Vom 5. April 2006
Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 16/1155
16. Wahlperiode 05. 04. 2006
Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht
des Ausschusses für Arbeit und Soziales (11. Ausschuss)
zu der Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung
– Drucksache 16/150 Nr. 2.265 –
Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur
Verbesserung der Portabilität von Zusatzrentenansprüchen (inkl. 13686/05 ADD 1)
KOM (2005) 507 endg.; Ratsdok. 13686/05
A. Problem
Zusätzliche Altersvorsorge durch Betriebsrenten gewinnt in der Alterssiche-
rungspolitik zunehmend an Bedeutung. Die in diesem Zusammenhang wichtige
Frage der Mitnahmemöglichkeiten von Betriebsrentenanwartschaften wurde in
Deutschland im Rahmen des Alterseinkünftegesetzes 2005 neu geregelt. Mit
ihrem Richtlinienvorschlag will die Kommission den innerstaatlichen Erwerb
und die innerstaatliche sowie die europaweite Mitnahme von Betriebsrentenan-
sprüchen erleichtern.
B. Lösung
Der Richtlinienvorschlag sieht eine Absenkung der Unverfallbarkeitsfristen für
den Erwerb von Zusatzrentenansprüchen auf zwei Jahre sowie eine Dynamisie-
rung der Anwartschaften ausgeschiedener Arbeitnehmer vor. Ferner sieht der
Vorschlag einen sofortigen und unbegrenzten Mitnahmeanspruch der Beschäf-
tigten vor, was die abgebenden Systeme erheblich belasten und im Ergebnis zu
inakzeptablen Renditeverlusten für die verbliebenen Arbeitnehmer führen
würde. Die deutschen Besonderheiten bei Direktzusagen der Arbeitgeber, bei
Unterstützungskassen sowie bei umlagefinanzierten Systemen sind zwar nach
dem Vorschlag von der verpflichtenden Übertragung ausgenommen, aber auch
für diese Systeme soll auf lange Sicht die Portabilität sichergestellt werden
(Überprüfung der Richtlinie 2018).
Annahme des Entschließungsantrags mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen der
CDU/CSU und SPD gegen die Stimmen der Fraktionen FDP, DIE LINKE.
und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
Drucksache 16/1155 – 2 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
C. Alternativen
Keine
D. Finanzielle Auswirkungen
Abschätzungen über die finanziellen Auswirkungen wurden nicht vorgenom-
men.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 3 – Drucksache 16/1155
Beschlussempfehlung
Der Bundestag wolle beschließen,
1. das Ratsdokument 13686/05 zur Kenntnis zu nehmen,
2 . den nachstehenden Entschließungsantrag anzunehmen.
„I. Der Deutsche Bundestag stellt fest:
Der Vorschlag der EU-Kommission für eine Richtlinie zur Verbesse-
rung der Portabilität von Zusatzrentenansprüchen hat das Ziel, die
Mobilität von Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmern in der Europäis-
chen Union zu erleichtern. Betriebsrentenanwartschaften sollen bei
einem Arbeitgeberwechsel besser mitzunehmen sein. Der Deutsche
Bundestag begrüßt und unterstützt die entsprechenden Bemühungen
der Kommisson. In der vorliegenden Fassung ist der Richtlinie-
nentwurf allerdings nicht zustimmungsfähig, weil er auch über die
Reichweite der gemeinschaftlichen Regelungskompetenz hinausgeht.
Aus dem Alterssicherungsbericht 2005 der Bundesregierung wird deut-
lich, dass zur Sicherung des Lebensstandards im Alter eine Ergänzung
der Ansprüche aus der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung durch eine
zusätzliche kapitalgedeckte Altersvorsorge unerlässlich ist. In Deut-
schland ist es in den vergangenen Jahren durch Reformen des Betriebs-
rentenrechts gelungen, die Betriebsrente zu einem erfolgreicheren
Instrument der zusätzlichen Altersvorsorge als in der Vergangenheit zu
machen. Nicht zuletzt durch die neu gestaltete staatliche Förderung hat
die betriebliche Altersvorsorge ihre jahrzehntelange Stagnation über-
wunden und ist auf stabilem Wachstumskurs. Mitte 2004 besaßen rund
60 Prozent der sozialversicherungspflichtig Beschäftigten in Deut-
schland einen Anspruch auf Betriebsrente, das sind 15,7 Millionen
Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer.
