 – 150 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
4.3.3. Policy Options and Screening
(37) Option 4.19: Keep situation as it is
(38) Option 4.20: Commission to provide a common reporting format
(39) Option 4.21: EU wide harmonised reporting and compliance check workflow
system, potentially linked with the registry
(40) Option 4.22: Extend scope of registry to also store emission reports and
verification statements
Screening the options leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: While the current situation (option 4.19) is characterised by a large variety
of IT systems in Member States, which aggravate comparison and compatibility of data,
the remaining options would achieve a more harmonised data management and are
promising in terms of complying with the objective.
– Efficiency: All options except 4.19 would incur higher costs compared to the current
situation. However, again this has to be seen in the context of achieving the objective
concerned. Identification of the least-cost or best cost-benefit option is left to further
analysis.
– Consistency: None of the option would adversely impact on other Community policies or
objectives.
The table below summarises the results of the screening:
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
4.19: Keep current system - 0 0 Discarded
4.20: Common reporting format � 0/- 0 Retained
4.21: Harmonised reporting/compliance � 0/- 0 Retained
4.22: Extended registry scope � 0/- 0 Retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
Consequently, option 4.19 is discarded, while options 4.20, 4.21 and 4.22 will be further
analysed.
4.3.4. Impact of Options
The assessment criteria used remain the same as in the preceding chapter, i. e. environmental
effectiveness, economic efficiency, administrative costs and competition. Again, impacts on
economic efficiency and administrative costs are jointly considered, since in terms of using
advanced IT applications, efficiency is closely related to the relevant administrative costs
incurred by regulators and operators. Impacts on competition are mainly considered in terms
of ensuring a level playing field across the internal market, but are not assessed in terms of
competitiveness with non-EU competitors, as they do not seem to be relevant in this respect.
Environmental effectiveness: According to option 4.20 specifying a common reporting
format through Guidelines or a regulation would mean that the Commission (in consultation
with MSs) would define a common standard for exchange of information on reporting of
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 151 – Drucksache 16/9334
emissions (pursuant to MRG 2007). MSs could then decide how far to go with IT solutions in
addition to using the standard on reporting. This option would therefore lead to greater
harmonisation in what is reported, but would not necessarily provide the efficiencies offered
by linked IT solutions/databases. A common reporting format would form the basis for better
(more complete and consistent) reporting. The targeting of the compliance checks
(inspections) of the CA would be easier, and the checks would be more sophisticated,
providing for a level playing field at a higher quality level for the whole EU concerning the
compliance checks to be expected.
Regarding option 4.21 this would provide a comprehensive and mandatory approach for all on
the use of IT and for the entire compliance system, significantly improving consistency and
harmonisation. A standardised system may ensure better comparability and completeness of
data, easy access to information and automated data error checks to improve data quality and
reduce errors. More robust and trustworthy data, that’s easier to access for assessments and
compliance checks, will increase environmental integrity of the system. It may be more
efficient for this option to be linked with existing software such as the registry. If this is
technically feasible, these links should be explored further.
With respect to option 4.22 the registries could be used to store additional information such as
emission reports and verification opinion statements. However, since registries constitute
banking systems made up of specialised databases, the storing of complex data or large
documents with a completely different purpose would be a considerable burden for registry
administrators. Although easy access to this information would provide greater transparency,
it may have limited additional benefits. It would only provide a relatively small amount of the
desirable information in one location, and it still might not be in a format that is easy to access
and analyse. This option would not simplify or speed up requirements for operators and will
not reduce the number of different reporting formats and systems currently used by CAs.
However, if option 4.3 above is not pursued, this would at least provide a central database
containing useful reports for subsequent assessment of the effectiveness of the System. In
addition, the standardisation of reporting formats and other complex technical standards
would be needed, making the previous options still a prerequisite.
Efficiency and administrative costs; According to option 4.20 improved uniformity and
transparency in information reporting would enhance the efficiency of the markets. A
common reporting format would be relatively cost-effective to include into Guidelines and/or
regulations as proposed under several of the other options. For some MS and CAs, this option
would avoid reinventing requirements and therefore reduce time and effort, and allow the
flexibility to use whatever IT systems are developed. For others with existing IT systems,
changes would need to be made, but these would not be overly onerous provided the existing
system is set up to allow for changes and include new reporting fields etc. Increased
consistency through a common format would also harmonise reporting for verifiers, making it
easier – particularly for those operating in more than one MS. As MS would incorporate ETS
reporting into their eGovernment environments, every operator would benefit from one
common platform per MS for many CAs contact issues (e.g. reporting, applying for permits,
etc.).
With respect to option 4.21, improved uniformity and transparency in information reporting
would enhance the efficiency of the markets. Costs cannot be judged on a standalone basis,
but in the context of general eGovernment systems, such as a general (environmental) permit
database. Total costs might be lower if every MS uses what is already in place than if all MS
purchase one software package for ETS alone, even if considered in an isolated ETS
Drucksache 16/9334 – 152 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
perspective, it would be more beneficial. Costs of developing a stand-alone ETS information
system may be considerable, requiring upfront investment and considerable consultation with
operators, MSs and CAs to reach agreements. Operators are likely to continue to develop their
own IT systems outside any formal requirements from the Commission or CAs. However, if a
system can be developed for EU ETS reporting that can be integrated into their existing
systems and the process becomes more automated; there may be some cost savings in terms of
time spent providing the relevant data to CAs; this is exactly what the common reporting
format should achieve. This option may only achieve relatively minor cost savings for the
smaller, less complex installations (PWC, 2006(a)) since they will collate data and report
relatively infrequently.
Regarding option 4.22 improved uniformity and transparency in information reporting would
enhance the efficiency of the markets. This option would require changes to the registries
regulation, MRG and Directive, which would not be straight-forward. There would also be
costs associated with adding-on software to the existing database.
Competition: With respect to option 4.20 a common reporting format would improve the
equity with which operators are treated. They would be subjected to much more consistent
information requests by CAs.
According to option 4.21 a mandated reporting and compliance workflow system would
improve the equity with which operators are treated. They would be subjected to much more
consistent information requests by CAs. CA would carry out more harmonised and possibly
more frequent compliance checks as other costs / workloads would be reduced due to
automatisation.
Regarding option 4.22 this option applied to all installations would be fair and equitable and
ensure emissions reports from all operators are available in the public domain.
Table 4.3.4. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Efficiency &
administrative. costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
4.20: Common reporting format + + +
4.21: Harmonised reporting/
compliance
+ + +
4.22: Extended registry scope - + +
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
4.3.5. Compliance of Options with Objectives
– Ensuring a common approach in order to guarantee environmental effectiveness and
integrity of the system
A common reporting format would form the basis for better (more complete and consistent)
reporting. The targeting of the compliance checks (inspections) of the CA would be easier,
and the checks would be more sophisticated, providing for a level playing field at a higher
quality level for the whole EU concerning the compliance checks to be expected. Increased
consistency through a common format would also harmonise reporting for verifiers, making it
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 153 – Drucksache 16/9334
easier – particularly for those operating in more than one MS. As MS would incorporate ETS
reporting into their eGovernment environments, every operator would benefit from one
common platform per MS for many CA contact issues (e.g. reporting, applying for permits,
etc.).
– Improving cost-effectiveness
A common reporting format would be relatively cost-effective to include into Guidelines
and/or regulations as proposed under several of the other options. There may be concerns
about the costs of replacing or upgrading existing systems, however, recent assessment of
national initiatives shows that it would not necessarily require MS and companies to
implement new systems. The framework could be developed offering harmonisation without
hampering the subsidiarity principle and MS can continue using their existing systems.
4.4. Compliance and enforcement
4.4.1. Identification of Problems
With respect to compliance and enforcement, relevant provisions in Member States are very
different implying different levels of incentives to comply. MS have considerable flexibility
to determine the types of offences that penalties are applied for. Under the status quo, the only
consistent penalty in the Directive is one for failing to surrender sufficient allowances by 30
April each year – namely €40 per allowance in Phase I and €100 per allowance in Phase II
and potentially Phase III.
For any other non-compliance events (e.g. failing to monitor in accordance with the MR
plan), each CA would continue to implement different requirements as set down in national
legislation and policies. This will potentially perpetuate rather confusing, inequitable and
variable compliance requirements for operators (PWC 2006). A series of additional policy
options is necessary in order to improve the effectiveness and equity with which installations
are treated in terms of inspections, compliance and any penalties levied for non-compliance.
4.4.2. Identification of Objectives
Against this background, the main objectives can be identified as:
– Reinforce compliance
– Ensure compliance also in the longer term
4.4.3. Policy Options and Screening
(41) Option 4.23: Develop Commission Recommendation on practical issues
of the complete compliance chain; A Commission recommendation on
practical issues of the complete compliance chain would be issued as a
communication from the Commission and would serve as a source of
information for CAs.
(42) Option 4.24: Develop Inspection Rules / Recommendations
Drucksache 16/9334 – 154 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
(43) Option 4.25: Penalties and sanctions:
(44) Option 4.25a: keep situation as it is: Member States to choose penalties and
sanctions, except for allowances not surrendered
(45) Option 4.26: Penalty for not surrendering allowances:
(a) keep situation as it is (€100/t)
(b) gradually increasing penalty taking into account inflation rate
(c) automatic penalty expressed in allowances deducted from allocation in
the following year
Due to the technical character and the similarity of the options concerned, the screening is
carried out in a rather sweeping manner, although a part of the options cannot really be
compared. For example, option 4.23 and 4.24 would be much more comprehensive, as it
addresses the whole chain, while, on the other hand, the remaining options only address
specific parts of the compliance chain. Screening the options leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: Generally, all options including those maintaining the status quo could be
effective in the sense that they provide incentives to operators to comply with the rules and
provisions of the EU ETS. Option 4.26a may, however, in the longer term only entail a
reduced incentive for compliance.
– Efficiency: While most of the options would only incur minor costs compared to the
current situations, Options 4.23 and 4.24 are somewhat outstanding in that they would
require more input, before they can be implemented.
– Consistency: None of the option would adversely impact on other Community policies or
objectives.
The table below summarises the results of the screening:
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
4.23: Commission Recommendation � 0 0 Retained
4.24: Inspection rules/recommendation � 0 0 Retained
4.25a: Current situation � 0 0 Retained
4.26a: Penalty: current situation - 0 0 Discarded
4.26b: Penalty: inflation rate adjustment � 0 0 Retained
4.26c: automatic penalty � 0 0 Retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
Consequently, option 4.26a is discarded, while the remaining options will be further analysed
to the extent possible.
4.4.4. Impacts – Comparing the Options
The assessment criteria used remain the same as in the preceding chapter, i. e. environmental
effectiveness, economic efficiency, administrative costs and competition. However, impacts
on environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency are jointly considered, since both
criteria are closely interrelated in terms of penalty provisions. Impacts on competition are
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 155 – Drucksache 16/9334
mainly considered in terms of ensuring a level playing field across the internal market, but are
not assessed in terms of competitiveness with non-EU competitors, as they do not seem to be
relevant in this respect.
Environmental Effectiveness and Efficiency: Option 4.23, a Commission recommendation
on practical issues of the complete compliance chain would be issued as a communication
from the Commission and would serve as a source of information for CAs. Such a
recommendation would be a much more extensive text than a legal text and could therefore
explain issues to a higher level of detail. That would contribute to all stakeholders’
understanding of the issues, which in turn would add to harmonisation throughout the EU.
Option 4.24 would only cover a limited part of the compliance chain, namely the way in
which the CAs undertakes inspections of installations. Therefore this is not a stand-alone
option, but additional to the options named in the previous sections dealing with Monitoring
and Reporting. The recommendation considered here still allows the CAs to determine how
often sites need to be inspected and the nature of enforcement action taken. As a
recommendation that needs to be integrated into national law, it is likely to improve the
consistency which CAs perform inspections, but there are still likely to be some variations in
its application throughout the 27 MS.
Option 4.25a, under the status quo, the only consistent penalty in the Directive is one for
failing to surrender sufficient allowances by 30 April each year – namely €40 per allowance
in Phase I and €100 per allowance in Phase II and potentially Phase III. For any other non-
compliance events (e.g. failing to monitor in accordance with the MR plan), each CA would
continue to implement different requirements as set down in national legislation and policies.
This will potentially perpetuate rather confusing, inequitable and variable compliance
requirements for operators (PWC, 2006). There are concerns that the current penalties and
variable enforcement may not provide sufficient deterrents through into Phase III to ensure
the integrity of the System.
Option 4.26b, gradually increasing the penalty to take account of inflation (around 2%) would
increase the penalty year on year. If added annually to the existing penalty of €100, this may
retain its deterrent affect over longer time periods.
Option 4.26c, the advantage of this option would be that the penalty would be adjusted
automatically to the carbon price and the penalty would de facto decrease the total cap,
improving the environmental integrity of the system, however, in the last year of an allocation
period this provision could be seen as "borrowing". This would require further study, as the
issue of borrowing may entail a number of other serious implications.
Administrative Costs: Concerning option 4.23 there may be considerable costs involved in
developing the recommendation, especially considering the broad range of issues to be
covered and the input needed from MS, operators, verifiers, CAs and accreditation bodies.
Indicative costs can be assumed from previous sections in terms of the costs involved with
developing guidelines and/or regulations on these issues: Participation in the development of
the recommendation will entail some expenses
Option 4.24 With respect to the Commission indicative costs can be assumed in terms of the
costs involved with developing guidelines and/or regulations on these issues. Participation in
the development of the recommendation will entail some expenses for MS and operators.
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Option 4.25a, retaining the current system would be the most cost-effective option for the
Commission, MS and CAs since not changes to existing legislation and requirements would
be required.
Option 4.26b, administrative costs to CAs would include costs for publishing the nominal
amount of the penalty each year and to operators this would constitute the costs of informing
themselves on the penalty level each year.
Option 4.26c, the administrative costs would be minimal.
Competition: Option 4.23 the option should achieve some quality and consistency
improvements in certain aspects, particularly where there is a current lack of certainty such as
for verification, accreditation and compliance requirements.
Option 4.24, a recommendation on compliance inspections will essentially ‘even out’ the
treatment of installations and compliance costs across the EU, but perhaps not to the same
degree as a regulation.
Option 4.25a, since all operators are in the same System, they should be subject to similar
compliance checks and penalties/enforcement action. If one installation in a MS is seen to ‘get
away with it’, then potentially another installation may attempt to do likewise. Alternatively,
if one operator is penalised and another gets away with it this can adversely affect competition
and the integrity of the System. Although ongoing information sharing through existing
forums such as IMPEL may bring some degree of harmony into compliance procedures and
the imposition of penalties over the longer term, such groups are unlikely to create a fully
consistent approach because there is no legal mandate for their decisions/recommendations.
Therefore, to improve consistency in enforcement and penalties in Phase III, additional
policies have been considered.
Options 4.26b, 4.26c, all installations should be subject to the same potential penalties. This
may be more about the way in which the penalties are levied rather than the level of the
penalty itself.
Table 4.4.4. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Efficiency &
administrative. costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
4.23: Commission recommendation + - 0/+
4.24: Inspection
rules/recommendation
0/- -/0 0/+
4.25a: current situation - 0 -
4.26b: Penalty: inflation rate
adjustments
+ + +
4.26c: Automatic penalty 0 0/+ +
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 157 – Drucksache 16/9334
4.4.5. Compliance of Options with Objectives
Reinforce compliance: Since all operators are in the same system, they should be subject to
similar compliance checks and penalties/enforcement action. If one installation in a MS is
seen to ‘get away with it’, then potentially another installation may attempt to do likewise.
Alternatively, if one operator is penalised and another gets away with it this can adversely
affect competition and the integrity of the System. Under the proposed options regarding
penalties, the level of the penalty will go beyond that decided by the MS. Different
“punishment cultures” and economic situations of the MS have to be taken into account but
aiming at a more harmonised approach. Ensure compliance also in the longer term:
Developing a commission recommendation on practical issues of the complete compliance
chain would constitute a source of information for CAs and would allow for a more uniform
interpretation of the legal texts. Changing the current penalty level for failure to surrender
allowances is recommended, in order to allow an adjustment with inflation and potential
carbon price increases and to maintain a high level of compliance. Detracting a multiple of
allowances from future allocations would lead to a better representation of the allowance
value, but the technicalities of this option interacting with borrowing (if the multiple used is
not high enough) would have to be addressed.
4.5. Registries
4.5.1. Identification of Problems
Since the 2005 January start of the EU ETS, the registry system, i.e. the 25 Member State
registries and the Community Independent Transaction Log ("CITL" have operated
successfully and efficiently. The amount of registry system downtime due to technical
problems was small, and no complaints arrived from the general public regarding the
execution of core tasks, i.e. the transfer of allowances between accounts, the management of
accounts and the management of verifications and surrenders. At the same time, the current
system is not very cost-effective, as it requires the maintenance of a costly IT-infrastructure in
each Member State and at the Commission. This infrastructure is made necessary only by the
current legislative framework. It is generally accepted by the expert working in the field that
the objective of "accurate accounting of the issue, holding, transfer and cancellation of
allowances" set out in the Directive could be attained at a much lower cost in a single
European registry.
Currently, registries are directly connected to the CITL and two registries transfer allowances
between each other through the CITL. However, as the first commitment period under the
Kyoto Protocol starts in 2008, Member State registries (that also function as registries for the
purposes of the Kyoto Protocol) should also be connected to the International Transaction Log
("ITL") managed by the UNFCCC for the purposes of the Kyoto Protocol. This means that
every single transfer of allowances (within a registry or between two registries) will need to
pass through the ITL. Though the technical standards for the registry-ITL-CITL co-operation
are well developed and the Commission has a good working relationship with the ITL, the
ITL's entry into the EU ETS introduces technical, political and administrative risks into the
operations of the registries system. The technical risks come from the fact that messages will
have to pass through more systems, which increases the scope for errors. (Also, more
sovereign participants make the resolution of errors more difficult and lengthy.) The
administrative risk comes from the fact that the ITL is not under the direct control of the
Commission or the EU Member States, and neither its policies nor its daily operative practice
Drucksache 16/9334 – 158 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
can be defined by the Communities. The political risk arises from the fact that countries
outside the EU would be able to influence the future development of the EU ETS.
Another issue impacted by the introduction of the ITL into the registries system is the
possibility of connecting the EU ETS with other trading systems. As after linking to the ITL,
the ITL will be situated between a Member State registry and the CITL, any trading system
wanting to connect to the EU ETS would also have to transfer messages through the ITL.
While the rules developed by the UNFCCC Secretariat currently allow this, these rules are
subject to the oversight of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, and it cannot be excluded that
third countries could obstruct the extension of the EU ETS both in terms of coverage and
linkage to emission trading systems established other than by Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
4.5.2. Identification of Objectives
The objectives of a revision of the provisions on registries should address the following
issues:
- The registries system should provide the same level of service to operators at a lower cost to
the public (both in terms of IT infrastructure and human resource)
- The registries system should be able to reliably serve the needs of the operators in the EU
ETS without being dependent on the reliability of the ITL’s functioning
- The registries system should be able to set up connections with trading systems outside the
EU without routing such messages through the ITL.
4.5.3. Policy Options and Screening
(46) Option 4.27: keep the system as it currently is.
(47) Option 4.28: revise provisions of the Directive with a view to merge
registries into a single EU-wide registry.
4.5.4. Impact of Options
Under the option 4.27, the current high operating costs would remain. At this stage the CITL
is not yet connected to the ITL, so we do not know how efficient the co-operation between the
ITL and the CITL will be. As regards the possibilities of connecting the EU ETS with other
trading systems, the negative impact of the current system cannot yet be assessed as linking
negotiations have not advanced to this level of detail.
Under option 4.28, a single European registry would be used to carry out trading in EU
allowances, and while the registries system would remain connected to the ITL, daily EU ETS
transactions between EU Member States would not need to pass through it. Only transactions
with other parts of the Kyoto Protocol registries system (e.g. Japan, CDM registry) would be
routed to the ITL. This would make the operations of the EU ETS much safer and less error-
prone. There are two ways of implementing this option:
a) the single European registry takes over all registry functions (i.e. both EU ETS
related functions and Kyoto Protocol related functions. This solution results in
the greatest savings as there would be no need for IT-infrastructure at a
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 159 – Drucksache 16/9334
Member State-level. At the same time, this solution would require the
(technically complex) merger of the single registry with the CITL in order to
allow intra-registry trading without the interposition of the ITL.
b) the single European registry only takes over the management of transactions
within the EU ETS. For this purpose, the allowances trading in the single
European registry would have to be copies of AAUs kept frozen in Member
States' Kyoto Protocol registries. A clearing mechanism would need to be
developed to periodically book EU ETS transactions between Member States
into their Kyoto Protocol registries.
As the details of a registry system are currently laid out in the relevant Commission regulation
on registries (required by the Directive 87/2003/EC), the review of the Directive should limit
itself to the framework provisions provided in the Directive. Detailed rules of the registries
system should continue to be provided by Commission regulation. Improvements to this
regulation could meet the above objectives, without requiring co-decision. The Commission is
open to such improvements, as long as they can be implemented in practice, increase certainty
and predictability for operators, and reduce administrative complexity and costs.
4.5.5. Compliance of Options with Objectives
Option 4.28 is capable of fulfilling the established objectives.
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5. FURTHER HARMONISATION AND INCREASED PREDICTABILITY
5.1. Identification of Problems
5.1.1. Problems as regards cap setting
In phase I and II of the EU ETS, the overall cap of the EU ETS is equal to the sum of national
caps determined by the Member States, following assessment by the Commission. The
national caps had to be established in line with Commission decisions assessing consistency
with the criteria laid down in Annex III of the Directive and with the guidance documents
issued by the Commission. This approach allowed a large degree of flexibility for Member
States to take account of specific and national circumstances, including the different
reductions of emissions required to comply with agreed efforts to comply with the Kyoto-
protocol, different economic growth rates and differences in the potential to reduce emissions.
This approach entailed, however, the following problems:
– National caps set higher than environmentally efficient levels: The existing rules create
a “prisoner’s dilemma”80 where each individual Member State recognises the collective
interest to set restrictive caps for optimal reduction of emissions in the EU, but also has an
interest to maximise the national cap. This has been clearly demonstrated by the allocation
beyond needs in the first trading period. The outcome for the second trading period is
expected to be a significant improvement, but it required strong intervention from the
Commission as many Member States were reluctant to impose restrictive caps on the
trading sector. Higher caps in the trading sector often required higher and more costly
emission reductions in the non-trading sector. This behaviour pattern risks compromising
the environmental effectiveness of the system as too many allowances in the market lead to
a lower allowance price, thereby reducing the incentive to develop and deploy clean
technologies and hampering the evolution towards a less carbon intensive economy. It also
requires a larger share of emissions to be reduced in the non-trading sector and if marginal
cost of reducing emissions in the non-trading sector is higher (as appears to be the case),
overall cost increases, which is to the detriment of the overall EU economy.
– Lack of a level playing field: Different levels of ambition for the ETS sector in Member
States translated into different allocations at sector and installation level. Differences are
most pronounced for the power generating sector, but also the allocations to other sectors
varied. As a consequence, distortions of competition between Member States' trading
sectors and also within sectors occurred.
– Uncertainty and lack of predictability: The approval of NAPs has been a long lasting
and cumbersome process, generating prolonged uncertainty as regards the scarcity in the
market. While in theory the Commission should adopt decisions on the NAPs by 15
months before the start of the subsequent trading period, practical experience shows that
late delivery of complete plans by Member States lead to the final NAP decision is adopted
less than 6 months prior to the subsequent trading period. Predictability of the overall
80 The “prisoner’s dilemma” is a notion developed in game theory that describes the situation where the
optimal outcome occurs when players cooperate, but where individual incentives and distrust lead to the
situation that no player actually pursues cooperation.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 161 – Drucksache 16/9334
regulatory framework and of the future price of allowances is crucial for investment
decisions. In case of too much uncertainty, operators will refrain from making long-term
investments and will rather focus on short term abatement measures, because the benefits
from long term investments are discounted more heavily. Investments with long-term
benefits include in particular innovative investments in new technology, so uncertainty has
particular negative effects on the structural transformation of the economy into a low-
carbon economy and these negative effects may persist for long time horizons. Because of
these negative impacts, uncertainty indirectly increases the overall cost of emissions
reductions and the carbon price.
– Undue volatility of allowance prices, negative impact on the functioning of carbon
markets: Prolonged uncertainty about the EU-wide cap has a negative impact on the
functioning of the allowance market. Uncertainty arises, among others from the relatively
large number of regulatory decisions to be taken. Market participants reacted both to
announcements of proposed NAPs by Member States and to Commission decisions
assessing the NAPs. Volatility triggered by regulatory decisions reduces the efficiency of
the system and should be limited as much as possible.
– Complexity and lack of transparency: The current system leads to high complexity as
regards the level of the national caps and as well as regards the procedures by which these
caps are decided. Transparency for market participants inside and outside the system, and
for the wider public is limited. This negatively impacts on confidence in the EU ETS.
– Negative impact on the credibility of the EU vis-à-vis third countries: The absence of
scarcity in the first trading period had a negative impact on the EU's credibility when
pressing for more ambitious climate change policies in third countries.
– High administrative burden: The process involves a high administrative burden
including a high level of transaction costs to Member States, the Commission and
companies covered by the system. This runs counter to the need to ensure simplicity and a
sufficient level of transparency with respect to cap setting required by both operators in the
EU ETS taking investment decisions and systems possibly linked up to the EU ETS.
5.1.2. Problems as regards allocation
While a stringent cap guarantees environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency is to be
ensured by a well-functioning market where marginal abatement costs are equalised across
installations. All installations would buy allowances as long as their marginal abatement cost
is above the allowance price on the market and would implement emission reduction
measures, as long as their marginal abatement cost is below the market price of allowances.
Article 10 of the Directive stipulates that for the first and the second trading period at least
95% respectively 90% of allowances has to be allocated free of charge. By far the largest
share of allowances has been allocated on the basis of "grandfathering", which means
allocating allowances on the basis of historical emissions. Only a limited share has been
allocated on the basis of "benchmarking", which means allocations based on a certain
benchmark multiplied by historical output, historical use of inputs, capacity etc. In practice,
however, Member States have applied these methods in many different ways and have added
a wide variety of specific allocation rules. This has brought about the following problems:
Drucksache 16/9334 – 162 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
– Negative impact on efficiency: Allocation methods have had a negative impact on the
economic efficiency of the ETS. The methods affects behaviour of new entrants, decisions
to close installations and the operating of existing installations:
� Allocations to new entrants create a perverse incentive to invest as they are
normally based on capacity to be installed and/or projected production. This
reduces the signal from the allowance price to invest in low-emission intensive
equipment and/or in production capacity of substituting products that entail lower
emissions. Perverse incentives have been particularly strong as most Member
States based the allowances to new entrants on technology or fuel-specific
benchmarks, taking away much of the incentive to invest in the most efficient and
least carbon intensive technology. As a result, the allowance price signal for new
investments is severely diluted and there is no or insufficient incentive to invest in
low carbon technologies. 81
� Closure rules, in combination with free allocation, have weakened incentives to
close down old emission-intensive plants. Closing an installation with high
emission intensity is less attractive if that reduces the number of allowances to be
received for free. This is true even when the operator receives an allocation from a
new entrants reserve for replacement capacity: without the closure rule, it would
have (even more) excess allowances that could be sold on the market. But
allocating allowances to closed installations has been perceived as undue and
could actually create strong incentives to close down installations without
replacement investment within their boundaries as the sales of allowances could
be more profitable than continuing production.
� With respect to existing installations, the availability of free allowances reduces
the financial necessity for undertakings to reduce emissions, in particular where
the cost of emissions as a percentage of turn-over is not very high and where such
costs can be easily recuperated by increasing prices, even though such behaviour
may not be economically rational. Moreover, expectations of future free
allowances to be based on current or future emissions significantly reduced the
incentive to reduce emissions. Also where installations expect future allocations
for free to be differentiated according to e.g. fuel use, technology, the incentive to
switch fuels or invest in low emission technology is reduced.
All these mechanisms lead to under-investment in low-cost abatement measures, and as
explained above, the negative effects of non-optimal investment may last over a long time
period. As a consequence, a higher allowance price is needed to realise compliance with the
overall cap on emissions. There is emerging empirical evidence that these negative effects
effectively occurred82.
– Distortions of competition: The variety in allocation methodologies has generated
distortions of competition across Member States. Differences in allocation levels stem in
particular from the application of different reduction factors, from different methods to
81 See e.g. Lindboe 2007, where the cost of allocating to new entrants in the electricity sectors of
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway and Sweden has been estimated at € 4 billion, i.e. some 25% of
the toal investmens in the electricity sector over the period 2006-2022.
82 E.g. final report 3rd ECCP-meeting.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 163 – Drucksache 16/9334
account for expected production growth and from different ways to take into account early
action and clean technology83. Differences in allocation levels have been most pronounced
in the power generating sector, whereas they remained smaller in industrial sectors.
Location decisions of the investors may have been distorted particularly by the rules for
allocating to new installations and transfer rules which restrict the benefit of keeping
allowances after closure to the same operator, site or to investment in the same Member
State.
– Undesirable distribution effects: Thirdly, the system has led to distributional effects seen
by many as undesirable and unjustified. The rational for allocating allowances for free
derives from concerns about competitiveness and net "carbon leakage", i.e. relocation of
production out of the EU that actually increases global emissions, and from the desire to
provide some compensation for sunk costs when introducing the EU ETS. In practice,
however, allocations for free have had significant redistribution effects, most prominently
but not exclusively in the power generating sector.84 In competitive markets, charging the
opportunity cost of resources, whether received for free or not, is rational economic
behaviour for any market participant85. Charging the (opportunity) cost of allowances is,
however, more difficult where prices are determined on world markets. Obviously, this is
not the situation for many sectors, notably not for the power generating sector, which given
the local nature of demand is relatively well able to pass through the opportunity costs of
allowances in the prices charged to its customers without risking to lose market share.
– Complexity and lack of transparency: The current wide range of allocation
methodologies has considerably increased the complexity of the allocation process and
thus negatively affected simplicity and transparency.
5.2. Identification of objectives
5.2.1. Objectives as regards cap setting
As regards cap-setting, the overall objectives of the review can be further specified as the
identification of measures designed to set the cap in a manner that:
� environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency
� achieves the overall emission reduction target for the EU and Member States at
least cost. This requires identification of the appropriate level of the overall cap
and design of the system in a way that ensures that this level is adopted and
maintained;
83 Apart from effects on actual production and pricing, allocations also affect financing costs and financial
power of the companies concerned.
84 See e.g. Cramton 2002, Sijm 2006a, Sijm 2006b, Smale 2006, Walker 2006. When addressing the
distributional effects of the ETS, solutions must be sought in the allocation methods. Inclusion of the
(opportunity) cost of emissions in final product prices is an intended effect of the ETS, as it ensures
correct carbon price signals, shifting demand towards less emission-intensive products. Such
substitution effects are essential for achieving emission reductions at lowest cost.
85 As the EU ETS affects all players in a sector in the same way, under perfect competition, full inclusion
of the opportunity cost in prices is the expected market result.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 164 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
� increases predictability of the future cap by increasing the stability of the
regulatory framework, without unduly limiting flexibility to adjust to new
information on e.g. actual climate change, technological developments and actions
undertaken elsewhere in the world;
� increases the EU's credibility on climate change policy vis-à-vis third countries,
since climate change is a global problem;
� allows predictable adaptation to a target for emission reduction of 30% instead of
20% once there is further international agreement on climate change policy.
� minimises distortions of competition between Member States and sectors included in the
EU ETS by establishing a level playing field for operators;
� avoid unduly negative impact on competitiveness and employment of the EU economy,
though facilitating the structural transformation to a low carbon economy;
� minimises the time and administrative cost to authorities and operators;
� increases simplicity and transparency;
5.2.2. Objectives as regards allocation
As regards allocation to existing, new and closing installations, the overall objectives of the
review can be specified as the identification of allocation methodologies that
� environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency
� ensure that the installations covered by the system reduce emissions within the EU
at least costs. The carbon price must convey a clear, un-distorted signal both
directly for operators involved as well as in final product markets, ensuring
dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS in the mid and longer term;
� avoid carbon leakage to the extent that such methodologies are cost-efficient
compared to other instruments, thereby contributing to the environmental
effectiveness of the system;
� establish a level playing field and eliminate distortions of competition;
� avoid unduly negative impact on competitiveness and employment of the EU economy,
though facilitating the structural transformation to a low carbon economy;
� minimise the time and administrative burden to authorities and operators
� increase transparency, simplicity and predictability of allocation methodologies;
� avoid undue distributional effects;
As regards distributional effects, the guiding principles are in the first place the "polluter pays
principle" and the principle of "internalisation of external cost". In line with the first principle,
the costs of measures to deal with pollution should be borne by the polluter who causes the
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 165 – Drucksache 16/9334
pollution. The second principle implies that, in order to ensure efficient markets, all costs
associated with the protection of the environment should be included in the companies'
production costs. In addition to these two principles, the Commission should ensure that new
policies do not inflict undue sunk costs upon companies, while companies should take care to
factor climate change into their investment decisions.
5.3. Cap-setting: level of harmonisation
The policy options for cap-setting concern three aspects. The present section concerns the
issue how to decide on the cap. In section 5.4., criteria for setting the level of the caps are
discussed. Section 5.5 assesses design options to increase predictability of the cap-setting
system.
5.3.1. Policy Options and Screening
The following options as regards the level of harmonisation are to be considered.
(48) Option 5.1: status quo. National caps set by Member States in line with
criteria in the Directive and subject to control by the Commission.
(49) Option 5.2: national caps set by Member States in line with reinforced
criteria in the Directive and subject to strengthened control by the
Commission. Some problems of the current approach could be remedied by
including stricter criteria for cap-setting in the Directive and giving stronger
powers to the Commission to ensure respect of these criteria. The criteria
could e.g. concern the method to calculate expected needs and the minimum
ambition level compared to historical emissions or expected needs. A
procedural provision could be included to have the cap decided by the
Commission in case the Member State does not submit its proposal on time.
(50) Option 5.3: an EU wide cap with criteria in the Directive for setting the
level at a later stage. Under this option only one single EU wide cap will be
set. The effort-sharing agreement for the post-Kyoto target would concern
only the non-ETS sectors. The Directive would include criteria for setting the
level of the cap, as well as the procedures and timing of the decision. The
actual cap would be set only later, in accordance with these procedures. The
EU-wide cap would be 'distributed' to individual Member States by
determining the number of allowances that each of them is allowed to auction
and/or allocate for free.
(51) Option 5.4: an EU wide cap set in the Directive. This option is equal to the
previous one, except that the cap for the third trading period is set directly in
the Directive. Criteria for setting the cap for later trading periods and the
corresponding procedures and timing of these decisions could be included in
the Directive or left to a subsequent review.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 166 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Screening86 the options leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: The status quo (option 5.1) does not take away the "prisoners' dilemma"
which led to overall caps beyond the environmentally efficient levels. Moreover it cannot
be expected to bring about any improvements in terms of minimising competitive
distortions or increased simplicity and transparency. It might also be doubtful, whether this
option would allow easy adoption of a 30% target in case of an international agreement.
The other options have the potential to successfully overcome these shortcomings of the
status quo approach.
– Efficiency: In particular options 5.3 and 5.4 are promising with respect to achieve the
objectives at less administrative cost than the status quo option would imply. Under certain
conditions (sufficiently detailed criteria laid down in the Directive), this would also apply
to option 5.2.
– Consistency seems best ensured by options 5.3 and 5.4, since any adverse impacts on
competition on the internal market can be avoided. Although option 5.2 may seem to allow
some more flexibility to take into account national circumstances, options 5.3 and 5.4 are
not at all inconsistent with the objectives of economic and social cohesion across the EU,
since different national circumstances can be fully taken into account when deciding on
other aspects of the system, notably the distribution of rights to auction allowances (see
section 5.6).
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
5.1: Status quo - - - Discarded
5.2: improved national cap setting with
oversight
� � � Retained
5.3: criteria for EU wide cap � � � Retained
5.4: EU-wide cap in Directive � � � Retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
Option 5.1 is therefore discarded and will not be further pursued.
5.3.2. Impacts – Comparing the options
An EU wide cap, so both options 5.3 and 5.4, would strongly improve environmental
effectiveness, as they avoid the current "prisoners' dilemma" which generated the upward
pressure on national caps in the first and the second trading period. Option 5.2, strengthened
harmonisation of national caps, may help to limit the shortcomings of the current system, but
it will be difficult to define additional criteria with sufficient precision and as this option does
not take away the situation of a "prisoners' dilemma" it would once again place reliance on the
Commission for an optimal outcome. Member States will continue to have incentives to over-
allocate to installations on their territory and/or to maximise the revenues from auctioning,
and therefore they can be expected to strive for high national caps.
86 To recall, the screening criteria are the following: effectiveness: the extent to which options can be
expected to achieve the objectives of the proposal; efficiency: the extent to which objectives can be
achieved for a given level of resources/at least cost; and consistency: the extent to which options are
likely to limit trade offs across the economic, social and environmental domain.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 167 – Drucksache 16/9334
Options 5.3 and 5.4 provide more safeguards for a level playing field between companies
within and outside the trading sector, as they best avoid different levels of ambition that could
result in differentiated levels of allocations for free.
Option 5.4 provides most predictability and transparency on how the cap would look like and
how it is composed. Options 5.2 and 5.3, in contrast, bear the risk of absence of a timely
decision on a cap, since the procedures for deciding the cap could only start once the revised
Directive enters into force. This would jeopardise the smooth continuation of the system into
the third trading period. Options 5.2 and 5.3 would bring some more flexibility to adapt to
new information over the next few years, but it will still be difficult to take such information
into account, so this advantage is considered to be limited.
5.3.3. Comparing the options with the objectives
From the assessment of the impacts above, it appears clearly that option 5.4 best complies
with the objective to increase the effectiveness and predictability of the system. In addition, it
renders the identification of an EU-wide cap more efficient, thereby minimising the time and
administrative burden of cap-setting for authorities and operators. Option 5.4 is, furthermore
the simplest and most transparent way to set the cap and therefore also ranks best as regards
the EU's international credibility. Finally, option 5.4 is the easiest to adapt the target for
reducing emissions to 30% compared to 20% in the absence of international agreement.
An EU-wide cap takes away some flexibility from Member States, but the need to shift the
effort between the ETS and non-ETS sector would be very much reduced if the effort-sharing
agreement for the 2020 emissions reduction target concerns only the non-trading sector87.
Moreover, as set out in the respective impact assessment, the Commission's proposal for this
effort-sharing is consistent with the different abatement potentials in non-trading sectors of
different Member States and with the different financial strength between Member States.
Finally, flexibility for achieving the reduction targets for the non-ETS sector and for the
production of renewable energy is provided for by the possibility for Member States to trade
their achievements as regards emission reductions and renewable energy production. An EU
wide cap set in the Directive is the option most consistent with these considerations.
87 The ETS by definition sets a carbon price which equals marginal cost of abatement measures in the
trading sectors. Therefore, the optimal effort-sharing does not depend on marginal cost curve of
abatement options in the ETS-sector in the individual Member State concerned.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 168 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Table 5.3.3. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Effectiveness
in appropriate
cap-setting
Comp-
etition
Pre-
dictability
Simplicity
trans-
parency
Interna-
tional
credi-
bility
Admini
strative
costs
Ability to
adapt to
30% target
5.2: improved
national cap-
setting with
oversight
0 0/+ 0/+ 0/+ 0/+ 0/+ 0/+
5.3: criteria for an
EU-wide cap
++ ++ 0/+ 0/+ + + ++
5.4: EU-wide cap
in the Directive
++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Key: ++ (significant improvement) + (improvement) - (deterioration) -- (significant deterioration) 0 (negligible change) n.r. (not
relevant
As option 5.4 scores better on all criteria, this option clearly stands out as the
preferred option.
5.4. Cap-setting: level of the cap
5.4.1. Policy options and screening
The following options for setting the level of the overall cap are to be considered.
(52) Option 5.5 Status quo. Currently, Annex III to the Directive contains
general criteria Member States have to respect when setting national
caps. These refer, inter alia, to the Member State's obligations to
achieve Kyoto targets and to the potential to reduce emissions.
(53) Option 5.6 Efficiency approach. Under this approach the
equilibrium of marginal abatement costs of the trading and non-
trading sectors defines both the cap for the trading and non-trading
sectors, within the scope of the overall EU target.
(54) Option 5.7 Equal effort approach. Under this approach the overall
cap is determined at a level where total abatement cost in the trading
and the non-trading sector are equal.
(55) Option 5.8 Proportional reductions approach. Under this option
emissions of the trading and the non-trading sectors are reduced
proportionally down to 20% compared to 1990 levels to meet the
overall EU target.
(56) Option 5.9 Benchmark based approach. Under this option, the cap
is defined by a bottom-up approach based on the abatement potential
within each sector.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 169 – Drucksache 16/9334
Depending on the choices made pursuant to the previous section, there could also be a
need for national caps. In theory, options 5.5, 5.8 and 5.9 could be applied both at EU
and Member State level. This is, however, not the case for option 5.6 and 5.7. Since
the ETS results in one single carbon price that determines marginal abatement cost in
the trading sector throughout the EU, under these options, a decision on any of the
national caps would have a direct impact on the decisions of all other national caps.
Therefore, only one common decision at EU level is possible.
Screening the options leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: Only option 5.6 would comply fully with the objective of least
abatement cost to reduce emissions. Options 5.5 and 5.9 are actually not effective
in setting a cap. The outcome of option 5.5 is undetermined, as it does not address
the question how to make the cap consistent with the post 2012 target to reduce
emissions, not at the EU-level, neither at Member State level. The outcome of
option 5.9 is not known either, as the cap would rather be determined by
assumptions as regards the period within which the required reductions could be
achieved, since it is not realistic to expect industry to comply with ambitious
benchmarks immediately upon entry into effect of the new overall cap. Cap-setting
under option 5.7 may as well proof unfeasible due to data and modelling
requirements.
– Efficiency: Options 5.6 and 5.8 would score best against this criterion, since there
would not be much new research required, while options 5.7 and 5.9 would entail
more costs as the required modelling would be much more complicated. By far the
most expensive and thus least efficient option would be 5.9, as it would mean to
develop appropriate benchmarks for each sector, irrespective whether they would
be used in the genuine allocation process.
– Consistency: All options are sufficiently consistent with EU objectives in other
domains. Option 5.6 offers best conditions for a level playing field for companies
under and outside the ETS, but other options do not necessarily harm the
functioning of the internal market.
Both option 5.6 and option 5.8 score significantly better than the other options and
should be further pursued.
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
5.5: Status quo - � - Discarded
5.6: efficiency approach � � � Retained
5.7: equal efforts - 0/- � Discarded
5.8 : proportional reductions 0 � � Retained
5.9: benchmark based - - � Discarded
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
5.4.2. Impacts – Comparing the Options
The impacts of option 5.6, the efficiency approach, have been analysed in detail with
the help of economic modelling. The details can be found in the Commission's impact
Drucksache 16/9334 – 170 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
assessment with respect to the effort-sharing of the post 2012 emissions reductions
target. The analysis results in an overall cap for 2020 emissions of 1720 Mt CO288.
Table 5.1 below summarises the expected emission reductions compared to 1990
emissions for the various sectors concerned:
Table 5.1: overall cap under the efficiency approach
Change in overall emissions between 1990 and 2020 (%)
Trading sector Non-trading sector
ETS including aviation 21% 10%
Option 5.8, proportional reductions, would result in an overall cap for 2020 emissions
of 20% reduction compared to 1990 emissions, which is significantly above the cap
set in accordance with the efficiency approach of option 5.6. The effort for the non-
trading sector is correspondingly higher. As the marginal abatement cost in the latter
will be higher, option 5.8 leads to higher total cost of reducing emissions in the EU.
See section [5.2.2] of the Commission's impact assessment on "Energy for a Changing
Europe – Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius, next steps to
implement the Energy and Climate change package" for more details on the economic
and environmental effects of this option.
As demonstrated also by the modelling, the impacts will not be spread completely
evenly over Member States. Positive employment effects, e.g., will be largest in
Member States with currently high unemployment. Increases in energy efficiency will
be highest in the new Member States that have the largest potential to increase energy
efficiency. This also implies that a relatively larger share of total reductions in
emissions will be located in these Member States. A fair distribution of efforts
between Member States can, however, be achieved in the distribution of rights to
auction allowances, taking into account the allowances to be allocated for free in the
different Member States.
Applying option 5.8 at Member State level, i.e. reducing emissions of the trading and
non-trading sector proportionally within each Member State, is likely to increase
overall costs of abatement much more significantly. This results from the fact that
some Member States may have relatively cheap abatement potential in the trading
sector, whereas others can reduce emissions rather within the non-trading sector.
The efficiency approach is likely to provide best pre-conditions for a level playing
field between sectors covered by the ETS and those in the non-trading sector. This is
most relevant where sectors partially fall within and without the scope of the ETS
(e.g. due to the potential exclusion of small installations).
Administrative costs of the different approaches are rather similar.
88 This does not take into account the inclusion of new sectors and gases.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 171 – Drucksache 16/9334
5.4.3. Compliance with Objectives
The efficiency approach of option 5.6 complies best with the first objective, which is
setting a cap in order to reduce overall emissions within the EU at least cost. Given
the overall cost levels that will be required in the medium and long term, both to
achieve emissions reductions in the order of 80% by 2050 and to adapt to the effects
of climate change, the case for the efficiency approach is considered very strong.
Compared to the importance of the first objective, the scoring of the options under the
other objectives is less relevant and given the small difference between the outcomes
of both options, the impacts are very similar.
Table 5.4.3. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Effectiveness
in setting
appropriate
cap
Minimising
distortions
of
competition
Simplicity
trans-
parency
International
credibility
Administra-
tive costs
Ability to adapt
to 30% target
5.6: efficiency
approach
++ ++ + + 0 +
5.8:
proportional
reduction
+ ++ ++ + 0 +
Key: ++ (significant improvement) + (improvement) - (deterioration) -- (significant deterioration) 0 (negligible change) n.r. (not
relevant
The importance of reducing emissions within the EU at least cost outweighs the
disadvantage of somewhat smaller transparency. Therefore, option 5.6 is the preferred
option.
5.5. Cap-setting: design options to increase predictability
5.5.1. Policy options89 and screening:
(57) Option 5.10: Status quo. The current Directive provides for 5-year
trading periods. Status quo trading periods would therefore concern
2013-2017 and 2018-2022.
(58) Option 5.11: Longer trading period 2013 – 2020. Under this
option, the trading periods from 2013 onwards would have the
duration of eight years.
(59) Option 5.12: Longer trading period 2013 – 2030. Under this
option, the trading periods would have the duration of 18 years.
89 All options must take into account the need to ensure that emissions in 2020 effectively
comply with the EU's commitment. The cap for any trading period on its own may not suffice,
as low emissions in other years could imply higher emissions in 2020.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 172 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
(60) Option 5.13: Set the cap for two consecutive 5-year periods. Under
this option, the cap for both the third and fourth trading period would
be set prior to the start of the third trading period. The cap for the fifth
trading period would be set prior to the start of the fourth trading
period and so forth.
(61) Option 5.14: Cap set out on the basis of a trend-line to 2020 and
beyond. Long-term rules would set the trajectory of the cap in
general, in addition to set the cap for 2020. For example, a rule could
specify that the cap will decrease by a fixed quantity per year. As
under option 2, trading periods could have the duration of eight
years90.
Note that, compared to the status quo, predictability is already increased as the cap for
the next trading period would be set as part of the revision of the Directive. The
adoption of the Commission proposal already provides a clear indication of the
desired level of the cap. Adoption by the Council and the Parliament will provide
certainty.
Screening the options leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: The status quo, option 5.10, does not allow increasing predictability
of the cap and is therefore not considered to be sufficiently effective. Option 5.12,
on the other hand, is too long for a single trading period, lacking flexibility to adapt
to new information, e.g. on actual climate change, emissions or efforts made
elsewhere in the world. The pretended certainty of option 5.12 would furthermore
not be credible, as the length of the period would be much longer than the
legislative process. For these reasons, option 5.12 is not retained for further
scrutiny either. Options 5.11, 5.13 and 5.14 would provide increased predictability.
– Efficiency: Options 5.11, 5.13 and 5.14 would ensue almost no additional costs
compared to the current situation. The uncertainty involved in option 5.12 does not
allow any statement on the costs involved, while the current situation (option 5.10)
is difficult to assess due to its incompliance with the objective.
– Consistency: There are no problems of consistency involved with any of the
options under consideration.
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
5.10: Status quo - - � Discarded
5.11: 8 year trading periods 2012-2020 � � � Retained
5.12: 18 year trading periods 2012-2030 - - � Discarded
5.13: two consecutive 5-year periods � � � Retained
5.14: Trendline with 8-year trading
period
� � � Retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
In the light of the above considerations, options 5.11, 5.13 and 5.14 will be further
pursued and analysed.
90 The timing of revision to the trajectory could be specified in the Directive.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 173 – Drucksache 16/9334
5.5.2. Impacts – Comparing the Options
Environmental effectiveness in this respect means finding the right balance between
long-term certainty and flexibility to adjust to new information on e.g. actual climate
change, on technological developments and on actions elsewhere in the world. Option
5.11 provides least certainty and most flexibility, leaving the options for cap-setting
after 2020 entirely open. Under options 5.13 and 5.14 predictability is significantly
improved at the expense of somewhat reduced flexibility. Compared to option 5.13,
option 5.14 creates more certainty and predictability as regards reductions after 2020.
The currently available information justifies continuation of the trend-line as an
appropriate point of departure for the future legislator. This in itself increases
predictability and the environmental effectiveness.
Prolonging the trading period from 5 to 8 years is likely to reduce average
administrative costs per year, in the first place for public authorities but also for
businesses.
5.5.3. Compliance of Options with Objectives
As indicated above, option 5.14 provides most predictability in further reductions of
the cap also after 2020 and therefore, this option strikes the best balance between
predictability and flexibility. For the same reasons, this option is also most effective
in increasing the EU's credibility vis-à-vis third countries. There are no significant
differences between the three options as regards their assessment under the remaining
relevant objectives.
Table 5.5.3. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Predic-tability Simplicity
transparency
International
credibility
Administra-
tive costs
Ability to adapt to
30% target
5.11: 8-year trading
period
+ + + + +
5.13: two
consecutive five-
year periods
+ + ++ + +
5.14: 8-year trading
period plus trend
line thereafter
++ + ++ + +
Key: ++ (significant improvement) + (improvement) - (deterioration) -- (significant deterioration) 0 (negligible change) n.r. (not
relevant
The preferred option is to set a trend-line that will achieve the cap for 2020 and
gradually reduce future caps beyond that year.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 174 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
5.6. Allocation: auctioning versus allocation for free
5.6.1. Policy Options and Screening: auctioning vs allocations for free
(62) Option 5.15: Status quo. Article 10 of the Directive prescribed for
the second period that at least 90% of allocations to be allocated free
of charge, but for the period after 2012 no rules are laid down.
(63) Option 5.16: full auctioning. Under this option, all allowances are to
be auctioned. The Directive would include provisions ensuring
efficient auctioning open to any installation to be executed in a way to
minimise undue price volatility, to ensure smooth interaction between
the primary and secondary market, to minimise transaction cost for
installations concerned and minimising cash-flow requirements for
companies. Auctions can be carried out either at European level or by
Member States. The first may bring some savings of administrative
cost. Such savings are, however, likely to be limited, since by 2013
many Member States will already have carried out auctions and
therefore built up experience and they are likely to take each other's
experience into account. In fact, they could well decide to 'pool'
auctions and use the same market participants and infrastructure if
that turns out to be most cost-efficient. Having the auctions carried
out at European level would, on the other hand, require further
financial provisions to redistribute the revenues. It appears preferable
to leave some flexibility and ensure that appropriate provisions can be
developed.
Auctioning will generate significant revenues. In line with the
objectives, a significant part of the revenues can and should be used
for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate
change. Another part of these revenues can be used to cover the
administrative cost in relation to this Directive. In addition, the
distribution of rights to auction allowances can be used to redistribute
(part of) the efforts of the national emission reduction targets and of
the national targets for the share of renewable energy. Finally, as
discussed in section 5.8.3 below, part of the revenues could be used
for measures to avoid carbon leakage.
(64) Option 5.17: Allocations for free up to a pre-determined sector
allocation, auctioning of the remainder. Allocating allowances for
free could be a transitional measure until all allowances are
auctioned. In order to ensure that all sectors adapt to climate change
policy, the sector allocations could be set at steadily decreasing levels
e.g. 20-50% below the sector's historical emissions, e.g. average
emissions over the period (2008-2012). Allowances would be
allocated for free only in absence of international agreement with the
main trading partners. Options for allocation methods at installation
level are discussed in section 5.7 below.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 175 – Drucksache 16/9334
(65) Option 5.18: Allocations for free up to a pre-determined sector
allocation only for sectors where "carbon leakage" is shown to be
real risk, auctioning of the remainder. This option is equal to the
previous, except that in the transition phase allocations for free are
given only to installations in sectors where carbon leakage is shown
to be a real risk. This excludes allocation for free to installations
supplying electricity or heat, refineries installations of facilities for
the capture, transport or permanent storage of greenhouse gas
emission and aviation. As regards the remaining sectors, in order to
be eligible for allocations for free, it must be shown that the sector is
exposed to significant international competition from similar
installations located in third countries which are taking no action to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, therefore entailing a risk of an
increase in emissions at the global level. The Directive could directly
identify the eligible sectors or alternatively lay down the procedures
and criteria by which these sectors are to be identified. The eligibility
of sectors would have to be reviewed in an appropriate time frame,
e.g. each 4-5 years.
Screening the options leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: Option 5.15, the status quo, does not bring any solution for the
identified problems, notably the negative impact on efficiency of the system and
the undesired distributional effects. Option 5.17 may achieve some of the
objectives, but only partially and the problem of undesired distributional effects
would remain to a significant extent. Options 5.16 and 5.18, potentially combined
with other instruments like border adjustment measures, are likely to achieve the
objectives to a much greater extent, as they allow taking into account an eventual
global agreement on climate change policy, the actual risk of carbon leakage and
alternative instruments to address these issues.
– Efficiency: The current situation, option 5.15, is the least efficient as the minimal
level of auctioning implies foregoing very significant revenues to the authorities
with very limited contribution to achieving the objectives. Option 5.17 may
constitute some improvement, but is still inefficient compared to options 5.16 and
5.18. Whether allocating any allowances for free is efficient or not (i.e. the choice
between options 5.16 and 5.18) is analysed in detail below.
– Consistency: Option 5.16 and 5.18 would in principle be fully consistent with
other Community policies, while option 5.17 might entail a potential for
inconsistency, which might concern the non-auctioned part of the ETS sectors and
be similar to the competition problems occurring in the current situation (option
5.15).
Against this background, options 5.16 and 5.18 are retained for further analysis.
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
5.15: Status quo - - - Discarded
5.16: full auctioning �/0 � � Retained
5.17: allocation for free of [50-80]% 0/- �/0 �/0 Discarded
Drucksache 16/9334 – 176 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
5.18: free allocation only to avoid
leakage
� �/0 � Retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
5.6.2. Impacts – Comparing the Options as regards auctioning and allocation for
free – Competitiveness and carbon leakage
Efficiency of the ETS and distortions of competition
Auctioning best ensures efficient functioning of the ETS as the cost taken into
account in decisions on abatement measures will be equal to the allowance price and
as there is no need to set rules for allocating allowances for free which have generated
the identified problems. Any allocation for free almost inevitably reduces the signal
from the allowance price. Such negative effects can be partially avoided, e.g. by full
harmonisation of allocation rules, by not updating the historical base periods, etc., see
sections 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 below, but some weakening of efficiency will remain, in
particular due to the inevitable need to develop some rules for new entrants and
closures. Auctioning furthermore requires operators to incur a financial outflow for all
the allowances they require, either through in-house abatement or participation in the
carbon market. It will reduce irrational behaviour of operators not taking abatement
measures simply because of the availability of free allowances. Therefore, full
auctioning is not only the most straightforward option in this respect, but also the only
option that entirely solves efficiency problems.