Um den Auf- und Ausbau der betrieblichen Altersversorgung zu
beschleunigen, wurden in Deutschland unter anderem die Mitnahme-
möglichkeiten erworbener Betriebsrentenanwartschaften bei einem
Arbeitgeberwechsel (sog. Portabilität) mit Beginn des Jahres 2005 ver-
bessert. Damit wurde sowohl den veränderten wirtschaftlichen Rahmen-
bedingungen und den daraus resultierenden geänderten Erwerbs-
biographien als auch dem notwendigen Ausbau der zusätzlichen kapi-
talgedeckten Altersvorsorge Rechnung getragen.
Die Zielsetzung des vorliegenden Richtlinienvorschlags, die europa-
weite Übertragungsmöglichkeit von Betriebsrentenanwartschaften zu
verbessern, wird in diesem Kontext grundsätzlich begrüßt. Die Mobi-
lität der Arbeitnehmer zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen
Union muss erleichtert, vorhandene Hindernisse für die grenzüber-
schreitende Mobilität in den Zusatzrentensystemen der Mitgliedstaaten
müssen möglichst abgebaut werden. Damit wird Arbeitnehmerinnen
und Arbeitnehmern, die während ihres Erwerbslebens in mehreren
Staaten der Europäischen Union beschäftigt sind, der Aufbau einer den
Lebensstandard sichernden Zusatzrente erleichtert.
Die Regelungen müssen neben der Förderung der Freizügigkeit und des
Binnenmarkts aber auch die Besonderheiten der in den Mitgliedstaaten
gewachsenen Betriebsrentensysteme berücksichtigen. Sie dürfen nicht
dazu führen, dass sich die nationalen Rahmenbedingungen der betrie-
blichen Altersvorsorge zugunsten EU-weiter Mobilität der Arbeitneh-
merinnen und Arbeitnehmer verschlechtern. Insbesondere muss den
Drucksache 16/1155 – 4 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Sozialpartnern in den Mitgliedstaaten bei der Gestaltung der betriebli-
chen Altersvorsorge weiterhin hinreichend Raum gegeben werden. Den
nationalen Besonderheiten der Zusatzrentensysteme wird durch tarifli-
che Regelungen vor Ort am besten Rechnung getragen.
Die betriebliche Altersversorgung in Deutschland ist ihrer Struktur
nach ein freiwilliges System. Die Arbeitgeber sehen darin ein personal-
wirtschaftliches Instrument zur Personalbindung und Belohnung der
Betriebstreue. Die betriebliche Altersversorgung in Deutschland wird
daher in bedeutendem Umfang auch durch Beteiligung der Arbeitgeber
finanziert. Der Nutzen der betrieblichen Altersversorgung für die
Unternehmen würde sich durch den Richtlinienentwurf verringern.
Damit bestünde die Gefahr, dass sich Arbeitgeber zunehmend aus der
betrieblichen Altersversorgung zurückziehen. Der Auf- und Ausbau
von Zusatzrentenansprüchen ist angesichts der demographischen
Entwicklung aber zumindest gleichrangig mit dem Ziel der Mobilität
von Arbeitnehmern zu sehen. Es gilt daher, eine sachgerechte Abwä-
gung in diesem Zielkonflikt zu treffen.
Um weitgehende Verbesserungen der Portabilität von Betriebsrenten in
der EU zu erzielen, sollte parallel zum vorgelegten Richtlinienvor-
schlag auch das Problem der einheitlichen Besteuerung von Altersvor-
sorgeprodukten aufgegriffen werden. Die Angleichung der steuerlichen
Behandlung betrieblicher Altersvorsorge in der EU ist eine Grund-
voraussetzung für eine unproblematische Übertragung von Renten-
ansprüchen und für die Vermeidung eventueller Doppelbesteuerung.
II. Vor diesem Hintergrund fordert der Deutsche Bundestag die Bundes-
regierung auf, im weiteren Verlauf des Rechtsetzungsverfahrens in den
Organen und Gremien der EU darauf hinzuwirken, dass
1. der Richtlinienvorschlag die sozialpolitische Bedeutung der Zusatz-
rentensysteme berücksichtigt und den nationalen Besonderheiten
der Zusatzrentensysteme insbesondere durch die Möglichkeit tarif-
vertraglicher Regelungen Rechnung getragen wird;
2. Direktzusagen der Arbeitgeber, über Unterstützungskassen abge-
wickelte Betriebsrentenzusagen sowie umlagefinanzierte Zusatzver-
sorgungssysteme vom Anwendungsbereich der Mitnahmeregelung
dauerhaft ausgenommen werden. Bei Direktzusagen sind die dafür
gebildeten Rückstellungen in der Regel im Unternehmen gebunden;
die Arbeitgeber sollten bei vorzeitigem Ausscheiden eines Beschäf-
tigten nicht zu deren Kapitalisierung verpflichtet werden. Bei Unter-
stützungskassenzusagen ist aufgrund der steuerlichen Rahmenbedin-
gungen eine volle Ausfinanzierung der Verpflichtung nicht möglich.
In umlagefinanzierten Systemen, wie sie besonders in großen Teilen
des öffentlichen Dienstes existieren, ist auf Dauer kein Kapital vor-
handen, das bei einem Wechsel mitgenommen werden könnte;
3. das vorgeschlagene Dynamisierungsgebot vor dem Hintergrund der
damit verbundenen Kostenbelastung der Arbeitgeber überprüft
wird. Nach dem Vorschlag sollen die ruhenden unverfallbaren
Betriebsrentenansprüche – auch bereits in der Vergangenheit – aus-
geschiedener Arbeitnehmer an die allgemeine Preisentwicklung
angepasst werden. Die Umstellung könnte aufgrund der massiven
zusätzlichen Kostenbelastung aber zu einem Rückzug vieler Arbeit-
geber aus der freiwillig finanzierten Altersvorsorge führen;
4. die im Richtlinienvorschlag vorgesehene Unverfallbarkeit ab einem
Alter von 21 Jahren und bei zweijähriger Zugehörigkeit zum Betriebs-
rentensystem unter dem Aspekt der Kostenbelastung für den Arbeit-
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 5 – Drucksache 16/1155
geber und möglicher Steuerausfälle geprüft wird. Zwar würden
Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer durch eine Herabsetzung der
Altersgrenze bereits früher als bisher unverfallbare Altersvorsor-
geanwartschaften erhalten. Damit würde insbesondere den Interes-
sen junger Mütter besser Rechnung getragen, die wegen der
Kindererziehung aus dem Beruf ausscheiden und deshalb derzeit
häufig keine unverfallbaren Betriebsrentenanwartschaften erlangen
können. Diesen zweifellos positiven Auswirkungen stünden aller-
dings Kostenbelastungen gegenüber, die kontraproduktiv für das
System der betrieblichen Altersvorsorge insgesamt sein können.