Fairness and distributional effects
Auctioning automatically sets an end to the identified undesirable distributional
effects. This is particularly important with respect to the energy sector, but also
significant parts of industry can be expected to pass-through a significant part of the
cost of allowances on to their clients, see below.
As operators will have to buy all their allowances on the market, auctioning is the
only option that fully respects the polluter pays principle. It best rewards operators
having undertaken early-actions to reduce emissions.
Compared to the other options full auctioning bears larger risks of inflicting undue
sunk costs upon operators. This risk is, however, likely to be limited. First of all,
climate change policy has been developed as from the 1990s and by 2013 operators
will have had many years to adapt to this policy. Moreover many operators have
demonstrated to be able to pass through at least a part of their costs of emissions and
by 2013, the total benefits generated under the current system may actually have
outweighed any sunk costs.
Impacts on the power generating sector
The ETS is designed to have a strong impact on the power generating sector, see the
Impact Assessment on the effort-sharing of the EU's commitment to reduce
greenhouse gases by 20% in 2020 for a more detailed assessment, in conjunction with
the options for achieving the 20% target for renewable energy. Differences between
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 177 – Drucksache 16/9334
impacts of auctioning and allocating allowances for free are relatively important for
the power generating sector. Firstly, full auctioning avoids generating undesirable
distributional effects as experienced under the current system and as can be expected
to continue in case of the option of allocating allowances for free is chosen. However,
even in case of full auctioning, profits in the power generating sector are likely to
increase significantly, mainly due to the fact that carbon-extensive generators benefit
from higher power prices set by carbon-intensive generators.
Differences between impacts on actual pricing and production will not be very large,
as already now these decisions largely take into account the opportunity cost of
grandfathered allowances. Estimates of the pass-through rates vary, but are generally
high, i.e. up to 70-90 percent, depending on the country, market structure, demand
elasticity and CO2 price considered. Demand for electricity generally is relatively
price-inelastic.
In contrast, auctioning is expected to increase the fall in the production of electricity
generated from fossil fuels that is matched by a large increase in biomass and smaller
increase in wind power. Small falls in electricity production from other sources, for
example nuclear, are expected, as they become relatively more expensive compared to
renewables, see the table below. These impacts stem in the first place from the
allowance price, but the impacts are strengthened since with full auctioning closure
rules, allocations from new entrants reserve and expectations for free allocations in
subsequent trading periods would no longer distort the signal from the allowance
price. Auctioning thereby gives the strongest incentives for investments in renewables
and other low emission intensive power generating capacity.
Table 5.2 Changes in fuel inputs to power generation
Scenario B Scenario A % change
Coal 458366 447056 -2.5
Oil 29343 27432 -6.5
Gas 1259495 1158629 -8.0
Biomass 796497 1220450 53.2
Wind 663100 703470 6.1
Note(s) : Figures show level of electricity generated from each source. Scenario B is allocation for
free based on benchmarks, whereas scenario A assumes full auctioning
Source(s) : E3ME
Impacts are largest for power producers relying most on coal and lignite. This also
means that impacts are unevenly spread across Member States. The differences in
impacts materialise only in the long run, mainly after 2020. See section 6.3.2 of the
impact assessment on the package of measures to achieve the objectives for climate
change and renewable energy for more details of the impacts on the power generating
sector, in conjunction with the impacts from other policy options for achieving the
overall CO2 emissions reduction target and the target for renewable energy.
Impact on industry: competitiveness
Obviously, when comparing full auctioning to allocating allowances for free, due
regard must be given to the aspects of competitiveness and carbon leakage.
Competitiveness is the performance of firms relative to competitor firms in terms of:
profitability, market share, production cost, and levels of investment, which should
Drucksache 16/9334 – 178 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
not be confused with (short term) profitability levels91. Furthermore, relocation of
activities out of the EU leads to (net) carbon leakage only if production elsewhere has
the same or higher emission intensity.The following sub-sections assess (1) the share
of energy intensive industry, (2) direct impact on production cost, (3) exposure to
competition, (4) sector specific features and (5) macro-economic modelling.
Impact on industry (1): share of energy-intensive industry
The direct impacts of the ETS are most important for energy-intensive industry. The
share of these industries concerned in the overall manufacturing industry varies, but is
limited for most, see figure 5.1 below. In addition, figure 5.2 shows that the
distribution of energy intensive industry varies across Member States.
Figure 2: Value added in Energy-intensive industries as a percentage of value
added in all manufacturing industry, 2004
0
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91 Reduced profitability levels also lead to reduced tax income. In other words, profit taxes
mitigate the impacts on businesses and effectively shift part of the burden on to the tax payer.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 179 – Drucksache 16/9334
Figure 3: Energy costs as a percentage of manufacturing industry turnover,
2004
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Ro
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nia
Sl
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Impact on industry (2): impacts on production cost of industry
A number of recent studies analysed the cost of allowances as a part of total
production cost or production value.92 Note that such cost-figures have limited
relevance for the choice between auctioning and (some) allocating allowances for
free. Firstly, in particular the indirect impact via increased electricity prices is
expected under either option, since electricity producers are likely to continue to
charge the opportunity cost of allowances irrespective of receiving them for free or
having to buy them on the market. Secondly, the opportunity cost of allowances
needed for direct emissions will also remain for production and investment decisions
and allocating allowances for free does not appear to be an efficient or even effective
instrument to remedy impacts on competitiveness (see discussion below).
Generally, the impact of a € 20/tCo2 allowance price on output prices lies between 0.1
and 5%, assuming a full pass through of costs along the upstream supply chain. Main
exceptions where higher price increases would be required to fully recover the costs
of emissions are primary steel (5-9.4%), primary aluminium (7.5-10%), cement and
lime (20-30%) and ammonia (25-48%)93. For most of the energy-intensive sectors, the
cost increases are directly related to the carbon content of the fossil fuels they use.
The main exception is primary aluminium where the cost increase is in the first place
due to the pass through of costs in the electricity price94. Typically, production from
92 See for more details e.g. studies by Carbon Trust, McKinsey 2006, Demailly 2006, Grubb
2006, Neuhoff 2006, Matthes 2007, Climate Strategies 2007 and Bergmann/Hayden/Schmitz
2007.
93 DG ECFIN 2007. Other studies compared the cost of emissions to production cost rather than
value. This generally leads to higher percentages
94 Most estimates of cost assume an increase of the electricity price by about € 9-10 per kWh.
The impact of the ETS on electricity costs for industrial consumers varies per company, sector
and country, but also for different types of demand. Impacts on long term-prices for base-load
demand differ from the impacts on forward prices for medium load demand and spot prices
Drucksache 16/9334 – 180 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
recycled material requires only a fraction of the energy the production from virgin
materials needs, thus impacts on production of iron and steel, aluminium, copper and
glass from recycled inputs is much less affected.
Calculations at sector level hide a large differentiation within the sectors concerned.
Hourcade et al95 analyse in further depth such differentiation.
– For the emissions from cement production, e.g., what matters is whether or not the
clinker is produced in the installation or imported, whether the cement is produced
in dry kilns with pre-heater and pre-calciner requiring 45% less energy input
compared to long kilns. Also the clinker content of cement is important in
determining the cost of emissions.
– For steel, emissions are much higher when produced in blast oxygen furnace
(BOF) compared to electric arc furnace (EAF). The latter involves melting scrap
metal. Mitigation potential exists both for BOF and EAF processes. Like the
situation of clinker in cement production, it matters a lot whether the iron producer
produces its own coke.
– In the pulp and paper industry, products range from pulp, newsprint, fine papers,
packaging and sanitary and household paper, and each product category is
subdivided in multiple qualities. In addition, raw materials may either be wood or
recovered fibre and there is a wide variety of processes with much higher emission
intensities for mechanical pulp and paper compared to chemical pulp and paper.
Abatement measures include energy saving by new modes of operation,
introduction of more energy efficient technologies and fuel switching (including
the use of combined heat and power (CHP)). The mitigation potential of these
measures differs considerably by region.
Calculations at sector or product level will never reflect particularities of individual
producers concerned. Variation in impacts on costs will arise in particular from
different fuels used, different types of energy supply contracts, quality of products,
age and efficiency of installations. Of course, it is precisely the objective of the ETS
to encourage each individual installation to invest in abatement measures and to
minimise emissions and thereby minimising the cost of buying allowances.
for short-term fluctuations in demand. Spot electricity prices are likely to absorb allowance
prices to a very high extent, although a large part of the market price is established by the so-
called "merit curve" and the price effect may depend on the emissions of the marginal supplier
in this curve. This may be less so for long-term and forward contracts due to indexation
formulae and other arrangements, including partial or full ownership of electricity generation.
Indexation formulae for long-term contracts are likely to include price floors and ceilings,
which will affect pass through at certain levels, while ownership allows for savings stemming
from differences between allowance prices and internal abatement costs. The sectors with the
largest self-generation capacity in the EU are the chemical sector, followed by pulp and paper,
refineries and metals and mining (IEA 2007). There are, however, no reasons to assume that
internal accounting prices for self-generated electricity and heat would not reflect the
opportunity cost of the allowance price.
95 Hourcade et al 2008.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 181 – Drucksache 16/9334
Apart from indirect impacts due to higher electricity prices, there are also indirect
impacts on industries further down the production chain that use products produced in
sectors directly affected. Such impacts will be generally small.
Impact on industry (3): exposure to competition and ability to pass through the cost of
allowances
Carbon leakage and competitiveness problems would not arise in case all companies
competing in the same market are confronted with the same carbon price. In such a
situation, all companies would pass through the cost of emissions on to their
customers96. This situation may, however, not arise, particularly as long as no
international agreement on climate change policy has been reached, and the ability to
pass-through the cost of emissions in prices may be limited by competition pressure
from competitors outside the EU that do not have a similar cost.
The 'ability to pass-through the cost of emissions' and 'international competitive
pressure' are, however, difficult to measure in an objective manner. Various indicators
can be used.
The most straightforward and objective indicator of the degree of international
competitive pressure that industry branches face is 'openness to trade'. Figure 5.6.3
below shows the ratio of extra-EU exports and imports to turnover of a number of
energy-intensive sectors. It must be noted that high openness to trade does not
automatically imply a bad/good international competitiveness position. For assessing
the exposure to international competition, one may rather focus on the duration of a
trade surplus/trade deficit, but still taking into account that trade may for a significant
part be determined by long-term capacity constraints (or surplus) or specialisation on
the supply side.
The “cement and concrete” branch stands out as being considerably less open to trade
than the other energy-intensive sectors, with exports and imports together amounting
to less than 10% of turnover. Other construction-related branches (stone, glass) also
appear among the relatively closed branches. At the other end of the scale, both “basic
precious and non-ferrous metals” (which includes aluminium manufacture) and the
branch “basic chemicals, pesticides, other agro-chemicals” are relatively open to
trade.
Figure 5.6.3: Openness to extra-EU trade 2004/2005
96
In less competitive markets, producers may actually accept a reduction of the profit margin
which they were able to obtain due to their market power. This would, however, not justify
compensatory measures.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 182 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
To
tal
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an
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Exports
%
Source: EUROSTAT Prodcom and UN Comtrade databases97
For comparison, changes of the nominal effective exchange rate as experienced over
the past years have by far more important impacts than a unilateral increase of costs
due to a carbon constraint. Based on modelling the impacts of changes of the nominal
effective exchange rate, using trade data on the 2001-2006 period, suggests that the
ETS would trigger a decline in exports relative to the baseline of less than 1% over a
ten-year period from most energy intensive industries, primary aluminium and iron
and steel from integrated steel plants being an exception to this98.
The ability to pass-through the cost of emissions in product prices may be assessed by
using various other indicators. Demand price elasticity could be estimated, although
it must be ensured that the estimate is based on statistical data on comparable price
changes that affect all producers in a similar way as the carbon price under the ETS.
Such information is only scarcely available in particular at disaggregated level.
The degree of market concentration, market structure and structure of ownership
may also provide relevant information. Due to the need of significant capital
requirements, energy intensive industries tend to operate in fairly concentrated
markets. Some of these industries have a significant track record of collusion and
infringements of the competition rules. If companies proof to be able to increase
prices by collusion, they can not be expected to have great difficulties in increasing
prices to a similar extent when facing increased cost of emissions.99 As regards
97 For reasons of data availability, values for exports and imports refer to extra-EU trade for the
year 2005, while the turnover figures refer to data from 2004.
98 Bergmann/Hayden/Schmitz 2007 2007.
99 Moreover, reduced profits from market power cannot be held as an objection. In case of less
than perfect competition, prices would exceed marginal cost by a certain profit margin. The
cost of emissions constitutes part of the marginal cost and hence, in case it increases, the price
would increase by less than the proportional amount, reducing the producer's profitability.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 183 – Drucksache 16/9334
market structure, one would generally expect a greater ability to pass-through the cost
of emissions onto sales prices the more products are differentiated in types, qualities,
and so on. With respect to structure of ownership in the industry, it should be
analysed to what extent the same market participants can shift production across the
globe and the incentives that may exist for maintaining production at several places
e.g. in view of spreading risks.
Impact on industry (4): sector specific assessment
The various indicators discussed above may not tell all information and can be
complemented by sector specific considerations100. Looking at the lasting trade deficit
e.g. for primary aluminium, one would expect international competitive pressure to
make it difficult for producers in the EU to pass through the cost of ETS to their
clients. However, primary aluminium production is also a showcase for a global
market characterised by a global oligopoly, and in which EU producers have the
advantage of being able to rely on a highly depreciated capital stock. Moreover, some
expect part of the primary aluminium production in the EU to be phased out in any
case over the next ten or so years, in view of comparative cost developments, the need
to renew long-term energy supply contracts and the ongoing increase of production
capacity elsewhere, irrespective of the impacts of emission trading.
Another example is the cement industry, where opinions diverge on the potential
growth of imports from non EU producers in particular those situated close to the
main European ports and close to the eastern borders of the EU. Cement is, however,
a heavy product having a low value in relation to its weight and is hence relatively
costly to transport. Shipping costs have, furthermore, increased significantly between
2002 and 2004. In addition, market concentration in the cement industry is rather high
and prone to collusion and formation of cartels.101 An analysis of trade flows102 shows
that the bulk of the growth of imports can be mainly attributed to the rise in
consumption in Italy and Spain, which is mostly driven by growth of consumption
and the lack of new domestic capacities. Local producers were unable to satisfy this
demand because they had previously closed down some plants to rationalise
production. Also the import of 8 million tonnes of cement from China to the EU in
2006 has not significantly affected the growth rate of non-EU imports. These imports
mainly substituted the sharp decline in Turkish and Egyptian cement imports. This
would suggest that import volumes are determined by the imbalance between local
capacity and demand rather than a supply-side push. In fact, according to experts,
outside the EU there would be few, if any, new cement production capacities being
built for export to the EU. Exports come from domestic excess capacities. Investing
for exports entails a significant risk for the investor, not only as regards the export
markets, but also for its domestic market. Moreover, investing for exports requires
also investments in harbour facilities in Europe for handling these trade flows and
making appropriate arrangements with shipping companies.
100 See e.g. ICF 2007 for an assessment of the economic impact of energy prices on
competitiveness of a number of energy intensive industries.
101
In 2006, e.g., a national cartel in Germany was broken up with the effect that the cement price
subsequently decreased from about € 70 per tonne to about € 50 per tonne.
102 Hourcade 2007.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 184 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Impact on industry (5): macro economic and multi-sector modelling
The preceding considerations are based on partial analysis. Macro-economic
modelling allows assessing the consequences for the overall economy, taking into
account general equilibrium considerations and secondary impacts e.g. due to effects
on the terms of trade, use of the revenues of auctioning, etc.
Entec 2007 modelled the impacts of three options for a revised ETS: a scenario where
all allowances are auctioned, a scenario where all allowances are allocated to industry
based on benchmarks and a hybrid approach where power generation and aviation are
not allocated allowances, but other sectors receive allowances for free, although
declining up to 2020. The identified impacts can be summarised as follows:
� The negative impact on GDP is most limited in case of full auctioning, i.e.
0.1% compared to the baseline scenario. Under both other scenario's, the
model predicts a negative impact of 0.2%. Note that these figures do not
rate the positive value of achieving the reduction of emissions!
� In case of full auctioning, due to the use of the revenues, employment
increases by 0.1%. In case of allocations for free, employment decreases
by 0.1%, whereas it remains unchanged under the hybrid option.
� The potentially negative impact for the basic metals and non-metallic
mineral sectors are confirmed but the model arrives at low impacts of 0.1
to 0.2% in terms of production losses (in case allowances are allocated for
free). Note that E3ME assumes a reduction of CO2 emissions of around
15% in 2020 compared to 1990 (without JI/CDM) with an allowance price
of around €36/tCO2 in 2020. It does not include RES targets and assumes
a carbon price of €22/t CO2 in the baseline103. Results of the model
indicate that some types of benchmarking (based on scaling down
allocations for industries resulting from Phase II of the EU-ETS)(option
benchmark in may even worsen the impacts for some sectors compared to
auctioning. A hybrid approach (partial auctioning combined with
benchmarking) or full auctioning with recycling to decrease labour costs
would increase GDP and have favourable impact for all sectors including
the i.e. labour intensive sectors since demand increases.
Table 5.3 Sectoral impacts on industry output compared to 2020 baseline
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario H
Agriculture and mining 0.2 0.0 0.1
Basic metals 0.0 -0.2 -0.1
Non-metallic minerals 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Wood & paper -0.1 -0.3 -0.1
103
ENTEC UK (2007) Support for the impact assessment in the context of the review of the
Directive 2003/87/EC. Draft final report: task 2: further harmonization and increased
predictability, July 2007, Chapter 8.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 185 – Drucksache 16/9334
Chemicals nes 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Rubber & Plastics 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Air transport 0.9 0.9 0.9
Electricity -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Non-ETS manufacturing 0.1 0.1 0.1
Construction -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Services -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Notes: Figures show percentage difference from baseline at an EU25 level in 2020. Scenarios are A (auctioned
allowances), B (benchmarked) and H (hybrid allocation).
Source(s): E3ME
The impacts on GDP and employment may differ per Member State, but this depends
not least on the distribution of allowances that Member States may auction or allocate
for free, see section 5.2.4 of the Commission's impact assessment "Energy for a
Changing Europe – Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius, Next steps
to implement the Energy and Climate change package".
The results are in line with the outcome of the GEM-E3 model, indicating that
auctioning is positive for the economy as a whole and also EEI since recycling
increases GDP and demand. GEME3 results, do however, suggest somewhat higher
impacts for the energy production sector, the ferrous and non-ferrous metal sectors
and the other energy intensive industry. Still these impacts are only a few percentages.
Exports volumes might decrease slightly more but the increase in export price
partially compensate for the loss of revenues. Remarkably, for all sectors, the negative
impacts on output and exports volume are smaller compared to the scenario where all
allowances are given for free.
Table 5.4. Sector impact GEME3 with auctioning and free allocation in 2020
Domestic
Production Volume
Exports Volume Price Exports
rel. EU average
Free
allocation
Auction Free
allocation
Auction Free Auction
Agriculture -0,6% -0,4% -1,0% -1,1% 0,9% 1,1%
Energy Production -6/0% -6.0% -4,8% -4,9%
Ferrous and non ferrous metals -2.0% -1,9% -3,6% -3,5% 2,1% 2,2%
Chemical Products -1,1% -0,9% -1,4% -1,3% 0,7% 0,7%
Other energy intensive -1,4% -1,3% -2,5% -2,5% 1,6% 1,6%
Electric Goods -0,7% -0,6% -0,9% -0,8% 0,4% 0,3%
Transport equipment -1.0% -0,9% -1,3% -1,2% 0,6% 0,5%
Other Equipment Goods -0,8% -0,6% -1,1% -0,9% 0,5% 0,4%
Drucksache 16/9334 – 186 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Consumer Goods Industries -0,6% -0,4% -1,3% -1,2% 0,7% 0,7%
Construction -0,3% -0,2% -0,2% -0,6% 0,0% 0,4%
Telecommunication Services -0,2% 0,0% -0,3% -0,2% 0,2% 0,2%
Transport -1,4% -1,2% -3,1% -3,1% 1,9% 2,0%
Services of credit and insurances -0,2% 0,0% -0,4% -0,2% 0,3% 0,1%
Other Market Services -0,3% -0,1% -0,6% -0,5% 0,3% 0,3%
Non Market Services -0,0% 0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,4% 0,4%
These results are largely in line with the outcome of other modelling104.
Of course, the issue of competitiveness is closely interrelated with impacts on
employment. Climate change mitigation offers many employment opportunities, but
the transformation to a low carbon economy also implies certain structural change.
However, the impact on employment will closely reflect the impact on domestic
volume of production in the sector concerned.
Net carbon leakage
As indicated before, negative impacts on competitiveness may, however, not lead to
net carbon leakage. Some third countries may actually offer conditions where
producing the same product leads to lower emissions compared to production in
Europe. E.g., in Iceland huge hydropower installations are under construction for the
production of aluminium. Another example may be found in the Middle East where
oil producing countries currently flare significant volumes of gases resulting from oil-
drilling operations. From an environmental point of view, it is highly preferable to use
these gases in a useful way, reducing energy needs elsewhere.
Transparency, simplicity and administrative cost
Auctioning is transparent and simple. Allocating for free can be done in more
transparent and simple ways than has been the case so far, but is likely to remain more
complex.
For public authorities and regulators, administrative costs of auctioning include set-up
costs of auction design, creation of infrastructure, marketing to potential participants.
The centralisation of the process would reduce set-up costs. There will be additional
administrative costs to regulators of conducting the auction, including support to
participants.
If all allowances are auctioned, administrative costs for regulators are likely to be
lower compared to the costs of administering the system of grandfathering or
104
E.g. Bollen 2004, COWI 2004, Kouvaritakis 2005, Quirion 2006. See
Bergmann/Hayden/Schmitz 2007 for a discussion on the most relevant models. This paper
also discusses ex-post evidence of impacts, e.g. in COMETR 2007.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 187 – Drucksache 16/9334
benchmarking, depending on the degree of harmonisation of the methods to allocate
for free. Of course, the costs of auctions could be covered by auction revenues.
Obviously, a combination of auctioning and allocation for free would mean higher
administrative costs for the public authorities. More importantly, identifying sectors
eligible for allocations for free as foreseen under option 4 will bring an additional
administrative burden to the Commission and all participants involved in the process.
For businesses, administrative costs of auctioning include learning about auction
rules, preparing a bidding strategy, training costs, and the cost of personnel time.
Typically, transaction costs are fixed per installation and small emitters incur
proportionately higher costs per unit of production compared to their larger
counterparts. Intermediaries could however greatly reduce these costs for small
emitters. Centralised, one-off auctions would entail lower transaction costs for
participants.
5.6.3. Compliance of Options with Objectives
On most accounts, the option of full auctioning compares favourably to other options.
It best ensures efficiency, transparency and simplicity of the system and it avoids
undesirable distributional effects from arising. The key question is whether, in case of
absence of international agreements on climate change policy, any allocation for free
should be retained in order to avoid carbon leakage. Doing so comes at the cost of
foregoing the revenue of auctioning and generating distortions into the system, even
when allocation rules are designed in order to minimise the distortions. The choice for
allocation for free therefore requires comparing the effectiveness and efficiency of
alternative instruments that may contribute to avoiding carbon leakage.
Avoiding net carbon leakage requires in the first place strengthening the competitive
position of the companies most exposed to international competition. The options
below concern instruments that can target specifically these companies, but these
come in addition to broader structural reform measures, e.g. increasing competition in
energy markets, that are at least as important for competitiveness.
Allocating allowances for free
The effectiveness of allocating allowances for free will vary by sector or even by
installation. Receiving an upfront allocation does not necessarily change production
decisions that will still take into account the opportunity cost of allowances. In other
words, having received the allocation, it may still be most profitable for the operator
to close down its installation and sell its allocation on the market (as far as it can keep
it under the closure rule). Allocating allowances for free will therefore be most
effective in industries with high exit costs and strong incentives to maximise capacity
utilisation.
Allocating allowances for free can be a rather inefficient way to use resources,
depending on the nature of competition. In some sectors, carbon leakage may be a risk
only for installations near the EU borders and sea-ports. Allocating for free will,
however, generate political and competitive pressures throughout the EU so, if
Drucksache 16/9334 – 188 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
allowed, it is likely that most Member States will decide to allocate for free also to
installations not immediately exposed to third country competitors.
On a higher level, inefficiency will also stem from reducing the dynamic incentives
deriving from competitive pressure, in particular by reduced pressure to increase
efficiency of operations, to innovate and to develop new technologies e.g. for
reducing emissions.
Allocating for free is inconsistent with some other measures, in particular trade
measures such as a border tax adjustment or inclusion of importers in the system.
Allowing higher levels of JI/CDM
See section 6.4.2 for the advantages and disadvantages of allowing the use of higher
levels of JI/CDM credits for operators exposed to international competition. As set
out in section 6.2.1, it is preferred to have the use of JI/CDM credits subject to an
overall quantitative limit. Setting differentiated levels for JI/CDM credits that may be
surrendered within that limit may favour the sectors with the higher levels to the
extent that arbitrage in the markets fails to equalise the real price of JI/CDM credits
(taking into account the higher risks) and the allowance price.
International sectoral agreements
Global sectoral agreements may contribute to ensuring that energy intensive industries
achieve the same performance benchmark (CO2 content of products) worldwide. The
cost of abatement measures would hence be comparable worldwide as well, with
remaining differences attributable to true competitive advantages. In case installations
within a sector would all be covered by linked trading systems, the cost of remaining
emissions could be equalised as well. Of course, this instrument has great advantages,
not least the real emission reductions that can be expected around the globe and the
absence of the need for constant financial funding apart from the administrative cost
of achieving these agreements and the corresponding cost of data gathering,
monitoring and enforcement.
Trade measures
In the absence of an international agreement on global climate change policy, and if
other measures or international sectoral agreements are not adequate in limiting
carbon leakage, consideration could be given to extending the coverage of these
domestic measures to imported goods. A number of issues would require careful
consideration and analysis in this case to ensure the effectiveness of the measures in
limiting carbon leakage and to avoid any unintended negative effects. Among the
issues for consideration are the higher cost of inputs that would emerge, which may
cause problems for European producers further downward in the production chain,
potentially limiting any positive effects in terms of avoiding net carbon leakage. A
careful analysis of legal implications, in particular WTO compatibility, would also be
required.
One instrument for consideration is to include imported products in the system. This
could imply that an importer of a product with high carbon intensity would be obliged
to surrender allowances. Also a refund of allowances to exporters could be thought of.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 189 – Drucksache 16/9334
There would be practical difficulties to set the level of allowances to be surrendered
by importers, deciding to which imports from which countries or source the system
would apply and setting up an effective monitoring system. In addition, the measure
would need to be designed in a way that ensures the integrity of the ETS, in particular
the absolute cap on emissions. If this can be ensured, such a system may effectively
contribute to avoiding net carbon leakage. There is, however, the same caveat as
regards increasing costs for producers further downward in the production chain
applies, as well as considerations with respect to WTO compatibility.
Reducing labour costs or investing in innovation, research and development and
training
Macro-economic modelling referred to above demonstrates that the ETS brings
considerable benefits to overall welfare in case the revenues are used to reduce labour
costs. The revenues of auctioning could also be used for innovation, research and
development and training in the sectors concerned or in other sectors105. The use of
revenues in this way may bring much greater value for tax-payer money than
allocating allowances for free. Of course, it may not be efficient to spend revenues
from auctioning only on R&D, innovation and training in the sectors most affected by
the ETS and such spending may not suffice to outweigh cost increases due to the ETS.
At the same time, it should be avoided that lasting lump-sum transfers in the form of
free allocations are used to retard structural economic reform.
With a view to these alternatives, the general conclusion is that allocating for free is a
costly instrument whose use would be cost-efficient only under highly exceptional
circumstances.
Table 5.6.3. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environ-
mental
Effective-
ness
Economic
Efficiency
Level
playing
field/ com-
petition
Simplicity,
transpa-
rency, pre-
dictability
Distribu-
tional
effects
Administra-
tive costs
5.16: full auctioning 0 ++ ++ ++ ++ +
5.18: allocations for
free for avoiding net
carbon leakage
0/+ + 0/+ 0 + 0/+
Key: ++ (significant improvement) + (improvement) - (deterioration) -- (significant deterioration) 0 (negligible change) n.r. (not
relevant
In conclusion, the preferred option is full auctioning. As a transitional measure, in
order to facilitate adaptation and avoid undue 'sunk costs', any allocation for free
105 In case this involves State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, the aid must
comply with the relevant State aid rules. An important general requirement is that the aid must
have an incentive effect on the behaviour of the beneficiaries and that certain aid ceilings must
be respected in order to avoid undue distortions of competition. Defensive direct production
subsidies, in contrast, are not likely to be efficient as they stifle the dynamic incentives of
competition and such subsidies are not allowed under the State aid rules as they run directly
counter to the basic principles of State aid policy.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 190 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
should be phased out gradually. Only in certain sectors where there is a demonstrated
risk of net carbon leakage, there may be a need for a longer transitional period or for
other instruments to be put in place, notably the inclusion of imports and exports.
5.7. Allocation methods for any remaining allowances allocated for free
5.7.1. Options and screening as regards any remaining allocations for free
The policy options described below apply only to allocating allowances for free to the
extent they are warranted under the chosen option under section 5.6 above.
(66) Option 5.19: Status quo, limited harmonisation based on a single
criterion generally prohibiting favourable treatment of certain
installations or sectors. This option represents the status quo.
(67) Option 5.20: Harmonised grandfathering. Under this option
allowances up to the sector allocation are distributed proportional to
historic emissions of the installations concerned. This form of
allocation has been predominant in the first two trading periods. In
order to avoid any perverse incentive weakening the signal from the
allowance price, the historical period on which allocations are to be
based ends at the latest in 2006. Installations for which no historical
emission data is available will be allocated allowances on the basis of
benchmarks similar as is done for new entrants (see section 5.8
below). The number of special rules, e.g. for early action to reduce
emissions and use of clean technology, is minimised and these rules,
if any, would be drawn up as simple as possible.
(68) Option 5.21: Fully harmonised benchmarking: Under this option,
allocations of allowances for free are determined on the basis of
benchmarks, i.e. a fixed number of allowances per unit of output. The
Directive would lay down the procedures by which the benchmarks
are established and the principles on which they are to be based.
Benchmarks could possibly also be applied to capacity figures, but
capacity may be difficult to identify in an objective manner and the
correlation between capacity and production (and hence potential
problems of competitiveness and carbon leakage) may be rather
loose. Benchmarks could possibly also be applied to inputs, but
inputs are only loosely correlated to production as well. Basing
allocations on capacity or inputs may, however, not be entirely
excluded, in particular when the output products concerned cannot be
defined with sufficient precision.
The benchmarks are to apply EU wide. Differentiating benchmarks
according to Member State inevitably distorts competition.
Benchmarks are to be specified for broadly defined product
categories. Differentiation according to processes and product
qualities should be minimised in order to maintain appropriate price
signals resulting from differences in emissions intensity.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 191 – Drucksache 16/9334
Differentiation of benchmarks according to the type of fuel used is
excluded for the same reasons.
The level of benchmarks must not exceed the level of emissions that
can be achieved by best available techniques (BAT). Indirect
emissions from electricity consumption cannot be taken into account,
since this would convert allocations into production subsidies and
these costs are passed through to varying degrees anyway. Moreover
producers using electricity from renewable or carbon neutral sources
do not face such costs.
A further reduction factor is applied if necessary to ensure that the
total allocations to a sector do not exceed the sector allocation as
determined under options 5.17 and 5.18 in section 5.6 above106 .
Output data of individual installations is sensitive information for
competitors. Therefore, in order to ensure confidentiality of annual
data, the output data on which allocations should be based would
cover a historical period of at least three years ending at the latest in
2006. The Directive would provide a basis for developing guidance to
ensure proper data collection. Options based on later production data
or updating of production data have not been retained for further
scrutiny in order to avoid any perverse incentives weakening the
signal of the allowance price.
(69) Option 5.22: Hybrid approach: harmonised benchmarking only
for large emittors, more discretion for Member States as regards
allocations to small emittors: This option is similar to the previous
option, except that allocation methods for smaller emitters are left to
the discretion of Member States, subject to certain criteria set in the
Directive. The distinction between the two groups could be based e.g.
on a capacity threshold of 60 MW, on a sector basis or on a
combination of both.
(70) Option 5.23: Relative performance benchmarking: Under this
approach, for each installation a relative benchmark is determined
which compares to its competitors as regards emissions intensity. The
cleaner the installation, the higher the relative benchmark. It could
also be a "bonus-malus" system where installations are identified
within a limited number of efficiency categories. In order to avoid
perverse effects, the relative benchmark would be applied to historical
emissions over a historical period ending at the latest in 2006.
Alternatively, the relative benchmark could be applied to allocations
determined for the second trading period. This option does not mean
that allocations will be adjusted to actual production (ex-post
adjustments).
106 In line with the IPPC-Directive, the maximum values for pollution in the permits for
installations covered by that Directive shall not exceed levels that can be achieved by BAT.
Even though CO2 emissions do no longer fall within the scope of the IPPC-Directive,
allocations at levels exceeding BAT means that the operator does not have to make any effort
in order to comply with its obligation to surrender allowances for its emissions. This would
directly go against the principles of the State aid rules for environmental protection.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 192 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Screening the options leads to the following results:
Given the problems described above, option 5.19 is not retained for further scrutiny.
All other options meet at least the minimum levels of effectiveness and efficiency and
none of these options is fully inconsistent with EU objectives in other domains.
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
5.19: Status quo - - - Discarded
5.20: harmonised grandfathering � � � Retained
5.21: benchmarking � � � Retained
5.22: partial benchmarking � � � Retained
5.23: relative performance benchmarking � � � Retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
5.7.2. Impacts – comparing of options for allocating for free
Effectiveness, carbon leakage
Since the number of allowances to be allocated for free is rather determined according
to the option chosen as set out in the preceding section, all options have similar effects
as regards environmental effectiveness and their potential to avoid carbon leakage.
Efficiency of the system
All options, except the status quo, exclude updating of the historical base period, and
therefore avoid as much as possible perverse incentives. However, allocating
allowances to relatively new installations for which the historical data is not available
would require special rules, which inevitably constitutes an incentive to invest,
weakening the signal of the allowance price. This is, however, very similar for all
these options. Obviously, the lower the allocation, the smaller the perverse incentives
are.
Impact on competition and the internal market
Variation in benchmark values can cause significant distortion in the market, but if
they are set for appropriate, broad, product categories and at appropriate levels,
harmonised benchmarking has the least distortive effects on competition. The hybrid
option 4, leaving discretion to Member States as regards the allocation methods
towards smaller installations, would have negative impacts in this respect, even
though the actual size of these impacts may be limited.
Administrative cost and feasibility
Options 5.20, harmonised grandfathering, and 5.23, relative performance
benchmarking, are probably the two options that have lowest administrative cost and
are easiest to put into place. Benchmarking involves cost of collection and verification
of output data and potentially a high administrative cost of setting and updating
benchmarks. In fact, the option of harmonised benchmarking may not be easily
feasible due to confidentiality of production data, difficulties to compile the data
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 193 – Drucksache 16/9334
and/or difficulties in determining the appropriate benchmarks. Option 5.22, partial
benchmarking, may reduce the administrative cost of setting benchmarks for the EU,
but would add potentially larger administrative costs to the Member States that have
to decide on the allocation to smaller installations.
Distributional impacts and fairness
As regards respect of the polluter pays principle, harmonised benchmarking is the
second best option after auctioning, since it does not reward the use of technology that
is more polluting than the benchmark. The main disadvantage of grandfathering is
that historical allocations do not differentiate between operators with clean versus
obsolete technology and do not reward those that have reduced emissions before the
system started. Relative benchmarking ranks in between the option of grandfathering
and harmonised benchmarking in this respect.
Simplicity and transparency
Grandfathering offers most transparency while under benchmarking transparency
depends on the process by which benchmarks are set. Setting relative benchmarks and
categorisation of installations in a limited number of groups may be simpler and more
transparent than setting benchmarks under the option of harmonised benchmarking. In
addition, collecting the historical data does not raise issues of confidentiality.
5.7.3. Compliance of Options with Objectives
In order to ensure environmental effectiveness and efficiency of the system, any
allocation for free must be harmonised as much as possible and must avoid basing
allocations on updated historical data (be it output or emissions). In case this is
ensured, the choice of allocation method is largely determined by fairness concerns on
the one hand and the administrative cost and practical feasibility on the other. On the
basis of the impacts above, and in case of absence of an international agreement on
climate change policy, the preferred option is harmonised benchmarking aiming at a
system of broadly defined benchmarks with minimum differentiation, only for a
limited number of sectors where allocating allowances for free is justified by the need
to avoid carbon leakage.
Table 5.7.3. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environ-
mental
Effective-
ness
Economic
Efficiency
Level
playing
field/ com-
petition
Simplicity,
transpa-
rency, pre-
dictability
Distribu-
tional
effects
Administra-
tive costs
5.20: harmonized
grandfathering
0 + + + 0 +
5.21: fully harmonized
benchmarking
0*+ + ++ + ++ 0/+
5.22: hybrid approach 0/+ + 0/+ 0/+ + 0/+
5.23: relative 0/+ + + + + 0/+
Drucksache 16/9334 – 194 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
performance
benchmarking
Key: ++ (significant improvement) + (improvement) - (deterioration) -- (significant deterioration) 0 (negligible change) n.r. (not
relevant
5.8. Allocation: new entrants
5.8.1. Policy Options and Screening
All options are subject to the principle of non-discrimination and to the requirement
not to favour certain installations above others in line with the State aid rules. The
exclusion of one or certain sectors from the new entrants reserve may not necessarily
constitute a selective advantage to all others. In the current Directive, these principles
are laid down in criterion 5 of Annex III to the Directive. In addition, in line with the
State aid rules, in order to avoid allocations beyond expected needs, the Commission
has consistently required allocations to new entrants not to exceed levels that can be
achieved by best available techniques, without however specifying precise levels. The
options to be assessed concern therefore the level at which the NER, if at all, is set
and administered and the guiding principles for allocations from the NER.
(71) Option 5.24: Status quo, Member States free to set the size and
administer the NER. Under the current ETS Directive only criterion 5
and the State aid rules are binding.
(72) Option 5.25: Fully or partially harmonised NERs to be
administered by Member States. Under this option, the rules for the
structure and the size of the NER would be further harmonised. In
particular differentiation according to technology or fuel could be
prohibited. The Commission could also set specific maximum values
for the benchmarks to be used107. Member States could maintain
discretion e.g. to exclude a certain sector from the reserve or to set
allocations at lower levels than the values specified by the
Commission.
(73) Option 5.26: One single EU-wide NER. Under this option, all new
entrants would receive their allocation from a central reserve at the
EU level. The allocation rules are the same for all new entrants.
Member States would remain responsible for processing applications
subject to control by the Commission. The size of the reserve would
be set at a level that covers expected needs for the allocation period
concerned and would be deducted from the allowances to be
auctioned, thereby having an impact also on the auctioning revenues
for each Member State. The Directive would set out the main
principles and the procedures to put in place more detailed rules.
107 The Directive would rather lay down the procedure by which maximum values would be
determined.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 195 – Drucksache 16/9334
(74) Option 5.27: No NER at all. Under this option, all new entrants have
to buy allowances in the market.
Both harmonised NERs at Member State level as well as an EU-wide
NER have to mirror the rules for allocations to existing installations
at least partially. Mirroring implies in the very first place that new
entrants in sectors that are not eligible for any allowances for free are
not allocated any allowances from the NER. In case allowances to
existing installations are allocated on the basis of benchmarks based
on BAT, the same benchmarks should apply to new entrants, if
applicable subject to similar reduction factors.
The strongest case for not-mirroring the rules for existing installations
is to reduce the perverse incentives that inevitably arise from any
allocation to a new entrant. It could e.g. be perceived that allocations
to new entrants are set only at levels of 40-60% of BAT-levels. These
choices depend on the other choices on allocation. For the remainder
of this section, it is reasonable to assume both the harmonised NERs
at Member State level as the EU-wide NER to mirror rules for
existing installations to a large extent.
Screening the options leads to the following results:
Given the perverse incentives and distortions of competition generated under the
current system, the option to maintain the status quo is not retained for further
scrutiny. All other options meet at least the minimum levels of effectiveness and
efficiency and none of these options is fully inconsistent with EU objectives in other
domains. As regards option 5.27, it is worth noting that the absence of a NER means
foregoing a potential instrument to avoid carbon leakage.
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
5.24: Status quo - - - Discarded
5.25: harmonised NERs at MS-level � � � Retained
5.26: single EU-wide NER � � � Retained
5.27: no NER -/� � � Retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
5.8.2. Impacts – Comparing the Options
As regards environmental effectiveness, the main differences in impacts concern the
possibility to avoid carbon leakage. NERs at Member State level may in theory offer
somewhat more flexibility to adapt the rules to minimise carbon leakage without
allocating allowances to new entrants if the circumstances would not require doing so.
Given the evaluation of allocation methods, the principle of non-discrimination and
the reluctance of Member States to be unduly strict on allocations to new entrants, the
benefit of this flexibility appears to be rather limited.
Any allocation to new entrants has the effect of an investment subsidy, thereby
inevitably reducing the signal from the allowance price and rendering the ETS less
efficient. The chosen technologies may still reflect optimal abatement measures, but
without the allocation, the new investment may not take place at all, so any NER
Drucksache 16/9334 – 196 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
discourages product substitution. Harmonised rules, exclusion of fuel or technology
specific benchmarks may reduce perverse incentives to some extent. Moreover, in
case allocations to existing installations are given only when carbon leakage is a
serious risk, the allocations to new entrants are likely to be justified for the same
reason, therefore not having the same negative impact on efficiency of the system.
A harmonised approach encourages a level playing field in the internal market. The
option of one single EU-wide reserve is the best guarantee for equal treatment of
similar installations across the EU. Given the desire to attract investments, Member
States may seek to maximise allocations from NERs if they have the authority to do
so. Control on estimating capacity and/or expected production levels will remain,
however, rather difficult. The option of not having a NER would distort competition
in favour of incumbent installations receiving allocations for free.
Allocations to new entrants furthermore increase the likelihood of entry in the market
and therefore render markets more competitive. Not allocating to new entrants may
actually lead to barriers to entry, thereby increasing the market power of incumbent
producers on the market.
Allocations for free to new entrants are likely to lead to undesirable distributional
effects to the same degree as for existing installations. In less competitive markets,
entry may however increase total supply and thereby reduce prices and profits for the
producers that see their market power reduced.
Administrative costs will obviously be lowest in the absence of a NER.
Administrative costs of harmonised NERs at Member State level will be higher than
in the case of a single EU wide NER due to the cost of national administrations
having to set their rules within the harmonised framework.
5.8.3. Compliance of Options with Objectives
The advantages of New Entrant Reserves are largest when allowances are to be
allocated for free only to sectors where carbon leakage is a serious risk.
Under many angles it may not matter very much whether to have a central EU-wide
NER or harmonised NERs at Member State level. The first, however, scores
significantly better in guaranteeing a level playing field and may overall entail lower
administrative costs.
Table 5.8.3. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environ-
mental
Effective-
ness
Economic
Efficiency
Level
playing
field/ com-
petition
Simplicity,
transpa-
rency, pre-
dictability
Distribu-
tional
effects
Administra-
tive costs
5.25: harmonized NER
at MS level
+ 0 + 0/+ 0/+ 0/+
5.26: single EU-wide + 0 ++ + 0/+ 0/+
NER
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 197 – Drucksache 16/9334
5.27: no NER - ++ - ++ + ++
Key: ++ (significant improvement) + (improvement) - (deterioration) -- (significant deterioration) 0 (negligible change) n.r. (not
relevant
Considering the various scores, option 5.26, a single EU-wide NER appears to be the
preferred option as it best safeguards a level playing field and it may be useful to have
as an instrument to avoid the risk of net carbon leakage.
5.9. Allocation: closure rules
The options under this section are only relevant for installations receiving allocation
for free.
The present Directive does not establish rules concerning the closure of existing
installations. Accordingly, Member States set up their own provisions. There are three
key elements.
� The definition of 'closure' varies among Member States. Some have, e.g., set
minimum levels of production below which an installation is assumed to be
closed..
� The period after closure during which operators continue to receive allowances
varies. Member States generally set the rule that no allowances are given for closed
installations as from the year following closure.
� In addition, a range of rules have been put in place to address specifically
replacement investment, where allocations to closed installations are transferred to
replacement investment by the same operator, on the same site or, more generally,
within the same Member State.
5.9.1. Policy Options and Screening
The following options are assessed:
(75) Option 5.28: status quo. The current rules provide full freedom,
apart from the criterion generally prohibiting favourable treatment of
certain installations or sectors.
(76) Option 5.29: No closure rule. Under this option, operators would
continue to receive allowances throughout the trading period
concerned, but would not receive allowances after closure in a
subsequent trading period.
(77) Option 5.30: a harmonised closure rule without transfer rule.
Under this option, the definition of closure and the number of years
after closure during which operators continue to receive allowances
are harmonised. Replacement investment might be eligible for
allocations from the new entrants reserve, but no transfer rules would
Drucksache 16/9334 – 198 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
be allowed. Allowances not allocated to installations due to closure
would not be forfeited, but are added to the new entrants reserve108.
(78) Option 5.31: a harmonised closure rule with a harmonised
transfer rule. This option is equal to the previous, but in addition an
EU-wide transfer rule is put in place. Under this rule, an operator that
closes its installation continues to receive allowances until the end of
the trading period if it can prove that production has been transferred
to a new or existing installation without any restrictions as regards
location in the EU and operator. The new installation, or the capacity
expansion of the existing installation, would not be eligible for
allocations from the new entrants reserve.
A transfer rule is relevant only in case the allocation per unit of production to existing
installations is higher than the allocation to new entrants. In sections 5.7 and 5.8
above it is, however, concluded that if any allocating of allowances for free remains,
the preferred option is to have these allocations based on harmonised benchmarks
both for existing and new installations.
Screening the options leads to the following results:
Given the problems resulting from the present lack of harmonisation, option 1 is not
retained for further scrutiny. All other options meet at least the minimum levels of
effectiveness and efficiency and none of these options is fully inconsistent with EU
objectives in other domains.
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
5.28: Status quo - - - Discarded
5.29: harmonised NERs at MS-level -/� � � Retained
5.30: single EU-wide NER � � � Retained
5.31: no NER � � � Retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
5.9.2. Impacts – comparing the options
The main impacts of the options concern a trade-off between increasing efficiency of
the ETS and avoiding net carbon leakage. Closure rules significantly reduce the
incentive to close down installations, so option 5.29 brings the largest improvement in
terms of efficiency. That option, however, may also induce more net carbon leakage.
A harmonised closure rule (with a transfer rule) has the opposite effects: less
improvement of efficiency, better impacts in terms of avoiding net carbon leakage.
The size of these impacts depends very much on other choices. In case allowances are
allocated for free only to sectors with a proven risk of net carbon leakage, the negative
impacts on efficiency under option 5.31 would be minimised. In case all sectors
108 Another option would be not to allocate the allowances not allocated due to closure at all,
thereby effectively reducing the overall cap on emissions in the trading period concerned.
Such a rule would, however, go against the principles of a "cap and trade" system, creating
undue uncertainty about the actual cap and is therefore not retained for further scrutiny.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 199 – Drucksache 16/9334
would receive allowances for free, the negative impacts on efficiency under option
5.30 is likely to be significant. In case a transfer rule would become relevant, the
negative impacts on efficiency of option 5.31 would be larger.
It may be noted that the overall cap is not very much affected, as even under the
current system most, if not all, Member States add forfeited allowances to the new
entrants reserve and most of them auction the remainder of such reserves towards the
end of the trading period.
Not having any closure rule may have a relatively strong negative impact on the
economy, since it generates the strongest incentive for closure. In particular
installations where the value of emissions is high compared to the net margin over
production cost may be tempted to close down at the beginning of the trading period
and sell all allowances they continue to receive.
Closure and, if relevant, transfer rules inevitably impact on competition and as
explained in section 5.1.1, the (potential) distortions as regards location of production
from non-harmonised rules are important. Therefore, any closure rule and particularly
any transfer rule, if relevant, must be fully harmonised.
As regards distributional effects, it must be taken into account that continuing to
allocate allowances to operators after closure of the installation can be perceived as
undue. In fact, this is one of the main arguments for the existence of closure rules.
Closure and transfer rules inevitably involve administrative costs both for the
authorities and for companies, e.g. due to the need to monitor whether installations are
closed or not and whether production is effectively taken over by installations
benefiting from the transfer rule. It is difficult to say whether overall administrative
costs would be higher or lower with a harmonised transfer rule.
5.9.3. Compliance of Options with Objectives
From the assessment above, it results that the impacts and the compliance with
objectives depend on the choices on auctioning and allocation for free. In case
allowances are allocated for free only in sectors with a proven risk of net carbon
leakage, the option of harmonised rules for closure with an EU-wide transfer rule
would best comply with the objectives. In case installations in all sectors were to
receive allowances for free, the negative impacts on efficiency are likely to outweigh
the benefits of avoiding net carbon leakage. Harmonisation of the transfer rule,
defining it as open as possible, would limit distortions of competition.
Table 5.9.3. Summary of the impact of options in relation to relevant problems and objectives
Option Environ-
mental
Effective-
ness
Economic
Efficiency
Level
playing
field/ com-
petition
Simplicity,
transpa-
rency, pre-
dictability
Distribu-
tional
effects
Administra-
tive costs
5.29: no closure rule - + ++ ++ - ++
5.30: harmonized
closure rule, no
0 + ++ ++ + +
Drucksache 16/9334 – 200 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
transfer rule
5.31: harmonized
closure rule with
transfer rule
0 + ++ + + +
Key: ++ (significant improvement) + (improvement) - (deterioration) -- (significant deterioration) 0 (negligible change) n.r. (not
relevant
Only in case allowances are allocated for free only in sectors with a proven risk of net
carbon leakage, the preferred option is to have a harmonised closure rule. It follows
from the previous sections that there should not be a need for any (harmonised)
transfer rule.
6. LINKING WITH EMISSION TRADING SYSTEMS IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AND
APPROPRIATE MEANS TO INVOLVE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND
COUNTRIES IN ECONOMIC TRANSITION
6.1. Linking to other systems
6.1.1. Introduction
Article 25 of the ETS Directive provides the legal basis for linking the EU ETS with
emission trading systems of third countries109. So far, agreement has been reached to
link the EU ETS with the EEA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The
recent launch of the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP110) underlines the
growing interest of other countries and regions in the world in considering linking up
with the EU ETS.
Any link of the EU ETS with another emission trading system would need to be
established through the use of Article 300 EUT. This article requires the Commission
to make recommendations to the Council, which authorises the Commission to open
negotiations on such linking agreements. The negotiations are conducted by the
Commission in consultation with Council committees (e.g. the Climate Change
Committee), and the final agreement is approved by Council by qualified majority.
Against this background, considerations concerning linking the EU ETS with other
emission trading systems in the framework of this impact assessment can only deal
with the general principles related to linking rather than the concrete impacts which
109 The term "linking" under heading 6.1 has to be understood in the sense of Article 25 of the
ETS Directive. Linking established through acknowledgment of credits created by JI and
CDM project is dealt with in the following section (see 6.2).
110 ICAP is a new initiative that aims to contribute to the establishment of a well-functioning
global cap and trade carbon market. It has been launched in the framework of a high level
event on 29 October 2007 in Lisbon and brings together public authorities from countries and
regions that have implemented or are actively pursuing the implementation of carbon markets
through mandatory cap and trade systems, to share experience and knowledge. It includes a
number of US states as well as the EU as founding members. For more information, see
http://www.icapcarbonaction.com/ and
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission.htm#brochure
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 201 – Drucksache 16/9334
may affect the EU ETS when linked up with another concrete trading system. In this
case, a separate impact assessment is likely to be required. The following sections will
therefore deal with general rather than specific deliberations.
6.1.2. Identification of Problems
Currently, the EU ETS is the largest GHG emission trading system based on trade
between companies in the world. By this, it provides a model for other countries and
regions that seek to reduce GHG emission at least cost. As it emanates from the
Commission Communication "Towards a global carbon market"111, the ultimate goal
of GHG emission trading is developing a world-wide carbon market for a number of
reasons:
� Environmental effectiveness: a global carbon market under a cap-and-
trade system would ensure that environmental objectives are met globally.
In the longer term, it is unlikely that the necessary emission reductions
can be achieved by only a part of the world offsetting growing emissions
in other parts of the world.
� Efficiency: a global carbon market would allow identifying least cost
abatement options at a global rather than regional scale, thereby
considerable decreasing overall costs at which a given emission reduction
target can be achieved.
� Avoidance of leakage: in a global system, the risk of leakage triggered by
relocation of production facilities from places with more stringent to less
stringent rules in place would be avoided.
� Fairness and acceptability: in the longer term, a global market is
indispensable, in order to ensure a certain degree of fairness in terms of
sharing the burden between all polluters. This is without prejudice to
considerations relating to the different stages of economic development
the various countries are facing. Overburdening one region may
undermine the political acceptance of emissions trading.
While there are many reasons advocating linking the EU ETS with emissions trading
systems of other countries, there are also risks involved. Linking can undermine the
systems involved. Poorly-designed linking of systems can reduce their environmental
effectiveness by negatively affecting the total reductions to be reached. Price caps in
one system, for example, may increase the risk of higher emissions throughout the
linked system as in practice the price cap comes to apply for both systems. Linking
can also result in environmental guarantees built into systems being bypassed. This is
for instance the case when different criteria are used for the eligibility of credits from
offsetting projects, e.g. JI or CDM projects, in the different linked systems. Poorly
designed linking could also negatively impact on competition between companies
covered under the systems and can adversely influence the market price of emission
reductions.
111 COM(2006) 676.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 202 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
To sum up: while linking with emission trading systems of third countries is highly
desirable for the reasons set out above, it must not undermine the environmental
effectiveness and proper functioning of the system.
6.1.3. Identification of Objectives
In the light of the preceding section, the following objectives can be identified:
1. Identification of criteria for assessing the potential for linking
2. Developing criteria for linking with other systems
It is worth highlighting that these criteria will be identified and developed in a general
rather than specific manner.
6.1.4. Criteria for assessing the potential for linking
In the light of the above objectives, the following does not refer to policy options, but
criteria to be applied when it comes to linking the EU ETS to another trading system.
The following criteria are assessed against effectiveness, efficiency and consistency.
� Type of system
� Voluntary/mandatory systems
� Stringency of cap
� Units used
� Registry standards
� Use of intervention measures
� Direct/indirect approach
� Use of banking
� Use of borrowing
� Sources/activities covered
� Emissions covered
� Monitoring & Reporting
� Compliance and enforcement
� Project credit provisions
A detailed assessment of these elements or criteria is contained in ENTEC 2007b.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 203 – Drucksache 16/9334
Summary
Having assessed each element against its impact, almost all elements are deemed to
have sufficient impact to form the basis of an assessment of the suitability of a system
to be linked to the EU ETS with the exception of the criteria "Sources/activities
covered" and "Emissions covered".
Table 3.1 summarises the assessment. In addition to these elements, the sustainability
of a linking agreement needs to be considered, this would include considering how to
adapt to changes in either system. A review clause would be required in a linking
agreement in order to return to the issue if major changes occur.
Table 3.1 Summary of Potential Differences
Potential impact on Element
Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency
Critical?
Type of system - 0 0 Y
Voluntary/Mandatory 0/- +/- 0 Y
Stringency of cap - - 0 Y
Units used - 0 - Y
Registry standards 0/- 0/- - Y
Use of intervention measures - - 0 Y
Direct/indirect approach - - 0 Y
Use of banking 0/+ +/- 0 Y
Use of borrowing - +/- 0 Y
Sources/activities covered 0 0 0 N
Emissions covered 0 0 0 N
Monitoring & reporting - 0 0 Y
Compliance and enforcement - - 0 Y
Project credit provisions 0 0 0/- Y
Key: Positive impact - Negative impact-0 Negligible or no impact
6.1.5. Developing Criteria for linking with other systems
The decision on whether or not to link with an emissions trading system will be made
on a case-by-case basis, so the assessment will need to be appropriate to the situation.
In particular, the assessment needs to be proportionate to risk and take into account
the level of potential impacts. e.g. size of market etc.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 204 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
To address the potential negative impacts, two conceptual approaches have been
considered:
� Exclusion criteria – using some criteria to assess the suitability of a system for
linking. This may be binary (yes/no, i.e. elements must be harmonised or it will not
be desirable/possible to link) or quantitative (e.g. a threshold level)
� Control measure – if possible, put some measures in place to restrict the link in
some way and minimise the negative impacts.
For each element, the issues involved are outlined and possible criteria and control
measures are identified. Where appropriate and evident, issues for further
consideration are highlighted. A more detailed analysis is available from ENTEC
2007b.
Criterion 1: Units Used
The EU ETS could not be linked to systems directly using AAUs without
undermining its effectiveness and environmental integrity.
Criterion 2: Registry Standards
If trading systems are to be linked, then their registry systems must be able to
accurately exchange data. Registry standards already exist under the Kyoto
Protocol112, but this does not apply to other countries. As a potential criteria, the
availability of an UN compatible registry or, if this turns out not to be possible, a
"translation system" to bridge the two standards might offer a solution.
Criterion 3: Type of System
Cap-and-trade systems are not incompatible with baseline-and-credit systems, so the
larger issue is the nature of the target (i.e. absolute vs. relative). If the proposed link
was to a system in a country that has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, then a relative
target could risk undermining the environmental integrity of the system.
For this reason, the EU ETS should only link with systems aiming at absolute targets.
Criterion 4: Voluntary/Mandatory
As outlined above, linking to a voluntary system might affect the environmental
integrity of the system and risk competitive distortions. For this reason, only links to
mandatory systems may be considered. Alternatively, in order not to exclude links to
voluntary systems but sort out potential adverse effects on the EU ETS, a requirement
to demonstrate additionality could be set up. Opting into the mandatory system might
also represent a possible criterion.
Criterion 5: Stringency of Cap
112 See Decision 12/CMP.1 - Guidance relating to registry systems under Article 7, paragraph 4,
of the Kyoto Protocol.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 205 – Drucksache 16/9334
The target in both systems needs to be tight enough to impose a binding constraint on
emissions. This means that the total quantity of allowances is smaller than the level of
need under business-as-usual conditions. In order to arrive at such a level, a formula
could be used to calculate the maximum allowable limits for the cap in the linked
system (similar to the approach taken by the Commission in Phase II) or to set a
threshold by assessing the allowance price. However, this might only be possible, if
there is a sufficient level of transparency on the market.
Whatever the arrangements for linking are, it is likely that there will be a difference
between the allowance prices in the 2 systems. On linking, the prices will converge.
Criterion 6: Monitoring and Reporting
In order to ensure the integrity of the EU ETS, monitoring and reporting standards
must be rigorous enough to be reliable and accurate. The use of EU standards or the
definition of appropriate minimum requirements would be relevant criteria.
Criterion 7: Compliance and Enforcement
As with monitoring and reporting, standards of a linked system must be rigorous
enough to avoid leakage or gaming. Make-good provisions, introduction of minimum
penalties and of other sufficient sanctions to ensure compliance must be considered.
Criterion 8: Intervention Measures
There are a range of intervention measures, generally designed to control costs.
Potential criteria for linking the EU ETS with systems employing intervention
measures may be not to establish links to systems with intervention measures or to
define a list of acceptable intervention measures.
Criterion 9: Direct / Indirect Approach
Emissions can be controlled directly at source or indirectly - at the level of end-users.
Linking two systems with different approaches can be technically complex.
Therefore, links will only be made to systems that trade direct emission reductions.
Criterion 10: Banking / Borrowing
Differences in banking / borrowing provisions can be problematic in situations where
there are doubts about the appropriateness of the allocation and differences in
allocation stringency between trading periods. For this reason, only a certain level of
banking/borrowing should be acceptable. If it is not adhered to, a restriction on
trading between the systems could come into play.
6.1.6. Compliance of options with objectives
Emissions trading systems can differ in several ways, but not all of these are
significant. There are several critical elements that must be considered when linking
systems, but no major technical obstacles to linking have been identified.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 206 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
When considering these critical elements, different approaches can be taken. In some
cases the potential negative impacts can be reduced or avoided through a variety of
control measures. Given the variety of systems, some flexibility and pragmatism is
needed for linking the EU ETS, but this must be balanced against cost-effectiveness.
There are also some over-arching issues that have been identified for further
consideration.
– EU ETS Harmonisation: There are some elements of the EU ETS that are not
consistent across the EU Member States. In order to ensure the sustainability of a
link, it is important to have internal harmonisation of the EU ETS as wide as
possible as a step towards external linking as this will minimise the change within
the EU ETS. More consistent harmonisation would simplify the process of linking
at a later stage. However, this does not need to delay progress on linking of trading
systems. A cautious approach would be prudent and a pilot period could be used to
reduce risks.
– Market Smoothing: Linking systems would result in an adjustment in allowance
prices as the prices in the two systems converge. Given the broader context of the
review, more consideration should be given to how to minimise the market shocks
resulting from this and how to provide improved predictability.
– Potential Barriers in Legal Framework: The Directive currently only permits
links to Annex B countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Linking to
systems in other countries would require an amendment. Furthermore, amendments
of the legal framework would be required to enable linking. Two have been
identified (Robinson et al, 2007) as:
� The recognition of EU allowances by the system linked to and the
recognition of other ETS units in the EU ETS would need to be
established. In order to address the issue of recognising non-EU ETS
allowances, a new regulation would have to be drafted.
� The definition of an allowance also identifies it as 1 tonne of CO2e, but
there is no reason why the EU ETS should not be linked to a system with
allowances of a different denomination. This may need amending of the
Registry Regulation.
– Legal Infrastructure Required: Having defined the criteria, the actual process
and infrastructure for linking agreements would need to be developed. At present,
the provisions in the Directive (Article 25) set out a two-stage process where
firstly, the Commission would reach an agreement with the entity wishing to link
its system to the EU ETS. However, the Member States would have a strong say in
the comitology committees accompanying the negotiations and the final conclusion
of an agreement by the Council. Also the sustainability of the linking agreement
should be considered in that there should be clear review clauses to allow both
systems to adapt to changes in either system or external changes that might
influence effectiveness, cost-efficiency or consistency.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 207 – Drucksache 16/9334
– Contents of Linking Agreement: The legal and governance issues stipulated in an
agreement for mutual recognition of allowances needs to be considered:
� How prescriptive should provisions be;
� How to change provisions of systems
� Frequency of meetings, aim of meetings of regulators of linked systems;
� Rules for expansion of membership;
� Legal provisions for withdrawal of membership;
� Links to international trade law;
� How a link between different ETS could be severed.
The Commission has already tendered out work to consider the structure and content
of an agreement.
6.2. Use of offsets113
6.2.1. Entitlements
6.2.1.1. Identification of Problems
Offsets allow EU operators to meet obligations under the ETS by investing in projects
to reduce emissions in developing countries. This can be a short term cost-efficient
way for companies to meet their obligations, and an incentive for developing
countries to come within an international agreement.
But they have their problems too as too much use of foreign offsets could avoid EU
countries to make real domestic change increasing future domestic abatement costs
and may undermine chances of achieving an international agreement post 2012.
Doubts also persist about the real emissions reduction impact of some offset projects.
Finally some industrialised countries resist the idea that offsets can cut the costs for
emerging competitors.
Finding a balance means improving the environmental integrity of offsets and
determining the right level of entitlements for EU operators. These entitlements will
need to be fixed with reference to the degree of incentive needed for EU operators,
and made flexible to allow for the evolution of international negotiation.
Following the experience of phase 1 and allocations for phase 2, serious concerns
have been raised about an over-supply of CERs/ERUs entering the EU ETS, resulting
113
Because uncertainty prevails about the exact shape and scope for JI/CDM beyond 2012 the
more general term "offsets" is used. JI and CDM are still used when dealing with the second
trading period and rules for transition to the third period.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 208 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
in insufficient supplementarity in the total effort to bridge and taking away incentives
for emission reductions and technological change within the EU.
Under the conditions for phase 2 around 1400 Mt of credits are allowed to enter the
EU ETS, or a yearly average of 280 Mt. Relative to 2005 emissions the estimated
phase 2 cap represents a reduction of approximately 130 MtCO2. If full use of credits
is made by operators, few domestic reductions would occur and in an extreme case
emissions in the EU ETS could even increase by 150 Mt, i.e. the difference between
280 and 130 Mt making it more difficult to achieve the EU's overall 2020 reduction
targets.
Banking provisions ensure that any excess credits or their equivalent allowances can
be transferred to the third commitment period. With expected higher prices towards
the end of the third commitment period, there exists an incentive to bank as many
allowances/credits as possible. This could water down the impact of the EU ETS on
the achievement of the 2020 energy and climate package. Keeping a similar high
entitlement for use of offsets in phase 3 could exacerbate this problem.
Increased access to offset credits might be able to alleviate competitiveness concerns.
However, domestic reductions achieved through the EU ETS contribute cost-
effectively to the overall EU GHG emission reduction targets for 2020, and the need
to continue reducing GHG also in the longer term, as already envisaged by the
European Council in March 2007114. More use of JI/CDM credits would require other,
more costly measures to be taken in other areas.
Finally, a too generous use of offset credits may reduce incentives for large-emitting
developing countries to take ambitious measures as part of an international agreement
on climate change, as they would benefit from the issuance of offset credits without
the need to take on any commitments in terms of reducing GHG emissions for
themselves.
Another problem relates to the un-harmonised access to these credits in different
Member States. Despite a narrowing down of the discrepancies by the Commission,
the level of use still differs between Member States. If more harmonised rules are
accepted in phase 3 for allocation of allowances, keeping access to offsets un-
harmonised could distort the level playing field between companies competing in the
internal market.
With respect to setting the entitlement for use of offsets in the EU ETS two scenarios
need to be clearly distinguished:
– No international agreement: In the absence of an international agreement the EU
would still need the flexibility that offsets offer, but if phase 2 entitlements are kept
unchanged the problem of over-supply is likely to persist in phase 3.
– International agreement: In case an international agreement is reached the ambition
level of the EU's overall reduction target increases from -20% to -30% compared to
114 In its conclusions of March 2007, the European Council envisaged developed countries to
collectively reduce their emissions by 60% to 80% by 2050 compared to 1990.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 209 – Drucksache 16/9334
1990 levels. In this case a higher entitlement of offset credits may be needed to
avoid excessively high compliance costs.
6.2.1.2. Identification of Objectives
Against this background, the following objectives may be identified:
– In the absence of an international agreement develop more harmonised quantitative
provisions on the use of offset credits to avoid market distortions, guarantee a
sufficiently high amount of reductions within the EU and contribute efficiently to
the 2020 energy and climate legislative package; In case an international
agreement has been reached, provide structures and procedures to reassess the
internationally agreed rules for the use of offsets and adapt them to the needs of the
EU ETS and the overall EU climate and energy package.
6.2.1.3. Policy Options and Screening
Two scenarios could occur:
In the event of an international agreement, increased access would be allowed in
tandem with the increase in the level of emission reductions to be achieved through
the EU emissions trading system. This would be done pending EU scrutiny of the
agreed international rules. In the event that the conclusion of an international
agreement is delayed beyond 2012, additional credits from projects or other emission
reducing activities may be used in the Community trading system in accordance with
agreements that may be concluded with third countries. Agreements reached shall
provide for the use of offsets in the Community emissions trading system from
renewable energy or energy efficiency technologies which promote technological
transfer and sustainable development.
In the absence of a global agreement several options for setting these entitlements
have been assessed:
(79) Option 6.1 status quo: non-harmonised approach whereby Member
States continue to give similar level entitlements as in phase 2 to their
installations (subject to approval by the Commission).
(80) Option 6.2 Mandatory unlimited entitlements to the use of offsets;
(81) Option 6.3 Harmonised EU entitlements below phase II levels: an
EU-wide harmonised provision for the use of offsets, banking
envisaged entitlements from phase 2 into phase 3. This option
assesses the impacts of a lower EU-wide harmonised level of
entitlements for the third period. The level of entitlement has to be
determined bearing in mind that the EU ETS plays a crucial role in
achieving the EU's 2020 renewables and overall emission reduction
target in a cost-effective way. A balance should be struck between
maximising the effect of the EU ETS in achieving these targets and
allowing flexibility in abatement options by use of offsets. To avoid
not achieving a sufficiently high price on the market for the EU ETS
Drucksache 16/9334 – 210 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
to significantly contribute to the 2020 energy and climate objectives,
it is suggested that in the third commitment period only ERUs/CERs
generated until 2012 and CERs generated after 2012 from projects
registered prior to 2012 will be allowed for compliance in the EU
ETS. To avoid oversupply, the crediting period for these projects
should be limited to a period of seven years.
(82) Option 6.4 differentiated EU sector averages: quantitative
provisions on the use of ERUs/CERS are harmonised at an EU-level
but differentiated by sector to allow increased shares of JI/CDM for
sectors submitted to auctioning and prone to international competitive
pressures.
Screening the options leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: Options 6.1 and 6.2 would allow a significant supply of offset
credits to be introduced in the EU ETS, thereby considerably lowering the
allowance prices. As a consequence, the incentive to lower EU carbon-intensity
may be postponed or greatly watered down. In the longer term, this is likely to
result in inabilities to meet overall EU GHG reduction targets. It also contradicts
the requirement for supplementarity and could lead to potentially no efforts
depending upon the costs of remaining abatement potential in Phase III versus
long-term offset prices being undertaken within the EU. This would lower
investment in clean technology which is vital for longer term emissions reduction.
In addition, a lack of domestic reductions will thwart EU’s ambitions in
negotiating greater participation in an international post-2012 agreement. Options
6.3 and 6.4 would safeguard the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS by
ensuring the necessary scarcity of JI/CDM credits, in order not to adversely affect
the level of domestic abatement.
– Efficiency: Option 6.3 would score best in this regard, as there is no additional
need for monitoring the amount of national offset credits anymore, while option
6.1 remains neutral. Additional costs would be incurred by option 6.4 due to the
differentiation of sectors, which would need to be established. Option 6.2 is likely
to incur costs in the long-term, as the higher lock-in of inefficient technologies
now may result in increased costs for both operators and authorities, and seriously
hamper achieving an international agreement on further emission reduction cuts.
– Consistency: Option 6.3 would improve consistency with other Community
policies, in particular with respect to the Lisbon Strategy and Sustainable
Development, while option 6.4 is likely to be neutral in this respect. Adverse
impacts on the Lisbon objectives and Sustainable Development may accrue from
options 6.1 and 6.2, as the need to adapt is considerably reduced. Competitive
distortions on the internal market should also not be excluded due to the non-
harmonised or unlimited supply of JI/CDM credits.
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
6.1: Status quo - 0 - discarded
6.2: mandatory unlimited entitlements - - - discarded
6.3: harmonised EU entitlement � � � retained
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 211 – Drucksache 16/9334
6.4: differentiated EU sector averages � - 0 retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
In the light of the above considerations, options 6.1 and 6.2 will not be further
pursued.
6.2.1.4. Impacts – comparing the options
The assessment criteria used for comparing the impacts of the options are
environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, administrative costs as well as
competition and competitiveness.
Environmental Effectiveness: As already set out in the chapter on “Further
harmonisation and increased predictability”, higher compliance costs could affect
investment decisions of industrial sectors exposed to the risk of carbon leakage as a
consequence of international competition. Option 6.3 is designed to ensure a level of
scarcity that is considered necessary to trigger the meaningful abatement measures.
This, however, may lead to carbon leakage.
A lack of domestic reductions will thwart EU’s ambitions in negotiating greater
participation in an international post 2012 agreement. Therefore, avoiding over-
supply of offset credits and introducing specific harmonised quantitative entitlements
on offsets, such as in option 6.3 is recommended.
The principle reason for having differentiated EU-wide sector limits for offsets, as
implied by option 6.4, is to help reduce the cost impact on sectors particularly
exposed to competition and as a result reduce the likelihood of leakage of emissions
outside of the system. By tailoring higher limits towards these sectors this option is
likely to perform better in terms of leakage reduction than harmonised EU-wide limits
across all participants (option 6.3).
Economic efficiency: A harmonised and restricted use of credits, as envisaged by
option 6.3, would increase the incentive to reduce emissions through new
technologies and practices, and substantially help achieve cost-effectively the EU's
20% renewables target. In the same manner, it could lead to more substitution away
from GHG-intensive products on the EU market towards less-carbon intensive goods
and production and larger incentives for investment in clean technology development,
which in turn could help achieve lower abatement costs both domestically and
internationally in the long-run. Therefore, option 6.3 is likely to establish an incentive
to dynamic efficiency, in particular in the light of the 2020 emission reduction target.
With more domestic reductions also come more ancillary energy security and health
benefits. As for the detailed quantitative impacts of this option, please refer to the
impact assessment on the effort sharing decision.
Option 6.4 is more likely to reduce efforts to undertake emissions reductions within
the EU, at least within these sectors, unless the differentiated offset limits could be set
such that the total import of these credits into the ETS is the same as under the
reference case or option 6.3 (harmonised EU-wide limits), with lower or even zero
limit for sectors such as power generation and a higher limit for more exposed sectors.
This would lead to the same overall emissions reduction within the ETS as a whole,
Drucksache 16/9334 – 212 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
but with carbon efficiency improvements more focused in the less exposed sectors.
However, it remains open whether incentives to ensure dynamic efficiency would
prove to be as efficient as assumed under option 6.3.
With respect to a well functioning carbon market and given that the offset credit
levels would be determined at EU level, one can expect an improvement in the
functioning of the internal market arising from both options.
Administrative costs: Compared to the baseline or reference scenario, option 6.3
would entail reduced administrative costs due to the application of uniform ceilings
across the entire EU. This is opposed to differentiated offset limits across ETS
sectors, which are likely to require higher administrative costs, as upfront costs would
be needed in the short term to design and assess the split in differentiated offset limits
across the ETS sectors. But the implementation of harmonised limits by EU-wide
sector rather than at a Member State level is unlikely to lead to significant difference
in administrative costs to public authorities over the longer term. Costs may increase
for businesses if they would have to prove competitiveness pressures in order for a
sector to become eligible for higher limits.
Competition and competitiveness: Given that the offset credit levels are determined
at EU level, option 6.3 would entail no major distributional equity deficiencies. An
installation level limit would reduce flexibility as opposed to a first come first serve
system. The latter would also be fairer in that companies with higher than average
abatement costs could have access to a higher than average share of credits if they use
them first. The differentiation by sector under option 6.4 should lead to an overall
improvement in the equity of treatment as industries’ first concern is achieving a level
playing field across the ETS within its own sector and with competitors outside the
EU. Because of the higher access to offsets this option could reduce these
competitiveness concerns and the risks of unintended leakage from these sectors. This
should therefore increase the equal treatment of those exposed as opposed to the non-
exposed installations. On the other hand, it may be difficult in practice to accurately
define sector differentiations, therefore raising possible state aid concerns.
Competitive distortions in case there is competition across sectors (e.g. in the
construction business) could also occur. Furthermore, if the overall amount of offsets
should not be increased, in order to implement domestic abatement measures rather
than offsetting emission by credits, option 6.4 could lead to potential distributional
equity problems, as other sectors not considered eligible for a higher amount of
offsets, would need to bear a stronger share of the overall reduction pie. There may be
more efficient and effective ways of dealing with the competitiveness issues rendering
option 6.4 redundant.
While in the short-run a higher level of domestic abatement can expose some sectors
to more international competition, in the long-run, as the geographic coverage of
carbon constraints increases, the international competitiveness of EU operators would
be enhanced under option 6.3.
Employment: In the short term and due to the potentially higher risk of carbon
leakage, employment effects accruing from option 6.3 cannot be fully excluded, but
are very likely to be limited and even not relevant, if a comprehensive international
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 213 – Drucksache 16/9334
agreement is likely to be concluded in the foreseeable future. Option 6.4 would allow
addressing this issue in a more tailor-made manner.
Another relevant aspect to be considered is that a separate key impact of quantitative
provisions on access to offset credits is on sustainable development outside of the EU,
as this is a requirement for approval of CDM projects. In general where a higher level
of offsets is allowed within the ETS this leads to higher demand for CDM credits, and
hence should lead to an improvement in sustainable development (SD) in developing
countries (albeit at the expense of investment in emissions abatement inside the EU).
However, this only holds true if the offsetting mechanisms truly contribute to SD in
the host countries. For many current projects doubts have been raised about this and
calls have been made to limit in qualitative ways access to some of these credits (see
section on standards).
Table 6.2.1.4. Summary of the impact of options
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Economic
Efficiency
Administrative
Costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
Employment
6.3:
harmonised
EU
entitlements
0/+ + + 0/+ 0
6.4:
differentiated
sector offset
levels
+ 0/+ - 0/+ 0/+
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
6.2.1.5. Compliance of options with objectives
The options considered include
� 6.3 Harmonised EU entitlements banking envisaged entitlements from
phase 2 into phase 3.
� 6.4 Differentiated EU-wide sector offsets entitlements.
Under the harmonised EU average approach (option 6.3), lower offset project limits
will provide signals to investors through a higher carbon price, but these would have
to be combined with a reduction in uncertainty with regards to the length of the
trading period115 and other impacts on returns on investment. In addition, the risk of
leakage would have to be dealt with as some industries can be damaged by the short-
term price disadvantage of this sub-option.
Option 6.4 proposes a way to limit leakage—through differentiated allocation of
offset credit rights among sectors. It would involve a number of different problems.
115 longer trading periods than five years will provide greater certainty for long-term investment
in capital intensive technology.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 214 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
For this reason, if other potential measures to give more favourable treatment to
exposed sectors such as revenue recycling from auctioning or trade related measures
are deemed sufficient by themselves then Option 6.3 would be the preferred choice.
6.2.2. Standards
6.2.2.1. Identification of problems
There is a general will to preserve and further increase the quality of JI and CDM
projects issuing credits entering the EU ETS market. Despite stringent scrutiny by the
CDM Executive Board doubts prevail regarding the permanence, additionality and/or
negative social and environmental externalities of some types of offset projects.
Because CERs/ERUs are used to substitute domestic reductions, doubts about their
additionality could create emissions to rise further. Project such as HFC-23 reductions
from HCFC-22 production facilities have problems of their own as they generate large
supplies of cheap credits, crowding-out investments in other projects with more
positive impact on sustainable development and long term technological change.
In the light of the considerable range of how various types of offset credits are used in
different countries and regions of the world, it is worth clarifying the following issues:
- The use of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) was ruled out at a very early stage of
the review process, as the reasons why this was initially not foreseen in the EU ETS
have not changed. AAUs are a creation of international public law, and their
credibility depends upon all countries granted AAUs taking on more stringent
requirements in the same system. The EU ETS is a robust company-based system
whose operation is independent of external events, and holdings of allowances are
guaranteed to remain valid. As from 2013, there is no certainty on the continued issue
of AAUs. Against this background, AAUs cannot be converted into EU allowances.
This situation will remain unchanged in the future, also in the event of an
international agreement post 2012.
- Allowances represent a legislative entitlement to emit greenhouse gases under the
EU ETS. CERs and ERUs, provided their environmental integrity is ensured,
represent legislatively approved and verified reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
possibly used in the EU ETS for compliance purposes. Contrary to EU allowances
and credits issued under the Kyoto Protocol, verified emission reductions (VERs)
cannot guarantee legislatively approved regulatory standards including for
additionality and robust baselines. They lack the credibility and reliability accruing
from legislative approval that EU allowances and Kyoto Protocol credits have to
undergo116. For this reason, risks in terms of misuse, double counting and even fraud
related to VERs are considerably higher compared to systems that are based on
116 This does not mean that VERs should not be used for voluntary balancing greenhouse gas
emissions, if a company or person wishes to do that (As an example see TÜV Süd: VER+ - A
robust Standard for Verified Emission Reductions (Criteria Catalogue), available from
http://www.tuev-sued.de/uploads/images/1179142340972697520616/Standard_VER_e.pdf).
However, this has to be clearly distinguished from the legal commitment arising in the EU
ETS or Kyoto Protocol context to comply with emissions and for which purpose, allowances
and credits have to comply with legislatively approved regulatory standards.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 215 – Drucksache 16/9334
international or EU laws and subject to the respective reporting, monitoring and
verification rules.
6.2.2.2. Identification of objectives
In the absence of an international agreement the EU ETS needs to develop more
harmonised qualitative provisions and standards on the use of offset credits to
safeguard its environmental integrity.
In case an international agreement has been reached, structures and procedures need
to be foreseen to scrutinise quality standards set internationally on the use of offset
credits, and adapt if necessary to safeguard the environmental effectiveness of the EU
ETS.
6.2.2.3. Policy options and screening
To limit the risk of problematic credits reducing the system's environmental integrity,
a number of options are considered117.
(83) Option 6.5 Reference case (current negative list): nuclear and
LULUCF projects continue to be excluded, but the existing provision
for use of the guidelines from the World Commission on Dams
(WCD) for large hydro projects will be further clarified.
(84) Option 6.6 harmonised listing of projects which are insufficient:
the most controversial project types could be excluded based on their
type affiliation, as was already the case in phases 1 and 2. In phase 3
this list would be complemented at regular intervals by the Climate
Change Committee to cover new developments in the offset markets.
Of particular interest are HFC-23 type projects. Member States would
be obliged to accept all remaining project types.
(85) Option 6.7 Use criteria (criteria): projects will have to meet general
or specific use criteria to be agreed upon via comitology. Specific
criteria could be developed for each project type, thus allowing a
more differentiated set of entry criteria. One example for general use
criteria could be the Gold Standard118. This is effectively an extended
positive list including provisions on the project type (only projects in
the domain of renewable energies and end-use energy efficiency
improvements will be accepted);
(86) Option 6.8 Use criteria combined with a discounting factor
(discounting): As in option 6.7, though with a discount on credit
117 Note that no further qualitative restrictions (apart from the existing ones) would occur in
options 6.3 and 6.4 on quantitative restrictions as this would change market access for credits
already accepted in the system in phase 2.
118
The Gold Standard (GS) is a labelling scheme for JI and CDM projects developed in 2003 by
a consortium of WWF, SSN and Helio International. The GS is a non-profit foundation under
Swiss Law funded by public and private donors.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 216 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
transfers into EU ETS for project types with very low specific
abatement costs per unit CO2 eq, such as HFC-23 projects. The level
of discount is proportionate to the difference between emission
reductions caused by the project and the EU benchmark for the same
type of projects.
Project-based standards based on the project type are designed to represent a
community-wide harmonised way to tackle the influx of doubtful credits.
Screening the options leads to the following results:
– Effectiveness: While option 6.5 obviously would not allow achieving the objective
in question, the other options score much better in this respect: a simple command-
and-control option, a negative (or a positive list) under option 6.6 would have the
best performance in terms of environmental protection against risks from
problematic projects, i.e. nuclear, large hydro, HFC or LULUCF. This option
would be particularly effective where an entire class of projects is to be dismissed.
The option to complement the list with new project types could improve
environmental effectiveness in the face of new developments. The introduction of
use criteria e.g. based on the Gold Standard under option 6.7 would also ensure
that projects are clearly additional and furthermore in line with sustainable
development. More specific criteria would allow for a more differentiated approval
process. Combining the use criteria with discounting for low-cost projects (option
6.8) would limit the number of cheap credits transferred from problematic but not
altogether banned projects into EU ETS than without discounting. Hence it could
further increase environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS compared to use
criteria only.
– Efficiency: Option 6.6 would be the most cost-efficient way to exclude credit
transfer from unwanted project classes from EU ETS. They are very simple to
implement and design, resulting in low administrative costs, as does in principle
also option 6.5. However, option 6.6 allows achieving the objective in question at
low costs, a fact which does not apply to option 6.5 (see above). The administrative
costs of option 6.7 would also be moderate for general criteria but relatively high if
particular criteria are chosen. Transaction costs for the project developer would be
higher, since the requirements for the project design document (PDD) would be
higher. Financing for the project developer would be more difficult as uncertainty
about project approval may increase. This also applies to option 6.8, which would
also entail higher administrative costs both for implementation and for monitoring,
as the setting and comparing of benchmarks would require higher costs. The
system would be more complex than introducing solely particular use criteria and
would demand more sophistication in order to establish a fair and applicable,
legally waterproof discounting system. Project developers would on the one hand
have better access to financing than under strict use criteria, since project approval
will be more likely.
– Consistency: Option 6.5 and 6.6 do not create any consistency problems, however,
both options would not promote other objectives of EU policy either. In the case of
option 6.7, sustainable development could be supported. This, would, albeit to a
smaller extent, also be the case with option 6.8. The qualification is due to the fact
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 217 – Drucksache 16/9334
that discounting would lead to smaller improvements in social and environmental
terms than it would be the case without discounting.
Option Effectiveness Efficiency Consistency Result
6.5: Status quo - 0 0 discarded
6.6 Listing insufficient projects � � 0 retained
6.7 Acceptance criteria � - � retained
6.8 Criteria combined with discounting � - 0 retained
� meeting the screening criteria, 0 neutral, - not meeting the screening criteria,
In the light of the above considerations, options 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 will be further
pursued.
6.2.2.4. Impacts – comparing the options
In the following section, the options that qualified during screening are assessed in
connection with the most important CDM types against the criteria of environmental
effectiveness, economic efficiency, administrative costs and social impacts in the host
countries. The suitability of the options concerning the relevant type is discussed.
Environmental effectiveness: Option 6.6 aims primarily at entirely eliminating
highly problematic project classes from EU ETS, such as HFC, nuclear, and LULUCF
projects. This option would offer the best protection against unwanted project types,
offering simple monitoring and enforcement. For example, the introduction of a
listing of projects which are insufficient for project approval would considerably
reduce the incentive for construction of additional HCFC-22 producing facilities for
the mere fact of selling off HFC23 credits. This would probably also give incentive to
prevent a further switch to HCFC-22 refrigerants. It follows that with less HCFC
production, less ozone-depleting substances would be produced. Firms would have
incentive to switch to alternative non-ozone depleting refrigerants.
Option 6.6 is, however, totally unsuited for project classes encompassing both wanted
and unwanted projects, as is the case with most other project types.
The option would on the other hand have no effect on the environmental effectiveness
of other projects not in the negative list. The obligation for Member States to accept
other project types would increase transparency.
Option 6.7 might be even more environmentally effective than option 6.6, since
additional requirements imposed on projects would most likely translate into a
reduction of available offsets, leading firms to comply with emission targets via
domestic carbon emission reductions. Thus the approach would not only raise the
environmental quality of offsetting projects, but also provide incentives for firms to
invest in carbon efficiency improvements in the EU. The overall impact on GHG
emissions would be positive, as there would be increased certainty about the
additionality of emission reductions. More specific or particular use criteria would
offer even more possibilities to differentiate within the project classes and facilitate
the exclusion of unwanted projects as well as prevent the unwanted exclusion of
environmentally sound projects, thus eliminating the shortcoming of a too-general use
criterion.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 218 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
While discounting (option 6.8) can be considered as a simple and objective method of
addressing additionality problems, but also concerns about very low-cost credits (e.g.
N2O projects) that can lead to windfall profits for developers and can undermine other
types of projects, it is less effective in eliminating undesirable projects than the former
two options. For this reason, it scores worse in terms of environmental effectiveness
compared to the other options. However, it is worth noting that discounting could be
used to avoid the reward of competitors outside Europe via CDM credits for standards
already achieved in Europe, an aspect, which might become more important in the
longer term.
Economic Efficiency: Option 6.6 could have a rather high impact on the offset
market, if certain project classes were to be excluded. Furthermore, as problematic
project classes sometimes also offer the lowest abatement costs per CER it can be
assumed that the average production price for CERs and thus the average CER market
prices will tighten. The financial market impact would be very predictable, since
exclusion criteria would be clear-cut, allowing the market to adjust in time and
anticipate the changes in supply. But the value of CERs from pre-2012 project coming
on-line after 2012 would suffer.
Under option 6.7, transaction costs for the project developer might be higher in the
short term. Project financing could also be more costly due to the existing uncertainty
about the project approval. This would be of particular importance in project classes
where both highly unfavoured and favoured projects coexist, as in energy efficiency.
Overall abatement costs might be higher than the case without use criteria. Using
specific criteria (as opposed to general criteria) would lower financing and transaction
costs for the project developer, but would raise the administrative costs. The higher
short-term costs have, however, to be seen in the light of other long-term objectives of
the EU, such as sustainable development. Higher economic efficiency in the short-
term might not necessarily mean the same in the long and longer term. Acceptance
criteria (option 6.7) might be more effective in addressing those considerations, as it
would be the case under options 6.6 and 6.8.
Option 6.8 in combination with use criteria would open the door for market
mechanisms and re-allow certain low cost projects to enter the market, probably
lowering the average production prices for credits and simultaneously enlarging the
volume of allowed credits, thus lowering the market price for credits allowed into the
EU ETS, when compared to the criteria-only option. By crediting only beyond the
level of the EU benchmark it would also avoid the reward of competitors outside
Europe via offset credits for standards already achieved in Europe.
Still, compared to the status quo, market prices would be higher due to the provisions
that discounting would place on the influx of credits into the market. It follows that
abatement costs will be slightly higher than in the current situation, but lower than in
a criteria-only setting.
Discounting could be especially useful for projects aiming at the abatement of
substances with a high global warming impact, but not banned from transferring
credits into ETS. In these project categories, such as nitrous oxides or HFC-23, high
windfall profits occur due to the very low abatement costs per CO2 equivalent. This
entails over-supply and crowding-out of other project types, and constitutes a subsidy
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 219 – Drucksache 16/9334
for production elsewhere. The discount factor would effectively even out this
competitive distortion between the different project types and thus allow for a more
diversified supply of CERs, potentially lowering price volatility for CER.
Administrative costs: The key advantage of option 6.6 is its ease of implementation,
the low monitoring costs and the simplicity of the mechanism and as a consequence,
no measurable impact on administrative costs. Compared with the current situation
and with the negative list option, use criteria, as under option 6.7, would require
higher administrative costs. Monitoring and enforcement would become more costly
with more sophisticated standards. The design of option 6.8 will require selecting
project types to be subjected to discounting and the discount rate/benchmarks to be
used. This will entail possibly considerable administrative costs at EU level.
Furthermore, discounting of selected project types will add to the complexity of the
offset system and will increase transaction (learning) costs for project developers.
Competition and competitiveness: Provided the matter of quality of offsets is
decided at Community level, it is not expected to have any significant impact on
competition on the internal market nor on competitiveness vis-à-vis non-EU
competitors.
Employment: Bearing in mind the low additionality of some of these past projects,
employment impacts from option 6.6 will be minimal, as realisation will not be
affected. Effectively applied quality standards, as implied by option 6.7, would most
likely change the shape of the carbon offset market and thus may also have
widespread positive social impacts. Some undesirable projects would become less
likely to be realised, while others would be favoured, based no longer solely on the
ratio of emissions reduction costs versus global warming impact, but rather on
broader quality-related criteria. Consequently, the definition of these criteria would
lay the path for the social development of all possible CDM or JI host countries.
Option 6.8 is not expected to have any social impacts for the EU.
Option Comparison
While there are indeed intrinsic advantages in each of the discussed policy options,
for some the negative impacts outweigh the benefits. The preferable options are those
where the balance between environmental integrity and economic efficiency seems
likely and the option appears relatively easy to implement and enforce. The suitability
also depends on the chosen path of harmonisation.
– Option 6.6 (listing projects which are insufficient) is the first choice if simplicity
is the key argument and flexibility for adding further problematic project types in
the future. It offers clear-cut environmental results at low administrative cost.
– Option 6.7 (Use criteria) for project approval would be preferable if the aim is to
achieve social and environmental sustainability in all projects delivering credits
into the EU ETS. Such criteria could complement a negative list. But this option
entails higher administrative and transaction costs.
– Option 6.8 (Discounting) would improve market efficiency but would entail
administrative costs to determine the level of discounting/benchmarks. It is
Drucksache 16/9334 – 220 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
recommended that it is undertaken only for specific project types with high risks of
windfall profits (e.g. N2O or HFC-type projects).
Table 6.2.2.4: Summary of the impact of options
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Economic
Efficiency
Administrative
Costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
Employment
6.6: listing
insufficient
projects
0/+ 0/+ + 0 0
6.7:
Acceptance
criteria
+ + - 0 +
6.8: criteria
with
discounting
factor
-/0 -/0 - 0 0
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
6.2.2.5. Compliance of options with objectives
� The analysis concludes that listing options which are insufficient is the
simplest to administer, but are least subtle and can lead to the exclusion of
a large number of valid projects. In order to avoid this, such an approach
could be complemented by other measures such as use criteria or could be
combined with discounting for specific project types. While the former
scores much better in terms of administrative costs, the latter might –
however, only under certain circumstances – be more suitable to address
the potential problem of windfall profits, if no other instruments were
available.
6.2.3. Additional projects into the EU ETS
6.2.3.1. Identification of problems
Domestic offsetting projects are projects similar to CDM or JI projects in the sense
that they also generate credits, but the projects are not approved by the CDM
Executive Board of the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee.
Including domestic offset projects would extend the scope of the EU ETS and its price
signal to other sectors, but would require establishing a new unit of trade and carries
certain environmental risks, and reduces simplicity and transparency of the system.
6.2.3.2. Identification of objectives
Develop conditions to allow inclusion of domestic offset projects in the EU ETS.
Foresee stringent rules for their use to guarantee the environmental integrity of the EU
system (options 6.9 and 6.10).
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 221 – Drucksache 16/9334
6.2.3.3. Policy options and screening
(87) Option 6.9: Member States' discretion on use of domestic projects.
Domestic offset projects (DOPs) are similar to CDM or JI projects in
the sense that they also generate credits, but the projects are not
approved by the CDM Executive Board of the Joint Implementation
Supervisory Committee, but by individual Member States.
(88) Option 6.10: Community offsetting projects: They are similar to
domestic projects but projects are approved and credits are issued in a
harmonised way at EU level.
As only two options are retained no pre-screening was carried out.
6.2.3.4. Impacts – comparing the options
Environmental integrity: DOPs would extend the carbon price signal to other
sectors outside the EU ETS. But a number of environmental problems could arise
undermining the environmental integrity of the EU ETS. These problems include a
lack of external scrutiny on the level of additionality. Double counting problems
could also arise if the reductions achieved in the non-trading sectors are already
accounted for to achieve the national reduction targets. If too low baselines are used
these projects could be used to subsidise certain sectors and reduce the environmental
integrity of the EU ETS. DOPs individually authorised by Member States (option 6.9)
are very likely to entail these shortcomings, as there is no Community-wide agreed
and approved approach. This might not be the case, if these projects are based on
binding guidelines or rules (option 6.10), agreed at Community level with a view to
ensuring environmental effectiveness of these projects across the EU. A Community
wide approach could also prevent Community wide projects to act as a disincentive
for including new sectors into the EU ETS.
Economic efficiency: DOPs can also add more flexibility in terms of choice on how
to comply with emissions targets, which increases liquidity in the carbon market.
Thus, price volatility will be limited and investing will be less subject to uncertainty,
alleviating the financial burden placed on firms in the EU. New areas could be opened
up for cost-effective emission reductions provided that relevant baselines can be
agreed upon. Again, an approach based on individual Member States (option 6.9) is
not likely to turn out as promising as a Community-based one (option 6.10), since the
abatement potential is likely to be restricted to the Member State concerned or in
other words, projects could not benefit from the abatement potential available from
other Member States. For this reason, economic efficiency in terms of this kind of
projects is much better ensured by option 6.10.
Administrative costs: On the other hand, creating an additional mechanism like COP
projects requires substantial additional administrative costs to develop and implement
the legislation and national structures. It will also be costly to develop and agree on
baselines that determine the quantity CO2 reductions delivered by the projects.
Additional administrative costs will occur for the administrative body responsible for
approving the different DOP and calculating the number of allowances that
developers receive for carrying out the projects. Either option increases administrative
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costs, albeit to a different extent: while the full costs of setting the administrative
design of offset projects would occur in each Member State under option 6.9, this
would not be the case under option 6.10, where Member States would incur only a
fraction of these costs with the balance born by the Community. Overall Community
costs might be higher than costs occurred for a single Member State under option 6.9,
but overall administrative costs are expected to be much smaller under option 6.10.
However, both options score negatively compared to the “baseline” option of not
allowing COPs.
DOPs could also suffer from strong competition from JI projects, which already have
the JISC in place to determine additionality and thus could be done at lower
administrative costs.
The development of such projects would require a new currency to be created to trade
in the EU ETS. This would increase administrative costs and reduce transparency.
Different additionality checks in the Member States will also create less transparency
and confidence to the system.
Consistency: COPs, just like DOPs generally are problematic if they interfere with
other instruments designed to achieve a reduction in greenhouse gases. The problem
is that the emissions reduction credited to the COP might in part be generated by other
instruments, which would still result in double counting of emissions reductions.
Competition and competitiveness: Option 6.9 is not likely to create a level playing
field across the internal market. The level of costs incurred (administrative costs and
compliance costs) might vary from Member State to Member State, a fact which may
also depend on whether certain companies can participate or cannot participate in
these projects. For this reason, competitive distortions could occur in two respects
under option 6.9: first, some companies of a certain sector/area may participate, others
not resulting in varying overall operational costs for the companies of the sector/area.
Second, the baseline against which the credits could be created might also vary from
Member State to Member State, opening the door for windfall profits and thus
competitive distortions or subsidies. These shortcomings are by far less likely to occur
under option 6.10.
Employment: No measurable effect can be identified at this stage.
Table 6.2.4.4.2: Summary of the impact of options (options 6.13 and 14: case of international
agreement, 6.15: no international agreement)
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Economic
Efficiency
Administrative
Costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
Employment
6.9: MS
discretion
- - - - 0
6.10:
Community
offsetting
projects
0/+ 0/+ - 0 0
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 223 – Drucksache 16/9334
6.2.3.5. Compliance of options with objectives
The analysis suggests that DOPs and COPs would entail some benefits in terms of
increased flexibility and reduced price volatility, but that they would come at high
administrative costs and risks of double counting. Given the context of increased
harmonisation, which is one of the aims of the ETS review and the potential to reduce
administrative costs, the analysis concluded that a mechanism for EU action to be
taken or a mechanism to make EU-wide ranging decisions through comitology is
recommended. Implementing the administrative procedures at EU-level would lower
administrative costs and ensure that Member States can have confidence in the
integrity and validity of any such projects.
6.2.4. Transition and predictability
6.2.4.1. Identification of problems
There is insufficient clarity on how credits acquired prior to 2012 (banking) or
expected to be issued post 2012 from projects initiated before 2012 will be treated in
the EU ETS. As mentioned before, there exists also continuous uncertainty about the
international architecture post-2012. The revised EU ETS also needs to provide
adequate structures and procedures to cope with the different situations post-2012, in
particular with respect to achieving the 20% or 30% targets.
6.2.4.2. Identification of objectives
For the transition period between phases 2 and 3 structures and rules need to be
developed for access to and use of JI/CDM credits issued prior to 2013 and to be
issued from projects certified by the Executive Board prior to 2013.
6.2.4.3. Policy options and screening
6.2.4.3.1. Options for transition period: banking CERs/ERUs
The EU ETS Directive is not explicit about banking JI/CDM credits. But Article
11b(5) of the linking directive states that a Member State that authorises private or
public entities to participate in project activities shall remain responsible for the
fulfilment of its obligations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and shall
ensure that such participation is consistent with the relevant guidelines, modalities and
procedures adopted pursuant to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. During the first
commitment period under Kyoto JI and CDM credits are each subject to banking
limitations (2.5% each to a Party's total assigned units). Phase 2 of the EU ETS
corresponds to the first Kyoto commitment period. As a result of Art 11b(5) banking
between phase 2 and 3 of the EU ETS falls under the same rules. In this context three
options are available for the transition period between phase 2 and 3 of the EU ETS:
(89) Option 6.11: current state: leave to Member State discretion how
much banking is to be allowed by companies in EU ETS, while
remaining nationally below the 2.5% of assigned amounts limit for
both JI and CDM (5% overall)
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(90) Option 6.12: adopt harmonised maxima for banking ERU/CER
credits in the EU ETS after 2012 (per installation, sector,
collectively), again remaining nationally below the 2.5% assigned
amount limit for both JI and CDM (5% overall).
As only two options are considered no pre-screening is deemed necessary.
6.2.4.3.2. Accepting credits post-2012
The EU needs to provide structures and rules that allow the smooth transition of offset
use in EU ETS to different potential situations post 2012. Policy options to be
included in the revised EU ETS Directive include:
(91) Option 6.13: If certain projects are (not) allowed internationally then
develop Community-level arrangements for the refusal
(authorisation) of projects.
(92) Option 6.14 international agreement: In the case an international
agreement is reached international rules for use of offsets will be used
in the EU ETS and credits can enter from all countries having ratified
the new agreement. The EU retains the right to scrutinise
international rules and adapt them through comitology for use under
the EU ETS.
(93) Option 6.15 no international agreement: Under this option, in case
there is no international agreement or the conclusion of an
international agreement is delayed beyond 2013, the EU would sign
bilateral agreements with host countries of JI/CDM allowing the
recognition of additional credits from projects or other emission
reducing activities. Agreements reached shall provide for the use of
credits in the Community emissions trading system from renewable
energy or energy efficiency technologies which promote
technological transfer and sustainable development.
The proposed options of dealing with the uncertainty of the post-2012 phase are not
mutually exclusive. Therefore no pre-screening was deemed necessary.
6.2.4.4. Impacts – comparing the options
6.2.4.4.1 Options for the Transition Period: Banking
Environmental Effectiveness: Allowing banking would provide a positive signal to
holders of credits who would no longer tend to use them all for compliance in the
second commitment period due to uncertainty of their value beyond 2012. This would
result in higher EU domestic emission reductions in the second trading period than in
the case without banking, which is particularly important in view of the potential risks
of serious oversupply of credits in the second trading period (see chapter on
entitlements). Certainty about banking would also lead to higher project development
levels and hence higher supply of credits.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 225 – Drucksache 16/9334
Leaving the decision with regards to the level of banking to the Member States
(option 6.11) would add complexity to the market and would therefore add to
transaction costs. This would be exacerbated by a differentiated approach to banking
by project type. Finally, a lack of a harmonised EU approach to banking could have
negative effects on linking as coordination would be more difficult relative to an EU-
wide approach.
Contrary to that, a harmonised EU-wide approach to ERU/CER banking, as suggested
by option 6.12, within the limits of an international agreement (either existing
UNFCCC decision 5/CMP.1 or any replacing decision) would provide positive
signals to JI/CDM investors in a transparent and uniform manner. Uniform banking
provisions would also allow coordinated EU balancing of carbon price concerns (as
banking has an impact on prices in phase 2 and 3) and promotion of domestic
investments in clean technology. In addition, a harmonised approach would allow for
effective negotiations for linking at the international level.
Economic Efficiency: Due to the likelihood of higher levels of banking under option
6.11, this option would lead to lower carbon prices in the third trading period. A
harmonised approach to banking (option 6.12), however, would allow banking levels
that would contribute to reaching an optimal carbon price which would not be
prohibitive and would allow for domestic investments in clean technology. Some
levels of banking would have positive effects on ERU/CER supply as well as on
demand as it would allow the smooth functioning of JI/CDM transactions through
reducing potential buyer losses associated with over-estimations of ERU/CER
requirements.
Administrative costs: Compared to the baseline, none of the options would entail
rising administrative costs. Authorities at national and Community level nor operators
would be affected by higher administrative costs. However, option 6.12 provides for
more transparency and clarity across the market and might therefore score slightly
better, as additional information requirements emerging from different approaches in
Member States would not exist.
Competition and competitiveness: Option 6.11 entails the potential to jeopardise a
level playing field, if Member States apply a divergent approach with respect to
banking provisions. This would not be the case if a harmonised approach (option
6.12) were applied.
Employment: None of the options is expected to have a measurable effect on
employment in the EU.
Table 6.2.4.4.1: Summary of the impact of options compared to the status quo/baseline
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Economic
Efficiency
Administrative
Costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
Employment
6.11: status
quo
0 0 0 0 0
6.12: + + 0/+ + 0
harmonised
Drucksache 16/9334 – 226 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
approach
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
6.2.4.4.2. Accepting credits post-2012
Environmental Effectiveness: Under option 6.13, the environmental effectiveness of
accepting projects refused internationally would depend on the strictness of the
assessment at EU level that would ensure that projects are indeed additional and that
their monitoring, reporting and verification procedures are robust. The environmental
impact on the refusal of projects would depend on the way this is done.
In the case an international agreement is reached international rules for use of offsets
will be used in the EU ETS and credits can enter from all countries having ratified the
new agreement. The EU retains the right to scrutinise international rules and adapt
them through comitology for use under the EU ETS, in order to ensure environmental
effectiveness.
By committing to recognise registered CERs and ERUs from continuing projects in
countries that support the post-2012 agreement (option 6.14), the EU would provide
positive signals both to investors in JI/CDM projects as well as to host countries:
� Investments in JI/CDM have been made under conditions of uncertainty. However,
there is a strong belief that a post-2012 agreement, which will create demand for
offset credits will emerge. Signals from the EU supporting this expectation will
increase investor confidence, which is necessary in order to ensure an
uninterrupted supply of offset credits, particularly in the light of the lead-time
required for the identification and development of projects; On the other hand the
conditional use of these projects on the basis of the host country's adherence to a
new global deal increases uncertainty, which may negatively impact the
development of new projects.
� Developing countries and transition economies are more likely to back a post-2012
agreement if they know that future investments in offset projects depend on their
support for the agreement. The table below presents total numbers of CERs at
stake from the six largest sources119.
Table 6.2 CDM Credit Supply 2012-2030
Top 6 Host Countries Difference in kCERs (CERs to 2012 and to 2030)
China 2,681,449
India 285,925
Brazil 292,619
South Korea 206,399
119 The equivalent cannot be provided for ERUs as the UNEP RISOE database does not contain
information on expected ERUs to 2030.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 227 – Drucksache 16/9334
Mexico 98,277
Malaysia 127,908
Source: UNEP RISOE
Despite high expectations with regards to a post 2012 agreement, existing projects
started with the assumption that carbon-revenues are only certain until 2012. Projects
whose financial viability depends on the continuation of the carbon revenue stream
post-2012 are undertaken at the risk of the investors. Therefore, a balance between
ensuring true additionality and rewarding risky but environmentally additional
investments is to be achieved.
The additionality problem can be controlled by committing initially to accept credits
from registered projects only up to a certain point in time (for the 7 or 10 year period,
as per UNFCCC EB rules). This would prevent credits stemming from the renewal of
ongoing projects (i.e. issuance of credits after the initial 7 year period) to enter the EU
ETS. The table below represents the difference between total expected CERs from
ongoing projects between 2012 and 2030 and CERs from registered projects for the
period between 2012 and 2020/2030:
Table 6.3 CDM Credit Supply 2012-2030
Projects Credits to 2012 Credits
2012 – 2030 (2020 for Registered
Projects)
Registered 1.0 million 1.9 million
Total* 1.9 million 3.7 million
*excluding rejected, withdrawn and forestry projects with an approved lifetime of 20 years.
Source: UNEP RISOE CDM database, updated 18 July 2007.
In terms of volumes, the supply of registered CERs would correspond to total 2005
verified emissions of installations covered by the EU ETS. Assuming, for example,
that installations would be required to reduce emissions by 10% compared to 2005
levels, and in the absence of any quantitative limits on their use there would be a large
over-supply of CERs even if only the registered ones are accepted.
In the absence of a post-2012 international agreement, establishing bilateral
agreements with host countries (option 6.15) would foster the development of new
high quality offset projects, which would allow for the continuation of a supply of
credits and would have a softening effect on the EU ETS allowance price. It would
also provide additional negotiation leverage for reaching a post-2012 international
agreement, while environmental effectiveness is fully ensured through the bilateral
agreements.
Economic Efficiency: The introduction of new abatement methods through
Community-level arrangements (option 6.13) has the potential of reducing overall
abatement costs and can therefore contribute to cost-efficiency improvements.
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However, additions of project types not recognised internationally, as possible under
option 6.13, would add to complexity, increase potential for incorrect interpretation of
rules and would ultimately add to transaction costs. Member States may have
increased uncertainty about achieving their international emission targets if
companies are meeting parts of their targets with credits that are not recognised
internationally. In the case projects accepted internationally are to be refused in the
EU, reaching acceptance on provisions by project type may be costly and time
consuming. However, once the types of projects to be rejected are decided upon, the
implementation of the option can take the form of a gateway in the registry.
Under option 6.14, consistent and transparent messages to investors with regards to
the standing of different projects in the EU ETS would enhance economic efficiency
and would allow for low-cost projects to be developed in the future. The operators
affected do not only include project developers, but also EU operators trading on the
CER market. The rejection of credits from continuing projects hosted in countries that
would not back a post 2012 agreement can however lead to losses among investors
and to higher risk premiums on CDM in the future.
In the absence of a post-2012 international agreement, establishing bilateral
agreements with host countries (option 6.15) would foster the development of new
high quality offset projects, which would allow for the continuation of a supply of
credits and would have a softening effect on the EU ETS allowance price. It would
also provide additional negotiation leverage for reaching a post-2012 international
agreement.
Administrative costs: The creation and operation of a EU institution mandated with
the approval of project types not authorised at international level can entail significant
transaction costs. For comparison, the CDM Executive Board had in 2005 $9 million
funding, which is considered extremely low in the context of the number, diversity
and complexity of the projects that require consideration, and in comparison to
Member States institutions for the administration of national climate change
programmes120. The number and diversity of projects likely to be considered by the
proposed community body would potentially be considerably lower, but still
considerable121.
Option 6.14 would not entail any rise in administrative costs, as already established
structures can be relied upon. If there were no international agreement (option 6.15),
administrative costs would be higher by nature for the parties involved. However,
there would not be any alternative, if project credits were not to be entirely excluded
from access to the EU ETS. If the Executive Board seizes to exist under this option
the EU would incur administrative costs on top of the typical costs related to JI/CDM
administration. These would be higher than the costs of operating under an
international agreement and would include costs related to:
120 DEFRA, 2005.
121 As a matter of cost distribution—it is possible to create a self-funding institution (where the
funding would be obtained in the form of a fee for each considered project). This would add to
the transaction costs of the projects and would be borne by the purchasing ETS operators
and/or CDM project developers.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 229 – Drucksache 16/9334
� The EU regulator would entail three additional costs
– Reaching the bilateral agreements (likely to be incurred by international
relations services);
– Providing a mechanism that ensures the additionality and sustainability of
projects (this role is currently fulfilled by the UNFCCC CDM Executive
Board and the JI Supervisory Committee) 122;
– Creating a new currency;
� Operators would incur two types of additional costs under bilateral
agreements;
– Learning (administrative) costs related to keeping up to date with the list
of countries that the EU has bilateral agreements with;
– Risk premiums and lost opportunities ensuing from the uncertainty of
whether the EU will reach an agreement with a given host country;
Competition and competitiveness: Community-level arrangements under option
6.13 and 6.14 would ensure a level playing field across the internal market and for
this reason, would not create any competition concerns. Competitiveness effects vis-à-
vis non-EU competitors are not likely. More attention should be paid to the matter of
competitiveness under option 6.15. The likely effect, however, might depend on the
partner countries with which the EU would conclude the bilateral agreements.