Aus Vertrauensschutzgründen sollte sich eine Absenkung der
Unverfallbarkeitsfristen ohnehin auf Neuzusagen beschränken;
5. die Übertragungsmöglichkeiten nicht zu einer unverhältnismäßigen
Belastung der abgebenden Systeme führen, sondern sinnvoll in der
Höhe begrenzt werden. Der Kommissionsvorschlag sieht einen
sofortigen und unbegrenzten Mitnahmeanspruch der Beschäftigten
vor. Dies würde besonders die abgebenden Systeme erheblich belas-
ten und im Ergebnis zu inakzeptablen Renditeverlusten für die im
System verbleibenden Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer
führen. Insoweit kann auf die Regelung zur Mitnahme im Betriebs-
rentengesetz verwiesen werden; sie ist bei externen Durchführungen
auf einen Betrag in Höhe der Beitragsbemessungsgrenze der gesetz-
lichen Rentenversicherung begrenzt;
6. bei den Informations- und Auskunftspflichten ausdrücklich die
Möglichkeit für den Arbeitgeber vorgesehen wird, diese Pflichten
und die damit verbundenen Haftungsrisiken auf die jeweilige Ver-
sorgungseinrichtung zu übertragen. In diesem Zusammenhang ist
dafür Sorge zu tragen, dass der Informations- und Auskunftsan-
spruch der Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer nicht zu einem
wesentlich erhöhten Verwaltungsaufwand der Arbeitgeber führt;
7. parallel zu den weiteren Verhandlungen die einheitliche Besteue-
rung von betrieblichen Altersvorsorgeprodukten in den Mitglied-
staaten der EU vorangetrieben wird. Erst wenn diese sichergestellt
ist, können die im Richtlinienvorschlag vorgesehenen Möglich-
keiten der Mitnahme von Betriebsrentenansprüchen ihre volle
Wirkung entfalten.“
Berlin, den 5. April 2006
Der Ausschuss für Arbeit und Soziales
Gerald Weiß (Groß-Gerau)
Vorsitzender
Peter Weiß (Emmendingen)
Berichterstatter
Der Ausschuss für Arbeit und Soziales hat in seiner 16. in den weiteren Verhandlungen zu dem Richtlinienvorschlag
Sitzung am 5. April 2006 das EU-Dokument beraten und
mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD
gegen die Stimmen der Fraktionen FDP, DIE LINKE. und
an den Vorschlägen zu einer verbesserten Übertragbarkeit
der Zusatzrentenansprüche im vollen Umfang festzuhalten
und darauf hinzuwirken, dass es keine generellen Ausnah-
Drucksache 16/1155 – 6 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Bericht des Abgeordneten Peter Weiß (Emmendingen)
I. Überweisung und Voten der mitberatenden
Ausschüsse
1. Überweisung
Das Unionsdokument – Ratsdok. 13686/05 – wurde am
8. Dezember 2005 im vereinfachten Verfahren mit Druck-
sache 16/150 Nr. 2.265 dem Ausschuss für Arbeit und So-
ziales zur federführenden Beratung sowie dem Rechtsaus-
schuss, dem Finanzausschuss und dem Ausschuss für Fami-
lie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend zur Mitberatung überwie-
sen.
2. Voten der mitberatenden Ausschüsse
Der Rechtsausschuss hat die Vorlage in seiner Sitzung am
8. Februar 2006 zur Kenntnis genommen. Der Finanzaus-
schuss sowie der Ausschuss für Familie, Senioren,
Frauen und Jugend haben die Vorlage in ihren Sitzungen
am 5. April 2006 zur Kenntnis genommen und den Ent-
schließungsantrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD
mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD
gegen die Stimmen der Fraktionen DIE LINKE. und
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN bei Stimmenthaltung der
Fraktion der FDP angenommen. Der Entschließungsantrag
der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/ DIE GRÜNEN wurde im
Finanzausschuss mehrheitlich abgelehnt.
II. Wesentlicher Inhalt der Vorlage
Zusätzliche Altersvorsorge durch Betriebsrenten gewinnt in
der Alterssicherungspolitik zunehmend an Bedeutung. Die
in diesem Zusammenhang wichtige Frage der Mitnahme-
möglichkeiten von Betriebsrentenanwartschaften wurde in
Deutschland im Rahmen des Alterseinkünftegesetzes 2005
neu geregelt. Mit ihrem Richtlinienvorschlag will die EU-
Kommission den innerstaatlichen Erwerb und die inner-
staatliche sowie die europaweite Mitnahme von Betriebs-
rentenansprüchen erleichtern.
Der Richtlinienvorschlag sieht eine Absenkung der Unver-
fallbarkeitsfristen für den Erwerb von Zusatzrentenansprü-
chen auf zwei Jahre sowie eine Dynamisierung der Anwart-
schaften ausgeschiedener Arbeitnehmer vor. Ferner sieht der
Vorschlag einen sofortigen und unbegrenzten Mitnahme-
anspruch der Beschäftigten vor, was die abgebenden Sys-
teme erheblich belasten und im Ergebnis zu inakzeptablen
Renditeverlusten für die verbliebenen Arbeitnehmer führen
würde. Die deutschen Besonderheiten bei Direktzusagen der
Arbeitgeber, bei Unterstützungskassen sowie bei umlagefi-
nanzierten Systemen sind zwar nach dem Vorschlag von der
verpflichtenden Übertragung ausgenommen, aber auch für
diese Systeme soll auf lange Sicht die Portabilität sicherge-
stellt werden (Überprüfung der Richtlinie 2018).