Employment: No measurable effects on employment can be anticipated at this stage.
Table 6.2.4.4.2: Summary of the impact of options (options 6.13 and 14: case of international agreement, 6.15: no
international agreement)
Option Environmental
Effectiveness
Economic
Efficiency
Administrative
Costs
Competition/
Competitiveness
Employment
6.13: autho-
risation/
refusal of
projects
+ - - 0 0
6.14: EU
commitment
+ + 0 0 0
6.15:
bilateral
agreements
+ + - -/0 0
The table does not compare the different options, as they are based on various starting points (international agreement, no
international agreement). It only provides indications summarising the arguments presented above.
+ positive effect, 0 neutral/no or negligible effect, - negative effect
122 The UNFCCC is the umbrella convention for the Kyoto Protocol, therefore the
discontinuation of the protocol will not automatically lead to the disappearance of the CDM EB and the JISC.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 230 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
6.2.4.5. Compliance of options with objectives
The EU ETS Directive guarantees that EU allowances can be banked beyond 2012.
The Kyoto Protocol puts limits on banking of ERU/CER. Banking of these is
discretionary for member States which over-achieve their reduction commitments.
These are followed by MS independently. The proposed policy options address the
uncertainty of the international situation for ERUs/CERs after 2012 and include:
� Leave banking at Member State discretion;
� Adopt harmonised recognition of banking ERU/CER credits after 2012.
The second option scored highest against the assessment criteria as it allowed for the
highest level of uniformity and market transparency, and also allowed for some
flexibility with regards to banking, which will aid the efficient functioning of the
ETS.
Another aspect dealt with as part of the predictability section is the treatment of
JI/CDM credits after 2012. The options considered include:
� If certain projects are refused (accepted) internationally, develop
Community-level arrangements for the authorisation/refusal of projects;
� To commit the EU now to recognise CERs and ERUs from continuing
projects based in countries which have ratified the post 2012 agreement;
� In case there is no international agreement, then until it is concluded, to
provide for bilateral agreements (e.g. through mutual recognition as for
linking trading systems).
The analysis suggests that the proposed options are not mutually exclusive. The EU
can have a system of approving and/or rejecting certain projects or project types,
establish bilateral agreements to recognise JI and CDM projects from certain hosts
between 2012 and the date when an international agreement is concluded, and commit
to accepting credits from continuing projects in countries that will support a post-2012
agreement. The relevance of all three options is contingent on the progress of
international negotiations.
7. CONCLUSIONS – THE PREFERRED OPTIONS
7.1. Scope
7.1.1. Streamlining the current scope
In the light of the analysis undertaken in chapter 3.1, a combination of option 1 and 2
is likely to deliver the best results. This means codifying a broad interpretation of
combustion installation in the Directive, underpinned by a new definition of
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 231 – Drucksache 16/9334
combustion installation and supplemented by a list of activities, where necessary in
order to ensure consistency and avoid competitive distortions. Such an approach
would allow a consistent application of the scope, provide legal certainty to Member
States and would ensure a consistent coverage of process emission. Furthermore, it
would contribute to the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS by broadening its
coverage.
7.1.2. Cost-effectiveness as regards small installations
With a view to increasing cost-effectiveness to small emitters through identification
of an appropriate threshold to include/exclude installations in/from the EU ETS, a
combination of capacity and emission thresholds (i.e. keeping the existing 20 MW
capacity threshold and combine it with a 10kt emission threshold) in combination
with a conditional opt-out should be preferred, as it represents – in terms of
environmental effectiveness – the best relation between emissions lost, i.e. not
covered anymore by the EU ETS (appr. 16 MtCO2) and small installations excluded
(4200 plus 800). These 4200 installations123 account on average for approximately
3800 tCO2 each. For comparison: Applying an emission threshold of 25kt would
remove approximately 6300 installations, each with an average emission of close to
8100 tCO2. This means that the loss of emissions covered by the EU ETS would more
than triple, while the number of small installations excluded would only rise by 50%.
Taking into account the 800 installations addressed by option 3.8a would not
fundamentally change this finding, while the combination with option 3.7 would
ensure that alternative equivalent measures for the small operators excluded are in
place.
7.1.3. Inclusion of other sectors and gases
As the analysis has shown, inclusion of CO2 emissions from petrochemicals,
ammonia and aluminium would fully comply with the objectives of the review and
enhance the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS. This also goes for N2O
emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and glyoxalic acid production and PFC
emissions from the aluminium sector. Inclusion of these sectors and gases would
enhance the coverage of the EU ETS by up to roughly estimated 97 MtCO2 or up to
4.6% of Phase II allowances. In combination with streamlining the scope of the EU
ETS, overall coverage would increase by up to 137 to 147 MtCO2 or 6.6 to 7.1%.
7.1.4. Carbon capture and storage
While acknowledging carbon capture and storage within the EU ETS is highly
desirable for environmental reasons, the actual choice of how CCS should be
acknowledged in the EU ETS, may depend on the possibility/feasibility of
establishing appropriate and reliable monitoring and reporting rules. If this can be
ensured, up front inclusion of all CCS activities by explicit reference to CCS in
Annex I of the Directive is preferred.
123
The number of 800 installations possibly excluded by implementation of Option 5a are
neglected here, since the number represents only a vague estimation. Including the number
would not change the result.
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7.1.5. Transport
Emissions from both the road transport and shipping sector are not recommended for
inclusion in the EU ETS at the current stage, as set out in the previous chapters. In the
longer term, however, this may not be excluded, if emissions trading turns out to
represent a cost-effective measure to curb CO2 emissions from these sectors.
7.1.6. Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF)
For the reasons set out in chapter 3.7.4, land use and forestry should not be included
in the EU ETS.
7.2. Monitoring, Reporting, Verification
Among the options considered, establishing regulations for Monitoring and Reporting
(MR) is likely to bring the highest benefits in terms of improving consistency in the
application of MR rules across the EU. Procedurally this is a complex option, and
would require efforts from a range of stakeholders including the European
Commission, the MS and competent authorities as well as operators. The alternatives
to an EC regulation would have lower legal stringency and would entail higher
uncertainties about the uniformity of their application.
The preferred option with regards to the frequency of reporting is increased reporting
frequency for large installations (over 500,000 tCO2e/year) as this would allow for the
release of verified information only, while keeping a balance between reporting costs
and annual emissions per installation.
Similarly to MR, a regulation on verification and accreditation of verifiers would
provide the highest level of certainty with regards to the uniformity of implementation
at MS level. Therefore it would be preferred, but would also require significant design
efforts. If this option is unfeasible, the next highest level of consistency across the EU
can be achieved through verification guidelines. In both cases, since the options are
not entirely mutually exclusive, the policy design process can rely on existing
frameworks and institutions such as the EA and ISO.
The options of providing a common reporting format and an EU-wide harmonised
reporting system scored highest against the criteria of using advanced IT applications.
The main trade-offs are between increased efficiency and transparency of the ETS
system versus respecting a high degree of subsidiarity and potential efficiency gains
from integrating a common reporting format into existing e-government systems of
individual MS.
Developing a commission recommendation on practical issues of the complete
compliance chain would constitute a source of information for CAs and would allow
for a more uniform interpretation of the legal texts. Developing such a
recommendation can involve considerable costs on the part of the EC.
Changing the current penalty level for failure to surrender allowances is
recommended, in order to allow an adjustment with inflation and potential carbon
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 233 – Drucksache 16/9334
price increases and to maintain a high level of compliance. Detracting a multiple of
allowances from future allocations has been assessed, but the technicalities of this
option would need to be further studied.
7.3. Further Harmonisation and increased predictability
7.3.1. Cap-setting: level of harmonisation
Among the options considered, an EU-wide cap set in the Directive would most
increase effectiveness and predictability of the EU ETS and best comply with the
requirement of transparency and simplicity. It would also strengthen the international
credibility of the EU while, at the same time, minimising internal administrative costs.
For these reasons, an EU-wide cap set in the Directive is the preferred option.
7.3.2. Cap-setting: level of the cap
In order to achieve a given emission reduction target at least costs, an approach based
on the equilibrium of marginal abatement costs (efficiency approach) between the
trading and non-trading sector is most suitable and should be pursued.
7.3.3. Cap-setting: design options to increase predictability
Basing future quantities on a trend-line in combination with 8-year trading periods
strikes the best balance between predictability and flexibility.
7.3.4. Allocation: auctioning versus allocation for free
The analysis has shown that, compared to any other allocation method, full auctioning
of allowances scores best in increasing the efficiency of the system and taking away
undesirable distributional effects. However, in exceptional circumstances and in the
absence of international agreement on climate change policy, some allocation of
allowances for free could be an efficient instrument to avoid net carbon leakage.
7.3.5. Allocation methods for any remaining allocations for free
If any allowances should be allocated for free, it should be done in a harmonised as
possible manner, in order to ensure environmental effectiveness and the efficiency of
the EU ETS.
7.3.6. Allocation: new entrants
In the event that some allowances are allocated for free in order to avoid carbon
leakage, it also is preferred to set up a single, EU-wide new entrants reserve for new
installations in these sectors. This would also help to ensure a level playing field in
the internal market.
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7.3.7. Allocation: closure rules
If there are allowances allocated for free, a harmonised closure rule with a harmonised
transfer rule would best avoid competitive distortions and other adverse effects.
7.4. Linking and JI/CDM
7.4.1. Linking to other emission trading systems
In the light of the above analysis, all barriers to linking EU ETS to all mandatory
emission trading systems capping absolute emissions in all countries or regions
should be removed. This should be done through arrangements to be adopted through
comitology. For each such a case a separate impact assessment is likely to be justified.
7.4.2. Use of offsets
A large number of policy options were considered with regards to use of offsets,
including quantitative and qualitative provisions as well as rules with regards to
banking and use of offset credits post-2012.
Entitlements
In the event an international agreement can be reached access would be allowed in
line with provisions in the agreement. This would be done pending EU scrutiny of the
agreed international rules. In the event that the conclusion of an international
agreement is delayed beyond 2012, additional credits from projects or other emission
reducing activities may be used in the Community trading system in accordance with
agreements that may be concluded with third countries. Agreements reached shall
provide for the use of offsets in the Community emissions trading system from
renewable energy or energy efficiency technologies which promote technological
transfer and sustainable development.
In absence of an international agreement option 6.3 EU-wide harmonised provisions
for the use of offsets below phase II levels would be preferred. This would avoid
insufficiently high prices on the market for the EU ETS to significantly contribute to
the efficient achievement of the 2020 energy and climate package.
But because a high degree of uncertainty remains about the amount of banked credits
and future supply and demand dynamics for offsets, the Directive will contain a
provision for reviewing this level of entitlement through comitology to account for
new developments. As such this provision should not create more uncertainty in the
market than that already existing from the absence of clarity about there being an
international agreement post 2012, and thus should not create undue regulatory
instability.
Under option 6.4 the limit set in option 6.3 could be diversified for sectors open to
competition as a tool to limit leakage. The main trade-off between this option and the
harmonised allocation is greater intra-ETS equity under the ETS-wide limits versus
the ability to help compensate sectors exposed to international competition. If other
potential measures to give more favourable treatment to exposed sectors such as
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 235 – Drucksache 16/9334
revenue recycling from auctioning or trade related measures are deemed sufficient by
themselves then option 6.4 would become redundant.
Standards
The analysis concludes that option 6.6 harmonised listing of projects which are
insufficient, is the simplest to administer but is also least subtle and can lead to the
exclusion of a large number of valid projects. This could be complemented by other
measures such as use criteria combined with discounting (based on benchmarks) for
specific project types, but this would entail a trade-off between higher environmental
integrity and higher administrative costs.
Some methods are better suited for certain project or project types than others. The
maintenance of current harmonised standards continues to be appropriate for nuclear
power projects and LULUCF, whereas discounting might be most suitable for credits
resulting from N2O and HFC reductions.
EU offset projects
The analysis suggests that Domestic and Community Offset Projects (DOP/COP)
would entail some benefits in terms of increased flexibility and reduced price
volatility, but that they would come at high administrative costs and risks of double
counting.
Given the context of increased harmonisation, which is one of the aims of the ETS
review and the potential to reduce administrative costs, the analysis concluded that a
mechanism for EU action to be taken or a mechanism to make EU-wide ranging
decisions through comitology is recommended (COP). Implementing the
administrative procedures at EU-level would lower administrative costs and ensure
that Member States can have confidence in the integrity and validity of any such
projects.
Predictability post 2012
On the choice between Member State discretion vs. EU harmonised limits on banking,
the second option scored highest against the assessment criteria as it allowed for the
highest level of uniformity and market transparency, and also allowed for some
flexibility with regards to banking, which will aid the efficient functioning of the
ETS.
On the treatment of JI/CDM credits after 2012 the analysis suggested that the
proposed options are not mutually exclusive. The EU can have a harmonised system
of approving and/or rejecting certain projects or project types, establish bilateral
agreements to recognise JI and CDM projects from certain hosts between 2012 and
the date when an international agreement is concluded, and commit to accepting
credits from continuing projects in countries that will support a post-2012 agreement.
The relevance of all three options is contingent on the progress of international
negotiations.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 236 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
8. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
In the following, an overview of administrative costs accruing from the preferred
options to operators and regulators (public authorities) at Member State and
Community level compared to the baseline is provided. However, caveats have to be
put in assessing these administrative costs of Member States due to the following
reasons:
– In all but two Member States more than one competent authority is responsible for
administrative tasks of the ETS;
– Approximately half of the Member States also involve regional or local authorities
in the administration for granting permission of installations, monitoring, reporting
and verification or other issues.124
– Coordination of ETS reporting with other reporting requirements (see EEA 2007a)
For these reasons, it is not possible to give quantitative figures on the administrative
costs incurred by regulators in the different Member States. The following
summarises the main findings on administrative costs from the preceding chapters and
attempts to draw qualitative conclusions with respect to their impacts on overall
administrative costs for operators and regulators, where possible in the short and in
the long term. In this context, it is important to note that “short term” impacts on
administrative costs often mean set-up and/or one-off costs, which may be incurred
already before the start of the post-2012 trading period. With respect to regulators, it
will, where possible and appropriate, be distinguished between the Community and
Member State level. Following this assessment, administrative costs to the
Community will be roughly quantified in terms of required additional resources.
In line with the relevant assessment criteria, administrative costs are meant the costs
incurred by operators and regulators to establish and maintain the system.
124 For a detailed overview on the various competent authorities in Member States, see EEA
2007a.
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ct on regulators
Community
short term long term
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
- 0
Table 8.1: Impacts on administrative costs emerging from preferred options identified in chapters 3 - 6
Option Impa
Impact on operators
Member State level
short term long term short term long term
Scope
3.1: codifying broad
interpretation
- 0 - 0
3.2: activity list - 0 - 0
3.6:Combination of capacity
and emission
0/+ 0/+ 0/+ 0/+
3.7: Opt-out + 0 + 0
3.8a: Aggregation capacity
threshold
+ 0 + 0
Petrochemicals and
chemicals
0/+ 0/+ -/0 0
Ammonia -/0 -/0 -/0 -/0
Aluminium -/0 0 0 0
N2O emissions -/0 0 0 0
3.12 include all CCS - 0 -/0 -/0
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- 0
- +
- 0
- 0
- +
0 0
-/0 +
y
+ +
0 0
+ +
- 0/+
projects
Robust Compliance and enforcement
4.4: Regulation on
monitoring and reporting
-/0 0 -/0 0
4.8: IT based reporting
format
-/0 + 0 +
4.11: Legal basis for
regulation on verification
0 0 -/0 0
4.17: Legal basis for
regulation on accreditation
-/0 0 -/0 0
4.21: Harmonised reporting/
compliance
-/0 + -/0 +
4.26b: Penalty: inflation rate
adjustments
0 0 0 0
4.28: single EU-wide registry 0 0 + +
Further Harmonisation and Increased Predictabilit
5.4: EU-wide cap in the
Directive
+ + + +
5.6: efficiency approach 0 0 0 0
5.14: 8-year trading period
plus trend line thereafter
+ + + +
5.18: allocations for free for 0/+ + -/0 +
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- 0/+
-/0 0/+
0/+ +
o Involve Developing Countries and
+ +
0 0
- -/0
0 0
- -/0
avoiding net carbon leakage
5.21: fully harmonized
benchmarking
+ + + +
5.26: single EU-wide NER + + + +
5.31: harmonized closure
rule with transfer rule
+ + + +
Linking with Emission Trading Systems in Third Countries, and Appropriate Means t
Countries in Economic Transition
6.3: harmonised EU
entitlements
0 0 + +
6.6: listing insufficient
projects
0 0 0 0
6.10: Community offsetting
projects
0 0 -/0 -/0
6.12: harmonised approach 0 0 0 0
6.15: bilateral agreements -/0 0 0 0
“-“ rising costs, “+” declining costs, “0” neutral or negligible change
Drucksache 16/9334 – 240 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
On the basis of the table above, the following conclusions can be drawn:
Scope: Applying the suggested approach in order to streamlining application of the Directive
may incur higher short term administrative costs for both operators and MS regulators due to
the higher number of installations covered. Small installations with annual emissions below
10.000 tonnes may incur considerably lower administrative costs, if opted out of the ETS
under the conditions specified above. This is expected to lead to lower administrative costs in
the short and longer term for operators and MS regulators. As for new sectors to be included
as from 2013, slight improvements might be possible for operators in the petrochemical and
chemical sector, once the sector is consistently covered by the EU ETS. Public authorities
may face some additional burden in the short term. Including emissions from ammonia
production would not raise excessively high administrative costs for operators and regulators.
Operators in the aluminium sector may face one-off administrative costs when setting up the
necessary monitoring and reporting facilities, which however are considered quite low in
terms of tonnes emitted. This would also apply to N20 emitting installations. Although a new
greenhouse gas would be included in the EU ETS, no additional costs would be incurred at
Community level due to the planned opt-in of some N2O plants in the 2nd trading period. With
respect to the inclusion of CCS, the main costs would remain with the Community, where the
relevant monitoring & reporting provisions would have to be developed. Operators would
need to install the necessary equipment, which to a considerable extent might be necessary
anyway and irrespective of inclusion of CCS into the EU ETS.
Robust compliance and enforcement: In the short term, a regulation on monitoring,
reporting, verification and accreditation would bring about higher administrative costs mainly
for the Community level, but to a smaller extents also for operators and national regulators. In
the longer term, in particular if combined with an IT based reporting format, cost savings are
expected to clearly outweigh these short-term costs. Inflation rate adjustments for penalties
will only involve negligible administrative costs. A Community-wide registry will entail cost
savings for regulators at Member State and Community level in the longer term, irrespective
of the detailed design of such a registry laid down in a registry regulation.
Further harmonisation and increased predictability: an EU-wide cap laid down in the
Directive in combination with an 8-year trading period and a declining trend line thereafter
would bring about administrative cost savings for all parties involved, while the way how to
determine the cap might not differ in terms of administrative costs, since gathering the
relevant information and calculating the respective figures does not involve large differences.
With respect to allocation, a hybrid approach involving auctioning and allocation for free
under harmonised conditions would only allow administrative cost savings to occur in the
longer term, while in the shorter term set up costs for both free allocation and auctioning
cannot be avoided. Harmonised rules on new entrants reserve as well as closures would free
up administrative cost expenses at Member State level.
Linking with Emission Trading Systems in Third Countries, and Appropriate Means to
Involve Developing Countries and Countries in Economic Transition: Harmonised EU-
entitlements would entail lower administrative costs for regulators at Member State and
Community level. Listing insufficient projects would not have any measurable impact on
administrative costs of parties concerned. Community offsetting projects would require
additional administrative costs to develop, implement and update the legislation and national
structures at Community level, but may not involve substantial administrative costs at MS
level. With respect to banking provisions, no change in administrative costs is anticipated to
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 241 – Drucksache 16/9334
emerge from an harmonised approach. Bilateral agreements to be concluded in the absence of
an international agreement would by nature involve higher administrative costs at Community
level, but also at operator level, at least in the short term, as operators would need to
familiarise themselves with the rules accruing from the various agreements.
While it is not possible to quantify the changes in administrative costs for public authorities
and operators, it is safe to say that the proposed approach evolving from the options indicated
in table 8.1 will result in considerable savings of administrative costs at operator and Member
State level. The savings are likely to emerge from stronger harmonisation across the EU. On
the other hand, in order to compensate lower administrative costs at Member State level,
higher administrative costs at Community level will be required. They are estimated in the
following taking into account findings represented in table 8.1. Table 8.2 below indicates the
estimated additional resources required for the relevant Commission services to carry out the
options identified. All other options are assumed to be sufficiently covered by existing
resources.
Table 8.2: Impacts on administrative costs at Community level
Option Additional short
term human
resources
Additional long term
human resources
4.4: Regulation on monitoring and
reporting
1 0,5
4.8: IT based reporting format 1 0,5
4.11: Legal basis for regulation on
verification
0,5
4.17: Legal basis for regulation on
accreditation
0,5
0,5
4.21: Harmonised reporting/ compliance 1 0,5
4.28: single EU-wide registry 1 0,5
5.18: allocations for free for avoiding net
carbon leakage
1 0,5
5.21: fully harmonized benchmarking 3 0,5
5.26: single EU-wide NER 0,5 0,5
5.31: harmonized closure rule with transfer
rule
0,5 -
6.10: Community offsetting projects 1 1
6.15: bilateral agreements 1 1
Total 12 7
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On the basis of these rough estimations and bearing in mind the standard salary of € 0,117
million per official, additional costs incurred by the Community would amount to € 1.404
million per year in the short term (i.e. to set up the system and ensure a proper start), which
would be reduced to € 0.819 million in the longer term, i.e. to monitor and adapt the system
over the whole trading period. The declining need for additional human resources is supposed
to be implemented in a gradual manner, which can be demonstrated by the following
explanations:
– The analysis has shown that allocation for free as opposed to full auctioning is likely to
play a more important role in the beginning of the post-2012 trading phase, which is
expected to diminish once an appropriate international agreement is in place or through a
declining role of free allocation. However, a full set of benchmarks allowing Community-
wide harmonised allocation would nevertheless be developed, even if an international
agreement enters into force in 2013, unless full auctioning is implemented from day one of
the post-2012 trading period.
– Auctioning rules would need to be developed, no matter whether they apply to all or only a
few sectors/installations.
– As for monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation matters, the rules need first to
be developed, but once they are in place, the requirements for additional resources is
expected to go down, since there may only be a need to further adapt the rules to ongoing
developments. This may also apply to rules for new entrants and closures.
– Rules for community offsetting projects would need to be developed. Their
implementation and compliance would need to be fully monitored and ensured. For this
reason, additional resources are likely to be needed also in the longer term. This also goes
for the development of bilateral agreements, which may not be needed, if an appropriate
international agreement would be concluded before the start of the post-2012 trading
period.
Although the table attempts to indicate additional resources required to carry out the preferred
options identified in the analysis, it does not necessarily imply that the full amount of
resources would need to be new, since the new system may free up human resources so far
working on issues, which are becoming superfluous, such as the NAP assessment.
It is also clear that the new system would involve considerable gains for Member States in
terms of administrative costs, which mainly accrue from a more harmonised approach at
Community level. It is obvious that such an approach brings about considerable reductions of
administrative costs at Member States level, which would not occur if the current
differentiated approach requiring 27 Member States to set up 27 national allocation plans,
were to be maintained.
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9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION
The amendments to Directive 2003/87/EC shall be implemented by the Member States within
nine months after its entry into force (Article 3). Member States shall inform the Commission
thereof and communicate relevant texts of national law.
Measurement of progress on the application of the Directive is regulated in Article 21 of the
Directive, which in its first paragraph requires Member States to submit to the Commission a
report on application of the Directive every year. This report shall pay particular attention to
the arrangements for the allocation of allowances, the use of ERUs and CERs in the
Community system, the operation of registries, the application of the monitoring and
reporting rules, verification and issues relating to the compliance with the Directive. Member
States reports shall be drawn up on the basis of a questionnaire or outline drafted by the
Commission in accordance with a procedure laid down in Article 6 of directive 91/692/EEC.
On the basis of the reports from Member States, the Commission shall publish a report on the
application of the Directive within three months of receiving the reports from the Member
States.
Furthermore, Article 21(3) requires that the Commission shall organize an exchange of
information between the competent authorities of the Member States concerning
developments relating to issues of allocation, the use of ERUs and CERs in the Community
system, the operation of registries, monitoring, reporting, verification and compliance with
this Directive.
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Annex 1: ECCP Report
Overall report
of the four ECCP meetings on the review of the EU ETS
27 July 2007
Final Report of the 1st meeting
of the ECCP working group on emissions trading
on the review of the EU ETS
on
The Scope of the Directive
8-9 March 2007
Centre Borschette, Rue Froissart 36, 1040 Brussels
Agenda item 1: Welcome and Introduction of the Review Process
The Chairman, Mr Jos Delbeke, welcomed participants to the meeting, the first of four
meetings dealing with the review of the EU ETS. The Chair explained that these meetings
were input to the Commission's preparation of a legislative proposal for the 2nd half of 2007.
Mr Peter Carl outlined the overall framework including the EU's commitment to limit
average global temperature increases to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. In this context, he
stressed the role and the importance of the EU ETS in stimulating innovation and conveying
strong economic signals, to achieve a low carbon and sustainable economy. The most
important feature of the EU ETS is to send a strong signal on carbon price. The current
architecture is sound, and the review should streamline the current scheme by making it
simpler and more predictable.
Agenda item 2: The Review of the EU ETS – Expectations and Challenges
Mr Urban Rid emphasised the same priorities, adding that Germany considers the EU ETS to
be the centre pillar of EU climate change measures. Germany would favour stronger
harmonisation of allocation rules, and linking the EU ETS with trading schemes of third
countries. He proposed including clear formula for calculating the caps in the Directive. As
for the scope, Mr Rid advocated unambiguous definition of installations and a sound cost-
benefit analysis for inclusion of additional activities. He also emphasised the importance of
dealing with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS).
In his intervention, Mr Anders Wijkman MEP expressed his wish for the EU ETS to develop
into a global system. The review should render the system simpler and easier to understand. In
his view, grandfathering allowances has led to huge windfall profits and over-allocation. For
the future, he would be in favour of auctioning allowances and using the revenues to stimulate
and promote investments in the renewable energy sector. A maximum of harmonisation and a
more important role for the Commission is necessary. Transport emissions have been
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 245 – Drucksache 16/9334
growing, and need action – for aviation, the Parliament has supported a separate system, while
for other transport emissions, there are opportunities and risks in pursuing trading.
The Chair thanked Mr Rid and MEP Wijkman for their interventions, noting the strong calls
for harmonisation on overall levels of allocation.
He informed participants that the Commission services will produce a report after each of the
four review meetings, a draft of which will be sent to participants for comments. Following
consolidation of the comments, the report will be published on the EU ETS review website125.
However, there will not be one single consolidated report after the four meetings, since it is
considered more important to report after each meeting. The four reports will serve as a major
input to the legislative work of the Commission to be carried out in the 2nd half of the year.
Agenda item 3: Expanding the EU ETS to other sectors and gases
Presentations
Mr Christian Egenhofer (CEPS) highlighted the economic rationale for expanding the EU
ETS, which would generally lead to lower abatement costs and could potentially reduce
compliance costs by up to 30-40% provided conditions including accurate monitoring
reporting and verification issues are met.
Mr Jochen Harnisch (Ecofys) presented the technical assessment criteria used and results of
an Ecofys study on expanding the EU ETS, which indicated that a number of additional
sectors might be included in the EU ETS if some potential barriers can be successfully
overcome. In his second presentation, he concluded that MRV (monitoring, reporting,
verification) for small emitters will be greatly simplified from 2008 onwards through the
revised MR (monitoring & reporting) Guidelines. While the inclusion of complex activities in
the EU ETS may require amendments of the Directive, the MR Guidelines, specific
verification guidance and the addition of simple activities may be straightforward.
The presentation by Mr Tore Jenssen (EFMA) advised that including N2O from the
production of nitric acid and adipic acid in the EU ETS is feasible. Mr Jenssen recommended
allowing opt-in of N2O from 2008, in order to gain experience, and that JI and CDM credits
should be allowed.
According to the presentation by Mr Philip Luyten (CEFIC,) considering inclusion of CO2
from petrochemical and chemical production processes, would depend on the solution of a
number of issues with a view to improving the current scheme.
Mr Eirik Nordheim (EAA) highlighted the global competition that the European Aluminium
industry is part of and stated that the aluminium industry for a number of reasons is not in
favour of inclusion in the present EU ETS, but is prepared to enter into agreements with the
EU authorities in order to explore further reduction possibilities based on industry
benchmarks and applying MRV principles equivalent to ETS including penalties for non-
compliance.
Regarding CH4 emissions from coal mines, Mr Bogalla (Euracoal) expressed doubts on
whether some a sufficient degree of accuracy of monitoring, reporting and verification would
125 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/review_en.htm
Drucksache 16/9334 – 246 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
allow their inclusion in the EU ETS. He also underlined the need to ensure an acceptable cost-
benefit ratio when including methane emissions from coal mining in the EU ETS.
Mr Matthias Duwe (CAN Europe) emphasised that any change to the EU ETS must make it
more reliable in ensuring absolute reductions in emissions. He identified a number of sectors
suitable for inclusion in the EU ETS, subject to these fulfilling certain environmental criteria.
Discussion
The discussion confirmed that an expansion of the EU ETS would in principle further reduce
abatement costs and thus renders the scheme more efficient. More harmonisation across
sectors and Member States would be required in particular with respect to monitoring,
reporting and verification. Opt-in provisions in the second trading period would offer the
possibility to gather experience and learn with a view to arriving at a more harmonised
approach from 2013 onwards. The availability of reduction potential may constitute a
criterion in the short term, but in the view of many stakeholders should not play a role in the
longer run, since there are already sectors included in the EU ETS with a limited reduction
potential.
According to some representatives from the industry, such as BusinessEurope, sectors that
have already carried out abatement measures at low costs but would face high costs to
implement additional measures following inclusion in the EU ETS should be very carefully
considered.
The energy intensive industry highlighted the matter of international competitiveness and the
pass-through of costs as well as the positive environmental contribution emerging from
indirect emission effects (e.g. lighter and better material entailing lower transport emissions).
Improvements to the EU ETS should also address these problems.
In their view, environmental additionality should also play a role. Companies, in particular
small and medium sized ones, should only face additional burden, if there is a positive
environmental effect. In this regard, the exclusion of sectors and the matter of process
emissions may be worth considering. Other industry representatives, such as the Carbon
Trading Sector, suggested that the make-or-buy rule as criterion should apply to the various
ETS sectors. All installations should face reduction requirements. The matter of
competitiveness should not constitute a reason not to include a sector, since it could be
addressed by alternative means, such as linking or allocation methodologies.
Double regulation should be avoided as much as possible, which is ensured by Article 26 of
the ETS Directive relieving installations to be covered by the ETS Directive from an emission
limit value under the IPPC Directive.
It was also stressed that the EU ETS may and should serve as a nucleus for a global system.
For this reason, too, the scheme should be kept simple.
Conclusions
� Following a broad-ranging discussion, the Chairman summarised the findings of the
presentation and the results of the discussion as follows:
� There are solid economic reasons indicating that further extension of the EU ETS could
reduce abatement costs and thus render the scheme more efficient.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 247 – Drucksache 16/9334
� While there is no objection in principle including new sectors should be subject to certain
conditions, such as an harmonised approach across Europe including MRV, clearer legal
definitions, recognizing technology and the international dimension.
� Opt-in might be used as a test ground for benchmarks and robust rules on monitoring,
reporting and verification.
� All sectors need to contribute to the reduction of GHG emissions, however, it might be a
question which policies should be applied.
� The matter of international competitiveness of ETS sectors must be seen in the context of
alternative measures and instruments available to authorities.
Agenda item 4: Unilateral inclusion of additional activities and gases under Article 24 of
Directive 2003/87/EC
Presentations
Mr David Mjureke (Swedish EPA) suggested that the definition of installation in the
Directive should be amended to allow treatment of a complete district heating system as one
single installation. In addition he recommended applying a general opt-in for all known and
unknown installations complying with certain opt-in criteria.
Mr Magnus Cederlöf from the Finnish Ministry of Environment suggested simplifying the
opt-in procedures with a view to avoiding separate approval from the Commission, if certain
conditions were met.
In his presentation on the opt-in of N2O, Mr Christophe Ewald from the French Ministry of
Ecology and Sustainable Development, highlighted the emission reduction potential of this
option as well as the most important elements linked to opting-in N2O from the French point
of view.
Discussion
The Commission clarified that subject to full legal checks where required and appropriate
there is no need for second time application for installations already opted in the scheme.
Concerns that unilateral inclusion into the EU ETS may lead to a non-harmonised scope were
not confirmed.
Experience gathered so far showed that pooling did not prove to be interesting for the
operators. This may relate to the need of having a legal entity to take responsibility for all
pooled emissions. Generally, opting-in should be considered a useful option, since emissions
trading ensures the reduction of emission at least costs, but it was also stressed that the same
environmental effects might be achieved through IPPC permits. Double regulation, i.e.
applying both the ETS and the IPPC Directive to the industry may only be justified under
specific circumstances, such as the risk of impacting negatively on human health.
Conclusions
Summing up the discussions, the Chairman concluded that
� The opt-in option was generally considered a solid option.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 248 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
� Until a harmonised approach is available from 2013 onwards, the opt-in of new gases and
sectors should be applied pragmatically and as far as possible in a harmonised way, in
order to prevent distortion of competition.
� While in principle double regulation should be avoided, as laid down in Directive
2003/87/EC, there could be exceptions to this rule for the sake of higher-ranking values,
such as protection of human health.
Agenda item 5: Streamlining the application of the current scope
Presentations
According to Mr Stefan Moser (European Commission), competitive distortions on the
internal market with respect to the application of the scope of the ETS Directive are thought
to be considerably reduced in the 2nd trading period thanks to the guidance submitted by the
Commission and the pragmatic approach taken by Member States. Including additional
emitters meant to increase the environmental benefit of the EU ETS. Discussions should focus
on how the definition of combustion installation in Annex I of the ETS Directive can be
improved.
In her presentation on “Further improvement in harmonising the application to installations in
the current scope”, Ms Dian Phylipsen (Ecofys) pointed out most important gains could be
achieved by harmonising the application of definition of furnaces, especially including
ammonia plants as well as by harmonising the definition and treatment of process emissions.
Discussion
The achievements of the Climate Change Committee in terms of streamlining the application
of the Directive allowed considerable improvements in the national allocation plans for the 2nd
trading period. However, further legal certainty and clarity with respect to the definition of a
combustion installation is needed.
As for how to define a combustion installation, the matter of process emissions was raised.
There is no unanimous view on whether a clear definition of process emissions is preferred or
whether Annex I of the Directive should be extended through adding new activities. The
Commission took the view that with the EU ETS internalising the costs of carbon, process
emissions ought to be included.
According to some industry representatives, including all large installations in the EU ETS, in
order to exclude small ones would meet some resistance, as it may make some industrial
sectors leaving Europe.
Industry representatives raised a number of specific concerns, in particular relating to the
production processes of lime, the ceramic industry, but also to the treatment of the glass
industry and its competing products.
The need to keep the EU ETS simple, also with a view to evolving a nucleus of a global
carbon market and to rendering it attractive to other parts of the world, was generally
highlighted.
Conclusions
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 249 – Drucksache 16/9334
In concluding the discussions, the Chairman highlighted the following points:
� The definition of combustion installations should be improved or a definition of process
emissions should be established with a view to ensuring consistent application across the
EU.
� In this respect, there is a need for further harmonisation, legal certainty, but also
simplification.
� On the basis of written input from stakeholders, a meeting of the Climate Change
Committee with participation of industry experts could, if need be, further examine
relevant definitions.
� Further work should be built on codifying the agreement achieved in the Climate Change
Committee.
Agenda item 6: Improving cost-effectiveness as regards small installations
Presentations
Mr Paul van Slobbe (Netherlands) identified a misbalance between the number of
installations and the share of allowances allocated to them as well as high MRV costs for
small installations. He proposed first, for small installations, to ensure the same scope in all
Member States, then to exclude small installations by means of a list of these installations and
finally cut down the costs of participating in the EU ETS for all installations.
Mr Stefan Moser (European Commission) set out the pros and cons of including/excluding
small installations as well as a number of policy options to deal with the issue. His analysis
addressed the possibility of both changing the currently existing aggregation clause and
identifying specific categories of combustion installations for targeted exclusion.
Discussion
The discussions showed that there is a trend of improving the cost-benefit ratio for small
installations under the EU ETS. Representatives from the energy intensive industry did not
confirm this observation.
While some participants advocated excluding small installations from the EU ETS, others
advised to be cautious when discussing restricting the scope of the ETS. If it comes to
exclusion of small installations/emitters, the question of alternative, equivalent measures
would clearly arise. In the event of excluding installations or sectors, a harmonised approach
at EU level was considered necessary in view of the potential to link the EU ETS with other
trading systems in third countries.
In order to define a threshold for including/excluding small installations, some stakeholders
suggested an approach based on emissions, while others would prefer either capacity, or a
combination of both capacity and emissions or refused any emissions based threshold. It has
also been suggested to exclude those installations from 2013 onwards the emissions of which
were below 25 kt/yr during the period 2008-12.
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The diversity of the various industrial sectors, such as ceramics, pulp and paper was
highlighted. Voluntary agreements were suggested as a possible solution, but did not meet
much agreement, but rather doubts on the credibility of such an approach at EU level.
While participants from the pulp&paper industry considered the matter of strategic behaviour
of companies not really relevant, others reported strategic behaviour of companies aiming at
updating their permit with a view to staying below the threshold of being included in the ETS.
Conclusions
Following the discussions, the Chairman identified a number of major elements emerging
from the debate:
� Monitoring, reporting and verification costs still represent a higher per ton cost for small
installations despite the considerable progress achieved.
� All sectors need to contribute to the reduction of GHG emissions, however, it might be a
question which policies should be applied.
� Feasible options in order to define “small installations” might be a capacity and an
emissions threshold.
� With respect to harmonisation, a possible starting point could be to draw up a list of small
installations of, for example, hospitals, to exclude from the scope of the Directive.
� Opting-out small installations has to be measured against alternative instruments, while the
opt-in should be maintained as an effective way of dealing with emission reductions.
Agenda item 7: Carbon dioxide capture and geological storage activities
Presentations
In his presentation, Mr Scott Brockett (European Commission) gave an overview on the
various aspects and risks related to CCS and presented suggestions how to cope with existing
barriers. He highlighted the role of CCS for meeting the reduction targets as well as the need
to manage the risks involved.
Mr Tim Dixon from the UK Department of Trade and Industry presented the work on CCS
undertaken in the UK with a view to opting-in CCS in the EU ETS. He stressed the CO2
mitigation potential of CCS and highlighted the efforts currently underway to give confidence
for an environmentally sound CCS.
Mr Göran Lindgren from Vattenfall and Mr Hans-Aasmund Frisak from Statoil presented the
CCS projects employed by their companies demonstrating the various technologies applied.
For Mr Stefan Singer, WWF, CCS represents an uncomfortable, but necessary option and
should become mandatory for all stations by 2020 at the latest.
Discussion
The debate acknowledged the potential contribution of CCS to the overall GHG emission
reduction objectives.
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However, a number of issues were raised on the relation between CCS and ETS: It was
argued that the EU ETS should cover the full chain of CCS. In this context, the questions
arose whether a new type of storage credits should be created and whether one ton of CO2 put
in storage should equal one ton of CO2 avoided. If storage credits where to be created, they
should be part of the allocation process, in order to provide the necessary incentives for the
upstream CCS chain. It was generally considered very important to formally recognise CCS
in the EU ETS Directive from the 3rd trading period onwards rather than relying on a pure opt-
in approach.
In the light of the costs of CCS, industry representatives highlighted their concerns as for the
ETS to bring about the financial incentives for CCS. Therefore, CCS should enjoy political
and financial support from technology programmes in the short term, while in the long term
markets will give the necessary price signals. In this respect, some stakeholders raised
concerns, whether a mandatory approach on CCS would be able to deliver by 2020 and would
prefer an incentive based one.
Participants of the meeting were pleased to note that both the steel and the cement sector are
interested in the abatement potential offered by CCS. The steel sector set up a consortium
looking at breakthrough technologies in this respect, which, however, will need adequate
support in the framework of the 7th Framework Programme and from the European
Investment Bank.
Representatives from the energy intensive industry were worried about CCS plants that may
serve as marginal supplier of electricity. Against this background, the Commission clarified
that economic theory requires internalisation of external costs. The industry concerned was
invited to provide a detailed analytical and empirical analysis on CCS as a marginal supplier
of electricity.
Conclusions
The chairman identified the following major elements emerging from the debate:
� The option of CCS is important and promising. While it does not provide a silver bullet, it
effectively contributes to the overall solution.
� De facto, there are two time frames available now:
� The opting in procedure, immediately available, which, for instance, will be
followed by the UK for the 2nd trading period;
� A harmonized approach from 2013 onwards. In that respect, account will need to
be taken of the different technologies applied, their specific aspects in the short
and in the long-term as well as the potential to include specific provisions on CCS
in the 3rd phase of the EU ETS.
Agenda item 8: Emission reduction projects within the Community
Presentations
In his presentation on "Emission reduction projects within the Community", Mr Frank
Convery, UCD Dublin, highlighted positive and negative aspects of domestic offset projects
(DOPs, here used as equivalent to emission reduction projects within the Community). The
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former could only come true provided that a number of conditions are met. The extension of
the EU ETS to DOPs would inevitably require harmonisation across Member States and
compliance with a number of pre-conditions. Mr Convery proposed a pilot scheme to be set
up, in order to test the viability of these projects under field conditions.
Mr Ignacio Sánchez García from the Spanish Ministry of Environment addressed the various
aspects such as how to link domestic projects with the EU ETS without affecting the well
functioning of the trading scheme, how additionality could be ensured, how to deal with
eligibility criteria and MRV.
Discussion
In the debate, stakeholders highlighted the various benefits and drawbacks of domestic offset
projects: On the positive side, it was argued that in order to achieve a 20% GHG emission
reduction, all opportunities including DOPs should be used. As for sectors not included in the
ETS, DOPs could unfold some synergies between the ETS and non-ETS sectors, as they may
allow preparing the ground for later inclusion in the ETS by discovering the price of carbon in
the non-ETS sector. Furthermore, DOPs may bring about new business opportunities for
industry and may lead to increased liquidity on the market.
On the other side, adverse effects from DOPs interfering with both the ETS and non-ETS
sector may appear: declining prices on the carbon market triggered by DOPs may reduce the
incentives accruing from the ETS to reduce emissions and for this reason may justify some
limitations, while DOPs are also seen as a potential barrier for identifying new policies and
measures in the non-trading sector.
It was generally admitted that complex approaches would be required to allow DOPs, since
there are no convincing concepts available yet to ensure environmental additionality, to avoid
double counting, to ensure the necessary monitoring, reporting and verification, to set the
necessary emissions development baseline and to set up a sufficiently simple design of the
DOPs.
In the event that the inclusion of DOPs into the EU ETS should be further pursued, these
problems must be overcome. Monitoring, reporting and verification requirements, but also the
overall design of the system should preferably be harmonised at European level. A list of
potential DOPs projects or pilot projects might be set up to decrease the uncertainty for
project developers.
Conclusions
Following the debate, the chair highlighted three major points emerging from the debate:
� There is a mixed perception of emission reduction projects within the Community (or
domestic offset projects) showing a number of drawbacks:
� they are administratively complex to handle;
� they may bring about adverse price effects on the market:
� the requirement of additionality is difficult to ensure and finally,
� they may interact with existing domestic policies and measures
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 253 – Drucksache 16/9334
� A pilot scheme with a limited list of projects to establish the merits and demerits of DOPs
might be envisaged. Among others, transport might represent a potential area in this
respect.
In the context of the debate on emission reductions projects within the Community, the UK
made a brief presentation on the matter of road transport. It was concluded that the issue
merits further reflection.
Agenda item 9: Concluding remarks
Before concluding the meeting, it was requested to introduce a new agenda item on the
functioning of the carbon market including the impact of the EU ETS on power prices, which
might be dealt with in one of the forthcoming meetings. The suggestion should be further
elaborated, in order to provide a sound basis for decision.
The Chair concluded the meeting by pointing out that
� a report will be established, which will be sent for comments to participants. The deadline
for submitting comments should be fully respected as otherwise the process might be very
cumbersome to manage. The report will not be verbatim and will not identify the positions
of the various stakeholders, but rather sum up the issues discussed with a view to
identifying converging and diverging views on the various subjects.
� the presentations will be put on the web. The relevant address is
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/review_en.htm.
� the next meetings will take place as indicated in the invitation to this meeting.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 254 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Final Report of the 2nd meeting
of the ECCP working group on emissions trading
on the review of the EU ETS
on
Robust Compliance and Enforcement
26-27 April 2007
Berlaymont, Rue de la loi 200, 1049 Brussels
Centre Borschette, Rue Froissart 36, 1040 Brussels
Agenda item 1: Welcome and Overview of the Review Process
The Chairman, Mr Jos Delbeke (European Commission) welcomed participants. After
introducing Ms Yvon Slingenberg as the new Head of Unit in charge of the EU ETS, he
pointed out that a draft agenda for the 3rd meeting and the final report of the 1st meeting has
been sent to participants after having received a number of comments that have been taken
into account in the final version. He asked for comments on these two documents as well as
on the agenda of today’s meeting. Participants did not have comments on any of these
documents.
Agenda item 2: Monitoring, Reporting and Permitting
Presentations
Mr Howard Leberman (UK Environment Agency) highlighted the importance of consistent,
robust and full implementation of the monitoring and reporting Guidelines (MRG). In his
view, accreditation of independent verifiers is critical. He advocated amending the Directive
to ensure a single standard for accreditation, which should be ensured by the European Co-
operation for Accreditation (EA) and stressed the role of monitoring, reporting and
verification for the reputation of the EU ETS, notably in relation to linking with other
emission trading schemes.
In his presentation, Mr Dop Schoen was not in favour of transforming the MRG into a
Regulation due to the resulting lack of flexibility of the legislative instrument. He asked the
EU Commission and Member States to better enforce the MRG, and to ensure consistent and
aligned application thereby make sure that there is a level playing field. As for the verification
process, among other issues, Mr Schoen stressed that based on the strategic assessment the
verifier should decide whether there can be an exemption for the site visit of particularly
remote locations such as offshore platforms. He advocated introducing Community level
accreditation for verifiers through the national accreditation bodies. The feasibility of
monitoring other GHG before including them into the EU ETS should be checked. In general,
the MRG should allow flexibility and pragmatic solutions.
According to Mr Ronald Kalwij (Royal Cosun), monitoring cost for SME (small and medium
enterprises) are still 10 times higher then for large installations despite the new monitoring
system. He identified a number of further improvements, such as verification of the energy
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bill to be conducted by the corporate controller, no monitoring of bio fuels, monitoring of the
whole site, even if monitoring is applicable to only one part of the plant, exclusion of spare
boilers.
Mr Tomas Wyns (CAN-Europe) addressed some shortcomings of the current MRV system
such as a different interpretation and implementation of the Monitoring Protocols (MP) in
Member States. He recommended that the M&R rules should be implemented in a more
harmonised way. With a view to rendering the MRV system with the MP foolproof, he
advocated ensuring a good technical verification of MPs and establishing a legal link between
verification of CO2 reports, MP and permits.
Mr Jochen Harnisch (Ecofys) set out some key problems emerging from different
implementation at MS level of permitting, monitoring and reporting. He recommended an
approach based on more harmonisation accruing from EU legislation for which he identified a
number of policy options, among which the establishment of a M&R Regulation. Mr Harnisch
concluded by highlighting the role of the MRV system of the EU ETS, which can serve as a
blueprint for other schemes. In his view, international linking makes further harmonisation of
MRV inevitable.
Discussion
The debate showed that there is a general agreement among all stakeholders on the need for
further harmonisation. However, stakeholders are split on the way how to achieve it. In the
light of 2020 emissions reduction targets, some Member States, supported by some NGOs,
favoured a harmonised approach based on Regulation, as this will have a direct effect and
may help to make the system fully fraud-prove. Other Member States as well as
representatives from the industry pointed to the need of subsidiarity, and wondered whether
currently existing problems could not be solved by better implementation through Member
States. Representatives from the industry stressed that current MRG are already binding and
could be tighter, if need be. Any solution should be cost-effective and should be based on an
analysis of the underlying problems including those of small installations. With respect to the
latter, opting out based on an emission threshold or an approach taking into account sector
specific features was suggested. Some Member States proposed that competent authorities
should validate all monitoring plans before issuing the greenhouse gas permit.
A number of stakeholders addressed institutional matters. Some of them advocated a
depoliticised and independent European Agency, which, according to some NGOs, should
also be responsible for accreditation and for the assessment of the implementation of the
Directive in Member States. Some Member States considered the idea of an agency rather
difficult.
While representatives of the Carbon trading sector were in favour of quarterly reporting in the
interest of transparency, some representatives from Member States and the industry pointed to
the additional burden, in particular for small installations emerging from these stipulations.
They highlighted that an appropriate balance must be kept.
According to the Carbon trading sector, site visits should continue to be a significant feature
of the MRV scheme, while other industry representatives again highlighted the principle of
proportionality.
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Representatives from the energy intensive industry suggested reconsidering the fall back
approach enshrined in the new MRG, while the Commission justified it as an innovative idea
that would prevent any unjustified deviation, while reinforcing the principle of cost-
effectiveness.
Conclusions
The chairman indicated he did not intend to present a coherent summary, but highlighted three
points:
� Monitoring, reporting, verification and permitting are closely linked together. Many
achievements can be recognised, but lots of things still remain to be done. It is very
important to acknowledge this in the light of market developments and the international
dimension. There is a high degree of agreement among stakeholders on both the elements
to be addressed and the need for further harmonisation. This does not mean that everything
has to be regulated into the last detail, since Member States and operators pointed out that
there are different national circumstances and different circumstances of operators. Thus, a
complementary comitology approach might be appropriate to deal with technical details
and guidance.
� There have been many comments on institutional issues, such as a plea for a European
Agency, which should be depoliticised, independent, centralised, managing information in
order to prevent leaks, catering for more regular reporting, but has also to be seen in the
international context. A common system of accreditation of verifiers has also been
suggested. Responsibilities of the different parties involved in monitoring, reporting,
verification and permitting must be very clear, as otherwise even a revised and improved
system may not work.
� It has been recognised that more can be done for small installations. However, the way to
follow is not clear, since any kind of emission related threshold would require monitoring
and thus not solve the problem of monitoring costs. There are also calls for a diversified
threshold for small installations in different sectors, which, taking environmental integrity
into account, may be difficult to handle. Furthermore, simplicity is an important matter for
small installations.
Agenda item 3: Compliance and Enforcement Issues in Relation to Expansion of the EU
ETS
Presentations:
Mr Roman Michalak (Republic of Poland) presented the Polish system of forest
management, where he concluded that responsible forest management would contribute to the
achievement of EU reduction goals. As a main challenge, he identified conserving and
increasing carbon pools through afforestation and reforestation & sustainable management
versus substitution of non-renewable energy by use of biomass.
Mr Günther Seuffert (European Commission) presented status and challenges of monitoring
biological sinks. He identified a number of uncertainties in terms of monitoring sinks, such as
the fact that the atmosphere does not see stock changes but fluxes, but also risks related with
terrestrial sinks, which may easily turn into a source of carbon (permanency risk). Hence,
current monitoring/reporting of sinks may not be adequate to guarantee accurate estimates.
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Instead, the methodology for conservative estimates could further be developed, to allow
easier estimation, and to guarantee at the same time that sinks are not overestimated.
Mr Mark Major (European Commission) presented the state of play on ETS and shipping.
According to him, there are currently a number of policy options under consideration. Mr
Major set out the advantages and disadvantages of including shipping in the EU ETS and
concluded that the Commission will continue to pursue international action, study the EU
policy options and consult stakeholders.
In his second presentation, Mr Jochen Harnisch (Ecofys) presented issues and policy options
for MRV emerging from possible new activities to be included in the EU ETS. With respect
to N2O from the chemical industry, CCS, aviation, shipping, domestic projects and sinks a
number of specific issues would need to be considered, with some of them (in particular
concerning N2O, CCS, aviation, and to a lesser extent shipping) feasible and others, such as
sinks and domestic projects, challenging, as they may require to introduce new elements,
usually not available in a cap-and-trade scheme. In his view, the right hierarchy of
instruments would be determined by the political will defining the corner stones and the
degree of flexibility required by the technical issues involved. The risk involved, however,
may be that the hierarchical legislation becomes fragmented and internally inconsistent.
Discussion
In the debate, most stakeholders taking the floor expressed deep concerns about sinks to be
included in the EU ETS. Doubts concerning the permanence of sinks, leakage risks, the matter
of additionality as well as the complexity involved were mentioned in this respect. NGOs
highlighted the role of forests for the climate, but stressed that the EU ETS is not the
appropriate tool to deal with forests. Very few Member States were in favour of giving sinks a
role in the EU ETS, and some of these only on condition that MRV issues were properly
addressed. Representatives of the carbon trading sector also recognised the complexity of
including sinks into the ETS, but were however convinced that the market would find ways to
mitigate the risks.
Some Member States explicitly asked the Commission whether shipping, road transport and
sinks would be considered for inclusion, at least in terms of the impact assessment.
Conclusions
In concluding the session, the Chairman responded to the questions concerning the potential
inclusion of sinks, road transport and shipping in the EU ETS. He confirmed that the impact
assessment on the review of the EU ETS Directive would deal with some transport issues.
However, there are still many topics, which are not clear yet, such as the scope of “road
transport” which could encompass passenger cars, lorries and long-haul distance transport or
any of them separately. The Chairman made clear that the EU ETS will not be extended to
road transport at the expense of current taxation regimes, as this would be environmentally
detrimental. As for shipping, he confirmed that the Commission is currently studying three
options: including shipping in EU ETS, a variation in harbour dues or a mandatory CO2 index
limit, which would involve the IMO. In his view, it is too early to have a clear view on road
transport and shipping, but no option will be excluded at this stage.
Agenda item 4: Verification
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Presentations
The analysis by Mr Jeroen Kruijd (PWC) showed a large variation in terms of verification
and accreditation in MS. In particular he underlined the unclear quality of the process. He
identified a number of policy options with respect to both verification and accreditation,
among which the adoption of verification and accreditation Guidelines or a verification and
accreditation Regulation. He concluded that a harmonised EU verification and accreditation
would by far be the most desirable approach to ensure trust in the EU ETS. International
linking and market operation requirements would make further harmonisation of verification
and accreditation inevitable. Finally, he pointed out that transparency in requirements and
performance of verification and accreditation should be enhanced and the role of the
competent authority herein clarified.
Mr Johan Pype (Tractebel Engineering) pointed to the large difference among verifiers
concerning their role, but also how verifications are notified and executed. He reported a
similar observation on the range of knowledge of verifiers. Against this background, he
considered increased harmonisation and the development of verification guidelines very
important.
Ms Anne-Marie Warris (IETA) presented her views on accreditation and verification and
what has to be done in terms of harmonisation. She also identified a number of elements that
should be an integral part of accreditation in the future, such as impartiality, consistency (‘a
tonne is a tonne’), harmonisation, comparability and transparency. Among other things, she
advocated a single ‘standard’ for accreditation process and functions, and a peer evaluation,
which should take place at regular intervals.