III. Beratung im federführenden Ausschuss
Keine Mehrheit im Ausschuss fand der nachstehend wieder-
gebene Entschließungsantrag der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/
DIE GRÜNEN, der mit den Stimmen der Fraktionen der
CDU/CSU, SPD und FDP bei Zustimmung der Fraktion
DIE LINKE. sowie der antragstellenden Fraktion abgelehnt
wurde.
Der Bundestag wolle beschließen:
I. Der Deutsche Bundestag stellt fest:
Moderne Arbeitsmärkte brauchen flexible Arbeitnehmer.
Deshalb muss auch die betriebliche Altersvorsorge flexibler
werden: Deutlich verkürzte Unverfallbarkeitsfristen von Al-
tersvorsorgeansprüchen sind deshalb ein wichtiger und
richtiger Vorschlag der EU-Kommission. Denn bei vielen
Arbeitnehmern verfallen bisher die bestehenden Ansprüche,
wenn sie nicht länger als 5 Jahre bei ihrem Arbeitgeber ar-
beiten.
Die Absenkung der Altersgrenze für die Unverfallbarkeit
von Ansprüchen auf 21 Jahre ist sinnvoll. In Deutschland
beträgt die Altersgrenze derzeit 30 Jahre. Das ist zu spät,
denn die gesetzlichen Rentenansprüche sinken. Heute muss
so früh wie möglich zusätzlich vorgesorgt werden, damit im
Endeffekt ein Gesamtrentenniveau erreicht werden kann,
das den Lebensstandard sichert.
Die steuerliche Förderung der betrieblichen Altersvorsorge
muss auch tatsächlich den Arbeitnehmern zugute kommen.
Allen Beteiligten muss klar sein: Betriebliche Altersvor-
sorge – vor allem die staatlich geförderten Formen – stehen
im Eigentum der Arbeitnehmer und sind keine beliebige
Finanzierungsmasse der Arbeitgeber. Die geplanten Aus-
nahmen bei der Übertragbarkeit für die Direktzusage, die
Unterstützungskassen und umlagefinanzierte Systeme sind
kontraproduktiv. Denn damit wären zwei Drittel der betrieb-
lichen Altersvorsorge in Deutschland von der Modernisie-
rung ausgenommen – zu Lasten der Arbeitnehmer.
Bessere Übertragbarkeit der Betriebsrentenansprüche, wie
von der Kommission vorgeschlagen, ist dringend notwen-
dig. Denn Arbeitnehmer mit mehreren Betriebsrenten sind
schon heute keine Seltenheit mehr. Darüber hinaus sollten
Arbeitnehmer ihre betriebliche Altersvorsorge bei einem
neuen Arbeitgeber generell und uneingeschränkt weiterfüh-
ren können. Hier muss eine vernünftige Lösung gefunden
werden.
Ebenso notwendig ist die Dynamisierung bestehender An-
sprüche für ausscheidende Arbeitnehmer, denn bei einem
flexiblen Arbeitsleben drohen sich sonst die Ansprüche aus
verschiedenen Betriebsrenten mit der Zeit zu entwerten.
II. Der Deutsche Bundestag fordert die Bundesregierung auf,
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN den vorstehend abgedruckten
Entschließungsantrag angenommen.