Mr Wolfgang Seidel (German Emission Trading Authority, DEHSt) presented requirements
for good verification and outlined the potential for harmonisation of accreditation and
verification. He confirmed specific needs for an EU-wide regulation of verification, which
could be accompanied by an accreditation forum at Community level, which could provide
further guidance. He argued against a centralised accreditation at Community level and
concluded that uniform application of the provisions on monitoring, reporting and verification
is essential for a level playing field within the EU ETS and that there is a need and a potential
for harmonising verification of emission reports.
Discussion
The debate showed a clear tendency in favour of a more harmonised approach on verification
including verification standards applying across the EU. However, Member States appear
divided on whether this should be achieved by means of legislative measures (Regulation) or
through better guidance by the Commission. While some Member States considered the
harmonisation of Monitoring Plans at EU level the most important issue, others called for
better implementation and application of existing legislation.
Some stakeholders advocated Community-level accreditation of verifiers (through national
accreditation bodies), in which the specifics of individual sectors should be taken into
account, while some Member States and representatives of the energy intensive industry
would not support this approach. National accreditation bodies should be recognised, which
may, however, apply common criteria on accreditation.
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On the matter of site visits, some representatives from the industry prefer the verifier to
decide on the need for site visits. In their view, he should also have the competence to decide
on exemptions, for instance in the case of small emitters and remote areas. Others would also
like to see the CA (competent authorities) involved, while some MS want the CA to decide.
Representatives from the industry put forward the idea of a Verification Forum comprising
verifiers, Member States and the Commission. The suggestion was much welcomed by almost
all stakeholders including the Commission.
The debate also confirmed that all non-conformity issues but the emissions fall under the
responsibility of the Member States and their CAs respectively.
Conclusions
Following the debate, the chairman drew the following conclusions:
� While a lot has been done and achieved in terms of verification, there is still room for
better implementing the current legislation.
� The role of the competent authorities in Member States is essential, but subject to
important differences in practical implementation.
� The Commission would look favourable to a Forum of and with verifiers and MS, but
would involve also small verifiers, in order to take account of the fact that verification is a
diversified business. Subject to agreement of stakeholders, the Chairman proposed to
organise the Forum before the summer break, in order to allow contributing to the
legislative work of the Commission.
� There is a general call for using some standards. Whether this could be achieved by means
of harmonisation by legislation, guidance, guidelines or voluntary processes, is left open
for the time being. However, there is a clear impression that the legislative issue must be
addressed, in order to provide the necessary structure to other processes based on guidance
or voluntary action.
� With respect to accreditation bodies, it is considered premature to conclude whether a
centralised body or the European Cooperation for Accreditation should be the preferred
route. However, regular checks and follow up of what accreditation bodies are doing need
to be provided for.
Agenda item 5: Perspectives for Compliance and Enforcement in the EU ETS
Presentations
Ms Lesley Ormerod (Environment Agency, UK) presented the results of work of the IMPEL
EU ETS group, which confirmed that robust, harmonised MRV & compliance underpin the
EU ETS. However, common approaches and definitions are required as well as focussing of
effort on the biggest emitters. Accreditation and verification must be performed to the highest
standards and consistently across Europe. It has also to be borne in mind that strong
environmental integrity and a comparable set of rules would provide the basis for linkage of
the EU ETS with developing schemes in other countries.
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Based on the experience of the 1st Trading Period, Ms Iris van Tol (Emissions Authority, The
Netherlands) presented various ideas on inspections and sanctions with a view to achieving a
high level of compliance in the entire EU. She highlighted the need for a clear structure of
responsibilities between the public and private domain as well as clear monitoring and
reporting structures and requirements supplemented by an adequate inspection and
enforcement strategy as well as the importance of a high level of acceptance by the industry.
Finally she advocated the establishment of an institutionalised forum of competent authorities
and the need for developing EU guidance on inspections and sanctions.
Mr Jarno Ilme (Energy Market Authority, Finland) set out the potential offered by IT to
further improve the EU ETS. He showed that effective utilization of IT represents an essential
tool for enforcement, inspection and overall compliance. He concluded that the development
of IT systems of operators, verifiers and CAs should be encouraged.
Mr Sanjeev Kumar (WWF) presented ideas on improving enforcement in the EU ETS. Based
on his analysis of the problems and solutions how to cope with them, he concluded that
penalties must be included in the revised Directive to ensure a platform on which Member
States could further build upon. Furthermore, all enforcement issues must be accessible to the
public, while good practice and continuous improvement should be encouraged and
supported.
Mr Reid Harvey (US Environmental Protection Agency) described monitoring, verification
and enforcement currently applied in the US cap-and-trade programmes (SO2 and NOX).
Main lessons learnt included applying reduced requirements for smaller emitters; imposing
progressively stringent substitute data requirements for data loss to ensure continuous
reporting; requiring comprehensive electronic reporting to enable targeted audits and
introducing automatic statutory penalties greater than cost of allowances.
In his second presentation, Mr Jeroen Kruijd (PWC) set out various policy options on
enforcement. He also presented elements for the architecture of a EU ETS Compliance
System. In his view, the EU ETS needs proper legal instruments for enforcement as well as
further harmonisation, in particular in the light of linking the EU ETS with other emissions
trading schemes. Important elements for such a system would be standards, structures and
adopting information technologies.
Discussion
The debate showed that a number of Member States impose sanctions in the case of non-
compliance, while others do not foresee any sanction. Representatives of NGOs supported an
enlarged scope of the Directive to include provisions on penalties in the event of non-
compliance. Some Member States and competent authorities considered existing rules
sufficient and highlighted the need to ensure compliance with existing rules before
introducing new ones.
The matter of more frequent reporting, i.e. quarterly reports instead of annual ones, were
raised in the debate. A number of industry representatives including cross sector associations
pointed to increasing costs and rising administrative burden in this respect without bringing
about any added value for the market and that there was a risk of unwarranted market reaction
due to not properly verified information being brought into the public domain. Some
companies including large emitters suggested they would just pursue a compliance strategy.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 261 – Drucksache 16/9334
Furthermore, the uncertainty of the first years of the EU ETS triggered by a lack of verified
emissions data would not exist anymore.
The Commission acknowledged the fact that many companies pursue a compliance strategy.
However, it is also convinced that this is about to change, since companies, on top of their
compliance efforts, would increasingly develop a market strategy, in order to benefit from
market opportunities. Experience has shown that piecemeal information creates volatility in
the market and constitutes discrimination, since information is not available to everybody at
the same time and at the same quality. It also has to be borne in mind that more frequent
information may diminish the focus on particular data release dates, as can be seen from the
US market, and thus provides for more stability on the market. For these reasons, the matter
of additional costs has to be weighed up against more and better market information enabling
market participants to benefit from market opportunities.
Some industry representatives wondered whether more inspections would not lead to rising
burden for the operators and bring about more inconsistency due to the different MS practices
involved in inspections.
Conclusions
The Chairman acknowledged that many useful elements have been raised in the debate, also
proving the different ways of implementation in terms of compliance and enforcement at
Member States level. The Commission would need to make use of the many existing
networks such as IMPEL, in order to identify the most essential elements addressed in the
debate for its further work. He pointed out that sanctions and penalties would only represent
one element of the whole enforcement cycle and, for this reason, have to be seen in a wider
context. The examples of the US and Finland representing more automatic ways of collecting
information may provide promising solutions and options. He also noted that as for reporting,
the matter of costs has to be borne in mind and weighed up against the benefit of more
information.
Agenda item 6: Registries
Presentations
Mr Istvan Bart (European Commission) briefly presented the registry systems in Member
States and their relation to the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL). According
to Article 30(f) of the Directive, the review should consider whether a single Community
registry would be appropriate. Relevant issues to be taken into account are costs, optimisation
of IT functions, functioning under the UNFCCC infrastructure and the role of Member States.
Mr Andrei Marcu and Mr Peter Zaman (both IETA) presented their views on registry
developments beyond 2012. They set out the current situation in the light of relevant UN
documents and considered advantages and disadvantages of a single European registry. In the
short term, it was recommended to get the system going by December 1, 2007. However,
IETA would support any outcome that will allow to implement the “best solution” within the
given parameters.
Discussion
The discussion focussed whether exchanges of allowances should first be registered under the
ITL or whether the CITL should be the first addressee for MS registries. This has to be very
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carefully considered. Many stakeholders agreed that the operational independence of the EU
ETS is absolutely essential. The ability of entities to communicate across different systems
was also emphasised.
Representatives from the industry warned against greatly increasing transactions costs in the
EU ETS as a consequence of the current system, if developing countries demand an extension
of the share of proceeds as part of an post 2012 agreement.
NGOs took the view that including new sectors in the EU ETS might not happen, if it is
subject to approval from parties outside the EU ETS.
Some Member States underlined the importance for the EU to be compliant with the Kyoto
Protocol and identified the need for further discussions.
Some stakeholders urged the EU Commission to reprioritise the need for Member States to
meet their Kyoto Protocol Article 17 commitments and for the national registries to connect to
the ITL as planned.
Conclusions
In concluding the session, the Chairman pointed out that currently the EU ETS represents the
only framework, where carbon trading among companies is underpinned by robust
monitoring, reporting and verification rules and compliance is enforced by sanctions. Article
17 of the Kyoto Protocol has to be seen as an enabling provision allowing trading. There are
no spontaneous compliance provisions at UN level. The only existing ones are those at EU
level, which are good.
Agenda item 7: Concluding Remarks by the Chair
The Chairman concluded that during the last two days a very good harvest of ideas has been
reaped concerning the improvement of monitoring, reporting, verification and permitting. It is
now up to the Commission to decide which of the various options will be further explored and
possibly incorporated in the legislative proposal. He also stressed that better implementation
of what is already on the table would also be a clear option.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 263 – Drucksache 16/9334
Final Report of the 3rd meeting
of the ECCP working group on emissions trading
on the review of the EU ETS
on
Further Harmonisation and Increased Predictability
21 – 22 May 2007
Centre Borschette, Rue Froissart 36, 1040 Brussels
Agenda Item 0: Welcome and Introduction
The chairman, Mr Jos Delbeke (European Commission) welcomed participants and
highlighted the importance of the meeting. He also appreciated having a balanced list of
speakers and presentations on the agenda of the meeting.
Agenda Item 1: Cap-setting: EU-wide versus national caps
In his presentation, Mr Felix Matthes (Öko-Institut) identified four general options to define
the split of an EU-wide cap between the ETS and non-ETS sector:
� Efficiency approach
� Equal burden approach
� Grandfathering approach
� Equity based approach
He said that in order to avoid distortions in the internal market and to ensure compliance with
the EU cap, a harmonised approach would be necessary and appropriate. National ETS caps
can be based on a common approach in the framework of an EU cap. A flat rate reduction
differentiated by ETS sectors where EU benchmarks could be applied would deliver the caps.
Assuming certain reduction targets, the caps for the traded and non-traded sectors would be
defined.
Mr Matthes concluded that if MS were to take on separate commitments under the
international regime, national caps are very likely. However, an EU-wide common approach
differentiated by ETS activities would be necessary, appropriate and feasible. Analysis
showed that sufficiently robust and precise criteria for national caps based on EU-wide
methodology could be formulated.
According to Mr Christian Egenhofer (CEPS), cap-setting and allocation under the current
EU ETS has been a highly decentralized negotiation process, characterized by the principle of
subsidiarity, industry preferences and reflecting the material differences of Member States. It
entails costs, which occurred due to a number of various reasons.
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With a view to avoiding distortions on the internal market and preserving environmental
effectiveness at the macro level, cap setting could either be done through emission projections
or an emissions coefficient applied to MS, sectors and installations. At the micro level,
allocation would be laid down by EU rules and implemented by the Commission, or, as
currently, by Member States.
Against this background, he identified two options with the EU ETS sector treated as if it
were a Member State:
� Cap-setting and allocation applied by EU based on agreed methodology;
� Cap-setting by EU and allocation by Member States with variations concerning the
treatment of new entrants.
Mr Egenhofer concluded by saying that
� agreeing on “objective” methodology for emissions projections is doable
� agreeing on an “objective” emissions co-efficient (e.g. benchmark) for MS, sector,
installation is the challenge
� principal distortions are due to EU-based burden-sharing agreement (better BSA needed
for Member States or for ETS sector)
� A key consideration is the application of a Community co-efficient (or benchmark) for
cap-setting (politically feasible if combined with special pleading).
Mr Stefan Moser (European Commission) considered the advantages and drawbacks of
upfront or NAP-based cap setting. He noted that upfront cap setting would lead to a
modification of the current system and would mean that the distribution of the reduction
burden between the EU ETS-sectors and the non-EU ETS sectors would be dealt with in a
harmonised manner across Member States. This could be achieved through separate national
caps or an EU-wide cap.
While a number of advantages would emerge from an up-front cap-setting, one consequence
of an up-front cap-setting would be less flexibility and margin of discretion for Member State
authorities to differ allocations from those in other Member States.
Mr Moser concluded that more harmonisation of cap-setting procedures can reduce regulatory
uncertainty and can improve simplicity, fairness and predictability for both operators and the
market. A more harmonised approach can reduce distortions of competition and of the
internal market as well as volatility of allowance prices.
Ms Kate Hampton (ECIS) presented the perspectives from the financial market’s point of
view. While business would not need complete certainty, it would need confidence in the
predictability of policy, which from the business point of view means de-politicisation. In the
current system, she considers that too much political/policy risk exists.
The national allocation process provides an additional and unnecessary layer of policy
uncertainty and should therefore be removed. An EU-wide system of auctioning and
benchmarking should support the EU-wide cap to be set out to 2020, with additional visibility
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 265 – Drucksache 16/9334
to 2030 as soon as possible.According to Ms Hampton, the cap should be based on a formula
that is a function of the EU 20% and 30% targets. Such a cap would be simple and transparent
and would provide greatest predictability. It should be committed to, even before an
international agreement is reached, so that businesses can make their own risk assessment of
the caps. Optimally, the formula would be included in the Directive. As a minimum, the cap
should be a reduction by the trading sector that is proportional to its emissions. However,
marginal abatement cost (MAC) analysis suggests that the trading sector should go deeper.
Discussion
In the debate, the Chairman highlighted the need to de-politicise the EU ETS. None of the
stakeholders present questioned the need for further harmonisation of cap setting. Almost all
stakeholders supported a more harmonised cap-setting approach, thus illustrating a very broad
consensus to improve cap setting. Some Member States considered harmonisation closely
associated with a level playing field, while other stakeholders pointed to the international
dimension of the EU ETS. In their view, more harmonisation would fit well in the
international discussion on sector approaches and could convey a signal to bring in
developing countries. Furthermore, the goal of compatibility between the EU ETS and the
international level in technical terms was stressed, in order to internationally recognise
emission reductions achieved by the EU ETS.
Albeit not against more harmonisation, some Member States consider it important to take into
account specific national circumstances, such as the level of economic development, impact
on economic growth, but also how the energy intensive or export dependent industry would
be affected. For these reasons, in their view harmonisation should enable a certain degree of
flexibility.
Representatives of several Member States, power generators, carbon traders and NGOs
advocated an EU-wide cap for a number of reasons: it is considered best to deliver in terms of
clarity of targets, a harmonised level of ambition and future scarcity of allowances. It could
best ensure a level playing field and would take away the discretion of Member States
resulting in adverse and distorting effects. Representatives of the carbon trading sector and
NGOs argued it would also lead to a higher level of transparency, which would make the EU
ETS more comprehensible to the outside world and underpin the political leadership of the
EU.
Issues raised in the context of an EU-wide cap concerned the determination of such a cap, its
impact on sector caps and economic development and growth.
Conclusions
Following the debate, the Chairman concluded 5 points:
� There is a unanimous call for improved cap setting. In terms of environmental
effectiveness, NAP1 did not deliver and NAP2 required firm intervention by the
Commission. A systematic approach is now needed, also in the light of the international
dimension, for the sake of which the EU has to be able to explain in clear terms how cap-
setting works.
� There is a general, very strong message calling for more harmonisation, if not a centralized
EU cap. This raises questions on how to do it including considering the EU ETS as if it
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were a separate Member State. Cap setting has to be in line with the firm decision of the
Heads of State and Governments to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions by at least
20% by 2020, increasing to 30% under certain conditions.
� There is a need for strong separation between cap setting and allocation to keep the process
politically and technically manageable.
� There is a strong call for transparency for both cap setting and allocation. A level playing
field and the recognition of regional circumstances and the diversity of the EU emerge as
the principles and criteria to be applied for cap setting. Both may appear from further
detailed work on sector allocation processes.
� There is a very strong call on predictability meaning the 3rd trading period to last at least
until 2020. All stakeholders called on longer periods, no one spoke in favour of a 5-year
period.
Agenda item 2: Increased predictability
Presentations
Mr Franzjosef Schafhausen (Germany) made a presentation on increased predictability. In
his view, predictability would be assured by:
� determining the rules and formula for cap-setting up-front in the ETS directive;
� linking the total ETS cap to the 20/30% target and the result of the burden sharing process;
� establishing indicative targets for the time beyond 2020;
� determining clear and harmonised allocation rules for all sectors as well as incumbents and
new entrants in the Directive. In his presentation on “Increased Predictability in Emissions
Trading”, Mr Owen Wilson (Eurelectric) proposed that in order to increase predictability, the
revision of the Directive should focus on:
� Stability in rules determining the ETS cap;
� Stability in rules determining the allocation trajectory;
� Well-signalled changes in the methodology of allocation;
� Either no provisions on companies' use of JI/CDM, or, provisions linked to targets;
� Well-signalled direction on energy R&D and technology support schemes;
� Known conditions/principles for linkage to other schemes;
� Well-signalled changes in percentage auctioning, coordination of auctioning;
� Opportunity to comment on future developments.
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Mr Mark C. Lewis (Deutsche Bank) presented ideas on improving the predictability of the
scheme. He concluded that medium-term compliance periods within a long-term emissions
trajectory is the rational policy for the following reasons:
A long-term cap set only for 30-40 years in the future would greatly reduce the incentive to
change behaviour in the short term, as economic agents would hope for improved technology
later in the period, or find other excuses to delay adaptation
However, having a long-term trajectory (30-40 years) for the carbon cap with shorter-term
compliance periods (8-10 years each) should ensure that the behaviour of the agents covered
by the scheme take the long-term trajectory into account from the outset of the first
compliance period
Discussion
The debate confirmed that a stable framework of rules and principles on cap-setting, the split
between the trading and non-trading sector and the trajectory would be the most important
elements for increased predictability. These elements have also to be seen against the
background of the international regime, to which the EU ETS should fit, however, without
being dependent upon this. Representatives of Member States and the research community
highlighted the role of allocation methods for the length of trading periods, also in terms of
the carbon price signal. A representative of the power generation industry suggested that a
predictability period should be envisaged, which is longer than the allocation and compliance
period, but shorter than the cap period.
In the view of the research Community, a 5-year trading period could be justified only
because of the uncertainties of the international regime, while others considered a 8-year
period not too long and often too short in the light of the lead time for investments. 10 years
might be a reasonable timeframe for representatives of the carbon trading sector.
Some industry representatives took the view that banking and borrowing of allowances would
enable there to be short trading periods, but would also provide some flexibility to introduce
new technologies. Representatives from the carbon trading sector raised concerns about
borrowing across compliance periods, while representatives from the financial sector and
NGOs are against borrowing, as this would detract from the purpose of having shorter
compliance periods.
Conclusions
Following the debate, the Chairman concluded two points:
� On the basis of the arguments put forward, there seem to be a consensus emerging to align
with the period on which a firm political decision has been taken, i.e. the 3rd trading period
to run from 2013 to 2020. The debate has confirmed the importance of having a longer
perspective, for which a political orientation indicating a reduction target of 60 to 80% by
2050 is becoming clearer.
� Stable and reliable rules of the game are very important and for this reason, a too frequent
revision of the EU ETS, e.g. in 2014/15 should not be envisaged. There are, however two
caveats in this respect: first, the revision of the international regime, which could lead to
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more ambitious targets, and second, linkage with other emission trading regimes, which
will have to be based on an explicit decision-making process.
Agenda item 3: Allocation methodologies
Presentations
Mr David Harrison (NERA) presented an overview of allocation methodologies and
principles. He identified environmental integrity, efficiency and distributional effects as major
evaluation criteria. Harmonisation should be pursued in line with the following principles:
� Harmonisation is more important where non-harmonisation increases compliance costs or
inefficiencies
� Non-harmonised new entrant allocations raise efficiency concerns
� Non-harmonised auction shares and incumbent allocations affect efficiency less, and may
result in possible distortion of the internal market
� Some non-harmonised parameters give rise to “prisoners’ dilemma” and Member States
may find it difficult to change unilaterally and thus should prefer harmonisation. On behalf
of IFIEC Europe, Mr Vianney Schyns (IFIEC Europe) presented ideas on “Improving
allocation – Performance based allocation is feasible…”. From his point of view, auctioning
would raise serious concerns with respect to competitiveness, leakage and recycling of
revenues and would not be appropriate to solve the problem of windfall profits in the
electricity industry.
However, benchmarking may offer a solution, as with suitable benchmark formula, it would
bring about the same incentive for low carbon technologies as auctioning. In his view, the
incentive derived from benchmarks to reduce emissions would be independent of the exact
value of the benchmark in a certain year. Finally, performance-based benchmarking would
provide incentives along the whole product chain and would also accelerate transition to a
global trading scheme.
Mr Alistair Steel (EuroChlor) presented energy issues on behalf of EuroChlor. Due to
electricity accounting for more than 50% of full production costs in the chlor industry,
compensation for the energy intensive industry in the form of free-of-charge allowances taken
from electricity generators must in his view be accepted as a legitimate concept.
Benchmarking, however, is acceptable to the chlor industry while auctioning is not, but if it
was to be adopted, the revenue arising should be recycled.
On behalf of CEFIC, Mr Peter Botschek presented “Solutions for an improved ETS”, which
in his view, are mainly necessary to ensure competitiveness of the chemical industry. He
proposed the targeted introduction of performance-based allocation through benchmarks to
large emitting, homogenous processes, linking allocation to production and excluding small
emitters from the EU ETS.
Auctioning would exacerbate the problem presented, although theoretically auctioning of
allowances would be an ideal way of allowance allocation if applied world-wide. Recycling
of auctioning revenues could lead to additional administrative procedures and costs, while a
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 269 – Drucksache 16/9334
level playing field could not be ensured if there were different practices in different Member
States.
Mr Yves de Lespinay from the European Lime Association presented a “Global Lime Carbon
Allocation Model” for the post 2012 carbon allocation based on the development of
benchmarks. While work on the model is currently ongoing, a draft of it should be available
in September 2007 and the full model by the end of 2007.
According to Mr Jean-Marie Chandelle (CEMBUREAU), criteria for benchmarking in the
European cement industry should be performance based on historical specific emissions.
While opposed to auctioning, revenues gained from auctioning should be used to reward the
best performance. Mr Chandelle also presented a global sectoral approach for CO2 reduction
in the cement industry. He concluded that the concept can be integrated in the logic of
national or regional schemes, and allows a worldwide vision in the cement sector and a
progressive evolution of non-constrained developing countries into a common scheme.
Mr Marco Mensink (CEPI) presented views on improving allocation of the EU pulp and
paper industry. He stressed that the large number of installations, the large variety between
installations and large number of smaller installations would create a challenge to implement
benchmarks in the pulp and paper sector. Current benchmarks in member states (NL, BE, AU,
Germany) are not fit yet to be brought directly to the EU level.
Mr Mensink advocated a combination of benchmarks and grandfathering for various reasons.
Auctioning would only give limited possibilities of recycling revenues and without return of
revenues, auctioning of credits would take away the funds needed to make technical progress
and directly influence global competitiveness.
Mr Guy Tackels (CPIV) made a presentation on the allocation method in the glass industry.
In order to improve the allocation method, fine-tuning by glass sub-sectors would be
absolutely necessary and free allocation would be essential (on the basis of world-wide
competition). Auctioning should be avoided. The allocation method must take into account
unforeseeable production growth and the wide diversity of the Glass industry. A sector-related
method and benchmarking is worth considering, but admittedly quite complicated. For this
reason, auditing can be used as a safety net. A harmonised European benchmark is required.
Mr Kevin Farrell (CERAME-UNIE) presented “Key positions of the European Ceramics
Industry on ETS and allocation methods”. Under certain conditions, benchmarking could be
applied to the ceramic industry. In Mr Farrell’s view, auctioning is not adapted to the
ceramics industry and should be avoided, as it is perceived as favouring carbon price volatility
and is very likely to deter new investments in the ceramics sector. However, should
auctioning occur, the revenues from it shall be recycled to those industries that have no
possibility to pass on cost increases. Ms Annette Loske (IFIEC Europe) made a presentation
on “Improving Allocation – Performance based allocation and activity rate: what is the
choice?” She commented that the EU ETS in its current form has raised fundamental
challenges, such as the power price effect and identified several problems with respect to
relying on forecast data. According to Ms Loske, these issues would be solved through
relying on actual production data, which would eliminate the disadvantages of the present
rules (uncompetitive high electricity prices, exporting and increasing emissions, hindering
competitive strategies, discriminating new entrants), but would realize advantages of a
market-based instrument, i.e. providing for cost efficiency, setting the right incentives for
efficiency improvements, guarantee of total cap.
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Discussion
The debate identified a number of requirements to be met by benchmarks: they must be
simple and strictly limited in terms of numbers of benchmarks. Some Member States
anticipated a risk of difficult political discussions when it comes to defining benchmarks,
while NGOs underlined the need of a transparent benchmark setting process which identified
the single best least CO2 intensive method of production to facilitate possible linking with
other international emissions trading systems. In the view of NGOs, the case for
benchmarking was dependent to a large extent on their exposure to international competition
and their inability to pass on costs to customers.
On request of the Chairman, representatives of industry confirmed that for the steel sector
about five benchmarks, one or two for the cement sector and about 20 benchmarks for the
chemical sector would in their view be required.
With respect to performance-based benchmarks, representatives of NGOs and the research
community took the view that they may introduce relative emissions targets instead of
absolute ones and also partly eliminate or distort the carbon price signal. Without a carbon
price signal, the cost-efficiency of the system would be jeopardized.
Representatives from a number of Member States, the carbon trading sector and the gas
industry assigned only a supplementary role to benchmarking. For most of them, the starting
point for allocation should be auctioning, as this would solve a lot of allocation problems.
Generally, the burden of proof why not to auction should lie with the industry concerned.
Benchmarking may only be appropriate, where it is proven that allowance costs could not be
passed through and where international competition necessitates a certain level of free
allocation.
The role of the carbon price signal in terms of the emissions reduction objectives to be
achieved had been highlighted. A 20 – 30% emissions reduction objective for the overall
economy is likely to involve a substitution effect. Auctioning could best ensure the carbon
price signal required, since benchmarking and auctioning do not provide the same incentives
unless, for example, a fuel switch signal were maintained in benchmarks.
Some representatives from the industry pointed out that only a decreasing share of inefficient
production would bring about reductions of emissions and advocated an absolute cap for the
sector and intensity targets for individual installations, which should be subject to ex-post
adjustments or ex-ante benchmarks based on real production.
In the view of many stakeholders including many Member States, the carbon trading sector
and NGOs, performance-based benchmarks and ex-post adjustments would run contrary to
predictability and would turn out to be disastrous for the EU ETS. The same would go for
other instruments such as price caps.
Representatives of the oil and gas industry took the view that internationally competing oil
companies should continue to receive the bulk of their allocations free of charge until there is
a worldwide carbon valuation and expressed a clear preference for a top-down process
allocating allowances for free on the basis of historic emissions. Representatives of the oil
industry were opposed to auctioning, but could consider some elements of benchmarking.
They also requested to take into account the so-called “Oil Refining Paradox”, which implies
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 271 – Drucksache 16/9334
that efforts required by law and undertaken to produce cleaner products for customers with a
view to reducing their emissions may result in greater CO2 emissions inside the refineries.
In the view of industry representatives, compensation requests from the industry, as presented
by Mr Steel, are justified. Some Member States did not exclude that part of the auction
revenues should be recycled back to the energy intensive industry.
For some industry representatives, the proposal to give indirect allowances to power
producers or direct allowances to consumers with a view to making up for increased
electricity costs is an option that should be considered.
Conclusions
The chairman concluded the debate by highlighting five points:
� There is no agreement among stakeholders on the preferred allocation method. The merits
and drawbacks of the various allocation methods have been presented and discussed, but
the split of views remains.
� With respect to allocation through benchmarking, it became clear that a lot of work
remains to be done and that this approach is complicated and demanding. This is also clear
to the industrial sectors, partly due to their work carried out in the past, partly due to
anticipation of forthcoming work. The Commission does not want to discourage the
industrial sectors from developing good benchmarks, but does not want to engage into
another Sevilla process on BAT (best available techniques) with all its promises and limits.
For this reason, the various sector associations are requested to sort out amongst
themselves which benchmarks could be applicable and thus provide important input to the
process conducted by the Commission.
� With respect to benchmarking, there are serious concerns about predictability to the
market, i.e. the certainty required by investors. The debate has demonstrated that the more
one goes into details, the more complicated the issues become. The Commission invites all
industrial sectors to look into benchmarking, but wants to make clear that ex-post
benchmarks are not compatible with the way the EU ETS is set up. For the sake of a well
functioning market, ex-ante benchmarks would represent a minimum requirement, while
frequent and/or regular ex-post interventions are excluded.
� There is also a matter of confidentiality, which emerges from the need to have reliable
production data and other inputs when it comes to defining benchmarks. Experience
showed that acquiring these data is in practice very difficult due to well-justified reasons of
confidentiality and competition. The industry is requested to reflect further on these issues,
since performance based benchmarks require that sort of input as a condition sine qua non.
� The international dimension of emissions trading requires simplicity of allocation, in order
to promote linking with other emissions trading systems. If auctioning is not the preferred
approach, it would be very important to present factual proof of how international
competitiveness of the European industry is affected, in order to allow the Commission to
take the matter of international competitiveness into account when it comes to proposing
allocation methods. The issue of recycling of revenues from auctioning would also be an
important aspect to consider.
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Agenda item 4: Carbon price signals, allocation methodologies and international aspects
including electricity prices
Presentations
On behalf of WWF, Mr Stefan Singer presented “The economic and ecological impact of
different allocation methodologies – grandfathering, benchmarking, auctioning”. Mr Singer
identified a need for a single EU-wide cap that is aligned to 30% + greenhouse gas reduction
limits by 2020. He advocated a cap level for 2020 with a percentage of periodic 5 years
decrease to be set in the directive as well as starting the debate on 2030, 2040, 2050 EU ETS
cap level.
WWF recommends that all permits should be auctioned as there is no other equally
transparent, equitable and non-distorting method of allocation. With respect to auction
revenues WWF recommends that the distribution of all money generated is transparent and
publicly accountable and used for climate protection. A substantive part of money should be
invested in developing nations to facilitate technology transfer, European export industries
and lead to an increased uptake of clean carbon solutions.
Mr Jos Sijm (ECN) made a presentation on “The impact of the EU ETS on electricity prices:
experiences from the past and expectations for the future”. According to his findings, the
main price drivers on 2005 forward markets, in the case of gas fired power generation were
fuel and carbon costs, while for coal-fired plants only carbon costs were identified. In Mr
Sijm’s view, carbon pass through is not a problem, but an intended effect. On the other hand,
he noted that although overstated generally by energy-intensive industries, it is an issue for
some sectors. Carbon pass through and windfall profits would continue in the future, although
the impact in the long run will be mitigated by induced additional investments in generation
capacity. In this respect, he stressed that however, free allocations undermine the incentive
structure towards carbon reducing investments. A shift of free allocation to auctioning will
have a beneficial impact on carbon reducing investments, reduce (windfall) profits of fossil
generators, but most likely not have a (significant) impact on cost pass-through or windfall
profits of non-fossil generators.
Mr Simon Baker (Eurometaux) made a presentation on “The impact of the EU ETS on
electricity prices – perspective from non-ferrous metal producers operating in Europe”. As for
the observed CO2 pass-through into power prices, Mr Baker explained that including the
opportunity cost of CO2 in pricing decisions is fully consistent with economic theory. Non-
ferrous metal producers need long-term predictable cost-based power supply arrangements.
Uncertainty on the future tightness of the carbon constraint, allowance allocations and
methodologies makes pricing long-term power supply agreements very difficult.
Consequently power generators are either unwilling to enter into long-term sales
arrangements or will look to push the CO2 price risk to the consumer. Non-ferrous metals are
globally traded commodities; producers cannot pass-through local cost increases such as the
incorporation of the CO2 cost into power prices in Europe.
As a consequence, shielding measures from the pass-through effect of CO2 into power prices
would be required, otherwise trade-exposed energy intensive industries in Europe such as
primary aluminium production will close and be replaced elsewhere with no overall
environmental benefit.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 273 – Drucksache 16/9334
Mr Baker proposed that long-term power sales to trade exposed energy intensive industries
should be entitled to an equivalent free allocation of allowances. In Mr Baker’s view, such an
approach does not affect fundamentals of the scheme nor monitoring and reporting and would
remove CO2 indirect effects in power prices.
In his presentation on “Impacts on electricity prices of emissions trading”, Mr Bill Kyte
(Eurelectric) stated that changes in electricity prices would not be a consequence of emissions
trading, but of implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. As the trading scheme is the cheapest
way to implement Kyoto, it means that any price changes will be the lowest necessary. He
pointed to electricity price increases starting already in 2002, while the EU ETS came into
effect in 2005. Real prices, however, were, according to Mr Kyte, still lower in 2006 than they
were in 1990, while a threefold increase in taxes from 4.2% in 1995 to 13.2% in 2006
contributed considerably to the power price rise.
He also argued that electricity prices in the US even rose more than in Europe (before taxes)
compared to 1995. Also fossil fuel prices went up more sharply than power prices with oil
price increases amounting to 186% (1995 – 2006), gas prices to 133% and coal to 34%. The
same would go for the metals and chemicals sectors with aluminium up 60% compared to
1997, steel a little bit less than 60% and copper around 20% (yearly average, based on $-
prices), while in the chemical sector ethylene, ammonia and methanol show price increases
between 40 and 140%.
As regards the impact of non-EU competition on the ETS sectors, he referred to a Climate
Strategies study conducted on behalf of DEFRA, which for most ETS sectors did not reveal
any significant value at stake, even in the scenario where no allowances were allocated for
free.
In his conclusions, Mr Kyte underlined that the objective of the EU ETS is to deliver carbon
reductions at the least cost and the impact of the EU ETS on competitivity has been over-
hyped. Key principles for allocation could be equity between installations, predictability and
harmonization.
Ms Sophie Dupressoir (ETUC) presented the viewpoint of European Trade Unions on
“Allocation of carbon permits, competitiveness and employment”. She outlined that for
energy intensive industries (EII), there is a threat of relocation and there might be the risk to
head towards a ‘lose-lose’ situation made up of the loss of European industrial basis and the
loss of potential of emissions reduction. The industries concerned would not account for more
than about 1 percent of EU employment. A study conducted on behalf of ETUC showed that,
in most cases, the sectors are not putting enough effort into R&D.
The level of auctioning should depend on the level of exposure to international competition,
while the risk of relocation could be minimised by a border adjustment mechanism. She
concluded that there should be as much as possible harmonisation in the EU ETS. It should
also be backed up by stronger and public R&D funds to bring the necessary technology
breakthrough. The transparency of the allocation process is considered crucial, even if
auctioning and benchmarking are applied.
Mr Christoph Grobbel (McKinsey & Company) made a presentation on competitive effects.
Power plants are generally profiting from EU ETS, but to a different extent: while nuclear
power does not face any cost but revenue increases, revenue increases of lignite, hard coal and
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old gas fired power plants would mainly depend on free allowances, as not all cost increases
could be passed through (merit order).
While revenue increases in the refining sector under free allocation clearly outweigh cost
increases, cost and revenue increases in the steel and cement sector would just level out each
other. All of these sectors, with the exception of EAF steel, however would depend on free
allowances. The aluminium sector faces pressure also with free allowances, since there are no
revenue increases but only increasing costs.
In summarising the lessons learnt, he concluded that competitiveness issues should be
addressed. This could either be done through a cross border taxation scheme or production
based allocation with benchmarking or auctioning with redistribution of the proceedings. In
the event of a global sector agreement, the issue would be resolved, too. The allocation
mechanism would determine the “pricing-in” of CO2 allowance value.
For the steel industry, Mr Paul Brooks (Eurofer) presented “A Proposal for A Sector
Approach”. Taking the view that the current EU ETS does not deliver a global reduction in
CO2 emissions and will not help achieving a reduction of CO2 emissions by 30% by 2020, he
proposed an alternative ETS based on a baseline and credit system. He described its main
characteristics – a mandatory scheme for the steel sector, including direct and indirect
emissions on the basis of a baseline. The system would offer a clear incentive to invest in
improvements and provides major advantages, such as quantified emission reduction
performance, real reward for innovation, avoiding delocalisation of emissions, no barrier to
growth, and it has a real potential to become global.
Mr Richard Baron (IEA) made a presentation on the economic role of carbon price signals
emerging from the EU ETS. It is to internalise the social cost of CO2 and to optimise choices
on that basis. In electricity, the carbon price signal is working. Emissions trading is a cost-
minimising policy instrument and would determine the appropriate carbon price. Asking
whether the same environmental outcome could be delivered at lower cost, he confirmed that
this would be possible on condition that incentives to lower emissions are unequivocal, and
uncertainty can be lowered through commitment periods and increased visibility to investors.
With respect to CO2 and competitiveness with outside the EU, the priority should be to seek
least-cost reductions through emissions trading. In order to improve the ability of the scheme
to deliver a CO2 price as low as it could be, the review should bring about new rules to lower
uncertainty.
According to Mr Baron, the market base of our economies makes CO2 pricing a central
coordination tool, yet other policy instruments are needed to overcome market barriers and
distribution issues must be addressed.
Discussion
In the debate, NGOs highlighted that with respect to international competitiveness, some
presentations have shown that cost issues are not as serious as claimed and requested data on
industry’s exposure to international competition. While some Member States took the view
that, where justified, concerns about competitiveness must be addressed by means of a
compensation mechanism including reinforced work on border tax adjustments, reference was
also made to studies showing that a high level of auctioning would be possible for energy
intensive industries without impacting on leakage.
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Representatives of the carbon trading sector took the view that leakage is often confused with
the impact of globalisation. With respect to a proposal presented, they stressed that Europe
would give the wrong signals if it were to have industrial sectors leave the EU ETS.
Auction revenues should be used to help other countries invest in clean technologies or export
credits. NGOs suggested that auctioning could reduce the costs for the society in comparison
to taxes.
Some industry representatives questioned some of the figures shown in some presentations
and pointed out they would not apply to energy intensive industries. They also had doubts
whether the results of a recent study published by DG Competition have been taken into
account with respect to market distortions.
Conclusions
In summing up the debate, the Chairman identified three points:
� The economic impact of the EU ETS is there and has created price effects throughout the
economy.
� As regards international competitiveness, there are direct and indirect impacts. Factual
evidence on these impacts will be needed and it is important that this evidence is made
clear. The EU ETS will be reviewed, however, without compromising its environmental
strength and integrity. It is also a matter of fact that globalisation is ongoing.
� In the event that negative impacts from international competition can be established, there
may be different ways to deal with them:
� differentiated allocation of allowances
� different allocation method, e.g. between the power and the industrial sectors
� The baseline and credit system, presented by Eurofer, however, would not be
compatible with the EU ETS.
� Border tax adjustments or similar compensation mechanisms might be considered,
when it comes to compensation.
Agenda item 5: Options for benchmarking
Presentations
Mr Mariano Morazzo and Mr Fabio Romani (Italy) presented “Benchmarking –
methodology for allocation”. They presented a general definition of benchmarking, as well as
the use of benchmarks (BMs) for allocation, where they could be used for both cap setting and
distribution. Benchmarking entails a number of advantages, such as transparency, an incentive
in favour of low carbon products and technologies and it can account for growth and market
share of the installation concerned. As a drawback, the need for quality data on processes and
products was mentioned.
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The definition of products to be taken into account may be a trade-off between simplicity and
equal treatment. Too many BMs reflecting different technologies or products would only
deliver small advantages compared to grandfathering.
Mr Morazzo concluded that there are issues to be overcome and technical options to be
assessed, such as outsourcing, data consistency and confidentiality, installation and process
boundaries, products and technologies, fuel (in)dependent BMs etc. On the other hand,
benchmarks represent a flexible policy tool that could bring environmental and economic
benefits.
Mr Tomas Velghe (Belgium) presented the role of benchmarking in the EU ETS. His
presentation primarily focused the distribution of EU ETS emissions among Annex I-
activities, the role of benchmarking in determining sectoral caps and the role of benchmarking
in individual allocation methodologies. When it comes to the role of benchmarking in
determining sector caps, the EU commitment to at least a 20% reduction has to be translated
in an EU ETS and non-EU ETS cap. This should happen following combination of a
“grandfathering” and “equity based” approach made at EU-level.
As regards the role of benchmarking in individual allocation methodologies, a strong (non-
fuel specific) benchmark should be used for all fossil-fuel fired power plants in the electricity
sector. The rest of the allowances within this sectoral cap could be auctioned or set up as EU-
wide reserve.
In some specific industrial sectors, existing benchmarks are being developed. Mr Velghe
advocated applying EU-wide benchmarks in these sectors for the sake of a level playing field.
As for smaller sectors, Mr Velghe did not exclude BMs, but considered them to be too
diverse.
Mr Paul van Slobbe (Netherlands) made a presentation on “Benchmarking and NAP-III”.
Since allocation should be fair, Mr van Slobbe excluded grandfathering and advocated
auctioning as the best method with benchmarks as a supplement if politically required.
Simplicity and predictability should be key starting points as criteria for benchmarks. EU
allocation norms should be set for existing plants and for new entrants, but only major
products/processes covering approximately 80% of emissions with the balance leaving to
Member States or excluding them from the scheme (Pareto concept).
He proposed to launch a pilot project with clearly defined objectives and features, which
should be finished in October 2007 and should provide input to the review of the EU ETS.
Summarizing his presentation, Mr van Slobbe highlighted that setting the total ETS cap is an
autonomous process; allocation should be done by auctioning and, where necessary
benchmarks; the real small emitters should be excluded; EU benchmarks for the major few
should be developed and kept simple; smaller emitters should be left to discretion of MS; a
pilot project should be started with MS taking the initiative.
Discussion
The debate revealed a considerable number of arguments for and against using benchmarks
for allocation.
Several Member States were open to support benchmarks, but acknowledged their
complexity, also involving the risk of over-allocation to efficient installations. Others
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highlighted that local circumstances should be taken into account as well as the structure of
the power sector and political considerations. Representatives of energy intensive industry
advocated considering benchmarks, as the impact of auctioning on customers of the power
generation sector has to be taken into account. On the other hand, NGOs highlighted the risk
of distortions arising from the implementation of benchmarks, which may result in 27 rather
than one benchmark in one sector. This could not only have protectionist effects, but would
also send the wrong signals. Contrary to benchmarking, auctioning would sort out a number
of problems (see below) without creating additional costs compared to the current pass-
through situation. Representatives from the academic research community proposed that
revenues from auctioning be used to support innovation in sectors exposed to international
competition.
Some Member States showed some sympathy for the Dutch proposal to have EU-wide
benchmarks only for the key sectors and considered it a matter of the industry concerned to
come forward with appropriate benchmarks. While other Member States identified EU cap
setting as a prerequisite for EU-wide benchmarks, which might be based on historic rather
than projected data, experience of some Member States advised to refrain fully from
production figures, as it failed to work. Some industry representatives said that fuel switching,
e.g. from coal to gas, as a means to reduce emissions might not always be possible and, since
the process side would not allow any reduction at all, emissions reductions might not be
possible. One Member State asked for considering whether a benchmark with a correction
factor for grandfathering allocation could be explored. A representative of the energy
intensive industry announced that the European lime industry is investigating to go for an EU-
wide benchmark taking into account the technical potential of reducing emissions.
From the point of view of representatives from the academic research community,
benchmarks could only be the 2nd or 3rd best solution, since any updating component of
benchmarks would create a major distortion of the price signal to the market, while the
yardstick should be a non-distorted price signal. Such distortions could also be expected, if a
fuel-specific benchmark was to be applied. Output based benchmarks in the 3rd trading period
would increase inefficient production in the 2nd trading period.
According to the Commission, state aid issues may be raised, if rewarding best performers
would mean to allocate more allowances than they need. While some Member States argued
that this could only be avoided by using benchmarks based on BAT (best available
technology), other Member States took the view that granting more allowances to more
efficient performers should not be seen as constituting state aid. In their view, this should be
clarified in the Directive. In the view of industry representatives, there should not be any
prohibited state aid involved as long as there is an environmental counterpart. The system
should not only stimulate BAT, but improving BAT. For this reason, it would be
counterproductive, if best performers receive fewer allowances. The yardstick for allocation
should be the incentive to invest. Industry representatives also pointed out that amortized
assets are usually the cash cow of the industry, since they incur only variable costs, but they
are very often very old and thus inefficient compared to new installations. In the case of non-
amortized installations, too few allowances would turn them into stranded assets. This could
only be avoided by setting very long-term, i.e. 25-30 years, benchmarks.
The Commission noted that performance-based standards require a solution of the
confidentiality problem, which would arise when setting the benchmark. The problem would
not only occur vis-à-vis the authorities, but even more among the companies of one specific
sector. Representatives from the industry suggested that this problem could be solved through
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outsourcing, if the rules were clearly laid down and if the “how” was solved. According to the
experience of some Member States actually applying benchmarks, the confidentiality problem
is still pending. It has also been highlighted that disclosure of allocation data would inevitably
reveal production data, and thus underline the confidentiality problem. Representatives from
the energy intensive industry set out that much information would already be available from
publications in the framework of EMAS and others. In the case of ex-ante benchmarks, the
matter of confidentiality would not create any problem, as it would only matter for the
shareholder market. According to one Member State, 80% of production figures are already
available, while the Commission underlined that data gathering would create a lot of work for
Member States. Representatives of the energy intensive industry drew attention to the fact that
for example data published by the IEA do not necessarily match between countries and
categories or sectors, as used by the CITL. It would be important to ensure that IEA and CITL
data were in line.
Some Member States and a Commission representative considered simplicity and
transparency of benchmarks to be key to convince other countries, such as the G8 plus five to
link up with the EU ETS, while a energy intensive industry representative took the view that
simplicity is not always easy to achieve and might not always be appropriate for a benchmark.
Other industry representatives stressed that EU benchmarks must be kept simple, not least for
linking purposes. In addition, they suggested that, for the sake of a global carbon market,
global benchmarks should be developed, since the US and Australia would develop an ETS
based on performance standards. Against this background and referring to current
developments in the US, NGOs strongly advocated auctioning as the only credible allocation
methodology.
Doubts were raised concerning the feasibility of benchmarks when it comes to linking the EU
ETS with China, on the basis that neither side could be expected to accept a more ambitious
or stringent benchmark than their own. Representatives from the industry took the view that
this consideration should not be a matter of concern now, because such a system would still
be 10 to 15 years away and that China is always using brand-new technology anyway.
The Commission raised the issue whether performance based benchmarks, which are to
provide more flexibility would still require a reserve. Some industry representatives took the
view that a reserve for growth would always be needed, in order to take into account the
growth of the whole economy.
Several Member States supported the idea of a pilot as proposed by the Netherlands. One
Member State raised doubts whether refineries would be the most promising sector for the
pilot and suggested that aluminium and steel would represent good starting points. A
representative of the energy intensive industry announced that the lime industry would
volunteer for the pilot subject to decision of the relevant industry board.
Conclusions
The chairman summarised the debate by highlighting five points:
� The presentations have shown that there could be a role for BMs in overall cap setting and
allocation. In determining an EU-wide cap , this could take into account EU sector caps,
for which BMs could be extremely useful, in order to minimise potential competitive
distortions.
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� Full auctioning would mean that there is no need for BM and vice versa. 100% auctioning
would also mean that there are no state aid concerns. A strong conclusion is emerging from
the debate: both auctioning and BM need a clear long-term perspective, in order to be
efficient from an environmental point of view.
� There are a number of different definitions for BMs, such as technical standards, norms,
BAT or correction factor of grandfathering. It is useful to have many different definitions,
as it might be difficult to have a one-size-fits-all approach employed. There seems to be
agreement that a BM should be EU-wide, and if possible, should have a global dimension.
There must also be only a limited number of benchmarks with a limited number of
installations. While simplicity would be very important, there is caveat meaning that this
principle comes under pressure, if one goes into the details.
� Problems to overcome with respect to BMs are
� the data requirements, which may be extensive and challenging, but not
impossible to overcome, although the debate highlighted a new problem accruing
from the incompatibility of international data basis, which would bring about an
additional layer of complexity.
� the confidentiality issue, where some stakeholders take the view that one could be
transparent on matters, but does not necessarily have to be on data, while other
think one cannot hide them as the credibility of the BM would be at stake. While
there may be ways to overcome the problem by involving a third party, the issue
remains a delicate one requiring a balance to be made.
� punishing those lagging behind is right, but might be politically difficult to
achieve.
There is also a need to minimise interference of the public sector by, e.g., ex-post
adjustment, which would de-stabilise the market and runs counter the set-up of the
EU ETS. All in all, BMs entail considerable problems, which however are not
impossible to overcome.
� A pilot exercise would be welcomed by the Commission, since it would allow taking stock
of the experience of Member States, but it should be done with an EU-wide, if possible
global dimension in mind. It could be done by a small group of experts in the framework of
the Climate Change Committee, where a case could be selected to provide insights for the
Commission when elaborating its legislative proposal. Input of the industrial sector would
be welcome.
Agenda item 6: Options for Auctioning
Presentations
Mr Kjell Olav Kristiansen (PointCarbon) made a presentation on „Auctions – new market
dynamics“. He concluded that
� There must be clear objectives behind EU/MS auction strategy addressing the issues of
market power, price regulation etc;
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� It is important to understand market behaviour and timing considerations
� Carbon exchanges/energy trading platforms should be used for auctioning (routines,
software, clearing routines etc at hand)
� The number of ”auction houses” and frequency of auctions should be limited
� A uniform price auction appears to be a simple and most common approach
� There should be low barriers to participation, in order to keep transaction costs as low as
possible.
Mr Karsten Neuhoff (University of Cambridge) presented design options for auctioning
under a single EU-wide cap or national caps. He concluded that
� A simple auction design would win participants and for this reason, a sealed bid, uniform,
frequent auction design, commissioned to institution with existing operations is likely to be
best. Open issues in this respect would be whether the distribution across auctions would
be uniform.
� Harmonisation of auctions would be simple but effective. They could be simplicity and
thus facilitates participation and avoid lock in. The possibility to commissioning auctions
to one institution should be jointly considered.
Mr Andrei Marcu (IETA) presented IETA’s views on auctioning. He presented arguments in
favour and against auctions and identified a number of requirements of auctions such as
transparency and simplicity of auctions, recycling the bulk of proceeds, a long-term
regulatory predictability, periodic and coordinated auctions without causing large distributive
effects, harmonised design and gradual implementation of auctions and the need for new
investment.
He concluded that recycling of revenues should not be used to introduce new market
distortions, but should be used to remove existing ones. If auctions are introduced, it must be
introduced gradually, taking into account the level of development, especially scope, of the
global GHG markets and concerns over competition.
Ms Gyorgyi Gurban (Hungary) presented the Hungarian experience with auctioning in the 1st
period. In Hungary, allowances are considered an asset of the Hungarian national treasury,
which is very different in other Member States. For this reason, harmonising the legal nature
of allowances across the EU has been recommended. The Ministry of Finance has been
nominated to be in overall charge and contracted a company, in order to implement an
electronic auction. The whole process turned out to be very long, but the system worked well
in overall terms. It was decided to use the revenues up to a certain level for climate adaptation
and mitigation measures. Ms Gurban recommended to set up rules at EU level on how the
revenues should be used, at least in order to make sure that they do not run counter the whole
system.
Mr Ken Macken (Environmental Protection Agency, Ireland) presented the experience on
“Auctioning Greenhouse Gas Allowances” in Ireland. For NAP1 the Irish Government had
directed EPA to auction up to 1% of allowances to defray the costs of administering the
emissions trading scheme. Two auctions took place, the first in January/February, the second
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in December 2006. Mr Macken identified a number of lessons learned from auction 1, from
which auction 2 in December benefited:
� Electronic transfer of deposits and matching to account holders was not as straightforward
as Irish authorities had been led to believe – the full data string did not appear on their on-
screen bank account.
� Time-lines for electronic funds transfer were generally very fast – two days would appear
to be sufficient. Hence settlement time-lines could have been shorter than the five days in
the 1st auction.
� Refunds to unsuccessful bidders was straightforward for those in the eurozone, but slower
for those outside the eurozone as authorities needed to ascertain if the return account was a
euro account or a national currency account.
� Vulnerability of auction if market dipped during settlement period. The deposit of €3,000
was insufficient to ensure payment of accounts and was increased to €15.000 in the 2nd
auction
Mr Tomas Wyns (CAN-e) made a presentation on allocation methods post 2012, which in his
view have to be auctioning and an EU-wide cap. He strongly advocated full auctioning as
single allocation method post 2012 on the following grounds:
� Transparency: auctioning would not need any complicated formulas, historical data,
benchmarks etc;
� Auctioning would convey a clear CO2 price signal;
� Auctioning would provide a better incentive for price internalisation and hence promote
investment in energy efficient, renewable technologies, which, according to Mr Wyns, will
be needed anyway, bearing in mind reductions needs by 2050 in the order of up to 80%.
� Auctioning would eliminate windfall profits and intra EU distortion of competition and
would provide a solution for new entrant and closure issues.
His final conclusion was that auctioning is, in principle, the best method to allocate
allowances.
Discussion
In the debate, a number of Member States clearly spoke out in favour of auctioning, some of
them advocating full auctioning from 2013 onwards. Representatives of the industry were
opposed to auctioning before a global agreement was reached, as the effect of auctions would
in their view represent a variable and unpredictable tax on business, would accelerate further
slipping behind in terms of EU R&D expenditure compared to the US and Japan and would
affect investment decisions and the ability to invest by reducing the profitability of
investments within the EU energy intensive industry relative to investments outside the EU.
Renewable energy generators argued that auctioning would remove investments from dirty
industry and shift them to clean industry, thus providing the right investment signal. They also
stressed that auctioning would remove market distortions and align with the “polluter-pays-
principle”.
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Stakeholders had differing views on the extent to which harmonisation of auctions should be
pursued or would be necessary. According to representatives from the academic research
community, empirical evidence does not prove large differences of auctions in terms of
results/outcomes. While industry representatives underlined the importance of harmonising
auctioning across the EU, some Member State representatives spoke out against
harmonisation of auctioning rules in favour of minimum standards in the form of Commission
guidance. Representatives of the carbon trading sector took the view that much experience is
already available from auctions in other sectors, but considered it necessary to discuss the
right way how auctions would be phased in. It has also been highlighted that, in terms of
coordination and timing, early announcements would be needed. The 2nd trading period would
also allow time to coordinate and identify appropriate solutions including identification of a
third body to implement the auctions on behalf of Member States. Some representatives of the
industry shared this view. Representatives of the energy intensive industry pointed to the Irish
example using small auctioning slots, which could work, but had doubts, whether such an
approach would be feasible at EU level.
They also raised doubts whether free access to auctions can be guaranteed to all including
small emitters. According to some Member States, this should not be a big issue, since
secondary markets would be open to all and the market would offer relevant services.
Representatives of NGOs also took the view that small companies would have plenty of
opportunities to buy allowances, while representatives from the academic research community
pointed out that a uniform price approach implied all are paying the same amount and would
therefore be rather simple also for small parties. In addition, frequent auctions would make it
difficult to exercise market power and would render the market less vulnerable to price
shocks. Representatives of the gas industry underlined that the auction design, such as the
frequency of auctions must be well known at the beginning of the period, as auctions have to
be designed to supplement secondary markets, in order to enable them to underwrite
investment decisions.
While representative of the energy intensive industry took the view that auctions would result
in higher electricity prices, representatives of the carbon trading sector were convinced that
auctioning would not lead to rising allowance prices, since the costs of allowances are already
passed through. In this respect, representatives from the academic research community
underlined that free allocation would inevitably lead to a distortion of the price signal and in
the longer term to higher CO2 prices and thus higher electricity prices.
With respect to the use of auction revenues, several Member States representatives were of
the view that the decision on their use should taken by Finance Ministers, most of them
however did not exclude that at least a part of these proceedings should be spent for
environmental purposes, for example through creation of a climate fund, if there were
justified needs. One Member State asked for a study of the Commission whether recycling of
revenues to the energy intensive industry would constitute state aid, while industry
representatives argued that the use of auction revenues must not be left to the discretionary
actions of Member States, but should be used for R&D measures with a view to helping the
industry affected by international competition or for promoting technology transfer to
developing countries. The argument that revenues must not disappear without any benefit for
the environment was also strongly supported by representatives from the carbon trading
sector, who pointed out that the ETS has been set up in order to address environmental
concerns, but not to raise revenue. In their view, the EU ETS would be undermined, if
revenues were not used for environmental purposes.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 283 – Drucksache 16/9334
Conclusions
In his conclusions, the Chairman raised three points:
� There is a lot of support for auctioning because of its merits in terms of transparency,
delivering a clear price signal, avoiding windfall profits and others. The merits have to be
balanced against the concerns relating to international competitiveness, however, this
would not apply to all sectors, but only those which can adequately demonstrate that they
are exposed to international competition or which cannot pass through their costs. The
bottom line with respect to both benchmarking and auctioning, however, is that there
should not be any new distortions or that the risk of new distortions should be minimised.
� Problems raised in the debate from a policy perspective concern the potential creation of
market power and the requirement not to bring about any instability, which would both
speak out in favour of frequent auctions. The timing of auctions is important, as is the
gradual nature of their introduction. Predictability also plays an essential role with a view
to avoiding upsetting the secondary market. Another crucial issue is how to guarantee
access to all market participants including the small ones. Auctioning would also bring
about a new EU dimension, i.e. the matter of using revenues, which could be implemented
nationally. There is scepticism about decentralised handling of auctions, as this may lead to
new distortions. Unproductive conditions arising from 27 different auctioning systems
have to be avoided.
� A solution on how to use revenues is technically possible, but is politically less
straightforward. While some maintain that the use of revenues should be fully open for
national treasuries to decide, others stressed that new distortions must be avoided. Thus, it
represents a new issue to look at. There have been many suggestions how to use auctioning
revenues including measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to promote new
technologies and R&D, to reduce corporate taxes or to introduce them to the EU budget,
from where it would be recycled to Member States. There is also a strong EU dimension
with respect to state aid.
Agenda item 7: Possible options for allocation under the EU ETS post 2012
Agenda item 8: New entrants
Agenda item 9: Closure of installations
Agenda item 10: Monitoring and reporting
Presentations
Mr Daniel Radov (NERA) presented options for allocation under the EU ETS post 2012. He
then presented options to harmonise allocation matters taking as a starting point the currently
existing situation. The options identified included maximum, moderate and low
harmonization. In a preliminary evaluation of these allocation options, Mr Radov arrived at
the following conclusions:
� Environmental integrity refers to certainty of a EU-wide cap and the risk of leakage. The
proposed options improve on status quo in terms of cap, some are more designed to
prevent leakage than others.
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� Efficiency of trading scheme refers to the ability to achieve emissions reductions at least
cost. Key negative factors are allocation to new entrants, differentiation of new entrant
benchmarks, and updating—but keeping in mind real-world complications would be
important.
� Administrative costs and feasibility depend primarily on data requirements, sensitivity of
data, and number of independent Member State allocation approaches. Recent production
data may be sensitive.
� Fairness is difficult to quantify or judge objectively. Is it “more fair” to allocate the same
to all, or more to those facing competition, or to those producing more, or to those
innovating the most, etc.?
As for the matter of new entrants, Mr Hans Henrik Lindboe (Denmark) presented
preliminary results of a study on “Impact of suboptimal design features in the EU ETS –
Allocation in the electricity market”. He outlined the impact on the electricity spot market
dispatch demonstrating that the merit order of electricity supply is affected by CO2 costs
rendering gas more competitive than coal. A similar effect could be observed with respect to
the long-run marginal costs of electricity generation, which are decisive for investment
decisions. As a consequence, wind power would be as competitive as gas, but more
competitive than coal. In an optimal design, the impact of emissions trading on the electricity
spot market would ensure efficient CO2 reduction and provide incentives to invest in low
carbon technologies.
He then outlined the project, the goal of which was to assess the impact of free allocation to
new entrants in the EU ETS. The overall outcome of the two scenarios examined under the
study showed that free allocations to new entrants would distort the market. Overall economic
welfare losses in the area researched would amount to more than € 15bn at a price of
€30/tCO2 amounting to 25% of investment.
Ms Ann Gardiner (Ecofys) presented a “Definition of new entrant” and identified four
harmonization options. She concluded that there are strong arguments in favor of harmonizing
new entrant rules, which should be linked to overall decisions on harmonization of future
phases of ETS. An EU rule book could begin harmonization and could set out the long term
approach. In the long term, a total remove of NER and closure rules could be considered.
Subsequently, Ms Ann Gardiner (Ecofys) presented options for harmonisation of closure
rules. She identified the same options as for new entrants, which have to be informed by
worked examples of real closure and transfer, a route map for long-term future and an
approach to international competition.
Discussion
With respect to the presentation on harmonisation of allocation, some Member States
suggested that the study should also include practical examples how various harmonization
options would work out for Member States. Other Member States may prefer a mixture of the
three options presented.
Representatives of several Member States, the carbon trading sector, NGOs, industry
representatives and the research community taking the floor agreed on the need for more
harmonised new entrants reserve (NER) most likely at EU level. In the view of most of them,
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there would not be a need for a NER for the power sector, which should be allocated through
auctioning. However, in the event that there is no full auctioning, almost all stakeholders
advocated applying the same approach to incumbents and new entrants, for example, based on
high performing benchmarks.
According to representatives from the academic research community, the need for consistency
between allocation, the NER and closure rules has to be respected. Free allocation to new
entrants could have the potential to distort between different fuels and undermine the
incentive to move to low carbon production. This observation was also confirmed by the
study presented by Denmark, as pointed out by one Member State.
The short debate on closure also highlighted the need for harmonisation in line with the
approach taken on the NER. However, while some stakeholders, such as NGOs, advocated
cancelling allowances after closure, in order to promote an increasing stock turnover, others,
such as representatives from the energy intensive industry argued that if allocations from
installations closing down are taken away, inefficient plants would run longer.
Representatives of the energy intensive industry suggested that the impact assessment of the
Commission should show the impact of the different options on Member States and sectors.
The Chairman reassured participants of the meeting that the Commission would do as much
as possible, but would not promise perfectionism, as there are too many design elements.
Conclusions
The chairman drew the following conclusions from the debate:
� There is strong evidence that considerable welfare losses would emerge from non-optimal
design options, as has also been demonstrated by the Danish study on new entrants. The
matter is not the degree of harmonisation, but how the best results can be achieved in terms
of environmental, economic and administrative efficiency.
� The nature of a NER will need to follow the overall allocation methodology: if full
auctioning is pursued, there will not be a NER. In the case of BMs, the same rules should
apply to new entrants and in the case of an EU-wide cap, there must be a EU-wide NER.
� There is a strong appeal that NER and closure would be the same issue, as they go hand in
hand. The timing issue would be very important in this respect. The discussion has
demonstrated that the better the allocation methodology, the less worries would occur on
closure rules, as they are perceived as a failure of allocation methods.
Agenda item 11: Concluding Remarks by the Chair
The Chair thanked all participants for their contributions to a very helpful and thorough
outcome of the meeting and drew their attention to the final ECCP review meeting scheduled
for 14 and 15 June.
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Final Report of the 4th meeting
of the ECCP working group on emissions trading
on the review of the EU ETS
on
Linking with emissions trading schemes of third countries
14 – 15 June 2007
Management Centre Europe, Rue de l'Aqueduc 118, 1050 Brussels
Agenda item 0: Welcome and introduction
The Chairman, Mr Jos Delbeke (European Commission) welcomed participants.
Agenda item 1-2: A parliamentarian view and introducing to linking
Mr Anders Wijkman (European Parliament) shared insights of his parliamentarian work
relating to tackling climate change and commented on key important issues for the
development of a global carbon market. He highlighted in particular that the global carbon
market needed to be established step-by-step by everyone working together on this project
taking due account of the experience that exists already in developing the EU ETS. In
particular he stressed that for linking emissions trading schemes the schemes must be
relatively similar, have mandatory caps and have robust monitoring and verification rules.
Furthermore, he noted that it is necessary to address the issue of costs abatement in an
equitable manner. On a more general note rules that limit the use of Kyoto credits, such as the
supplementarity rule, would be important for the European Parliament and should be retained
in the further review process. CCS should be considered in the further review process. He
advocated that action was needed to avoid deforestation in developing countries but was not
sure that the EU emissions trading system was the instrument for this.
In his presentation, Mr Simon Marr (COM) set out a general overview of the opportunities
and challenges for linking emissions trading schemes. For linking emissions trading schemes
lessons from the EU ETS Phase I should be taken into account. This includes keeping any
emissions trading scheme environmentally effective by keeping a simple design, having a
robust data basis for allocation as well as robust and stringent monitoring and compliance
provisions in place and avoiding governmental interference in the market.
Mr Eric Haites (Margaree Consultants) gave an overview of the different types of linking and
stressed that environmental effectiveness of linking emissions trading schemes can be reduced
by various factors, including weak enforcement, a price cap, lower standards for offset credits,
different rules on borrowing and banking. He highlighted that schemes' rules should converge
and once they are linked it is important that the link is sustained, in particular by conducting
comparable changes to the schemes, if necessary.
Agenda item 3: Evolving emissions trading concepts in other parts of the world and
their potential for linking with the EU ETS
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Ms Vicky Arroyo (Pew Centre) filled the audience in on the various state and regional
programs underway in the US, as well as various federal legislation proposals and their
implications on linking. She explained that whilst linkages were being considered in the
development of these programs, they were never a top priority and linkage provisions were
often less detailed than other aspects of bills. In some cases, explicit restrictions on linking
were even in place. However, she stressed that although linking might not be a priority
initially, it could nevertheless be brought in at a later stage. In any case, communication
would be important.
Mr Toru Morutomi (Kyoto School of Government & Graduate School of Economics)
outlined both the significance and limitations of the Japanese Voluntary Emissions Trading
System by pointing out that whilst it allowed for the establishment of an institutional
foundation for future full-scale mandatory ETS and the development of guidelines for
monitoring and reporting, an emissions control system and electronic registry system, it was
not positioned as an official policy instrument in Japan's climate change policy and not
compatible with the polluter-pays principle.
Mr Leif Ervik (Finnish Ministry for Economics) gave a presentation on ETS Partnerships and
explained that Joint ECS systems had the potential to play a dominant role in the fight against
climate change and that up to 90% of all GHG could be covered. The same carbon price in all
countries and sectors was a good basis efficient climate policy since it allows for as many
countries as possible to join. At the same time, he emphasised that it was the Cap and only the
Cap, which determines the actual effect on the climate. Thus it is vital that any system should
have an appropriate level of scarcity.
Discussion (part 1)
The debate showed that it is still early to be discussing the issue of full-fledged linking. There
is no precedent to follow in this case, which makes the determining of details more
challenging. A number of stakeholders addressed the environmental effectiveness argument,
as well as the economic benefit of linking emissions trading systems. While representatives of
the carbon trading sector were in favour of full market effectiveness through depoliticising of
cap setting, representatives from the energy intensive industry welcomed the possibility of
cost effective reductions through investment in JI/CDM projects which was described as a
form of linking in its own right and a certain degree of flexibility when linking the EU ETS
with other schemes.
Agenda item 4: Compliance and Enforcement Issues in Relation to Expansion of the EU
ETS Key elements for linking the EU ETS with third countries’ emissions trading
schemes (part 1)
In her presentation, Ms Barbara Buchner (IEA) set out the economic perspective of linking
and identified where differences in design of different emissions trading schemes affect
results of linking. She noted the importance to distinguish between design differences of
different emissions trading schemes and resulting accounting problems and the issue of
linking itself. She highlighted that one needs to look at cost-abatement opportunity measures
in the different schemes, if schemes should be linked. According to her the basic economic
advantages of linking is to reduce overall compliance costs and reduce volatility of the market
price of allowances. However, the extent of the reduction potential depends on the
comparability of the design features of different schemed. To this end key design features
include comparable tradable units, stringent monitoring, compliance and accounting rules to
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avoid double counting. Coverage of the scheme should be as precise and complete as
possible, also as a means to ease competitive concerns. She concluded that it is possible to
link systems even with very different design features by way of proper accounting
methodologies or the use of a gateway which could, however, diminish the economic benefits
achieved by lining.
Mr Jeroen Kruijd (PWC) emphasised the importance of building trust in emissions reporting.
In order to build trust, one would need to ensure transparency, accountability and integrity
with what he calls "a global emissions compliance language". He suggested that at least four
elements be in place: A new, global institutional framework with local mirroring in which the
public parties organise private markets; well developed, transparent and aligned compliance
processes; a four-tier model for monitoring, reporting, verification and compliance standards
and enhanced use for enabling technologies.
Ms M.J. Mace (FIELD) discussed the legal issues on linking emissions trading schemes by
analysing both legal and organisational issues which might arise from linking the EU ETS
with other trading schemes. She concluded that different kinds of agreements would be
needed in order to link with different partners and on different levels. Moreover, the time
frame would be decisive in determining the structure of the agreement and one would have to
bear the differences in ambition and design elements of a scheme in mind, since these might
increase the complexity of the linking agreement. According to her the EU legislative
framework could be amended to give the needed flexibility.
In his presentation, Mr Albert de Haan (ECX) demonstrated what linking the EU ETS with
other trading schemes could mean for the carbon market. A true carbon price could only be
achieved in a liquid market and linking would only strengthen the EU's leading role.
However, Mr Haan emphasized that linking would only make sense if schemes were
harmonised in order to enable trading. In his opinion, CERs could play the role of a global
currency, but regulatory support with regards to ITL and eligibility criteria, for example,
would be needed in order for it to function properly. In conclusion, Mr de Haan also noted the
EU ETS's positive image within the US.
Ms Jill Duggan (DEFRA, UK) gave an overview of the UK thinking on linking emissions
trading schemes and also noted the importance for the international cooperation of linking.
She stressed the proliferation of different emerging emissions trading schemes also in
countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol and suggested that in order to be able to
link with such schemes the Directive should be amended to ensure confidence and
environmental credibility in the system by ensuring scarcity and economic efficiency. In
addition, she noted the need for a mechanism to assess whether a system is appropriate to link
with, taking into account the need for either a bilateral linking or multilateral linking
arrangement. Moreover, she advised that the review process should take into account how
third parties look at trading in order to render linkages with the EU ETS more feasible.
Ms Helle Juhler-Kristoffersen (BUSINESSEUROPE) stressed that getting the right price for
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions is what industry needs, because this is the foundation of a
cost effective climate change policy. Therefore global expansion of the GHG market is
necessary. According to her, linkage is a means to expand the global GHG market and create
a level playing field for companies. BUSINESSEUROPE is therefore interested in expanding
the market for GHG. But it is the expectation that regional trading schemes will be very
different from the EU ETS on numerous areas. Therefore JI and CDM credits will be the short
and medium term way of linking the regional schemes. At present, it is therefore imperative to
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improve the JI and CDM system. A number of barriers need to be removed.. One barrier
according to BUSINESSEUROPE is the restrictions on companies' access to JI and CDM
credits.
Mr Jean-Marie Chandelle (Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries) emphasised that the
future scheme should both capitalise on EU experience and lead to cost-effective CO2
reduction, whilst preserving and ensuring competitiveness of EU Energy Intensive Industries.
He also noted some criteria, which should followed: It should be open and avoid leakage of
EU production, provide long-term predictability and safety for investments, allow for
economic growth and meet society's needs, allow for specific reduction objectives by making
use of technological potential, be a driver for cost-efficient solutions and innovation and be
compatible with JI/CDM schemes and abstain from setting limits on these.
Mr Sanjeev Kumar (WWF) stressed the importance to first make the EU ETS work before
any linking can happen and the fact that linking must not undermine the environmental
effectiveness of the EU ETS and moreover, the ambitious long term CO2 reduction targets of
the EU as have been concluded in this year's Council energy package. To this end he stressed
that as a prerequisite to linking the EU ETS with any third emissions trading scheme there is a
need for a similar level of CO2 reduction commitment.
Discussion (part 2)
In the debate, stakeholders stressed the role of JI and CDM for creating links in the common
carbon market. Some industry representatives and some member states placed emphasis on JI
and CDM credits maintaining value after 2012, no matter what follows the Kyoto-protocol. If
greater certainty is not given, in their view JI and CDM activities will slow down. Emphasis
was put on the importance of linking schemes that are mature enough and have proved their
stability, and the compatibility with the continued acceptance of JI/CDM credits. In addition,
stakeholders stressed that when linking the EU ETS with third country schemes, instruments
need to be found to ensure a level of flexibility. Some Member States explicitly asked what
kind of policy instruments would be needed in the future to deal with possible linkages to
other international schemes. The question was also posed what role the EU institutions would
play on a global stage.
Concluding Remarks by the Chair
Following the debate, the chairman drew the following conclusions:
� With regards to the openness of the EU ETS, it was vital to ensure the transparency of and
trust in the CDM. This was in place as an instrument under the Kyoto Protocol, and
provisions would be required for appropriate recognition in the next phase to provide
investors and stakeholders with a greater degree of security and predictability in case no
Kyoto successor agreement were yet concluded.
� It is important to have internal harmonisation of the EU ETS as wide as possible as a step
towards having external linking happen.
� However, this should not delay long-term efforts towards future linking of trading systems.
An element of caution should be preserved and a pilot period of reflection could be wise
for any third emissions trading scheme before linking it with the EU ETS. For the same
reason, against the background of the proliferation of various systems some flexibility is
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needed for linking the EU ETS with such systems. Working together along with
harmonisation efforts at this stage will certainly simplify the process of linking at a later
stage. Cost effectiveness will be an important driver towards the eventual linking of
systems.
� Winners and losers should not be determined at this stage in the process. It is less a
question of Member States than it is one of companies, and one must bear in mind that
boundaries between the winners and the losers are often indeterminable.
� Simplification of compatible building blocks, such as common standards to build up for
monitoring, verification and compliance in general can be crucial for linking and
reassurance of each others' systems.
� Building trust in linking is crucial in order to guarantee the functioning of the system at a
later stage. Ensuring that the right key design elements of any linked emissions trading
scheme, in particular as regards cap-setting and appropriate provisions on offsets, are in
place and that these are compatible with the EU ETS will guarantee greater confidence in
linking.
Agenda Item 6: linking the EU ETS to the flexible mechanisms (JI and CDM) of the
Kyoto Protocol – opportunities and pitfalls
The morning session started off with a presentation by Mr Thomas Bernheim (COM) who
outlined briefly the current rules and procedures for use of JI/CDM by installations falling
under the EU ETS, and pointed out opportunities and challenges they bring along. The
presentation set out some questions for the debate with stakeholders, raising the issues of
dealing with uncertainty in the status of JI/CDM after 2012, the potential future broadening of
the scope of flexible mechanisms to include sectoral and policy CDM and what quantitative
and qualitative restrictions could be needed in order to safeguard the environmental credibility
of the project mechanisms in the context of a global carbon market.
In his presentation on the status of development of JI and CDM markets, Mr Joergen
Fenhann (UNEP Risoe centre) gave an overview of the market in carbon credits generated by
project mechanisms, with a country and sectoral breakdown of projects. He also discussed the
implications of track I JI, which according to his research constitutes 61% of the 170 JI
projects.
Mr Pedro Barata (Centre for Clean Air Policy) presented the concept of broadening the scope
of flexible mechanisms by introducing extended CDM (programmatic, sectoral and policy)
and sectoral no-loose targets. Each has certain merits but also generate problems of their own
that need to be addressed. Specific methodological issues concern the setting of baselines and
the availability of appropriate data. Also the additionality checks would in some cases remain
problematic, even with use of sectoral baselines. Finally the institutional set-up of the CDM
(Executive Board) may have to be changed to accommodate for the new types of offset
mechanisms. As a way forward, he emphasized the need for more pilot projects in various
sectors and regions to be developed to learn about the difficulties and opportunities of setting
baselines and determining additionality.
Ms Kate Hampton (ECIS) emphasized the need for CDM to be seen as a tool to both reduce
compliance costs (especially for exposed sectors) and to stimulate actions in developing
countries. The review needed to address the continuation of fungibility after 2012 for projects
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initiated before 2012 and more visibility should be given on banking for CERs/ERUs under
the ETS. She emphasized there was a need to go beyond offsetting in developing countries
and develop mechanisms to help finance sector-wide policies (e.g. sectoral and policy CDM).
She acknowledged the potential dichotomy between cheap reduction credits and the need for
Europe to change technologies. One point of criticism related to the financial additionality
checks for CDM which in her view hindered the bringing to the market of many negative-cost
energy efficiency projects. In her final recommendations, she recommended that in reaching
an international agreement according to which the EU commits to a 30% reduction target,
such an agreement should include sectoral crediting and policy co-financing.
Agenda Item 7: Quantitative limits: pros and cons of caps and supplementarity
requirements
The presentation by Mr Jürgen Salay (COM) focused on the provisions in the ETS Directive,
delineating the use of JI and CDM credits within the Community scheme supplemental to
domestic actions. He gave an overview of the expected use of flexible mechanisms within the
ETS in the 2nd trading period (individual MS' limits on JI/CDM credit imports amounting to
10-15% of the total cap) and an analysis of the 22 NAPs assessed so far, which that imports of
1110 Mt in JI/CDM credits would be allowed in total (of which companies based in the EU-
15 MS could use up to 928 Mt). He pointed out that this represents a theoretical maximum
and it is not certain that these limits will be reached. He pointed out that at present MS can
accept at their discretion the amount of JI/CDM credits up to the maximum level allowed
under the Linking Directive. For internal market considerations there was a desire in the
future to go for a more harmonised approach towards JI/CDM limit setting (for example,
through a flat rate from start, triggers or differentiated limits depending on type of JI/CDM
credits). An important political consideration for capping the access to JI/CDM was to ensure
attractiveness for other systems to link to the EU ETS.
Mr Guy Turner (New Carbon Finance) made a quantitative contribution to the analysis of
supplementarity in the use of CDM/JI credits within the ETS. He commented that
supplementarity results in higher price signals in the EU ETS than might otherwise be the
case, and that this higher price is needed especially in the long turn to steer capital investment
into low carbon technologies. In the period until 2012, short-term possibilities for emission
reductions included fuel switching, including renewables, but over time capital stocks could
only be changed if a long term price prevailed well above what the CDM would induce in the
ETS. This in itself justified the use of supplementarity requirements. He also suggested that
the secondary market for CDM closely follows the trend in allowance prices (however staying
below the allowance price as a result of additionality requirements). This has led to a strong
increase in primary project developments by industry and in energy sector, offering cheaper
alternatives. Additionality could result in price volatility as there always will be arbitrage
between allowance and CERs. A final conclusion was that the use of low-cost external credits
in the ETS can help reduce the costs of compliance but will not help investment in carbon
reducing projects within the ETS.
Mr Owen Wilson (Eurelectric) presented an overview of the pros and cons of a cap on the use
of JI/CDM within the Community trading scheme. Negative impacts according to him
predominated, and were expressed through discouraging long term investments and creating
instability in the market among others. He called for more certainty about the CDM in a post
2012. If supplementarity rules were to be retained, there would be a need for more transparent
and harmonised rules throughout the EU. The fact that in the EU formula for supplementarity,
a priority was given to government purchases was seen as discriminatory against companies.
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There was no strong wish to link the EU ETS to other ETS if this would result in higher
prices. Generally, industry was much keener on full use of (cheap) CDM rather than linking to
other (more expensive) ETS systems.
In her presentation, Ms Vicki Arroyo (Pew Centre) noted that while there may be a general
perception in other countries that the US was not willing to accept imports of CDM credits,
CDM credits were however allowed in proposed US trading schemes. Some reservations were
made concerning certain categories of credits. She acknowledged that the transfer to e.g.
China of considerable amounts of money through the CDM was a political issue in the US.
This was counterbalanced by the cost gains that would be generated by access to those
cheaper credits. She questioned the use of land for offsets but proposed that they be replaced
with best practices in farming and other similar schemes.
Ms Mahi Sidgeridou (Greenpeace) presented the views of NGOs on the use of CDM credits
within the ETS. In her presentation, she underlined the lack of supplementarity and cases of
bad quality of CDM projects. She made a case for an overhaul of the system based on the
principles of environmental effectiveness on the grounds that the price impacts of a low cap
should not go below the marginal green investment costs. More stringent caps would
stimulate internal abatement in the EU, and were needed to achieve the 2050 abatement
targets.
Agenda Item 8: Qualitative restrictions (gases, sectors and project types) on the use of
offsets
Presentations
Mr Lambert Schneider (Öko Institut) outlined the range of problems encountered in assessing
the additionality of projects. He commented that there was no objective way to confirm that a
project would not have been implemented without CDM. As no benchmark approach had yet
been submitted to the CDM EB that would demonstrate additionality, CDM EB relies on a
barrier analysis, investment analysis and common practice analysis. Amongst others,
renewable energy projects are not always additional. CERs have, moreover, only small impact
on the projects' internal rate of return (IRR), sometimes amounting to just 1–3%. While for
some categories of projects this could make a difference, for others (e.g. wind farms) this is
almost negligible. His personal assessment was that up to 30-50% of CDM projects could not
be viewed as being additional. One of the solutions he proposed to stem windfall profits from
some categories of CDM projects would be to introduce benchmarks
Mr Damien Meadows (COM) in his presentation noted that Member States were allowed and
not obliged to authorise their companies to use JI/CDM and that a harmonised agreement only
existed on not using certain types of credits. He suggested that there could be a need for a
more harmonised approach towards qualitative restrictions on the use of JI/CDM, perhaps by
stating that companies "shall be" be allowed to use such credits, rather than "may be". This
was illustrated with respect to the use of nuclear, temporary (or delayed emission) credits,
which both raised issues of governments taking on liability. A common approach could be
applied where there have been widespread criticisms, for example, as regards HFC and
hydropower credits. Such harmonisation could be done in several ways, e.g. through co-
ordinated Member State action not to use certain credits, specific provisions set down now
through co-decision or a mechanism for EU-wide action to be taken. He ended with some
considerations on the transition beyond 2012, highlighting the potential need for flexibility to
take into account the evolution of commitments expected in the post-2012 agreement. In the
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context where such an agreement were not yet in place, consideration was needed as to what
credits should be used in the meantime, and by what process harmonised rights to use them
could be granted. In respect of credits to which banking limitations under the Kyoto Protocol
applied, he noted the need for provisions to avoid governments taken on liabilities. Finally, he
queried whether there was merit in Community-level arrangements for authorising projects
more broadly than allowed by the CDM.
Mr Andrei Marcu (IETA) pointed out that linking would lead to the emergence of larger
(ultimately global) market, thus reducing costs of compliance and improving efficiency. GHG
markets provide make or buy option. Not all countries are receptive to buying, notably the US
is not enthusiastic on CDM, among others, resisting the idea of shipping capital offshore to
deal with emissions and voicing concerns about environmental integrity of emissions trading
as such. IETA agrees that actions against climate change should begin at home and offsets are
temporary mechanisms as the goal is to introduce global emissions trading. He also advocated
setting up supplementarity rules at the EU level and allowing a broader range of projects as
CDM.
Mr Dieter Beisteiner, (Austria) presented experience of a member state in JI/CDM project
approval and procedures. Austria is one of the EU MS with an experience of financially
supporting projects that would generate emission reductions abroad through the use of
flexible mechanisms.
On LULUCF, Mr Igino Emmer (Climate neutral group) made a presentation on forestation
credits. In his view tCERs should be included, but lCERs could not be for various reasons.
The LULUCF sector could contribute to 30-40% of efforts in GHG reductions necessary to
achieve the +2°C target. He acknowledged that people perceive LULUCF projects as risky
business, as they introduce temporary credits. There are also fears about swamping the market
with very cheap credits. However these problems could be overcome.
Mr Tomas Wyns (CAN Europe) insisted one shouldn't compare CERs with allowances (as
this amounts to comparing apples with pears). He warned for the negative credibility
consequences of including sink projects in the CDM. Instead the EU ETS should only allow
credits that respected the gold standard (energy efficiency and renewable projects). Finally he
called for the EU ETS to take sustainable development criteria more seriously and develop
screening mechanism for projects entering the EU ETS. This could be done by adding a
positive list of criteria to the CITL, allowing for an automatic check on the CERs type and
provenance before accepting to register them for compliance within the EU ETS.
In a concluding remark, Mr Jos Delbeke (chair) stated that without supplementarity
provisions CDM supply would most likely outstrip demand, so that their price would tumble.
This could start a political debate about whether the EU ETS is capable at all of fulfilling its
role of driver for technological change within the EU and instead mainly creates flows of
money and investment outside the EU.
Discussion
In the course of the ensuing debate, MS representatives expressed their views on topics
covered in the course of presentations. Member States expressed support for the idea of
expanding emissions trading into a global regime, while some emphasised that in the
meantime offset projects could play an important role for at least further 10 years. It was also
proposed to discount CDM projects from some countries after a certain level of supply was
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reached. Some Member States supported including LULUCF credits in the ETS and
discussing LULUCF at COP/MOP in Bali. It was said that the Commission should review the
pros and cons of the project-based approach.
The Commission pointed out that double counting was also an issue influencing the
environmental credibility of the system, thus the double counting guidelines will need to be
maintained. In the current international situation, there is a large number of CERs on the
market and the ETS should not be an engine for transferring reduction efforts abroad.
Ms Jill Duggan (UK) noted that to achieve a 50% emission reduction by 2050 declared by G-
8 countries, the inflow of JI/CDM credits into the EU ETS must be limited. According to Mr
Lambert Schneider, at current cap levels for JI/CDM in the period 2008-12, emissions from
the MS could be higher than in 2005. An assumption is needed that emissions will not grow.
In Germany, for example, new lignite plants are planned, as EU ETS at present is clearly
insufficient to promote alternatives to new lignite plants.
The participants considered various options of integrating project mechanisms into emission
trading so as to foster European reduction efforts and not jeopardise the market. An idea was
floated in the course of discussion of using a Community-level procedure for approving
projects within the EU to also assess credibility of inflowing project credits. A positive list of
criteria for promoting clearly additional types of CERs was also proposed.
Some industry representatives argued that all effort should be put into improving the UN
system, e.g. improving the approval procedures, rather than developing parallel systems, EU
specific standards and procedures which could increase complexity and reduce transparency.
Wrap-up of the second day
Summarising the meeting, Mr Delbeke stressed five points:
� A wealth of information had been shared over the last two days. The current experience
with CDM had been a success, with the engagement of developing countries. However,
there had been concerns expressed that the size of the market could become so big
(especially if there were extended CDM) that it may turn people against the CDM
altogether. There were a number of flaws including, among other issues, doubts about the
additionality of certain projects and the crowding-out effect of HFC projects which create
problems of credibility that risked spilling over to the EU ETS. These need to be
addressed.
� Participants shared the common objective of a long term global carbon market. Linking
emission trading systems will require time, and can build on the CDM as an intermediate
step. For an effective market, there needs to be balance between supply and demand, In
Marrakesh, it had been expected that there would be wider demand, which would b e the
case with the US on board. In the current situation, the CDM could lead to an imbalance
for the EU which would need to be addressed.
� Ideally, the existing problems with the CDM will be remedied within the UNFCCC. This
will involve developing benchmarks, and taking into account policy implementation. There
is also a need to develop better criteria for showing additionality. Some stakeholders had
called for a more fundamental rethink, while others said that we should look at the benefits
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 295 – Drucksache 16/9334
of CDM to EU companies including as a stimulus for innovation, and that this should be
assessed empirically.
� If the problems identified with the CDM cannot be sufficiently well solved within the
UNFCCC, then these problems would have to be addressed in the EU ETS. Views differed
on quantity, where some said there should be no limit while others emphasised that
quantitative provisions should be set at EU level. The issue of discounting was also raised.
On quality, lists came back onto the table – both positive and negative. On nuclear, the
Marrakesh Accords had so far been proving successful. There were outspoken views for
and against the idea of an additional JI/CDM board and screening.
� There was broad consensus that provisions on the use of JI/CDM should be dealt with in a
harmonised manner. In addition, it was noted that this would strengthen the EU's position
internationally. Problems should aim to be corrected within the UNFCCC, with solutions
implemented at EU level if not successful. There was wide support for an assurance to be
introduced that companies would definitely be able to use JI/CDM credits in the next
period, even if people disagreed on which types.
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Annex 2:
Summary of stakeholder contributions submitted to the Commission
The Commission services have established a functional mailbox on the EU ETS review
website (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/review_en.htm), in order to allow
all interested parties to submit their view on the review of the EU ETS to the Commission.
This document contains a summary of these views as well as a list of parties which have
submitted their view.
Scope of the Directive
On issues related to the scope of the Directive, stakeholders share the opinion that more
consistency is needed at the European level. The definition and inclusion of small
installations, as well as the overall expansion of the EU ETS to include other gases and a
range of other sectors and activities have been considered.
According to the energy intensive industry, small installations should be excluded from the
EU ETS on the basis of sector thresholds. Simplified rules on MRV should be agreed on for
small installations, in order to ease their administrative burden. Some argue in favour of an
opt-out provision or that CO2 output per unit of turnover ought to be taken into account in
such circumstances. In order to safeguard the functioning of the overall system and for the
sake of efficiency, small emitters might be best served outside the EU ETS, where separate
provisions should apply to them. It has been noted that the majority of non-district-heating
providers are exempted under the small installations provision, which in turn has an impact on
the competitiveness of more efficient district-heating installations. Small installations are also
subject to different treatment in Member States.
Expansion of the EU ETS by including additional gases and sectors is favoured as long as it
offers more opportunities for reducing emissions at a lower cost whilst stimulating
innovation. Distortions in the market should, nevertheless, be avoided. Sectors ought to be
notified within reasonable time, in order to safeguard investment decisions. In addition, these
new sectors would have to face similar MRV standards so as not to disadvantage incumbents
in other sectors, in which case unilateral inclusion by Member States might even be possible.
Some are in favour of expansion on a case by case basis and they believe that further analysis
is needed on this issue. Surface transport ought to be kept out of the EU ETS altogether. If
shipping and aviation are included, the majority of reductions must take place within the
sectors and not be avoided through the use of JI/CDM credits. Other measures might also be
feasible in these sectors in the near future. Generally, doubts have been raised about the
feasibility to include the transport sector within the EU ETS due to its specific features. The
EU ETS should not be considered a panacea for everything; depending on the sector, other
measures might be more effective. This may also be the case for sinks and LULUCF as well
as domestic offset projects.
The inclusion of Carbon Capture and Storage technology is generally positively perceived.
The technology ought to be incentivised, but should not lead to any distortion and not be
made mandatory in any case. There is also a need for clear definitions and monitoring
standards and guidelines. CCS should also be accredible through Kyoto flexible mechanisms
when used elsewhere in the world and a regulatory approach should focus on developing
permitting and assurance systems for selecting and managing storage sites. In some
contributions to the debate, concern over the possible impact on the price of electricity was
expressed.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 297 – Drucksache 16/9334
The definition of 'combustion installation' is of key importance and may be in need of
further clarification. Strong calls for clarity on the issue also requested the use of more
technical descriptions in future. It was suggested that for consistency and simplification
purposes, the definition of "combustion plant" be based on that in the Directive on Large
Combustion Plants (88/609/EEC as amended by 2001/80/EEC).
Further Harmonisation and Increased Predictability
Many stakeholders stressed the need for certainty beyond the current periods, which could be
achieved by setting long term EU targets, providing further assurance that the EU ETS will
continue to operate in the future or by way of rolling allocation periods. Certainty could be
accomplished without extending allocation periods. As for cap-setting all options must be
considered carefully, regardless whether at EU level or Member State level. The existing
division of the burden, according to the burden sharing agreement thought to be inequitable.
Each Member state should be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking the ability to reduce
emissions based on GDP and other factors into account. An extension on the length of
allocation periods would provide for more certainty, increase predictability and would better
suit business cycles. The necessity of keeping within the timeframe of international
agreements and providing enough flexibility for investment was acknowledged, and extending
the allocation period beyond 10years was opposed. Some stakeholders would prefer EU wide
sector allocation in the long-term and in the interim, national incumbent benchmarks should
be applied. Others would prefer allocation rules and overall emission targets to be set at a
minimum of 15-20 years along with 8-10 year trading periods including an EU wide cap with
sectoral sub caps and harmonised allocation of allowances across the EU. More transparency
and disclosure would ensure the stability of the system. Preserving a provision for the banking
of allowances between periods would be favoured, since this would provide necessary safety
valves. A central institution to be set up to deal with these issues has been suggested.
Some stakeholders proposed a hybrid top-down and bottom-up approach with regards to cap-
setting. Generally, ambitious targets are needed and should be sought from the beginning. The
EU wide cap should be set at up to 30% and indicative targets should be provided for 2030,
2050 and 2080.
Many stakeholders from the industry argue that allocation through benchmarking would be
the best solution for large homogeneous processes. Where this is not possible, 'grandfathering'
would be an option. In addition, the reduction potential and 'pass-through' ability of a sector
ought to be taken into account in all allocation decisions. Performance-based allocation (e.g.
through benchmarks) to large emitting, homogenous processes would also be an option. If
linked to actual production, this also solves the problem of allocating to new entrants and
closures. Benchmarks should be agreed on by the sector's respective organisations, as well as
the European Commission. The allocation would also have to be under the responsibility of a
separate authority. In any case, a high level of free allocation must be maintained in the
future. From an industry point of view, the 'pass-through' of prices should be avoided at all
costs and measures should be mitigated for energy intensive industries facing international
competition. A framework is to be created for energy-intensive industry to fulfil their needs in
the long-term at reliable prices. Favourable conditions and incentives for the development of
long-term supply contracts, in line with EU and national competition law, would help ease the
excess burden placed on these sectors. Some industries favour a 'baseline & credits', sector-
based approach.
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As long as auctioning is not applied on a global scale, representatives from energy intensive
industry are not in favour of auctioning, as it has a serious disadvantage in that it
disadvantages processes with a high CO2 output per unit of profit ratio. This effect is
increased where a sector is not able to pass on the cost to its customers. Price increases as a
result of the EU ETS would certainly hinder European Economy and benefit foreign
competitors. Auctioning should only be used in those sectors that are not under threat from
imports or which have a high profit to emissions ratio. In some cases, a different approach
between sectors may be possible but certain factors would have to be taken into account, such
as the possibility of carbon leakage through auctioning, the inability of sectors to pass on
costs to consumers and the removal of value, which might otherwise be invested in Research
and Development. Where auctioning is applied, the revenue generated must be recycled for
supporting R&D of adaptation and mitigation technology.
Other industry representatives are strongly in favour of auctioning. Where it is applied, there
should be a common set of auctioning requirements including harmonised levels of auctioning
across EU and, above all, clarity on the timeline towards full auctioning. Some Member State
authorities believe that full auctioning would be possible from 2012 onwards for the energy
sector and any other sectors not facing international competition. Other stakeholders argue
that 100% auctioning gives a clear price signal, complies with the Polluter-pays principle and
does not discriminate against certain sectors. The revenues generated could go to Member
States' investments in 'clean carbon solutions' to prevent and mitigate actual and further
environmental damage.
Harmonised rules and guidelines are needed on new entrants and closures and must be
defined consistently throughout the EU. New entrants should be allocated simultaneously as
incumbents in the same sector and receive a high level of allowances, since this would
stimulate a move towards cleaner technologies and sets a clear signal. If the reserve of
allowances is insufficient to cover new entrants, then the Member state must purchase CERs
and ERUs to compensate. EU wide rules on closures should be further harmonised and the
transfer of all allowances between an old and a new installation permitted. In case of a
complete closure, the installation should be allowed to retain its allocation for the remainder
of the phase. In contrast, some argue that new installations would not carry sunk costs of old
installations if these were made to sell theirs off, thus enabling new entrants to purchase their
allowances like incumbents. This would also make a new entrants reserve unnecessary.
Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Enforcement
There is a need for more harmonisation on Monitoring and Reporting and approaches to
compliance and enforcement between Member States, in order to ensure the integrity of the
Scheme. At the same time, however, a balance between high standards and cost-effective
solutions must be retained New methods of accreditation should be considered in order to
speed up the process and increase the integrity of the verification system. Mutual recognition
of verifiers accredited in other Member States, central accreditation and other existing
methods developed by the European Co-operation for Accreditation (EA) are just some of the
proposals which were brought forward during the assessment. In addition, guidance is needed
for the verification process and for the enforcement of sanctions following non-compliance.
A plead has been made for more transparency and accurateness whilst, at the same time,
lowering the burden, in particular for small emitters, and respecting confidentiality. Some
have requested that an analysis on reporting standards be conducted across Member States
and have argued against the need for a regulation, reiterating that a Directive is an appropriate
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 299 – Drucksache 16/9334
and sufficient legislative tool to deal with MRV rules. While some argue that more frequent
reporting is not required since it will not significantly improve market information, others
advocate it on the grounds of enhanced and improved transparency.
Many have spoken out for less bureaucracy in the third trading period with a view to
providing for more clarity. Errors in the verified emissions data should also be rectified in the
verified report. Some stakeholders point out that more regular onsite verification is essential
for an effective monitoring of CO2 emissions and that this must be realised in future. Results
gained through the verification process must then be linked back to the monitoring protocol
and must relate to the GHG permit of the installation. An expert review regarding the
implementation of the MRV rules must take place per annum in every Member State and the
fines and enforcement process should become part of the Directive.
Linking and the use of JI/CDM
In the view of most stakeholders, linking the EU ETS to other emission trading systems is
possible and desirable. However, some have warned that the price of carbon in both systems
will be an issue for consideration, as well as compatibility of the systems in question. The
scheme that, at the time of linking, had the higher abatement costs will profit more from it.
Hence, there is a political element to linking, which must be taken into account. At the same
time, access to Kyoto credits may offer a solution, since the allowances provide for a safety
valve against high domestic abatement costs. For this reason, industrial stakeholders are in
favour of unlimited access to JI/CDM project credits within the EU ETS. Energy intensive
industry believe that JI/CDM credits should be recognised within the EU ETS on a 1/1 scale.
In terms of linking the EU ETS with other schemes, they would like to see the EU ETS
become part of a global ETS in order to avoid carbon leakage. In addition, sector approaches
should be encouraged on a worldwide scale. Other industry representatives would like to see
more project proposals approved in developing countries and would welcome further efforts
to guarantee the continuation of JI/CDM projects beyond 2012 through recognition post 2012.
In addition, the EU should consider community authorisation of JI/CDM projects, since this
would shorten and reduce bureaucracy. However, they do not favour the development of a
parallel EU body in addition to other UN bodies and demand more flexibility through
harmonisation of JI/CDM use in all Member States, since limitations harm technology
transfer.
In contrast, other sectors call for both a quantitative and qualitative limit on the use of ERUs
and CERs. Quantity of external credits, which may be used by companies in a Member State,
should be based on the difference between historical emissions - not projected emission - and
the EU's post 2012 emission reduction targets. Aside from this, only 'CDM Gold standard'
credits should be permissible under the EU ETS and neither LULUCF credits nor credits
generated from the use of nuclear technology ought to be allowed in the EU ETS. In addition,
they are firmly against domestic offsets and the use of JI from EU countries in the scheme.
Linking, whilst favoured in principle, will need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 300 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
List of stakeholders that have submitted contributions for the
review process of the EU ETS
Abbreviation Organisation
AFEP Association Française des Entreprises Privées
Alliance of the Energy Intensive Industries
BAF British Abrasives Federation
BCA British Cement Association
BusinessEurope The Confederation of European Business
CAN-Europe Climate Action Network Europe including WWF, Greenpeace and Friends
of the Earth
CEFIC European Chemical Industry Council
CEFS Comité Européen des Fabricant de Sucre
CEMBUREAU The European Cement Association
CEMEX
CER Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies
CIAA Confédération des Industries Agro-Alimentaires de l'UE
Climate Strategies
Danskenergi Danish Energy Association
Danish Ministry of Transport and Energy
E.ON AG
EAA European Aluminium Association
EDF Electricité de France
EFET European Federation of Energy Traders
EFIEES European Federation of Intelligent Energy Efficiency Systems
EIC The Environmental Industries Commission Ltd.
EPAGMA European Peat and Growing Media Association
EpE Entreprises pour l'Environnement
EURELECTRIC Union of the Electricity Industry
EURIMA European Insulation Manufacturers Association
EUROCHAMBRES The Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry
Euro-Coop European Association of Consumer Cooperatives
EUROFER European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries
Euroheat & Power International Association representing the combined heat and power (CHP),
district heating and cooling (DHC) sector in Europe and beyond
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 301 – Drucksache 16/9334
Abbreviation Organisation
EUROPIA European Petroleum Industry Association
EWEA The European Wind Association
FEASTA Foundation for the Economics of Sustainability
FEPA Federation of European Producers of Abrasives
Finnish Energy Industries
GRIAN Greenhouse Ireland Action Network
Iberdrola
ICC UK International Chamber of Commerce UK
IETA International Emissions Trading Association
Norwegian Mission to EU
Ministry of Environment
OFGEM The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
OGP International Association of Oil and Gas Producers OGP Europe
O-I Europe (Manufacturer of Glass Containers)
Scottish and Southern Energy Group
SNAS Syndicat national des abrasifs et super-abrasifs
SFM Sustainable Forestry Management Ltd.
VCI Verband der Chemischen Industrie
VDEW Verband der Elektrizitätswirtschaft e.V.
VDS Verband Deutscher Schleifmittelwerke
VöZ Austrian Clay Brick and Roof Tile Industry
WWF World Wide Fund For Nature
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Annex 3: Description of the E3ME model
(Source:http://www.camecon.com/suite_economic_models/e3me/purpose_and_design.htm
and http://www.camecon-e3memanual.com/cgi-bin/EPW_CGI )
E3ME: AN ENERGY-ENVIRONMENT-ECONOMY MODEL OF EUROPE
The E3ME model has been built by a European team under the EU JOULE/THERMIE
programme as a framework for assessing energy-environment-economy issues and policies.
The model has been used for general macro and sectoral economic analysis and for more
focused analysis of policies relating to greenhouse gas mitigation, incentives for industrial
energy efficiency and sustainable household consumption. Its pan-European coverage is
appropriate for an increasingly integrated European market. E3ME provides an econometric
one-model approach in which the detailed industry analysis is consistent with the macro
analysis: in E3ME, the key indicators are modelled separately for each sector, and for each
region, yielding the results for Europe as a whole.
� The E3ME model provides annual comprehensive forecasts to the year 2030:
� for 27 European regions including the EU25 (as of 2006), Norway and
Switzerland
� for industry output, investment, prices, exports, imports, employment and
intermediate demand at a 42-industry level including 16 service industries - for
consumers' expenditure in 28 categories
� For energy demand, split by 19 fuel uses of 12 fuels, and environmental
emissions.
� Full macro top-down and industrial bottom-up simulation analysis of the economy,
allowing industrial factors to influence the macro-economic picture
� An in-depth treatment of changes in the input-output structure of the economy over the
forecast period to incorporate the effects of technological change, relative price movements
and changes in the composition of each industry's output
� Dynamic multiplier analysis, illustrating the response of the main economic indicators,
industrial outputs and prices to standard changes in the assumptions, eg changes in world
oil prices, income taxes, government spending, and exchange rates
� Scenario analysis, across a range of greenhouse gas mitigation policies in Europe,
including carbon taxes and permit trading
THE PURPOSE AND DESIGN OF E3ME
The Policy Analysis of Long-Term E3 Interactions
E3ME is intended to meet an expressed need of researchers and policy makers for a
framework for analysing the long-term implications of Energy-Environment-Economy (E3)
policies in Europe, especially those concerning R&D and environmental taxation and
regulation. The model is also capable of addressing annual short-term and medium-term
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 303 – Drucksache 16/9334
economic effects as well as, more broadly, the long-term effects of such policies over the next
20 years, such as those from the supply side of the labour market.
Most conventional macroeconomic models which are operational in government describe
short and medium-term economic consequences of policies but with a limited treatment of
long-term effects, such as those from the supply side of the labour market, and this limits their
ability to analyse long-term policies. In contrast, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
models, have been widely used to analyse long-term E3 policies. CGE models specify explicit
demand and supply relationships and enforce market clearing, and are therefore seen as
desirable characterizations of long-term outcomes in which markets are assumed to be in
equilibrium; for this reason they have been developed particularly in the US for the analysis
of environmental regulation. However, CGE models are not generally estimated by time-
series econometric methods and they have not typically been subjected to rigorous historical
validation, either in terms of the values of the model’s parameters or, more broadly, the
underlying assumptions with respect to economic behaviour. They also typically tend to
impose the dynamics of the model solution, and so cannot be used for historical validation of
the overall model; the analysis of short- and medium-term impacts of policy changes,
meanwhile, tends to arise from the assumptions inherent in the model. Their use in forecasting
or scenario projections is therefore more limited. Therefore, CGE models are not necessarily
the most appropriate vehicle for understanding the process of dynamic adjustments and
structural change at the sectoral level.
E3ME combines the features of an annual short- and medium-term sectoral model estimated
by formal econometric methods with the detail and some of the methods of the CGE models,
providing analysis of the movement of the long-term outcomes for key E3 indicators in
response to policy changes. It is essentially a dynamic simulation model of Europe estimated
by econometric methods.
The Method: Long-Term Equations and Short-Term Dynamic Estimation
The econometric model, in contrast with some macroeconomic models currently in operation,
has a complete specification of the long-term solution in the form of an estimated equation
which has long-term restrictions imposed on its parameters. Economic theory, for example the
recent theories of endogenous growth, informs the specification of the long-term equations
and hence properties of the model; dynamic equations which embody these long-term
properties are estimated by econometric methods to allow the model to provide forecasts. The
method utilises developments in time-series econometrics, with the specification of dynamic
relationships in terms of error correction models (ECM) which allow dynamic convergence to
a long-term outcome. E3ME is therefore a relatively ambitious modelling project which
expands the methodology of long-term modelling to incorporate developments both in
economic theory and in applied econometrics, while at the same time maintaining flexibility
and ensuring that the model is operational.
The Model and the Research Strategy
E3ME is a detailed model of 42 industrial sectors with the disaggregation of energy and
environment industries, in which the energy-environment-economy interactions are central.
The model is designed to be estimated and solved for 27 regions of Europe (the EU-25
member states in 2006 plus Norway and Switzerland). For the ten member states that joined
the EU in 2004, shrinkage methods are applied to the raw data to estimate long-term
parameters from relatively short data series (1993-2004).
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This one-model approach is distinguished from the multi-model approach, which is a feature
of earlier model-based research for the EU. In principle, linked models (such as the DRI or
the HERMES-MIDAS system of models) could be estimated and solved consistently for all
the economies involved. However, in practice, this often proves difficult, if not impossible,
and considerable resources have to go into linking. Even if the consistency problem in linkage
can be solved by successive iterative solutions of the component models, there remains a
more basic problem with the multi-model approach if it attempts to combine macroeconomic
models with detailed industry or energy models. This problem is that the system cannot
adequately tackle the simulation of `bottom-up’ policies. Normally these systems are first
solved at the macroeconomic level, then the results for the macroeconomic variables are
disaggregated by an industry model. However if the policy is directed at the detailed industry
level (say, a tax on the carbon content of energy use), it is very difficult (without substantial
intervention by the model operator) to ensure that the implicit results for macroeconomic
variables from the industry model are consistent with the explicit results from the macro
model. As an example, it is difficult to use a macro-industry two-model system to simulate
the effect of exempting selective energy-intensive industries from the carbon/energy tax.
Comparative Advantages of E3ME
E3ME has the following advantages over many competing models:
� Model disaggregation: The detailed nature of the model allows the representation of fairly
complex scenarios, especially those that are differentiated according to sector and to
country. Similarly, the impact, of any policy measure can be represented in a detailed way.
� Econometric pedigree: The econometric grounding of the model makes it better able to
represent and forecast performance in the short to medium run. It therefore provides
information that allows for dynamic responses to changes in policy and that is closer to the
time horizon of many policy makers than pure CGE models, which provide long-term
equilibrium solutions.
� E3 linkages: E3ME is a hybrid model. An interaction (two-way feedback) between the
economy, energy demand/supply and environmental emissions is an undoubted advantage
over models that may either ignore the interaction completely or only assume a one-way
causation. For example, the EU ETS includes a cap on CO2 emissions: the model can be
used to solve for the CO2 allowance price, allowing for effects on electricity prices and
demand, as well as on macroeconomic variables.
Summary of the Characteristics of E3ME
In summary, the characteristics of E3ME are such that the model is:
� elaborated at a European rather than at a national level, with the national economies being
treated as regions of Europe
� dealing with energy, the environment, population and the economy in one modelling
framework
� designed from the outset to address issues of central importance for economic, energy and
environmental policy at the European level
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 305 – Drucksache 16/9334
� capable of providing short- and medium-term economic and industrial forecasts for
business and government
� based on a system of dynamic equations estimated on annual data and calibrated to recent
outcomes and short-term forecasts
� capable of analysing long-term structural change in energy demand and supply and in the
economy
� focused on the contribution of research and development, and associated technological
innovation, on the dynamics of growth and change.
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO E3ME
Economic activity undertaken by persons, households, firms and other groups has effects
which transmit to other groups, sometimes after a lag, and the effects persist to include future
generations, although many of the effects soon become so small as to be negligible. But there
are many such groups, and the effects, both beneficial and damaging, accumulate in economic
and physical stocks. The effects are transmitted through the environment, with externalities
such as greenhouse gas emissions leading to global warming, through the economy and the
price and money system via the markets for labour and commodities, and through the global
transport and information networks. The markets mainly transmit effects through the level of
activity creating demand for inputs of materials, fuels and labour, through wages and prices
affecting incomes and through incomes in turn leading to further demands for goods and
services. These interdependencies suggest that an E3 model should be comprehensive,
including many linkages between different parts of the economic and energy systems.
These systems are characterised by economies and diseconomies of scale in both production
and consumption, by markets with different degrees of competition, by the prevalence of
institutional behaviour which may be maximisation, but perhaps the satisfaction of more
restricted objectives, and by rapid and uneven changes in technology and consumer
preferences, certainly within the time scale of greenhouse gas mitigation policy. Labour
markets in particular may be characterised by long-term unemployment. An E3 model to
represent these features must be flexible, capable of embodying a variety of behaviours and
capable of simulating a dynamic system. The approach can be contrasted with that of general
equilibrium models, which usually assume constant returns to scale, perfect competition in all
markets, maximisation of social welfare measured by total discounted private consumption,
no involuntary unemployment, and exogenous technical progress following a constant time
trend (see Barker, 1998, for a discussion).
E3ME AS AN E3 MODEL
The model comprises:
� The accounting balances for commodities from input-output tables, for energy carriers
from energy balances and for institutional incomes and expenditures from the national
accounts
� Environmental emission flows
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� 22 sets of time-series econometric equations , covering energy demand, the labour market,
prices and the components of GDP, with two different disaggregate consumption
specifications and optional transport equations.
The chart: E3ME as an E3 model shows how the three components of the model - energy,
environment and economy - fit together. Each component is shown in its own box and utilises
its own units of account and sources of data. Each data set has been constructed by statistical
offices to conform with accounting conventions. Exogenous factors coming from outside the
modelling framework are shown as inputs into each component on the outside edge of the
chart. For the EU economy, these factors are economic activity and prices in non-EU world
areas (the world areas distinguished in the model are listed below in Chapter 5) and economic
policy (including tax rates, growth in government expenditures, interest rates and exchange
rates). For the energy system, the outside factors are the world oil prices and energy policy
(including regulation of energy industries). For the environment component, exogenous
factors include policies such as reduction in SO emissions from large combustion plants. The
linkages between the components of the model are shown explicitly with arrows showing
which values are transmitted between components.
The economy module provides measures of economic activity and general price levels to the
energy module; the energy module provides emissions of the main air pollutants to the
environment module, which in turn indicates damages to health and buildings (this effect is
not yet included in the formal model). The energy module provides detailed price levels for
energy carriers distinguished in the economy module and the overall price of energy as well
as energy use in the economy.
E3ME AS A REGIONAL ECONOMETRIC INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL
The chart E3ME42 as a regional econometric input-output model shows how the economic
module will be solved as an integrated EU regional model. Most of the economic variables
shown in the chart are at a 42-industry level. The whole system is solved simultaneously for
all industries and all 27 regions (although the software allows a single-region solution, with
the other regions at base-projection values). The chart shows interactions at three spatial
levels: the outermost area, encompassing the others, is the rest of the world; the next level is
the European Union outside the region in question; and finally, there are the relationships
within the region.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 307 – Drucksache 16/9334
The chart shows three loops or circuits of economic interdependence, which are described in
some detail below. These are the export loop , the output-investment loop and the income
loop.
E3ME's export loop
The export loop runs from the EU transport and distribution network to the region's exports,
then to total demand. The region's imports feed into other EU regions' exports and output and
finally to these other regions' demand from the EU pool and back to the exports of the region
in question. It should be noted that activity in the rest of the world is treated as exogenous and
so E3ME will not produce this feedback effect from exports external to the EU. Likewise, if
the model is being solved for just a single region the export loop will be broken and there will
be no feedback effects.
The modelling of international trade is central to this relationship. The basic assumption is
that, for most commodities, there is a European 'pool' into which each region supplies part of
its production and from which each region satisfies part of its demands. This might be
compared to national electricity supplies and demands: each power plant supplies to the
national grid and each user draws power from the grid and it is not possible or necessary to
link a particular supply to a particular demand.
The demand for a region's exports of a commodity is related to three factors:
� Domestic demand for the commodity in all the other EU regions, weighted by their
economic distance from the region in question
� Activity in the main external EU export markets, as measured by GDP or industrial
production
� Relative prices, including the effects of exchange rate changes.
Economic distance is measured by using a set of actual bilateral trade matrices for 1997
(although there are plans to introduce a time series covering the period 1993-2002) or by a
special distance variable, normalised with a weight of 1 being given to activity in the home
region. For the special measure of distance, the weights for the other regions are inversely
proportional to the economic distances of the other regions from the exporting region.
Regional imports are related to demand and relative prices by commodity and region. In
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addition, measures of innovation (based on R&D) have been introduced into the trade
equations to pick up an important long-term dynamic effect on economic development.
E3ME's output-investment loop
The output-investment loop includes industrial demand for goods and services and runs from
total demand to output and then to investment and back to total demand. For each region, total
demand for the gross output of goods and services is formed from industrial demand,
consumers' expenditure, government demand, investment (fixed domestic capital formation
and stockbuilding) and exports. These totals are divided between imports and domestic output
depending on relative prices, levels of activity and utilisation of capacity. Industrial demand
represents the inputs of goods and services from other industries required for current
production, and is calculated using input-output coefficients. Input-output tables have been
obtained from Eurostat, ONS and GTAP and used to give 2000 estimates for the 27 E3ME
regions. The coefficients are calculated as inputs of commodities from whatever source,
including imports, per unit of gross industrial output.
Forecast changes in output are important determinants of investment in the model. Investment
in new equipment and new buildings is one of the ways that companies adjust to the new
challenges introduced by energy and environmental policies, so the quality of the data and the
way they are modelled is of great importance to E3ME. Regional investment by investing
industry is determined in the model as intertemporal choices depending on capacity output
and investment prices. When investment by user industry is determined, it is converted, using
coefficients derived from input-output tables, into demands on the industries producing the
investment goods and services, mainly engineering and construction. These demands then
constitute one of the components of total demand.
Gross fixed investment, enhanced by R&D expenditure in constant prices, is accumulated to
provide a measure of the technological capital stock. There are problems with the usual
definition of the capital stock (see Scott, 1989), partly because there are no satisfactory data
on economic scrapping. The accumulation measure is designed to get round the worst of these
problems. E3ME42 makes the distinction between ICT and non-ICT investment to capture the
effects of the new economy. Investment, both in ICT and non-ICT areas, is central to the
determination of long-term growth and the model embodies a theory of endogenous growth
which underlies the long-term behaviour of the trade and employment equations.
E3ME's income loop
In the income loop, industrial output generates employment and incomes, which leads to
further consumers' expenditure, adding to total demand. Changes in output are used to
determine changes in employment, along with changes in real wage costs, interest rates and
energy costs. With wage rates explained by price levels and conditions in the labour market,
the wage and salary payments by industry can be calculated from the industrial employment
levels. These are some of the largest payments to the personal sector, but not the only ones.
There are also payments of interest and dividends, and transfers from government in the form
of state pensions, unemployment benefits and other social security benefits. Payments made
by the personal sector include mortgage interest payments and personal income taxes.
Personal disposable income is calculated from these accounts, and deflated by the consumer
price index to give real personal disposable income.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 309 – Drucksache 16/9334
Totals of consumer spending by region are derived from consumption functions estimated
from time-series data (this is similar treatment to that of the HERMES model). These
equations relate consumption to regional personal disposable income, a measure of wealth for
the personal sector, inflation and interest rates. In the subsequent allocation of this spending
by commodity, the approach makes the most of the disaggregated data on consumers'
expenditure available by region from Eurostat. Again sets of equations have been estimated
from time-series data relating the spending per capita to the national spending using the CBS
version of consumption allocation system. The incorporation of this system into the solution
is complex: the allocation system has been adapted to provide the long-run income and
relative price parameters in a two-stage procedure, with a standardised co-integrating equation
including demographic effects providing the dynamic solution. The substitution between
categories as a result of changes in relative prices is achieved at the regional level.
INTRODUCTION TO ENERGY-ENVIRONMENT MODELLING IN E3ME
This section outlines how energy demand and prices are modelled in E3ME, and how this
links into the economic modelling. This includes a discussion of top-down and bottom-up
methodologies and how this is applied to E3ME, the Emissions submodel and finally
feedback effects from the energy submodel to the economic model.
Top-Down and Bottom-Up approaches to E3 modelling and their use in E3ME
E3ME is intended to be an integrated top-down, bottom-up model of E3 interaction. In
particular, a detailed engineering-based treatment is planned for the electricity supply industry
(ESI), the demand for energy by the domestic sector, and transportation. The current version
of the model is top-down, but it is important to be aware of the comparative strengths and
weaknesses of the two approaches.
Top-down economic analyses and bottom-up engineering analyses of changes in the pattern
of energy consumption possess distinct intellectual origins and distinct strengths and
weaknesses (see chart: Comparison of top-down and bottom-up modelling methodology).
Perhaps the most significant difference is in the treatment of capital and technology. In top-
down models capital is usually treated as a homogeneous input, which is related to energy
only insofar as it is assumed to possess a degree of substitutability with energy inputs in
production. Technological change (ie qualitative change in the characteristics of capital) is
usually represented as an exogenous trend, sometimes explicitly related to energy
consumption, affecting the productivity of the homogeneous capital input. Conversely, in
bottom-up models capital is given an explicit empirical content and is related to energy in a
very specific way, either in terms of generating equipment, other energy-related capital, or
public infrastructure. Technological change is represented as a menu of options presently
available or soon-to-be available, which enjoy increasing market penetration.
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Similarly the mechanisms which represent the driving force in the respective analyses are
very different. In economic models change is usually modelled using elasticities, such as
substitution between factors, or price and income elasticities. In bottom-up modelling the
determinant force is captured by the relationship between technological options and usually
by some notion of the discount rate employed by economic agents (households, firms and the
government). In some sense, the discount rate employed in bottom-up models is the mirror
image of an elasticity employed in top-down models. Both factors will determine the extent to
which agents react to changes in the conditions associated with the energy supply chain (see
Barker, Ekins and Johnstone, 1995).
The two approaches also start from different conceptions of the nature of markets. Most top-
down models, although not E3ME, do not admit to the possibility of market imperfections (eg
imperfect competition). Most importantly, the existence of costless opportunities is often
assumed away (except at the margin). Energy consumption (and thus carbon dioxide
emissions) are a reflection of revealed preferences and thus any alternative technological
scenarios which have not been taken up in the economy are left unexploited for sound
economic reasons, such as agent uncertainty (with respect to supply and demand factors) or
'hidden' factors (such as disruption or management costs). Conversely, in bottom-up models
the inability of the economy to reach a technologically efficient supply chain in terms of the
provision of energy services is attributed to market imperfections (eg credit constraints,
information asymmetries, transaction costs). The relationship between such imperfections and
decision-making is, however, left unexplored.
As noted, both types of analysis possess important strengths, but both have weaknesses when
used to address long-term issues. On the one hand in top-down models, the notion that an
elasticity of substitution between capital and other factors (estimated on the basis of 30 years
of data, or imposed on the basis of intuition or the requirements of functional form) can be
used to make useful comments about the world over the next 50 or 100 years from now is
suspect. Indeed, beyond a certain number of years it is the engineering characteristics of the
'back-stop' technology, and not the behavioural relations themselves, around which the
carbon-energy-output relationship revolves. On the other hand the depiction of the long-run in
bottom-up models as a menu of technological options is clearly unsatisfactory as well. At
best, the technological options can be presented in chronological form (commercially
available, in development stages, technologically feasible), coming on line progressively. By
defining capital precisely the models cannot be made dynamic in a satisfactory manner unless
the path of technological change is known, and as such are restricted in their relevance to
short and medium-term analysis.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 311 – Drucksache 16/9334
In addition, the characteristics of the two approaches limit the relevance of the respective
analyses. For instance, top-down models are not able to analyse the effects of non-price based
policies which affect the nature of the market itself and not just prices within the market.
Institutions and regulations are (implicitly) not subject to change. Given the prevalence of
imperfections in the market for energy services, such an omission is significant. Conversely,
bottom-up models are not able to analyse the price effects of the introduction of the options
enumerated, or associated feedback effects. For instance, an analysis which examines the
technological options available to the electricity supply industry misses important feedback
effects unless it examines the effects of such a programme on the construction industry which
undertakes the conversion, on the energy sector which is faced with significant dislocation,
and on those sectors which use electricity and other energy carriers intensively as inputs in
production.
E3ME's Top-Down Energy Submodel
The energy submodel in E3ME42 is constructed, estimated and solved for 19 fuel users, 12
energy carriers (termed fuels for convenience below) and the 27 regions of E3ME. The chart
Inputs to the energy sub-model shows the inputs from the economy and the environment into
the components of the submodel and the chart Feedback from the energy sub-model shows
the feedback from the submodel to the rest of the economy.
Aggregate energy demand, shown at the top of the first chart, is determined by a set of co-
integrating equations, with the main explanatory variables being:
� Economic activity in each of the 19 fuel users
� Average energy prices by the fuel users relative to the overall price levels
� Technological variables, represented by R&D expenditure in key industries producing
energy-using equipment and vehicles.
Fuel use equations are estimated for four fuels - coal, heavy oils, gas and electricity - with
four sets of equations estimated for the fuel users in each region. These equations are intended
to allow substitution between these energy carriers by users on the basis of relative prices,
although overall fuel use and the technological variables are allowed to affect the choice.
Since the substitution equations cover only 4 of the 12 fuels, the remaining fuels are
Drucksache 16/9334 – 312 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
determined either as fixed ratios to aggregate energy use or are assumed to behave in an
identical way as other, closely related fuels (e.g. other coal and hard coal, crude oil and heavy
fuel oil, other gas and natural gas). The final set of fuels used must then be scaled to ensure
that it adds up to the aggregate energy demand (for each fuel user and each region).
E3ME's Emission Submodel
The emissions submodel calculates air pollution generated from end-use of different fuels and
from primary use of fuels in the energy industries themselves, particularly electricity
generation. Provision is made for emissions to the atmosphere of CO2, SO2, NOX, CO,
methane (CH4), Black smoke (PM10), volatile organic compounds (VOC), nuclear, lead,
CFCs and the other four greenhouse gases N2O, HFC, PFC, SF6. This means that, where the
data are available, the results will include:
� Effects on non-CO2 GHGs (especially those in the Kyoto Protocol - CH4, N2O, HFC,
PFC, SF6)
� Ancillary benefits relating to reduction in associated emissions eg PM10, SO2, NOx
The theory, data collection and parameter estimates are reported in Working Paper 9b
(Bruvoll, Ellingsen and Rosendahl, 1999). This draws from the emission sources (ES)
classification which is closely linked to the 19 fuel user groups in E3ME.
Emissions data for CO2 are available for fuel users of solid fuels, oil products and gas
separately. The energy submodel estimates of fuel by fuel user are aggregated into these
groups (solid, oil and gas) and emission coefficients (tonnes of carbon in CO2 emitted per
toe) are calculated and stored. The coefficients are calculated for each year when data are
available, then used at their last historical values to project future emissions. Other emission
data are available at various levels of disaggregation from a number of sources and have been
constructed carefully to ensure consistency.
Feedback from E3ME's Energy submodel to the rest of the economy
The chart: Feedback from the energy sub-model shows the main feedbacks from the energy
submodel to the rest of the economy. Changes in consumers' expenditures on fuels and petrol
can be formed from changes in fuel use estimated in the energy submodel, although the levels
are calibrated on historical time-series data. The model software provides an option for
choosing either the consumers' expenditure equation solution, or the energy equation solution.
Whichever option is chosen, total consumer demand in constant values matches the results of
the aggregate consumption function with any residual held in the unallocated category of
consumers' expenditure. The other feedbacks all affect industrial, including electricity,
demand via changes in the input-output coefficients.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 313 – Drucksache 16/9334
The Effects of a Carbon/Energy Tax in E3ME
One of the purposes of the model is to provide a consistent and coherent treatment of fiscal
policy in relation to greenhouse gas emission. Some form of carbon/energy tax is an
important component of such policy and E3ME is capable of exploring scenarios involving
such a tax, as well as other fiscal and alternative means of reducing emissions. The chart:
Impact of the carbon/energy tax on prices and wage rates shows how the tax affects prices and
wage rates in the model. There are inevitably certain simplifying assumptions made in
modelling a carbon/energy tax.
The first assumption is that the effects of the tax in the model are derived entirely through the
impact of the tax on fuel prices, and through any use of the subsequent revenues from the tax
in reducing other taxes. Other effects are not modelled. For example, if the introduction of
such a tax caused the electricity industry to scrap coal-burning plant in advance of what might
be expected from the relative price change induced by the tax, this effect would have to be
imposed on the model results.
The two components of the tax are treated separately. The carbon component of the tax is
given in real prices of the starting year as a rate in euros per tonne carbon (euros/tC) emitted
in the form of CO2. The rate is then indexed on average consumer prices in each of the EU
regions to give annual rates over the projection period. The carbon tax liability of all fuels is
calculated on the basis of their CO2 emissions, and converted into euros per tonne oil
equivalent (euros/toe) on the basis of the heat content of the fuels. The energy component of
Drucksache 16/9334 – 314 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
the tax is expressed in terms of euros/toe directly and again the escalating rate is indexed to
consumer prices in each region. A matrix of total energy tax rates (in euros/toe) in the form of
additional excise duties on energy products by fuel user by fuel, can then be constructed for
each region in each year. Tax revenues can be calculated from fuel use; the revenues will be
reduced according to the fall in use, but will rise according to price inflation and any escalator
in the tax rates.
The second assumption is that imports and domestic production of fuels will be taxed
according to the carbon and energy content of the fuels, with exports exempt from the tax
coverage. The treatment is assumed to correspond to that presently adopted by the authorities
for excise duties imposed on hydrocarbon oils. It is assumed that industries and importers pay
the tax, and that it is then passed on in the form of higher fuel prices paid by the fuel users. A
further assumption is that industrial fuel users pass on all the extra costs implied by the tax in
the form of higher prices for goods and services. The increase in final price will be a result of
the direct and indirect carbon/energy content of each commodity distinguished in the model.
If the revenues are used to reduce employer tax rates, then industrial employment costs will
fall and these reductions in costs are also assumed to be passed on through the industrial
system.
The net effect on industrial and import prices will eventually feed through to consumer prices
and will affect relative consumption of goods and services depending on the carbon/energy
content and on their price elasticities. The higher consumer prices will then lead to higher
wage claims. The econometric evidence supports the theoretical presumption that all the tax is
eventually paid by the final consumer and this condition is imposed in the long-term solution
of the model.
The chart: Impact of the carbon/energy tax on fuel use, CO2 emissions and industrial
employment shows the consequent effects of these price and wage rate changes. The changes
in relative fuel prices as a result of the tax will change fuel use, depending on substitution
elasticities. The fuel price increases will be passed on to more general increases in prices,
which will cause substitution in consumers' expenditure, in exports and between imports and
domestic production. These changes will feed back to fuel use. CO2 emissions are derived
directly from the use of different fuels. If employment costs are reduced when tax revenues
are recycled, then industrial employment will be stimulated directly, with a further indirect
effect as labour-intensive goods and services gain in relative price competitiveness.
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r inclusion in the EU ETS
Abatement
availability
Abatement
cost
Existing
regulation/competition
L LM Competition with materials
already covered. Covered
under broad interpretation
L LM NAP2 guidance specifies
inclusion of rockwool
M MH Partly covered if >20MW
combustion installation +
NAP2 guidance specifies
crackers and carbon black
ependent on process Partly covered if >20MW
combustion installation
MH MH Partly covered if >20MW
combustion installation and
broad intrepretation
H (but may
not be
accessible
due to
safety)
L to H
depending
on site
NAP2 guidance specifies
inclusion of flaring
Annex 4: Table representing the outcome of screening of sectors emitting CO2 fo
Source Gas EU25
MtCO2eq
(2003)1
Trend
(annual
%� 2010-
2020)
Uncertainty Data
collection
Installation
boundaries
Ability
to
identify
operator
Verification No and
size of
emitters
Complexity
of MRV
Gypsum
production
n.d. Stable L + + + + Small /
small
L
Rock wool
production
n.d. & ~6 Stable L + + + + Small /
average
ML
Petrochemicals ~66 & small Slightly
increasing
in ST and
stabilisation
in the
LT
126
MH + 0 + + Small /
Large
ML
Other
chemicals
~66 & small Slightly
increasing
in ST and
stabilisation
in the
LT126
M + 0 + + Large /
Small–
large
Very varied, d
Ammonia
production
~15 & ~30 Slightly
increasing
in ST and
stabilisation
in the
LT126
L + + + + Small /
large
L
Gas/Oil flaring
CO2
~4 Stable in
ST;
possible
decrease in
the LT
MH 0 + + 0 Average /
large
MH
126 Lack of individual sub-sector data, so trend reflects overall chemical sector.
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Abatement
availability
Abatement
cost
Existing
regulation/competition
L L Partly covered if >20MW
combustion installation.
Secondary Al. covered
under broad interpretation.
Competition with materials
already covered
H LM Partly covered depending
on definition of combustion
installation. Energy
Services Directive
M LM Waste Incineration
Directive and IPPC
G emissions (exc. LULUCF) are approximately 4990 MtCO2eq
Source Gas EU25
MtCO2eq
(2003)1
Trend
(annual
%� 2010-
2020)
Uncertainty Data
collection
Installation
boundaries
Ability
to
identify
operator
Verification No and
size of
emitters
Complexity
of MRV
Aluminium
production
n.d ~8 Stable,
possible
decrease in
LT126
L + + + + Small /
average
L
Food and drink ~57 Slightly
increasing
in ST and
stabilisation
in LT
127
L - 0 + 0 Large /
small to
medium
L
Waste
incineration
~4 Stable MH + + + + Average /
average
MH
Source: Adapted from LETS (2006) and Ecofys (2006)
Note: 1 For CO2 where only one figure is shown this relates to combustion emissions, where two sets are shown the latter relates to process emissions. Total 2003 EU25 GH
(EU27 ~ 5215 MtCO2eq)
127 Due to lack of sub-sector data, this trend reflects the overall trend in the secondary manufacturing sector.
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HG for inclusion in the EU ETS
Abatement
availability
Abatement
cost
Existing
regulation/competition
H M
L M Partly covered
(compressors)
MH L IPPC
L L IPPC
LM MH F-Gas Regulation and
Worldwide Voluntary
Agreement
M L F-Gas Regulation
G emissions (exc. LULUCF) are approximately 4990 MtCO2eq
Annex 5: Table representing the outcome of screening of sectors emitting non-CO2 G
Source Gas EU25
MtCO2e
q
(2003)1
Trend
(annual
%�
2010-
2020)
Uncertainty Data
collection
Installation
boundaries
Ability to
identify
operator
Verification No and size
of emitters
Complexity
of MRV
Coal
mining
~31 -1.4% M 0 0 + - Small / large M
Natural gas
distribution
CH
4
~30 1.2% Generally H,
but individual
source sectors
could be M/L
0 0~ - 0 Large / small L
Adipic and
nitric acid
N2
O
~53 0.1% L + + + + Small / point
sources
LM
Aluminium
production
PF
Cs
~4 -0.7% L + + + + Small / point
sources
L
Semicondu
ctor
manufactur
e
~1 4.5% L + + + + Small / point
sources
L
Magnesium
foundries
SF6 ~3 9.5% L + + + + Small / large L
Source: Adapted from LETS (2006) and Ecofys (2006)
Note: 1 For CO2 where only one figure is shown this relates to combustion emissions, where two sets are shown the latter relates to process emissions. Total 2003 EU25 GH
(EU27 ~ 5215 MtCO2eq)
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S
Annex 6: Overview of refineries and chemicals sector and potential sect
ource: ENTEC 2007b
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 319 – Drucksache 16/9334
Annex 7: List of References
Böhringer 2003 Böhringer/Lange: Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation
Schemes for Emission Allowances - A Theoretical and Applied
Analysis, Mannheim, 2003
Bergmann/Hayden/
Schmitz 2007
Bergmann/Hayden/Schmitz 2007: "Imposing a unilateral carbon
constraint on energy-intensive industries and its impact on international
competitiveness – data & analysis," note for the attention of the
members of the Consultative Inter-service Working Group on the
competitiveness of energy intensive industries in a carbon-constrained
EU
Bollen 2004 Bollen, J, Manders, T., Veenedaal, P..: "How much does a 30%
emission reduction cost? Macroeconomic effects of post-Kyoto climate
policy in 2020", CPB Document 64, (2004)
Bosetti 2007 Bosetti et al: International Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics
of Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Stabilization, FEEM paper, July 2007
Carbon Trust Carbon Trust Ltd., London, informations on CO2 emission factors
available at: http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/resource/conversion_factors/
CEMOETR 2007 Competitiveness Effects of Environmental Tax Reforms. Policy
Brief.Project funded under the EU 6th framework programme for
research and development. Project coordinator prof. Mikael Skou
Andersen (NERI, University of Aarhus, Denmark).
Council 2007b Council of the European Union: Council Conclusions: Review of the
European Emissions Trading Scheme, Brussels, June 2007
COWI 2004 COWI/UNICE: Competitiveness and EU Climate Change Policy,
October 2004
Cramton 2002 Cramton/Kerr: Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions - How and why to
auction not grandfather, Energy Policy 30, 333-345
Delbeke 2006 Delbeke, Jos et al.: EU Energy Law - The EU Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading Scheme, Leuven, 2006
Demailly 2007 Demailly, D., Grubb, M., Hourcase, J.C., Neuhoff, K. and Sato, M.,
"Differentiation and dynamics of EU ETS Competitiveness impacts",
Interim report at www.climate-strategies.org, March 2007
Driesen 2003 Driesen, David M.: Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?,
ELR paper, 2003
EA-6/03 European Co-operation for Accreditation, “EA Guidance for
Recognition of Verification Bodies under EU ETS Directive”, revised
April 2007 – Download:
http://www.european-accreditation.org/n1/doc/EA6_03.pdf
Drucksache 16/9334 – 320 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
EC 2000a European Commission: Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions
trading within the European Union, Brussels, 2000
EC 2003a European Commission: Communication from the Commission on
guidance to assist Member States in the implementation of the criteria
listed in Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC and on the circumstances under
which force majeure is demonstrated, COM(2003)830 final, Brussels,
2003
EC 2005a European Commission: Further guidance on allocation plans for the
2008 to 2012 trading period of the EU Emission Trading Scheme
COM(2005)703 final, Brussels, 2005
EC 2005b European Commission: Winning the Battle Against Global Climate
Change, COM(2005)35, Brussels, 2005
EC 2006b European Commission: Report from the Commission towards achieving
the Kyoto objectives, COM(2006)658, Brussels, 2006
EC 2007a European Commission: Commission Staff Working Document -
Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission
to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and
Social Committeee and the Committee of the Regions - Limiting global
Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius - The way ahead for 2020 and
beyond - Impact Assessment, SEC/2007/7, Brussels, 2007
ECN 2007 ECN: The impact of the EU ETS on electricity prices, Brussels 2007
(not published yet)
Ecofys 2005 Ecofys: Review of EU Emissions Trading Scheme - Survey Highlights,
Brussels, November 2005
Ecofys 2006a Ecofys: Harmonisation of Allocation Methodologies, Brussels, 2006
Ecofys 2006b Ecofys: Inclusion of additional activities and gases into the EU ETS,
Brussels, 2006
Ecofys 2006c Ecofys: The Approach to new Entrants and Closures in the EU ETS,
Brussels, 2006
Ecofys 2006d Ecofys: Auctioning of CO2 Emission Allowances in the EU ETS,
Brussels, 2006
Ecofys 2007a Ecofys: Small installations within the EU Emissions trading scheme.
Brussels, 2007
EEA 2006a European Environment Agency: Greeenhouse gas emission trends and
projections in Europe 2006, Copenhagen, 2006
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 321 – Drucksache 16/9334
EEA 2006b European Environment Agency: Application of the emissions trading
directive by EU Member States, Copenhagen, 2006
EEA 2007a European Environment Agency: Application of the emissions trading
directive by EU Member States, reporting year 2006, Copenhagen, 2007
EEA 2007b European Environment Agency: Annual European Community
greenhouse gas inventory 1990-2005 and inventory report 2007,
Copenhagen, 2007
Ellerman 2003 Ellerman/Joskow/Harrison: Emissions trading in the US: Experience,
lessons and considerations for greenhouse gases, Pew-Center, New
York, 2003
ECFIN 2007 Imposing a unilateral carbon constraint on energy-intensive industries
and its impact on international competitiveness – data & analysis, Note
from DG ECFIN, 2007
ENTEC 2007a ENTEC UK Ltd: A Centralised Cap Setting Process - Analytical Work
required to inform UK Government/Environment Agency, London,
2007 (not published)
ENTEC 2007b ENTEC UK Ltd: Support for the Impact Assessment in the Context of
the Review of Directive 2003/87/EC, London, 2007 (not published yet)
ER 2007a European Council: Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European
Council, 8-9 March 2007, Brussels, 2007
ETUC 2007 ETUC, Climate Change and Employment, Brussels, 2007
http://www.tradeunionpress.eu/Web/EN/Activities
/Environment/Studyclimatechange/rapport.pdf
Grubb 2006 Grubb/Neuhoff: Allocation and competitiveness in the EU Emissions
trading scheme: policy overview, Climate Policy, 6, 7-30
Grubb 2007 Grubb, M., Sato, M., Cust, J., Chan, K., Korppoo, A. and Ceppi, P.,
"Differentiation and Dynamics of competitiveness impacts from the EU
ETS", April 2007
Hepburn 2006 Hepburn/Grubb/Neuhoff/Matthes/Tse: Auctioning of EU ETS phase II
allowances: how and why?, Cambridge, 2006
Hourcade 2008 Hourcade/Demailly/Neuhoff/Sato: Differentiation and dynamics of EU
ETS industrial competitiveness impacts, Climate Strategies Report,
2008
ICF International
2007
ICF International, "Analysis of the economic impact of energy product
prices on competitiveness of the energy and manufacturing sectors in
the EU: comparison between EU and US", report submitted to the
European Commission, DG Transport and Energy
Drucksache 16/9334 – 322 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
IEA 2006a IEA: Linking GHG Emission Trading Systems and Markets, Paris, 2006
IEA 2006b IEA: Industrial Competitiveness under the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme, Paris, 2006
Kouvaritakis 2005 Kouvaritakis, N., Paroussos, L., Stroblos, N., Van Regemorter, D. ,
Revesz, T., Zalai, E..:"Impacts of energy taxation in the enlarged
European Union, evaluation with GEM-E3 Europe", DG TAXUD 2005
LETS 2006a LETS UPDATE: Scoping Phase Report, London, April 2006
LETS 2006b LETS UPDATE: Decision Makers Summary, London, April 2006
LETS 2006c LETS UPDATE: Working Groups A and B Report, London, April 2006
Lewis 2007 Lewis, Mark C.: Banking on Higher Prices: We see EUA at € 35t/CO2
over 2008-2020, Global Markets Research, Deutsche Bank AG,
London, 2007
Lindboe 2007 Lindboe Hans Henrik. et al: Impact of CO2 quota allocation to new
entrants in the electricity market,
http://www2.mst.dk/Udgiv/publications/2007/978-87-7052-494-
0/pdf/978-87-7052-495-7.pdf
Matthes 2005 Matthes/Graichen/Repenning: The environmental effectiveness and
economic efficiency of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme:
Structural aspects of allocation, WWF/Power Switch/Öko-Institut, 2005
Matthes 2007 Matthes, F.C. and Neuhoff, K., "Auctioning in the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme", Oekoinstitut and University of Cambridge,
report commissioned by WWF, September 2007
McKinsey 2006 McKinsey/Ecofys: Report on International Competitiveness, Brussels,
December 2006
NERA 2007 NERA: Allocation Options for Phase III of the EU ETS, Brussels, 2007
(not published yet)
Neuhoff 2006a Neuhoff et al: Implications of announced Phase 2 National Allocation
Plans for the EU ETS, Climate Policy, 6 (5)
Neuhoff 2006b Neuhoff/Keats Martinez/Sato: Allocation, incentives and distortions:
The impact of the EU ETS Emissions Allowance Allocations to the
Electricity Sector, Climate Policy, 6
PWC 2006 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Evaluation of the 1st round verification of the
EU ETS, Final report, Utrecht, 2006
Quirion 2006 Quirion, P., Hourcade, J.C., "Does the CO2 emission trading directive
threaten the competitiveness of European industry?", CIRED, 2006,
available at:
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 323 – Drucksache 16/9334
http://www.centre-cired.fr/perso/quirion/quirion_hourcade_eaere.pdf
Sijm 2006a Sijm, J., Chen, Y., ten Donkelaar, M., Hers, S. and Scheepers, M., "CO2
price dynamics: a follow-up analysis of the implications of EU
emissions trading for the price of electricity, ECN, Petten
Sijm 2006b Sijm, J., Neuhoff, K. and Chen, Y., "CO2 cost pass through and
windfall profits in the power sector, CWPE Working Paper 0639 and
EPRG Working Paper 0617.price dynamics: a follow-up analysis of the
implications of EU emissions trading for the price of electricity, ECN-
C—06-015, Energy research Centre of the Netherlands, Petten
Sijm 2007a Sijm, J.P.M.: Options for EU Burden Sharing and EU ETS allocation
post 2012
Sijm 2007b Sijm, J.P.M.: The impact of the EU ETS on electricity prices, ECN,
Petten, 2007 (not published yet)
Smale 2006 Smale, R., et al, "The impact of CO2 emissions on firm profits and
market prices", Climate Policy 6(1) Special Issue: Emissions allocation,
incentives and industrial competitiveness under the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme, pp.31-48
Stern 2006 Stern, Jonathan: Stern review: The Economics of Climate Change,
London, 2006
UBA 2006 UBA et al: Where next for the EU Emissions Trading Scheme?, 2006
Walker 2006 Walker, N., Concrete Evidence? An Empirical Approach to Quantify
the Impact of EU Emissions Trading on Cement Industry
Competitiveness, School of Geography, Planning and Environmental
Policy, University College Dublin. Working Paper
ZEW 2007 ZEW: Competitiveness Effects of Trading Emissions and Forstering
Technologies to meet the EU Kyoto Targets, Mannheim, 2007
Drucksache 16/9334 – 324 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Annex 8: Abbreviations
AB Accreditation Body
BAT Best available technique
CA Competent Authority
CER Certified Emission Reduction Unit
DOP Domestic offset project
EA European Co-operation for Accreditation
ECCP European Climate Change Programme
ER Export ratio: the proportion of home production that is exported.
ERU Emission reduction unit
EUT Treaty of the European Union
GHG Greenhouse gas emissions
IPR Import Penetration Ratio: the proportion of home consumption that is made up of imports.
lCER Long-term certified emission reduction
IMO International Maritime Organization
IMPEL European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change
IPPC Integrated pollution prevention and control
ISO International Standardisation Organisation
LCP Large Combustion Plant
LVOC Large volume organic chemicals
MR Monitoring and Reporting
MRG Monitoring and Reporting Guidelines (pursuant to Article 14 of the ETS Directive)
MRV Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
tCER Temporary certified emission reduction
VER Verified emission reductions
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 325 – Drucksache 16/9334
RAT DER
EUROPÄISCHEN UNION
Brüssel, den 29. Januar 2008 (30.01)
(OR. en)
Interinstitutionelles Dossier:
2008/0013 (COD)
5862/08
ADD 2
ENV 52
ENER 29
IND 11
COMPET 31
MI 34
ECOFIN 34
TRANS 22
AVIATION 25
CODEC 105
ADDENDUM ZUM VORSCHLAG
der: Europäischen Kommission
vom: 28. Januar 2008
Betr.: Arbeitsdokument der Kommissionsdienststellen – Begleitdokument zu
dem Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parlaments und des
Rates zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG in Bezug auf die Ver-
besserung und Ausweitung des EU Systems für den Handel mit Treib-
hausgasemissionenszertifikaten
Zusammenfassung der Folgenabschätzung
Die Delegationen erhalten in der Anlage das Kommissionsdokument – SEK(2008) 53.
Anl.: SEK(2008) 53.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 326 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN
Brüssel, den 23.1.2008
SEK(2008) 53
ARBEITSDOKUMENT DER KOMMISSIONSDIENSTSTELLEN
Begleitdokument zu dem
Vorschlag für eine
RICHTLINIE DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS UND DES RATES
zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG in Bezug auf die Verbesserung und
Ausweitung des EU-Systems für den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionenszertifikaten
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER FOLGENABSCHÄTZUNG
{KOM(2008) 16 endgültig}
{SEK(2008) 52}
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 327 – Drucksache 16/9334
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
1. EINLEITUNG UND POLITISCHER RAHMEN
Nach Maßgabe von Artikel 30 der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG („Emissionshandelsrichtlinie“) sind
in der Mitteilung der Kommission „Errichtung eines globalen Kohlenstoffmarkts – Bericht
nach Maßgabe von Artikel 30 der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG“1 die vier Hauptbereiche festgelegt,
die bei der Überprüfung des EU-Emissionshandelssystems (EU-EHS) zu bearbeiten sind:
1) Geltungsbereich der Richtlinie, 2) robuste Erfüllung und Durchsetzung, 3) weitere
Harmonisierung und Verbesserung der Berechenbarkeit, 4) Verknüpfung mit
Emissionshandelssystemen in Drittländern und geeignete Maßnahmen zur Einbindung von
Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern. Diese Themen wurden insbesondere im Zuge des
Überprüfungsprozesses, der im ersten Halbjahr 2007 im Rahmen des Europäischen
Programms zum Klimawandel (ECCP) stattgefunden hat, aber auch im Rahmen der seit
Einführung des EU-EHS im Jahr 2005 kontinuierlich stattfindenden Kontakte zu
Interessengruppen eingehend erörtert.
Die Überprüfung findet zu einem Zeitpunkt statt, an dem der Klimawandel ganz oben auf der
politischen Tagesordnung steht. Im März 2007 billigte der Europäische Rat die neue Energie-
und Klimaschutzstrategie, die die Europäische Kommission im Januar 2007 vorgeschlagen
hatte und der zufolge die Industrieländer ihre Treibhausgasemissionen (THG-Emissionen) im
Rahmen eines künftigen globalen Übereinkommens bis zum Jahr 2020 gegenüber den Werten
von 1990 um 30 % verringern sollen. Auch bei Ausbleiben eines internationalen
Übereinkommens wird die EU ihre eigenen Emissionen bis 2020 um mindestens 20 %
senken.
2. ALLGEMEINE ZIELE
Der Rat hat bestätigt, dass das EU-EHS eines der wichtigsten Instrument der EU ist und
bleiben wird, um das strategische Ziel, den durchschnittlichen Anstieg der Erdtemperatur bei
2 °C über vorindustriellen Werten zu stabilisieren, zu erreichen.
Vor diesem Hintergrund ergeben sich drei allgemeine Überprüfungsziele:
(1) volle Ausschöpfung der durch das EU-EHS gebotenen Möglichkeiten, in
wirtschaftlich effizienter Weise zu den allgemeinen Verpflichtungen der EU zur
Treibhausgasreduzierung beizutragen;
(2) Verfeinerung und Verbesserung des EU-EHS im Lichte der gewonnenen Erfahrungen;
(3) Beitrag zur Umwandlung Europas in einen Wirtschaftsraum mit niedrigem
Treibhausgasausstoß und Schaffung von wirksamen Anreizen für zukunftsweisende
Investitionsentscheidungen zugunsten kohlenstoffarmer Technologien, indem ein
deutliches, unverzerrtes und langfristiges CO2-Preissignal gegeben wird.
1 KOM(2006) 676.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 328 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
3. GELTUNGSBEREICH DER RICHTLINIE
Straffung des derzeitigen Geltungsbereichs
Die uneinheitliche Auslegung des Begriffs „Feuerungsanlage“ durch die Mitgliedstaaten hat
zu Wettbewerbsverzerrungen, zu einer unzureichenden Erfassung von Prozessemissionen und
zu Rechtsunsicherheit hinsichtlich des Geltungsbereichs der Richtlinie geführt.
Von den verschiedenen Optionen dürfte die Konsolidierung einer breiten Auslegung des
Begriffs „Feuerungsanlage“, die mit der Mitteilung der Kommission über neue Hinweise zu
den Zuteilungsplänen für den Handelszeitraum 2008-2012 des Systems für den EU-
Emissionshandel2 weitgehend im Einklang steht und durch eine neue Definition des Begriffs
„Feuerungsanlage“ untermauert sowie durch eine Tätigkeitsliste ergänzt wird, die meisten
Aussichten auf Erfolg haben. Auf diese Weise könnte der Geltungsbereich, auch in Bezug auf
Prozessemissionen, konsequent angewandt und den Mitgliedstaaten Rechtssicherheit
gewährleistet werden. Außerdem würde dieser Ansatz durch Ausweitung des
Erfassungsbereichs des EU-EHS zur Umweltwirksamkeit des Systems beitragen.
Kostenwirksamkeit von Kleinanlagen
Derzeit sind rund 10 800 Anlage am EU-EHS beteiligt. Die größten Anlagen im System (7 %)
sind für 60 % der Gesamtemissionen verantwortlich, während auf die kleinsten Anlagen
(14 %) nur 0,14 % aller Emissionen entfallen. Dieses Verhältnis deutet auf ein
unausgewogenes Kosten-Nutzen-Verhältnis hin. Es hat sich als beste Option zur Steigerung
der Kostenwirksamkeit des EU-EHS erwiesen, Feuerungsanlagen mit einer
Feuerungswärmeleistung von mehr als 20 MW aber weniger als 25 MW und mit Emissionen
von nicht mehr als 10 kt/Jahr unter bestimmten Bedingungen aus dem System zu befreien
(Opt-out), da diese Option das beste Verhältnis zwischen den aus dem EU-EHS
ausgeschlossenen Emissionen und der Anzahl ausgeschlossener Kleinanlagen gewährleistet.
Einbeziehung neuer Sektoren und Gase
Auf Basis der geprüften Emissionen für 2005 und des EU-Verzeichnisses der
THG-Emissionen sind 41 % aller THG-Emissionen der Europäischen Union im EU-EHS
erfasst. Eine Ausweitung des Erfassungsbereichs des Systems durch Einbeziehung neuer
Sektoren und Gase würde die Umweltwirksamkeit des Systems verbessern, zu neuen und
weiteren Minderungsmöglichkeiten führen und dadurch mehr Emissionsminderungen zu
niedrigeren Kosten ermöglichen.
Bei der Entscheidung über die Einbeziehung neuer Sektoren und Gase müssten verschiedene
technische Kriterien erfüllt sein, um eine ordnungsgemäße Überwachung der
THG-Emissionen gewährleisten zu können. Darüber hinaus ist auch das Ziel, die
Umwandlung Europas in einen Wirtschaftsraum mit niedrigem CO2-Ausstoß zu fördern, zu
berücksichtigen. Obgleich Minderungspotential und Minderungskosten in dieser Hinsicht eine
Rolle spielen können, darf das Nichtvorhandensein dieses Potenzials kein Grund dafür sein,
einen bestimmten Sektor nicht in das EU-EHS einzubeziehen.
2 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/nap_2_guidance_de.pdf
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 329 – Drucksache 16/9334
– In Bezug auf CO2-Emissionen wäre es nach Maßgabe der Screening-Analyse angebracht,
CO2-Emissionen aus petrochemischen Erzeugnissen sowie sonstigen chemischen
Produkten und aus der Ammoniak- und Aluminiumproduktion einzubeziehen.
– Was andere THG-Emissionen als CO2 angeht, so wird empfohlen, N2O-Emissionen, die
bei der Herstellung von Salpetersäure und bei der Produktion von Adipin- und
Glyoxylsäure entstehen, sowie PFC-Emissionen aus Aluminium in das EU-EHS
einzubeziehen.
– CCS-Projekte können im EU-EHS bereits jetzt durch einseitige Einbeziehung (Opt-in) im
Sinne von Artikel 24 der Richtlinie anerkannt werden. Angesichts des beachtlichen
Potentials dieser Technologie3 und zur Erhaltung des Vertrauens der Investoren wird
vorgezogen, sämtliche CCS-Tätigkeiten durch ausdrücklichen Hinweis auf das CCS in
Anhang I der Richtlinie von vorne herein einzubeziehen.
– Für eine Einbeziehung des Straßenverkehrs und der Schifffahrt in das EU-EHS wären
weitere Untersuchungen und gründliche Analysen, insbesondere eine umfassende Kosten-
Nutzen-Analyse, einschließlich eines Vergleichs mit alternativen Maßnahmen,
erforderlich, um in dieser Frage zu einem sachlich fundierten und begründeten Ergebnis zu
gelangen.
– Eine Ausweitung des Geltungsbereichs der Richtlinie zur Anerkennung von
LULUCF-Projekten wird nicht empfohlen.
Mögliche Wirkung einer Kombination von politischen Optionen auf den
Geltungsbereich des EU-EHS
Eine breite Auslegung des Begriffs „Feuerungsanlage“, die weiter oben erwähnte
Einbeziehung weiterer Sektoren und Gase sowie die beschriebene Erhöhung der
Kostenwirksamkeit von Kleinanlagen erbrächte - was den Erfassungsbereich des EU-EHS im
Falle einer Emissionsschwelle von 10 kt für den möglichen Ausschluss von Kleinanlagen
anbelangt - einen zusätzlichen Nettogewinn in Höhe von 5,8 – 6,3 % (bis zu 121 –
131 Mt CO2 Äq)4 und hätte rund 40 % Anlagen weniger zur Folge, ohne dass die
Umweltwirksamkeit des Systems unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Ausschlusses von Anlagen in
Frage gestellt würde.
4. ROBUSTE ERFÜLLUNG UND DURCHSETZUNG
Überwachung und Berichterstattung, Prüfung und Akkreditierung
Um sichergehen zu können, dass „eine Tonne auch wirklich eine Tonne“ ist, ist eine
konsequente Überwachung und Berichterstattung erforderlich. Ohne glaubwürdige und
zuverlässige Prüfung der Überwachungsberichte könnten die Anlagenbetreiber die
Umweltintegrität des Systems in Gefahr bringen. Es zeigt sich jedoch, dass Mitgliedstaaten
3 Der Weltklimarat (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC) schätzt das wirtschaftliche
Potenzial für die kumulierte globale Reduzierung von CCS-Emissionen in diesem Jahrhundert auf 220-
2200 Gt CO2. Zum Vergleich: Die derzeitigen EU-EHS-Emissionen liegen bei 2 Gt CO2/Jahr.
4 Wie in der Vollfassung der Folgenabschätzung erläutert, ist bei diesen Zahlen einige Vorsicht geboten,
da sie mangels zuverlässiger Angaben auf Schätzungen beruhen.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 330 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
und zuständige Behörden bei der Überwachung, der Berichterstattung, der Prüfung und der
Akkreditierung von Prüfstellen sehr unterschiedlich vorgehen. Dies ist der
Umweltwirksamkeit und der Glaubwürdigkeit des Systems nicht zuträglich.
Mit Blick auf die Erfüllungskontrolle (Compliance) besteht nach der Analyse die beste Option
darin, eine Verordnung für die Überwachung und die Berichterstattung und eine andere
Verordnung für die Prüfung und die Akkreditierung vorzusehen. Dies läge im Interesse einer
größeren Kohärenz und Transparenz, würde die Kostenwirksamkeit der Überwachungs- und
Berichterstattungsnormen längerfristig verbessern, ein einheitliches und vergleichbares
Niveau bei der Prüfung und Akkreditierung garantieren und
Prüfungs-/Akkreditierungsdienstleistungen EU-weit zur Auflage machen. Dies wiederum
würde die Qualität der Prüfungen und deren Eignung zur Feststellung und Berichtigung von
Fehlern sowie die Datenqualität verbessern.
Die Ausarbeitung EU-weit geltender Vorschriften könnte den Mitgliedstaaten nach einer
anfänglichen Frist zur Überarbeitung der nationalen Leitlinien und Vorschriften
Möglichkeiten für erhebliche Kosteneinsparungen bieten.
Register
Das derzeitige Registrierungssystem, das aus den 27 einzelstaatlichen Registern und der
unabhängigen Transaktionsprotokolliereinrichtung der Gemeinschaft (Community
Independent Transaction Log - CITL) besteht, hat aus technischer Sicht keine
Schwierigkeiten bereitet. Mit Beginn des ersten Verpflichtungszeitraums gemäß dem
Kyoto-Protokoll im Jahr 2008 sollten die Register der Mitgliedstaaten jedoch auch mit der
internationalen Transaktionsprotokolliereinrichtung (International Transaction Log - ITL)
verbunden werden, die für die Zwecke des Kyoto-Protokolls von der Klimarahmenkonvention
der Vereinten Nationen (UNFCCC) verwaltet wird. Die Einführung des ITL würde bedeuten,
dass jedes Handelssystem, das sich dem EU-EHS anschließen möchte, seine Angaben auch
über das ITL, das unter der Aufsicht der Vertragsparteien des Kyoto-Protokolls steht,
übermitteln müsste. Diese Entwicklungen bergen technische, politische und administrative
Risiken für das Funktionieren des Registrierungssystems, die mit Hilfe des bestehenden
Gemeinschaftsregisters, in dem die EU-Zertifikate erfasst sind, beseitigt werden könnten.
5. WEITERE HARMONISIERUNG UND VERBESSERUNG DER BERECHENBARKEIT
Festlegung von Obergrenzen für die erlaubten Gesamtemissionen (Cap-setting)
In den Phasen I und II entsprachen die Obergrenzen für die im Rahmen des EU-EHS
erlaubten Gesamtemissionen der Summe der nationalen Obergrenzen, die die Mitgliedstaaten
nach Maßgabe der diesbezüglichen Kommissionsentscheidungen festgesetzt haben. Auch
wenn dieser Ansatz den Mitgliedstaaten viel Flexibilität zur Berücksichtigung spezifischer
und nationaler Umstände einräumte, trat dennoch eine Reihe von Problemen auf, die zu
unausgewogenen Wettbewerbsbedingungen und einem Mangel an Berechenbarkeit und
Transparenz führten und für alle Beteiligten mit einem hohen Verwaltungsaufwand
einhergingen.
Die Analyse hat gezeigt, dass das Ziel der Verbesserung der Wirksamkeit und der
Berechenbarkeit des Systems am besten erreicht werden kann, wenn in der Richtlinie eine
EU-weit geltende Obergrenze festgesetzt wird. Dieser Ansatz minimiert den mit der
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 331 – Drucksache 16/9334
Festlegung der Obergrenze einhergehenden Verwaltungsaufwand und ist die einfachste und
transparenteste Möglichkeit, eine Emissionsobergrenze festzulegen und die Glaubwürdigkeit
der EU auf internationaler Ebene zu sichern. Angesichts der Notwendigkeit, die im EU-EHS
geltende Obergrenze in Einklang mit dem Ziel einer 30 %-igen THG-Emissionsminderung,
das die EU nach Abschluss eines internationalen Klimaschutzübereinkommens wird einhalten
müssen, anzupassen, ist diese Option letztlich auch am einfachsten umzusetzen.
Was die Höhe dieser Deckelung angeht, so wäre ein auf Wirksamkeit gegründeter Ansatz die
einzige Möglichkeit, die Emissionsminderung so kostengünstig wie möglich durchzuführen.
Um die Berechenbarkeit zu verbessern, bietet sich eine Trendlinie mit achtjährigen
Handelszeiträumen an, da diese Lösung Emissionsminderungen nach 2020 sicherer und
berechenbarer macht. Die Trendlinie wäre außerdem sehr wirksam, wenn es darum geht, die
Glaubwürdigkeit der EU gegenüber Drittländern zu verbessern.
Zuteilung
Im ersten und zweiten Handelszeitraum wurden die meisten Zertifikate kostenlos vergeben.
Die Mitgliedstaaten wendeten dabei sehr unterschiedliche Zuteilungsregeln an, die zu
verschiedenen Problemen führten: negative Auswirkungen auf die Wirtschaftlichkeit,
Wettbewerbsverzerrungen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten, unerwünschte Verteilungseffekte
und Mangel an Transparenz.
Mit den neuen Zuteilungsregeln dürften diese Probleme vermieden werden; sie
berücksichtigen aber auch das Verursacherprinzip und den Grundsatz der Internalisierung
externer Kosten.
Versteigerung gegen kostenlose Zuteilung
In den meisten Fällen bietet die vollständige Versteigerung die beste Möglichkeit, um
Wirksamkeit, Transparenz und Einfachheit des Systems zu gewährleisten und unerwünschte
Verteilungseffekte zu vermeiden. Versteigerungen entsprächen außerdem in jeder Hinsicht
dem Verursacherprinzip und wären für frühzeitig handelnde Anlagenbetreiber von Vorteil.
Sie entsprächen somit den allgemeinen Zielen der Überarbeitung.
Kostenlose Zuteilung in der Übergangszeit: Benchmarking
Die kostenlose Zuteilung kann sich als notwendig erweisen, bis ein System für die
vollständige Versteigerung operativ ist; potenzielle nachteilige Auswirkungen sollten jedoch
so weit wie möglich vermieden werden. Nach Maßgabe der zugrunde liegenden Analyse
dürften gemeinschaftsweite Benchmarks zu den besten Ergebnissen führen.
Handelsbezogene Maßnahmen: Absicherung (Hedging) gegen potenzielle Verlagerungen von
CO2-Emissionen
Da sich mangels eines internationalen Klimaschutzübereinkommens in einigen
energieintensiven Industriesektoren, die im Wettbewerb mit Ländern stehen, die weniger
Anstrengungen zur Minderung der THG-Emissionen unternehmen, die Gefahr einer
Verlagerung von CO2-Emissionen ergeben könnte, wurde eine Reihe handelsbezogener
Maßnahmen geprüft. Da jedoch davon ausgegangen wird, dass es ein internationales
Übereinkommen geben wird, empfiehlt es sich, zunächst ein deutliches Signal zu senden und
die Durchführung von Maßnahmen erst für einen späteren Zeitpunkt vorzusehen, damit
Drucksache 16/9334 – 332 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Drittländer die Möglichkeit erhalten, sachdienliche und angemessene Verpflichtungen
einzugehen.
6. VERKNÜPFUNG MIT DEN EMISSIONSHANDELSSYSTEMEN IN DRITTLÄNDERN UND
GEEIGNETE SCHRITTE ZUR EINBINDUNG VON ENTWICKLUNGS- UND
SCHWELLENLÄNDERN
Verknüpfung mit anderen Systemen
Jede Verknüpfung des EU-EHS mit anderen Emissionshandelssystemen sollte nur unter
Berücksichtigung aller Modalitäten des betreffenden Systems erfolgen. In diesem Fall ist mit
einer gesonderten Folgenabschätzung zu rechnen. Für einige allgemeine Überlegungen wird
daher auf die Vollfassung der Folgenabschätzung verwiesen.
Ausgleichsprojekte (Offsets)
Rechte
Offset-Projekte im Ausland könnten reale Veränderungen innerhalb der EU verhindern,
wodurch wiederum künftige einheimische Minderungskosten und die Kosten für die
Erreichung einheimischer Ziele in Bezug auf Emissionen und erneuerbare Energieträger bis
2020 steigen dürften. Wenn die EU ihre Emissionen nicht verringert, dürfte es schwierig
werden, Entwicklungsländer mit hohen Emissionen davon zu überzeugen, nach 2012
ebenfalls Verpflichtungen zur Emissionsminderung einzugehen. Würden Drittländer die
Möglichkeit erhalten, auch ohne Unterzeichnung eines neues internationalen
Übereinkommens mit dem EU-EHS Geld zu verdienen, so wäre dies ein Anreiz dafür, einem
neuen Übereinkommen nicht zuzustimmen. Außerdem könnte ein nicht harmonisierter
Zugang zu Gutschriften in den Mitgliedstaaten die Wettbewerbsbedingungen für die
Unternehmen auf dem Binnenmarkt verzerren.
Die Rechte zur Inanspruchnahme von Offsets innerhalb des EU-EHS müssen daher im
Verhältnis zu dem Anreiz festgelegt werden, der gegeben werden muss, damit Betreiber im
Rahmen des EU-EHS Emissionen im eigenen Land verringern; außerdem müssten sie im
Interesse der Entwicklung internationaler Verhandlungen flexibel sein.
Normen
Es wäre sinnvoll, Projekttypen, die der ökologischen oder sozialen Integrität des Systems
nicht abträglich sind, Zugang zum EU-EHS zu gewähren, um so zu einem ausgewogenen
Gleichgewicht zwischen einem hohen Maß an Umweltwirksamkeit einerseits und dem
Verlust an Wirtschaftlichkeit andererseits zu gelangen. Dieser Schritt könnte jedoch durch
weitere Maßnahmen ergänzt werden, beispielsweise die Anwendung von
Anwendungskriterien in Kombination mit der Diskontierung (auf Basis des Unterschieds
zwischen Projekt-Benchmarks und EU-Benchmarks), aber das Verhältnis zwischen
Verbesserung der Umweltintegrität und Anstieg der Verwaltungskosten wäre dann weniger
ausgewogen.
Übergang und Berechenbarkeit
Es gilt zu klären, wie Gutschriften aus der Zeit vor 2012 (Banking) bzw. Gutschriften, die
voraussichtlich nach 2012 für vor 2012 registrierte Projekte vergeben werden, im EU-EHS zu
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 333 – Drucksache 16/9334
behandeln sind. Wegen der ungewissen internationalen Lage nach 2012 muss das
überarbeitete EU-EHS auch geeignete Strukturen und Verfahren vorsehen, mit denen sich die
verschiedenen Situationen nach 2012 regeln lassen, und zwar insbesondere, was die
Verwirklichung des Ziels einer Emissionsreduzierung um 20 % bzw. 30 % anbelangt. Die
EU-Emissionshandelsrichtlinie garantiert, dass EU-Zertifikate auf die Zeit nach 2012
übertragen werden können. Das Kyoto-Protokoll sieht bestimmte Grenzen für dieses so
genannte Ansparen von ERU/CER-Gutschriften vor, und es steht den Vertragsstaaten, die ihre
Verpflichtungen zur Emissionsminderung übererfüllt haben, frei, über die Inanspruchnahme
dieses Mechanismus zu entscheiden. Von allen geprüften Optionen wurde der Erlass
gemeinschaftsweiter harmonisierter Vorschriften für die Anerkennung des Ansparens von
ERU/CER-Gutschriften zur Verwendung in der Zeit nach 2012 angesichts der
Bewertungskriterien als beste Option gewertet, da sie ausgewogenere Wettbewerbs-
bedingungen und eine größere Markttransparenz ermöglicht.
Für die Verwendung von JI/CDM-Gutschriften aus der Zeit vor 2012 in den Jahren nach 2012
wird nach Maßgabe der Analyse empfohlen, verschiedene Optionen zu kombinieren. Die EU
kann ein System zur Billigung und/oder Ablehnung bestimmter Projekte oder Projekttypen
einführen, sie kann bilaterale oder multilaterale Übereinkommen zur Anerkennung von JI-
und CDM-Projekten aus bestimmten Gastländern zwischen 2012 und dem Datum des
Abschlusses eines internationalen Übereinkommens schließen oder sich verpflichten,
Gutschriften aus laufenden Projekten in Ländern, die ein Übereinkommen für die Zeit nach
2012 unterstützen, zu akzeptieren. Die Relevanz der drei Optionen richtet sich nach den
Fortschritten, die bei den internationalen Verhandlungen erzielt werden.
7. ÜBERWACHUNG UND BEWERTUNG
Die Umsetzung der Richtlinie wird gemäß Artikel 21, wonach die Mitgliedstaaten
Jahresberichte über die Anwendung der Richtlinie vorlegen müssen, überwacht und bewertet.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 334 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Brussels, 29 January 2008
Interinstitutional File:
2008/0013 (COD)
5862/08
ADD 3
ENV 52
ENER 29
IND 11
COMPET 31
MI 34
ECOFIN 34
TRANS 22
AVIATION 25
CODEC 105
ADDENDUM to PROPOSAL
from: European Commission
dated: 28 January 2008
Subject: Commission staff working document accompanying the package of
Implementation measures for the EU's objectives on climate change and
renewable energy for 2020
Impact Assessment
Delegations will find attached Commission document SEC(2008) 85.
________________________
Encl.: SEC(2008) 85
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 335 – Drucksache 16/9334
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Brussels, 23.1.2008
SEC(2008) 85
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Document accompanying the
Package of Implementation measures for the EU's objectives on climate
change and renewable energy for 2020
Proposals for
DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the EU greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading system
DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the
Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020
DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the promotion of use of renewable energy sources
{COM(2008) 16}
{COM(2008) 17}
{COM(2008) 19}
Drucksache 16/9334 – 336 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Package of Implementation measures for the EU's objectives on climate
change and renewable energy for 2020
1. INTRODUCTION
In the opening months of 2007, the European Union stepped up its energy and climate change
ambitions to new levels. The Commission put forward an integrated package of proposals
calling for a quantum leap in the EU’s commitment to change”1. A political consensus grew
up in support of this approach, with the support of the European Parliament2 and the Member
States at the 2007 European Spring Council. This culminated in agreement on the principles
of a new approach and an invitation to the Commission to come forward with concrete
proposals, including how efforts could be shared among Member States to achieve these
targets:
� an independent EU commitment to achieve at least a 20% reduction of greenhouse gases
by 2020 compared to 1990 levels and an objective for a 30% reduction by 2020 subject to
the conclusion of a comprehensive international climate change agreement;
� a mandatory EU target of 20% renewable energy by 2020 including a 10 % biofuels target.
This impact assessment accompanies three key policy proposals implementing the agreed
energy and climate package:
(a) a proposal for a Directive on the promotion of renewable energy,
(b) a proposal for amending the EU Emissions Trading Directive reviewing the EU
emissions trading system (EU ETS),
(c) a proposal relating to the sharing of efforts to meet the Community's
independent greenhouse gas reduction commitment in sectors not covered by
the EU emissions trading system (such as transport, buildings, services, smaller
industrial installations, agriculture and waste).
This impact assessment sets out the options explored and the analysis made to underpin the
policy choices made in the proposals. The work undertaken has been central to the
conclusions reached by the Commission – as this summary shows, the Commission has
refined its proposals in the light of their expected impacts. The ensuing proposals are
complex, with mutually-reinforcing policy goals designed to dovetail to in order to achieve
1 An Energy policy for Europe - COM(2007) 1 - and Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees
Celsius - The way ahead for 2020 and beyond - COM(2007) 2.
2 European Parliament resolution on climate change adopted on 14 February 2007 (P6_TA(2007)0038).
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 337 – Drucksache 16/9334
the EU's goals in a politically acceptable as well as an economically efficient way. The
implications of the proposals are substantial – but the option of policy design chosen gives the
EU an opportunity to make adaptations to change significantly less challenging. Finally, the
European Union is promoting change which will have a profound impact on Europeans for
decades to come, so the Commission has taken great care to ensure that its proposals can be
demonstrated to be the fruit of careful analysis by policymakers.
The work on this analysis started well before the Commission’s proposals of January 2007.
As the work has deepened, certain cost assumptions set out in those proposals have changed.
One reason is that over the last twelve months, there have been substantial changes in energy
prices, both in relative and absolute terms, for both conventional and renewable energy
sources.
2. KEY PRINCIPLES FOR IMPLEMENTATION
The Commission has based this impact assessment on a number of key principles:
Cost-effectiveness - achieving the agreed objectives can have significant economic impacts
and therefore the implementation of cost-effective policy instruments is crucial.
Flexibility – The impact assessment takes into account different ex-ante national
circumstances, e.g. projected GDP growth, changes in industry and energy sectors. However,
these projections are uncertain. Therefore the proposed policy instruments need to allow for
sufficient flexibility in the manner that the targets are achieved. Without policy instruments
that allow for flexibility, any variation from ex ante projections could lead to costs which a
less rigid option could avoid.
Internal market and fair competition – The proposed policy instruments need to be consistent
and create a level playing field in the EU that ensures fair competition among EU industries in
the context of the internal market. This can be achieved through the use of market based
instruments such as the EU-ETS and other community wide policies and measures such as
product standards.
Subsidiarity – It is important to ensure that action is taken at the most appropriate level. In
some sectors, such as transport, Members States hold key competences to define policies and
measures such as ambitious taxation schemes, traffic management, modal shift, public
transport, urban and transport planning. In these sectors, the EU needs to create the enabling
framework, concentrating for instance on setting minimum targets, product standards and
other supportive policies. In other areas, where there is a single market with free competition,
having 27 national rules, standards and regulations would unnecessarily raise costs and distort
economic decisions. For these areas it is appropriate to provide a detailed regulatory
framework at the European level.
Fairness – The European Council in March 2007 recognised that it is necessary to take into
account Member States' different circumstances and the reality that differing levels of
prosperity have an impact on Member States' capacity to invest.
Competitiveness and innovation – Until a comprehensive international agreement is reached,
carbon leakage could occur undermining the overall environmental objective of EU climate
and energy policies. In such circumstances, some energy-intensive industries particularly
Drucksache 16/9334 – 338 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
exposed to international competition could be affected. The need to protect the competitive
position of EU industry has been taken into account in the design of the proposals while, at
the same time, the agreed objectives reflect a clear commitment to take leadership on climate
change, to improve energy security and accelerate innovation and create a competitive edge in
clean energy and industrial technologies.
3. METHODOLOGY
The climate and renewable energy targets are ambitious in nature and will require a
significant initial economic investment, even if the overall long term benefits are positive and
important for the sustainable development of the EU economy. This underlines the
importance of the question on how to put in place policies which minimise economic costs
and at the same time distribute the effort in a fair manner amongst Member States and across
different economic sectors.
(a) Economic modelling tools
For the purpose of this impact assessment, a set of modelling tools has been used. No single
model is able to assess the full range of parameters and impacts of three different policy
proposals at different levels (EU as a whole, Member States' level, sectoral level) – and the
complexity of the package would in any event call for the options to be explored in a variety
of ways, with different models used to test out the robustness of the options.
The impacts of different methodologies to share the efforts for the three policy proposals have
therefore been assessed through a number of models and options.
In this context, it is important to underline that modelling tools have not been used for
determining targets, but for assessing the effects of different allocation methodologies and
policy design choices. Annex I contains a description of the main models used.
(b) The GHG reduction effort: the need to determine national targets for GHG
reductions not covered by the ETS
The EU ETS is a policy instrument to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in electricity plants
and major industrial installations. It covers today some 40% of all EU-27 greenhouse gas
emissions. The impact assessment for the EU ETS review assesses several options with
respect to the cap-setting procedure under the EU ETS. The preferred option that comes
forward is a single EU wide cap for the emissions covered by the EU ETS, ensuring as such
effectiveness and a level playing field in the single European market in setting the appropriate
cap, better predictability, simplicity and transparency, guaranteeing international credibility,
and ensuring to achieve the appropriate contribution of the EU ETS to the 20% GHG
reduction commitment.
The choice of one EU-wide cap under the EU ETS implies that the total effort for greenhouse
gas reduction must be divided between the EU ETS and non EU ETS sectors. A second
consequence is that the sharing of greenhouse gas reduction efforts among Member States is
determined solely for sectors not covered by the EU ETS. These sectors represent today some
60% of total GHG emissions in the EU and relate to a wide range of sectors covering mostly
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 339 – Drucksache 16/9334
small scale emitters, such as transport (cars, trucks), buildings (in particular heating), services,
smaller industrial installations, agriculture and waste3. In these sectors, Member States hold
key competences to define and implement policies and measures. At the same time, a number
of EU-wide measures for instance related to energy efficiency standards, the Common
Agricultural Policy or waste legislation contribute to emission reductions in these sectors.
(c) Base year
In the impact assessment, the year 2005 has been used as the base year or 'yardstick' against
which greenhouse gas reductions and increases in renewable energy shares are presented.
Calculating reductions and renewable energy shares with 2005 gives a transparent and easily
understandable picture of the changes needed, as it compares such changes with the present
situation.
In addition, 2005 is the only year for which reliable verified emission data are available for
both the EU ETS (verified emissions at installation level) and the overall GHG emissions of
Member States as reported to the UNFCCC4. For the distribution of the overall GHG
reduction target between the EU ETS and sectors not covered by the EU ETS, consistent use
of both data sets is necessary to ensure that their combined effect adds up to the 20% overall
GHG reduction compared to 1990.
(d) Unit of measurement for energy
Energy is often expressed in terms of "primary energy consumption". This method measures
the energy content of the first commodity or raw material which is the basis for multiple
energy uses before transformation into final energy use. As such, no transformation losses are
taken into account. For instance, for electricity that is generated through wind, hydropower or
solar energy it is assumed that the primary energy input is equal to the energy output. This
puts these 'non-thermal' renewable energy sources at a disadvantage against the other energy
sources because even if they would produce the same amount of electricity, they still would
require a lower amount of primary energy as no transformation losses are accounted for.
This bias against renewable energy becomes increasingly significant as the share of these
renewable energy sources grows within the overall energy mix. Another method that
measures "gross final energy consumption", defined as the energy commodities delivered to
final consumers for energy purposes, neutralises this problem. Existing European legislation
(Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC) has set renewable energy objectives (in the
electricity and biofuels sectors) more on the basis of final energy consumption than of
primary energy consumption.
For these reasons, the Commission has adopted final energy consumption as the unit of
measurement of renewable energy targets.
3 Agriculture and waste lead to substantial amount of non CO2 greenhouse gas emissions (methane,
N20). All non CO2 greenhouse gas emissions represent some 20% of total greenhouse gas emissions in
the EU, CO2 represents some 80%.
4
Malta and Cyprus have no reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol and thus no annual
emission reporting requirement under the UNFCCC. But under the EU Monitoring Mechanism
Decision No 280/2004/EC an annual inventory report has to be compiled by all Member States.
Drucksache 16/9334 – 340 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
(e) Assessing the options
To implement both the renewables target and the GHG reduction commitment, a wide range
of policy design choices will have to be taken. For the purpose of assessing the overall
impacts of these different choices, several modelling options using the set of models have
been developed, reflecting combinations of policy design choices. However, all options are
based on the simultaneous achievement of both the 20% renewable target and the 20%
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
The central point of the impact assessment was an option centred on cost-efficiency at the EU
level. This option reflects a least cost approach against which both targets could be reached
simultaneously within the EU at least cost for the EU as a whole, under a set of framework
conditions such as no exogenous strengthening of energy efficiency improvements or no
import of JI/CDM credits. It therefore assumes that marginal costs across all Member States
and all sectors are equalised, both for greenhouse gas emission reductions within and outside
of the EU ETS as well as for the deployment of renewable energy. This assessment
demonstrates that a purely cost efficient allocation of the effort to Member States would lead
to substantial differences in the economic costs between Member States. Since the
Commission considers that this outcome would represent a disproportionate call on Member
States with the lowest levels of GDP per capita, it examined alternatives.
Several options have been analysed against the core cost-efficient reference option, with a
view of reaching a fair distribution of effort between Member States without incurring a
significant increase in the overall economic cost. These policy design choices relate to the
targets set for GHG reductions in the sectors not covered by the EU-ETS, the renewables
targets and the amount Member States are allowed to auction under the EU ETS.
The impact assessment of the renewables target also assumed the implementation of yet
unimplemented energy efficiency policies, such as those stipulated in the Energy Efficiency
Action Plan. These were not specifically included in the cost efficient reference option which
is only driven by carbon prices and renewables energy incentive policies.
Additionally the impact of access to credits from project based activities such as CDM on the
costs of achieving the targets was assessed.
Finally, in order to address concerns of carbon leakage and of the competitiveness of
internationally exposed energy intensive industries, some options have been assessed to find
optimal ways for limiting the potential negative impacts through (i) different levels of access
to project based activities such as CDM, (ii) the use of international sectoral agreements, (iii)
the continued free allocation of allowances to industrial installations other than the power
sector, and (iv) the inclusion of imports of energy-intensive goods in the EU ETS.
All policy scenarios take into account gradual technical efficiency improvements, normal
capital stock turn over (e.g. old power plants being replaced by more efficient new ones),
effects of the relatively higher projected energy prices (using an assumption of US$ 61 per
barrel of oil), energy efficiency policies implemented in the Member States up to the end of
2006 and additional efficiency effects of higher carbon prices.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 341 – Drucksache 16/9334
4. THE COST-EFFICIENT REFERENCE OPTION
(a) Overall results
The cost efficient reference option reaches both the 20% GHG reduction target and the 20%
renewable energy target simultaneously at a direct economic cost5 of 0.58% of EU GDP or €
91bn in 2020. These objectives are projected to be reached at a carbon price of € 39 per tonne
of CO2 and at a renewable energy incentive of €45 per MWh. Oil and gas imports are
expected to go down by some € 50bn in 2020, air pollution control costs drop by around
€10bn in 2020 (see table III, column 1 for more details) while electricity prices are likely to
go up by 10-15% in comparison to today’s level (see chapter 10). Overall, this leads to an
energy intensity improvement of approximately 32% between 2005 and 20206.
The cost efficient reference option assumes no access to emission reduction credits from
projects in third countries such as CDM. If this would be allowed, as in the current proposal,
costs are estimated to decrease to 0.45 % of GDP (see Chapter 8 and Table III, column 3).
(b) High oil price cost efficient scenario
The cost efficient reference option assumes that oil prices rise from US$ 55 per barrel in 2005
to US$ 61 per barrel in 2020. A high oil price baseline scenario was also assessed that
projects oil prices to increase further to US$ 100 per barrel in 2020 with related price
increases for natural gas and coal. Total energy system costs increase substantially in the high
oil price scenario, with € 275 bn.
On the other hand the additional effort necessary to achieve the GHG and RES targets
decreases with around € 32 bn to € 59 bn or just below 0.4% of GDP, demonstrating that the
cost of implementing the GHG and RES targets is much lower than the economic impacts of
current oil price increases.
(c) Relative efforts for the EU ETS and non ETS sectors
To determine the effort to achieve the 20% greenhouse gas reduction commitment between
the EU ETS, i.e. the EU ETS cap, and the sectors not covered by the ETS, the preferred
choice has been to use the cost-efficient reference option as a basis, ensuring minimal overall
cost. The resulting carbon price in this scenario is €39 per tonne of CO2.
The projected cost effective distribution of effort to meet both GHG and RES targets leads to
the following sharing of the effort between the EU ETS and Non-ETS sectors7:
5 Direct economic costs are the increased costs experienced in the energy system (investment costs and
changes in operating, management and fuel costs.) and due to mitigation measures for the non-CO2
gases. They do not represent a net loss in GDP. They give an assessment on the amount of additional
resources within our GDP that need to be directed towards mitigation measures and renewable energy
to achieve the GHG reduction and renewables targets.
6 This is a considerable acceleration of energy intensity improvements compared to past trends in the last
15 years (between 1990 and 2005 energy intensity improved by 19%).
7
Note that the overall required GHG reduction effort in the EU compared to 2005 is less than 20% to
achieve a reduction of 20% compared to 1990 given that the EU’s GHG emissions, including aviation,
in 2005 are already around 6.8% below the 1990 level.
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� The EU-wide cap for current ETS sectors would need to be reduced by approximately 21%
compared to 20058 by 2020.
� The sectors not covered by the EU ETS would need to reduce emissions by around 10%
compared to 2005.
This division, with about 60% of reductions to be achieved in EU ETS sectors, reflects the
larger cost-effective potential in particular in the electricity sector compared to non ETS
sectors. In addition, it is estimated that more than half of the 20% renewable energy target is
achieved in the EU ETS sectors, as such increasing the cost efficient GHG reduction effort
within the EU ETS and demonstrating the synergies between the EU ETS and renewable
policies. It also underlines that there is a need for the possibility of flexibility in achieving the
renewables targets because they could have a significant impact on the reduction options in
the EU ETS where full flexibility is built into this approach.
It should be noted that within the non ETS sectors, there are also considerable differences,
with larger reductions in non CO2 gases (-21% compared to 2005), and lower CO2 emissions
reduction opportunities from for instance buildings, and even more so in transport (-7%
compared to 2005).
(d) Distributional effects in the cost-efficient reference option
The differences in increased direct energy system costs and non CO2 mitigation costs in 2020
relative to GDP are substantial between Member States. In Table II, Scenario 1 the increased
direct costs relative to GDP are given for the cost-efficient reference scenario for each
Member State. On average, these increased direct costs amount to 0.58% of the EU GDP.
However, the country specific results show that a cost-effective distribution of the effort
among Member States results in proportionally higher direct costs for Member States with
lower GDP per capita and hence the smallest capacity to invest in GHG mitigation and
renewable energy. The impact assessment further shows that also in terms of macro-economic
GDP effects a similar conclusion arises relating to the cost-effective distribution of effort.
The large national differences in these costs are not consistent with the need to share the effort
in a fair and equitable way, as agreed by the Spring European Council. It should be
emphasized that with EU enlargement economic and social divergences in the EU-27 have
increased considerably, with GDP/capita in some countries by a factor of 10 lower than in the
richest countries.
The design choices for the policy instruments proposed need to take these large differences in
impacts into account and ensure that the distribution of efforts would lead to a fairer
distribution of the impacts between Member States. Three major policy design choices as
regards differentiation have been assessed:
� Targets for Member States in the sectors not covered by the EU ETS could be
differentiated (see Chapter 5).
8 The ETS sector as a whole, including intra EU and outbound aviation, would see emissions reduce with
around 18% compared to 2005. See Table 3, column 1.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 343 – Drucksache 16/9334
� Increased use of auctioning in the EU ETS could allow for a partial redistribution of the
right to auction allowances among Member States (see Chapter 6).
� National targets set for the deployment of renewable energy could be differentiated
between Member States (see Chapter 7).
5. DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN MEMBER STATES’ GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION
EFFORTS IN NON EU ETS SECTORS
In the impact assessment, a range of options have been considered. Table I, column 2 and the
Figure below represents an alternative scenario from the cost effective option whereby the
targets in the sectors not covered by the EU ETS are modulated according to the relative level
of GDP/capita of Member States. Member States with a GDP/capita below the EU average
would need to reduce less than the EU average (i.e. around -10% below 2005 levels) and in
some cases even be allowed to increase their emissions above 2005 levels in the sectors not
covered by the EU ETS with a maximum of +20% above 2005 levels. Member States with a
GDP/capita above the EU average would need to reduce more than the EU average with a
maximum reduction of -20% below 2005 levels for those Member States with the highest
GDP/capita.
Figure: Country specific targets for non EU ETS modulated on the basis of GDP/capita
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0
GDP/Cap (000 €)
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20%: BG
19%:RO
17%: LV
14%: PL
13%: SK
11%: EE
10%: HU
9%: CZ
5%: MA
1%: PT
-5%: CY
-10%: ES
-13%: IT
-14%: DE, FR
-14%: BE
-16%: AT, FI, UK, NL
-17%: SE
-20%: DK, IE, LU
15%: LT
4%: SL
-4%: EL
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0
GDP/Cap (000 €)
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20%: BG
19%:RO
17%: LV
14%: PL
13%: SK
11%: EE
10%: HU
9%: CZ
5%: MA
1%: PT
-5%: CY
-10%: ES
-13%: IT
-14%: DE, FR
-14%: BE
-16%: AT, FI, UK, NL
-17%: SE
-20%: DK, IE, LU
15%: LT
4%: SL
-4%: EL
In this approach, countries with a low GDP per capita would be allowed to emit more than
they did in 2005 in sectors not covered by the EU ETS, thereby reflecting projections that
their relatively higher economic growth will be accompanied by increased emissions in for
instance the transport sector, and to a lesser extent in heating of buildings. Nevertheless these
Drucksache 16/9334 – 344 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
targets still represent a cap on their emissions and represent a real contribution from those
Member States.
Table II, Option 2 shows the effects of these differentiated targets on the direct costs. While
for the EU as a whole the overall cost only increases from 0.58 to 0.61% of GDP, cost
reductions can be substantial in those countries with a very low GDP per capita relative to the
EU average. Overall, the range of direct cost increases per Member State in this modulated
allocation is much closer to the EU average compared to the cost-effective allocation. Thus,
the modulated allocation leads to a more equal and fair effort across EU Member States.
6. A PARTIAL REDISTRIBUTION OF AUCTIONING RIGHTS UNDER THE EU ETS
The impact assessment of the EU ETS review concludes that the preferred long term option is
full auctioning with free allocation taking place during a transitional period based on
harmonised EU-wide rules, and taking into account progress in reaching an international
agreement to avoid net carbon leakage and for those installations in energy intensive sectors
exposed to international competition. This impact assessment also analysed the macro-
economic and distributional effects of the introduction of high levels of auctioning.
(a) Financial revenues from auctioning
Revenues that can be generated through auctioning are substantial. If all sectors in the EU
ETS would have to acquire allowances via auctioning at a carbon value of around € 40 per
allowance in 2020 as estimated for the cost-efficient reference option, then auctioning
revenues would represent some 0.5% of GDP, or € 75 bn in 2020. In some new Member
States, revenues could even exceed 1% of GDP. It should be recalled that auctions are open to
operators from all Member States.
In the case of partial auctioning (e.g. only full auctioning for the power sector), auctioning
revenues would be reduced to around half of these estimates. More use of project based
activities such as CDM would further reduce revenues for national authorities due to lower
carbon prices.
(b) Distribution of auctioning rights to Member States
Even when taking into account the positive re-distributional effects of a GDP/capita
modulation for the targets in the non EU ETS sectors, the overall relative direct costs would
still be significantly high in a number of Member States with a relatively low GDP/capita
compared to the richer ones. These higher relative direct costs are the result of a larger
renewable energy potential as well as to large mitigation potentials in the EU ETS sectors and
a relatively low GDP/capita. For this reason, it is useful to consider alternative options for the
distribution of auctioning rights which, together with the target setting approach for the non
EU ETS sectors, could further reinforce the criterion of fairness between Member States. Of
course, as national auctions will have to be open to all installations in the EU, this would only
have distributional effects at Member State level and would not affect the level playing field
for the installations covered by the EU ETS.
In the impact assessment, a range of options have been considered. For the cost estimates as
presented in Table II, the option is retained whereby 90% of the auctioning rights are
distributed according to the Member States’ share in the 2005 emissions in the EU ETS, with
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 345 – Drucksache 16/9334
the remaining 10% auctioning rights distributed to low income countries taking into account
their GDP/capita and their overall growth expectations. This would result in new Member
States auctioning more allowances than their domestic sectors need to acquire. Table II,
option 3 shows the same energy system costs as in option 2, increased by the amount each
Member States' ETS sectors need to spend to acquire allowances and decreased with the
amount of auctioning revenue received by the Member States. Such a distribution method of
auctioning rights can result in a significant reduction of the overall direct costs experienced by
Member States with a relatively low GDP/capita. At the same time, for the richer countries
the overall increase in direct costs remains limited. The impact assessment also shows that in
terms of macro-economic effects (GDP, private consumption, employment), such a
redistribution can have positive effects for low income countries.
(c) Macro-economic effects of auctioning
The effects of the package in general and of auctioning in particular on GDP, private
consumption and employment have been assessed with the GEM-E3 and PACE models under
various modelling scenarios In these scenarios, it has been assumed that auctioning revenues
are recycled back into the economy. In the case of free allocation, it is estimated that GDP
would be reduced by a little more than -0.5% by 2020, or in other words, GDP would increase
between 2005 and 2020 by 37.5% instead of the projected 38% (see table III). The
introduction of auctioning in the EU ETS reduces negative GDP effects: from -0.5 to -0.35%.
Such effects are, however, not confirmed in the simulations with the PACE model, where
there are essentially no macroeconomic differences between free allocation on the one hand
and auctioning combined with revenue recycling on the other. The economic literature shows
that the macro-economic impact of auctioning largely depends on how revenues are recycled
back to the economy.
The primary difference between auctioning and free allocation of allowances is in terms of
their impacts on income distribution. Under auctioning the allowance revenues go to the
public authorities, whereas with free allocation the value of the allowances goes to the
installations covered under the ETS. The opportunity cost of an allowance is identical in both
cases. The adverse macroeconomic impacts of introducing a greenhouse gas emissions
constraint through auctioning in the EU ETS sectors can be partly offset by returning the
allowance revenues to the economy. Obviously, the method chosen by Member States to
recycle these revenues in the economy is important to determine the scale of this offsetting
effect. Direct transfers to households improve private consumption, but could have less
impact on employment. Reduction of labour taxes could generate benefits for employment
and reducing corporate taxes could decrease the direct impact on the sectors affected.
Full auctioning of allowances imposes an additional financial cost on firms, in particular
energy-intensive ones if these are unable to pass through the cost of allowances due to
exposure to intense competition from outside the EU (see Chapter 11).
7. RENEWABLE ENERGY
(a) Renewables energy targets
As with GHG targets, setting renewable energy targets based on the cost efficient reference
option results in an uneven allocation of effort and costs amongst Member States. Thus, a
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complementary option for spreading economic efforts more evenly between Member States
compared to the reference option was used.
The impact assessment provides an analysis of two main options for the distribution of the
effort in renewable energy:
1. on the basis of Member States' national renewable energy resources potential
2. on the basis of requiring half of the effort to be made through a flat-rate increase in
the share of renewable energy and the other half weighted by GDP, modulated to
take account of national starting points and efforts already made.
Both options have been assessed against a number of criteria. It has been concluded that the
combination flat rate/GDP is more appropriate and better respects the criterion of fairness.
(b) Improved Guarantee of Origin System
A guarantee of origin (GO) regime was created by Directive 2001/77/EC in order to facilitate
domestic or international trade in renewable electricity (i.e. proof of the green nature of the
electricity) and to increase transparency in consumers' choice between renewable and non-
renewable electricity. The Directive established certain minimum requirements, however their
use is voluntary. Currently, some Member States use them for disclosure purposes; others
simply recommend such practices; others still use them to qualify for national support
schemes. These differing national perspectives have lead to different specifications for GOs in
Member States, unnecessarily increasing transaction costs.
The impact assessment analyses the standardisation of the information requirements on the
guarantee of origin, extending the regime from the electricity to the large scale heating sector,
requiring mutual recognition and setting guidelines on issuance. The result of such
standardisation should be the creation of a unique and robust certification regime which is
accurate, reliable and fraud resistant. The analysis suggests that such a regime will greatly
facilitate trade in renewable energy and help Member States develop their renewable energy
resources in the most cost effective manner possible.
(c) Transferability of Guarantees of origin of renewable energy
A consequence of the approach chosen for determining renewable targets, is that targets will
be more difficult to achieve for those countries that have a lower resource potential and a
relatively higher target. The introduction of transferable Guarantees of Origin (GO) for
renewable electricity and large scale heat is foreseen in order to enable Member States to meet
targets more cheaply and therefore more easily.
The benefits through reduced direct costs due to improved flexibility compared to a situation
where each country has to meet its target domestically has been analysed with the PRIMES
model, and have been estimated at some € 8 bn in 2020. A different modelling exercise using
the PACE model on a different basis (the GHG target plus a 30% target for renewables
electricity) estimated that with no flexibility, the deterioration in EU economic performance
could represent 0.2% of GDP. It also pointed to a significantly stronger increase in electricity
prices than other models. The differences between estimates of the impact of GO trade are
due to differences in estimated costs and cost effective potential in renewables, differences in
assumed energy efficiency gains (which lead to a lower absolute level of renewables to meet
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 347 – Drucksache 16/9334
the 20%), and the fact that some of the models include imports and exports of renewable
energy which are independent of GO transfers whilst others do not.
Whilst the broad, macroeconomic advantages of opening the GO market are clear, the
uncertainty surrounding the distributional impacts and the risk associated with changes to
support schemes imply that a cautious approach is appropriate. Uncertainty and risk are
difficult issues to model and analyse, but it is clear that industry growth that is dependant on
support (such as most of the renewable energy sector today) is sensitive to any change in
support regimes. In addition the impact assessment finds that unrestricted GO trade could
have an impact on innovative technology promotion measures and could create some
significant windfall profits for existing producers of renewable energy. Finally, the prospect
of buying GOs could reduce pressure on national governments to remove barriers to large
scale renewable energy development (grid access design, congestion management, balancing
markets, planning regimes and administrative processes) which could put the achievement of
the national targets at risk.
The extent to which Member States will rely on such flexibility arrangements will depend on
a range of factors that are difficult to predict ex ante. Overall, allowing for flexibility around
flat rate/GDP approach targets allows for cost reductions and provides additional incentives
for RES in countries with a high potential but lack the capability to finance the necessary
investments. As such, the transfer of Guarantees of Origin could lead to a net financial
transfer towards countries with a lower target (low income countries) and a relatively high
renewable potential. Table II, option 5 shows the direct costs in each country, taking into
account financial flows due to the transferability of GOs9.
In conclusion, the Commission's preferred option is to create the regime enabling the transfer
of GOs and to leave sufficient discretion to Member States in terms of the level and pace of
their transferability. This would permit Member States to continue to manage their support
schemes in view of fostering renewable energy technology development within their national
territory. At the same time there would be a partial market opening that allows Member States
to take advantage of cheaper resources and achieve their targets in a more cost effective
manner.
An assessment of the transfer of guarantees of origin between Member States in
circumstances where Member States retain the option of national support schemes should be
undertaken after sufficient experience has been gained.
(d) Biofuels
The European Council decided on a 10% biofuel target for transport, subject to production
being sustainable, second-generation biofuels becoming commercially available and the Fuel
Quality Directive being amended accordingly to allow for adequate levels of blending. In the
renewable energy roadmap, the Commission assessed the impact of achieving this goal. It
concluded that it would incur significant additional costs but result in a significant reduction
of oil imports, generate extra employment and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
In order to ensure that all the biofuels used to meet the 10% binding target are produced in a
sustainable manner fulfil the sustainability criteria and contribute to CO2 reductions, the
9 These estimates have a higher level of uncertainty as they are very sensitive to the estimation of the
cost-effective potential of renewables in each country, which is difficult to assess and project until 2020
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Commission committed itself to the creation of a biofuels sustainability regime in the
renewable energy roadmap.
The Commission's impact assessment analyses a number of key options for the design of the
scheme and concludes that it should include a minimum level of greenhouse gas saving of
35%, a ban on the conversion of areas with a high carbon stock or a high biodiversity value
and (in the EU) an extension of the cross-compliance criteria to cover all feedstock used for
biofuel production.
The scheme would potentially increase annual greenhouse gas benefits by at least 7 Mt CO2eq.
These calculations do not take into account the greenhouse gas benefits of avoided land use
change or the biodiversity benefits.
8. THE USE OF PROJECT BASED ACTIVITIES SUCH AS CDM AS PART OF THE
INDEPENDENT 20% COMMITMENT
The Kyoto Protocol has created the novelty of earning carbon credits as a reward to
investments in climate-friendly projects abroad. The EU has always been favourable to CDM
as it reduces greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective way globally. Within the EU ETS it
offers opportunities to businesses to use these credits for compliance against their domestic
targets. Moreover, allowing for credits generated through project based activities such as
CDM in the absence of an international agreement can significantly help overcome some of
the possible negative economic impacts on the European industry. However, this would
require a bigger effort to reach the renewable target and improvements in air pollution would
be smaller. Finally, there would be less pressure to drive deployment and further development
of innovative clean technologies in the EU.
(a) overall effects of investments in project based activities such as CDM
The impact assessment considers various levels of access to CDM type of mechanisms. In this
context, it is important to distinguish between 2 totally different situations: (1) the case of a
20% independent GHG reduction commitment with no international agreement and (2) the
case of an international agreement, and a 30% GHG reduction in the EU. In the case of a 20%
independent commitment, the impact assessment assumes that the EU would be the only
region in the world in demand for CDM credits.
Under a 20% GHG reduction scenario where only the EU would be in demand for CDM
credits and with limitless access to such credits, carbon prices are projected to be potentially
as low as of 4 €/tonne and EU emissions would be reduced only marginally. This would imply
that no significant changes in our energy system would be achieved, that oil and gas savings
would not materialise and that technological innovation is not spurred within the EU. In
addition, the 20% RES target would become much more difficult to achieve, and significantly
more support for renewable energy technologies would be required. This approach would
mean less EU leadership on climate change and a smaller impetus to develop and deploy
advanced energy and low carbon technologies.
Therefore other scenarios were analysed where project based activities such as CDM can still
contribute to the achievement of the EU’s independent 20% GHG reduction target (see table
III, column 3), but with some limitations. The Option in column 3 assumes that project based
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activities are allowed up to a level which would ensure that the carbon price in the EU is not
higher than € 3010.
The resulting decrease in internal reductions would be significant. In case of a carbon price of
€ 30 per tonne of CO2, the overall emission reduction efforts by 2020 would reduce by a third
compared to a situation without access to CDM-type mechanisms, namely from -14.5% to -
9.3% compared to 2005 emissions. At the same time the renewables support needs to be
increased to ensure that the RES target can be achieved. Overall costs would decrease to
0.45% of EU GDP or some € 70bn in 2020, i.e. significantly lower compared to the case with
no access to CDM type of mechanisms. Equally, benefits for instance related to air quality
would diminish.
(b) the effects of access to JI/CDM in the 2nd EU ETS trading period and banking
In considering the appropriate access to CDM for the period 2013-2020, it is also important to
take into account the treatment of CDM credits in the 2008-2012 EU ETS trading period. The
decisions on the National Allocation Plans for this period have allowed JI/CDM credits over
the 2nd trading period in the EU ETS of more than 13 % on top of the total emission cap that
has been set. Due to the possibility to use JI/CDM credits for compliance in the period 2008-
2012 and to bank any excess allowances, the existing limit on the use of JI/CDM in the 2nd
trading period of the EU ETS could have a large impact on the period after 2012. Assuming
that this 13% absolute cap in the period 2008-2012 is spread out for compliance over the
entire period 2008-2020, this would represent approximately 5% of the total cap, or already
around a quarter of the required reduction effort by 2020 within the EU ETS.
It can therefore be concluded that the decisions taken under the national allocation plans for
the 2nd EU ETS trading in relation to the allowed level of carbon credits, in combination with
the possibility to bank allowances from 2008-2012 into the 3rd trading period (2013-2020)
resembles option 3 in Table III.
(c) Towards the 30% greenhouse gas reduction target through more CDM credits
To assess the impact of taking on a higher reduction commitment under an international
agreement of -30% GHG emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 two scenarios where assessed
in the POLES model: One where the 20% GHG reduction target is achieved without access to
CDM and one where the 30% GHG reduction target is achieved with full access to CDM. The
projected impact on the EU energy system and thus GHG reductions is similar for both
scenarios with the major difference that around one third of the effort in the 30% GHG
reduction scenario is achieved through CDM credit purchases.
This indicates that high internal emission reductions under the independent commitment,
close to the 20% GHG reduction target, would require only small additional changes to the
EU energy system if a 30% multilateral target would be agreed and increased access to the
CDM would be foreseen. Nevertheless in case of such a 30% GHG reduction target within an
international agreement, substantial financial resources would have to be made available to
acquire additional credits generated through CDM.
10 Carbon prices can be lower in non-ETS than €30 for those Member States that can achieve the non-ETS
targets at a lower price.
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9. IMPROVED ENERGY SECURITY : REDUCTION OF OIL AND GAS IMPORTS
Oil and gas import savings were estimated with the PRIMES model. Energy import prices
derived through the POLES model take into account market power of for instance OPEC. Oil
prices rise from US$ 55 per barrel in 2005 to US$ 61 per barrel in 2020, while gas prices are
oil-indexed and hence follow a similar development. An exchange rate of US$ 1.25 per € has
been used.
If the current high oil prices of around US$ 100 per barrel would continue, the costs due to the
implementation of the proposed energy and climate change legislation reduce (see chapter 4,
b).
Table III shows the impact of the various modelling scenarios. The value of the oil and gas
imports saved equals 0.3% of GDP (i.e. import savings of €47 bn without CDM). Hence the
EU economy would be less exposed to supply disruption and price shocks that might result
from the concentration of supply in a limited number of countries. Achieving greenhouse gas
reductions outside of the EU through investments in CDM implies that these energy security
benefits would be reduced.
Overall it can be concluded that reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing renewable
energy according to the targets agreed by the Heads of State makes the EU considerably less
dependent on imports of oil and gas. Next to positive trade balance effects, this reduces the
exposure of the EU economy to rising and volatile energy prices, inflation, geopolitical risks
and risks related to inadequate supply chains that are not matching the global demand growth.
10. IMPACTS ON POWER GENERATION COSTS, ELECTRICITY PRICES AND ENERGY
EXPENDITURE OF CONSUMERS
Table III indicates that the increase in average costs of electricity generation varies between
23 to 33% compared to PRIMES baseline developments, the lowest increase being in the case
that part of the effort is met through investments in CDM (scenario 4 and 5). Effects on
average electricity prices11 (between 19 and 26%) are smaller than power generation costs
increases since electricity prices include grid costs, which are largely unaffected.
It is important to note that the PRIMES baseline assumes a continuation of the EU ETS at
carbon prices of €22 per tonne of CO2 by 2020 with full free allocation of allowances and no
specific cost pass through due to the inclusion of opportunity costs in the price setting for
electricity. This might underestimate the electricity price level developments in the baseline.
Therefore electricity prices increases could well be lower, at 10 to 15% by 2020 compared to
baseline, taking into account today's carbon prices of € 20 per tonne of CO2 or more, and the
fact that carbon prices have been reported by several studies to be factored into current
electricity prices already.
For final consumers increases in unit electricity prices are partially compensated by overall
increased energy efficiency, which in the above policy scenarios is resulting in a reduction of
11 These are electricity prices averaged over different types of consumers. Electricity prices are different
for small, medium sized and large energy consumers.
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electricity consumption of around 10%, thereby to a large extent countering the above
mentioned increases in electricity prices.
These combined effects allow for rather moderate energy cost increases for households which
are estimated on average to be some € 150 per year (in 2020). In the case of a continuation of
today's high oil prices this amount would reduce further.
11. ADDRESSING COMPETITIVENESS IMPACTS FOR THE ENERGY INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES
As pointed out in chapter 8, the direct economic costs for implementing the greenhouse gas
and renewable energy targets can be lowered through the use of CDM credits. Overall,
therefore, this would strengthen the competitiveness of European industry. However, the
impact of reducing recourse to CDM would vary – a very positive for innovative companies
in the forefront of developing and producing new low-carbon technologies of the future, but a
source of concern for those companies producing goods which are carbon and/or energy
intensive and which are sold in highly competitive international markets where non-European
players do not face similar constraints.
The EU is committed achieving an international agreement on climate change for the post-
2012 period, for environmental reasons and for reasons related to fair competition for carbon
and energy intensive activities. In this context the issue of carbon leakage needs to be taken
into account. Simulations with the PACE model indicate that the achievement of the 20%
independent GHG reduction without addressing the impacts on the energy intensive sectors
could lead to a rise in emissions beyond business as usual in other world regions equal to
2.5% of EU27 emissions and hence reduce the overall effect of EU policies accordingly.
(a) Defining energy and carbon intensive sectors and subsectors
The impact of the proposed package on energy and carbon intensive industries will depend on
the cost incurred relative to competitors outside the EU, the ability to pass on these cost in
prices of products and services and the extent to which compensating measures are taken.
Energy intensive industries are defined as business entities where the purchase of energy
products and electricity amounts to at least 3.0% of the production value.
A recent Commission study finds that some 50 sub-sectors might require price increases for
their products ranging from 0.1 to 5% to recoup costs imposed by an carbon price of €20 per
tonne of CO2: cement and lime production, primary steel (blast oxygen furnace), aluminium
production, production of primary container glass and some basic chemicals (ammonia, nitric
acid, fertilizer production)12. It is important to note that this study does not evaluate the effects
of the simultaneous introduction of the renewable target and CO2 mitigation policies. The
study notes that the cement sector is unlikely to be significantly exposed to international
competition due to high transportation costs, although there is a marked increase in trade in
the Mediterranean basin. Because of limited ability to pass through additional costs, sectors
most at risk are primary aluminium production, primary steel (blast oxygen furnace) and some
basic chemicals. The competitiveness problem for energy intensive industries therefore
12
Imposing a unilateral carbon constraint on European energy-intensive industries and its impact on their
international competitiveness – data & analysis", DG Economic and Financial Affairs Economic Paper
n° 297, forthcoming.
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appears to be concentrated in a limited number of genuinely energy intensive industries while
not generally affecting manufacturing industry as such.
(b) Specific measures for carbon/energy intensive sectors
The analysis is based on the PACE model that features a disaggregated regional and sectoral
coverage as well as the relevant trading systems and policy measures. Different specific
measures have been assessed and the following conclusions emerge from the results shown in
tables V:
– Global sectoral agreements assuming realistic efforts by other regions would lead to
substantially greater GHG reductions at the global level and have a positive, albeit modest,
effect on the output performance of energy intensive industries. The overall economic
effects (in terms of GDP) of the EU's GHG/renewables package would, however, not be
much affected.
– Free allocation of ETS allowances to energy intensive industries on the basis of
benchmarks contributes very strongly towards avoiding significant output losses without
compromising total economy-wide performance as CO2 and electricity prices are hardly
affected. This instrument seems to be a very powerful tool to offset carbon leakage and
adverse effects on energy intensive industries. This is even more the case if the free
allocation would also allow for the compensation for indirect costs arising from the CO2
content of energy intensive industries’ intermediate energy consumption (e.g. electricity)
on the basis of appropriate benchmarks.
– The inclusion of importers of energy intensive products in the EU ETS impacts positively
on energy intensive industries' performance and generates some additional global GHG
reductions. However, the net amount of allowances required by importers creates an
important pressure on the ETS allowance price, which could have a negative impact on all
ETS sectors and the economy as a whole and this would have to be addressed.
– Access to CDM significantly limits the output losses of the energy intensive industries and
reduces carbon leakage considerably. Furthermore it has a positive impact on overall
welfare costs. As such this instrument reduces the impact on energy intensive industries.
Of course the GHG reductions achieved internally in the EU also reduce.
No single specific measure of this package alone will be sufficient to ensure the
competitiveness of the most exposed energy intensive industries. The results in Table IV
show that several of them can be linked to form a coherent and effective package, consistent
with the Community’s energy and climate change objectives.
12. REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS
(a) The EU ETS
The impact assessment for the review of the EU ETS has pointed out that the contribution of
small and large emitters to the overall emissions covered by the EU ETS is uneven. Large
installations representing only 7% of the total number of installations produce 60% of total
emissions, while small installations representing around 14% of total installation only emit
0.14% of total emissions.
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To reduce the administrative burden of this large number of small emitters the proposal of the
Commission will maintain the current applicable threshold of 20 MW for combustion
installations but will combine it with an emission threshold of 10 000 tCO2/year, as long as
they remain below 25 MW. These small installations can only be excluded if measures are in
place that achieve an equivalent greenhouse reduction in these installations.
(b) To facilitate the achievement of the renewable energy target
In the renewable energy sector, a range of administrative procedures are necessary for
developing renewable energy projects, mainly to ensure compliance with EU as well as
national legislation and policy objectives, such as environmental protection, public health and
protection of workers. However such procedures, which cover licensing, planning permission,
environmental impact assessments and grid access approvals, cause delays and raise costs and
have a constraining effect on the deployment of renewable energy. The impact assessment
shows that existing administrative procedures are hampering the development of renewable
heating and cooling as well as electricity.
The Commission's proposal on renewable energy therefore requires Member States to take a
range of actions that reduce the delays, uncertainties and administrative costs faced by
European businesses and households.
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ANNEX:
The following modelling tools have been used:
� PRIMES : This is a detailed partial equilibrium energy model dealing with all sectors and
fuel types including their transformation in a technology rich way. It is detailed at Member
States level, which allows for meaningful comparisons and aggregations on the basis of a
harmonised approach. It was used to assess changes in the energy system in detail (e.g.
investment costs, changes in fuel mix and consumption).
� GAINS : This is a model that allows to assess the impact of reducing non-CO2 greenhouse
gases (GHGs) taking into account the developments in the energy system. It was also used
to assess the resulting impact on air pollution emissions other than GHGs.
� GEM-E3 : This is a general equilibrium model that represents all economic sectors and
their interactions but has less detail on different mitigation technologies. It was used to
assess the macro economic impacts at Member State level of reducing GHG emissions in
the energy sector (e.g. GDP effects, effects on private consumption and employment).
� PACE: This is a global general equilibrium model similar to GEM-E3 but with more detail
on electricity generation technologies. It was used to examine the sector specific impacts
on energy-intensive industries of meeting a 30% renewable electricity target and the
greenhouse gas objectives. It is more aggregate at Member State level than GEM-E3.
� POLES: This is a global partial equilibrium energy model that was used to assess the
impacts of a future international agreement on the EU energy system. It does not include
macroeconomic impacts.
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Table I Legally-binding targets for Member States
(1) (2) (3)
Targets
2020
Reduction target in sectors not
covered by the EU ETS compared to
2005
Share Renewables in the final energy
demand by 2020
AT -16.0% 34%
BE -15.0% 13%
BG 20.0% 16%
CY -5.0% 13%
CZ 9.0% 13%
DK -20.0% 30%
EE 11.0% 25%
FI -16.0% 38%
FR -14.0% 23%
DE -14.0% 18%
EL -4.0% 18%
HU 10.0% 13%
IE -20.0% 16%
IT -13.0% 17%
LV 17.0% 42%
LT 15.0% 23%
LU -20.0% 11%
MT 5.0% 10%
NL -16.0% 14%
PL 14.0% 15%
PT 1.0% 31%
RO 19.0% 24%
SK 13.0% 14%
SI 4.0% 25%
ES -10.0% 20%
SE -17.0% 49%
UK -16.0% 15%
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CDM credits. This is not a loss in GDP. Macro-
Table II Economic impact of the building blocks of the proposals in terms of increased direct costs13
Cost
as %
of
GDP
2020
Cost efficient
reference option
Redistribution of
Non ETS targets,
no CDM
Redistribution of
Non ETS targets,
no CDM
+ Partial
redistribution of
auctioning rights
EU ETS
Redistribution of
Non ETS targets
+ Partial
redistribution the
auctioning rights
EU ETS
+ with CDM
Redistribution of
Non ETS targets
+ Partial
redistribution
auctioning rights EU
ETS
+ with CDM
+ Redistribution of
RES targets and full
RES trade
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5
EU27 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.45 0.45
AT 0.66 0.86 0.82 0.58 0.34
BE 0.76 0.83 0.93 0.69 0.70
BG 2.16 1.09 -0.35 0.14 -1.25
CY 0.09 0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.07
CZ 1.12 0.49 0.03 0.20 -0.51
DK 0.29 0.57 0.50 0.22 0.11
EE 1.59 1.09 0.41 0.58 -0.53
FI 0.47 0.53 0.56 0.52 0.22
FR 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.32 0.47
DE 0.57 0.47 0.60 0.49 0.57
EL 0.97 0.74 0.53 0.60 0.59
HU 1.22 0.46 0.29 0.36 -0.40
IE 0.47 0.61 0.63 0.47 0.45
13 Measured as change in direct energy system cost, abatement cost in non CO2 greenhouse gases and costs to acquire
economic impacts are given in Table III.
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IT 0.49 0.99 1.05 0.51 0.66
LV 1.10 1.60 1.50 0.88 -0.18
LT 1.02 0.52 0.36 0.43 -0.72
LU 0.54 0.89 0.91 0.59 0.70
MT 0.31 0.17 -0.36 -0.21 0.00
NL 0.28 0.34 0.43 0.28 0.32
PL 1.24 0.48 0.32 0.38 0.02
PT 0.87 0.48 0.54 0.57 0.51
RO 0.95 0.37 0.29 0.29 0.04
SK 1.17 0.79 0.74 0.60 0.26
SI 0.86 1.11 0.86 0.47 0.53
ES 0.70 1.20 1.08 0.62 0.42
SE 0.66 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.78
UK 0.49 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.41
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targets,
f the
trade.
Table III Overview of impacts at EU level for key scenarios of the impact assessment
Scenario 1 2 3 4
Cost
efficient
reference
scenario
Redistribution
of Non ETS
targets, no
CDM
Redistribution
of Non ETS
targets, but
with CDM
Redistribution of the Non ETS
no CDM + Redistribution o
renewables targets, no RES
Carbon price ETS (€/tCO2) 39 43 30 47
Carbon price non-ETS (€/tCO2) 39 37 Max. 30 37
Renewable value (€/MWh) 45 44 49 51
CLIMATE &ENERGY14
Reduction GHG over 1990 (%) -20 -20 -14 -20
GHG reduction current ETS sector
including emissions from aviation
(% over 2005)
-18 -20 -13 -20
GHG reduction non-ETS sector
(% over 2005) -12 -10 -7 -10
Renewables share in final Energy
Consumption (%) 20 20 20 20
Gross Energy Consumption (% change
compared to baseline) -10 -10 -5 -10
Direct costs (% of GDP) 0.58 0.61 0.45 0.66
Change Energy + non CO2 Costs +
acquisition CDM credits (bn €) 91 95 70 103
Reduced oil & gas imports (bn €) 49 47 41 46
Increase in Electr. generation costs
compared to no cost pass through of
opportunity costs (%)
28% 30% 23% 33%
Increase in Average Electricity price
compared to no cost pass through of
opportunity costs (%)
23% 24% 19% 26%
Increase in Average Electricity price
taking into account the inclusion of 10% to 15%
14 Results by PRIMES/GAINS.
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sectors18
ference Scenario
+international
sectoral
agreements
+ inclusion of
porters in the EU
ETS
Reference Scenario
+international
sectoral
agreements
+ inclusion of
indirect emissions
20 20
opportunity costs at present in power (%)
MACRO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS15
Change in GDP (%) -0.35 -0.34 -0.21
Change in private consumption (%) +0.19 0.21 0.21
Employment (% change BAU) -0.04 -0.09 +0.05
AIR QUALITY16
Costs air pollution control (bn €) -10 -11 -8 -11
Air pollution: SO2, NOX and PM2.5 (%
reduction 2020) -14 -13 -10 -13
SECTORAL IMPACTS17 (% change over BAU)
Energy cost 6.4 6.3 4.4 6.8
Energy Cost per Value Added Industry 12.6 13.5 9.6 14.3
Energy costs per Value Added Tertiary 1.7 2.2 0.7 3.0
Production change top 3 Energy Intensive - 2 - 2 < 1.5 >- 1.5
Table IV: Impact of international sectoral agreements and free allocation for energy intensive
Reference Scenario**
Reference
Scenario
+ access to CDM
for 25% of the
reduction effort
Reference
Scenario
+international
sectoral
agreements
Reference Scenario
+international sectoral
agreements
+ free allocation
through benchmarking
for Energy Intensive
Sectors
Re
im
Share of renewable in EU energy
consumption in 2020 (%)
20 20 20 20
15 Results by GEM-E3.
16 Results by GAINS.
17 Results by PRIMES.
18 Results by PACE.
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-16.8 -16.8
-14.4 -14.1
+43.8 +43.9
22.5 22.9
34.8 35.2
-0.66 -0.69
-6.8 -4.5
-1.0 -1.1
-2.4 -2.4
-6.2 -5.0
-3.7 -3.9
).
V
ertrieb: B
undesanzeiger
V
erlagsgesellschaft m
bH
, A
m
sterdam
er
S
tr. 192, 50735
K
öln, Telefon
(02
21)
97
66
83
40, Telefax
(02
21)
97
66
83
44
IS
S
N
0722-8333
Change in EU CO2 emissions vs
1990 (% change)
-16.8 -11.0 -16.8 -16.8
Carbon leakage*(% of EU 2020
emissions)
2.5 0.8 -14.1 -14.3
World CO2 emissions
(% of global emissions 1990)
+47.0 46.5 +43.9 +43.9
electricity price (% change vs.BAU
in 2020)
22.0 13.9 22.3 22.8
CO2 price (Euro per ton CO2). 34.2 21.0 34.5 35.2
Welfare
(% change in GDP vs BaU in 2020)
-0.69 -0.51 -0.69 -0.69
Ferrous metals output
(% change vs BaU)
-8.0 -5.4 -7.4 -4.8
Paper products output
(%change vs BaU)
-1.1 -0.7 -1.0 -1.1
Mineral products output
(%change vs BaU)
-2.8 -1.8 -2.6 -2.3
Non-ferrous metals output
(%change vs BaU)
-6.5 -4.2 -6.4 -6.0
Chemicals output
(%changevs BaU)
-4.3 -2.7 -4.0 -3.7
* Carbon leakage stands for the relative impacts of EU measures on the CO2 emissions of other non-EU countries (in % of EU27 1990 emissions
** The reference scenario includes partial auctioning for all sectors and free trading of GoOs
G
esam
therstellung: H
. H
eenem
ann G
m
bH
&
C
o., B
uch- und O
ffsetdruckerei, B
essem
erstraß
e 83–91, 12103 B
erlin