men für Direktzusage, Unterstützungskasse und umlage-
finanzierte Systeme gibt.“
lich das Anliegen der EU-Kommission, Hemmnisse zu be-
seitigen, die der Portabilität entgegenstehen. Hier gebe es
allerdings einen Zielkonflikt, da hohe Standards bei der Por-
tabilität im Gegenzug vermutlich zu einem Rückgang der
betrieblichen Rentenzusagen führen würden. Im Übrigen
hegten nicht nur die Arbeitgeber, sondern auch die Gewerk-
schaften erhebliche Bedenken gegenüber den Vorschlägen
der EU-Kommission. Die in Deutschland gefundenen Kom-
promisse bei der Portabilität seien ausgewogen, wenngleich
eine Herabsetzung des Mindestalters wünschenswert sei. Zu
beachten sei auch, dass eine Verwirklichung der Kommissi-
onsvorschläge für die betrieblichen Rentensysteme zu er-
heblichen Kosten führe, was eine Absenkung der auszuzah-
lenden Betriebsrenten zur Folge habe. Man sehe bei dem
Richtlinienentwurf erheblichen Nachbesserungsbedarf. Der
eingebrachte Entschließungsantrag unterstütze die Bundes-
regierung, in den Verhandlungen in Brüssel zu einem ausge-
wogenen Ergebnis zu gelangen, welches auf die besonderen
deutschen Anliegen Rücksicht nehme.
chendes Gesamtrentenniveau zu erreichen. Da es hierfür ei-
ner weiteren Flexibilisierung bedürfe, unterstütze man den
Vorschlag der EU-Kommission, die Übertragbarkeit von
betrieblichen Rentenanwartschaften zu verbessern und die
vorhandenen Ansprüche ausgeschiedener Arbeitnehmer und
-innen zu dynamisieren.
Die Mitglieder der Fraktion der FDP erklärten, dass sie
den Richtlinienvorschlag der Kommission ablehnten, da er
über die reine Frage der Portabilität hinausgehe und sich
auch mit inhaltlichen Aspekten von Betriebsrentensyste-
men befasse. Während der Entschließungsantrag der
Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD nicht weit genug gehe,
indem dieser die Portabilität nicht ausreichend fördern
wolle, beinhalte der Entschließungsantrag der Fraktion
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN eine Anerkennung einer
Richtlinienkompetenz der EU-Kommission in diesem Be-
reich, die man so nicht als gegeben ansehe. Aus diesen
Gründen lehne man beide Entschließungsanträge ab.
Berlin, den 5. April 2006
Peter Weiß (Emmendingen)
Berichterstatter
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 7 – Drucksache 16/1155
Die Mitglieder der Fraktion der CDU/CSU äußerten Zwei-
fel an der Kompetenz der Europäischen Union für eine der-
artige Richtlinie. Zugleich kritisierten sie, dass der Richtli-
nienvorschlag nicht ausreichend Rücksicht auf die in den
einzelnen Ländern unterschiedlich gewachsenen Zusatzren-
tensysteme nehme. Sie äußerten die Befürchtung, dass eine
Verabschiedung der Richtlinie in der vorliegenden Form
kontraproduktiv sei, da sie die beim Aufbau von betriebli-
chen Versorgungssystemen erfreulicherweise erreichten
Fortschritte in Frage stelle. Daher unterstütze man die Ver-
handlungsposition der Bundesregierung, in jedem Falle zu
erreichen, dass eine etwaige Richtlinie auf die Besonderhei-
ten der betrieblichen Rentensysteme, aber auch die der Zu-
satzrentensysteme im Bereich des öffentlichen Dienstes aus-
reichend Rücksicht nehmen wird. Den Entschließungsan-
trag der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN lehnten sie
ab, da er die genau gegensätzliche Zielrichtung des eigenen
Entschließungsantrages verfolge.
Die Mitglieder der Fraktion der SPD begrüßten grundsätz-
Die Mitglieder der Fraktion DIE LINKE. betonten, dass
sie gegen den generellen politischen Trend seien, betrieb-
liche und private Alterssicherungssysteme auf Kosten der
gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung auszubauen. Dessen un-
geachtet trete man jedoch für den Schutz von betrieb-
lichen Altersversorgungsansprüchen ein. Angesichts der
abverlangten Mobilität solle die Portabilität von betrieb-
lichen Zusatzrentenansprüchen im größtmöglichen Inte-
resse der Arbeitnehmer und -innen geregelt werden. Aus
diesen Gründen lehne man die Positionen der Fraktionen
der CDU/CSU und SPD ab und unterstütze den Entschlie-
ßungsantrag der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN.
Die Mitglieder der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
sahen demgegenüber eine Zuständigkeit der Europäischen
Union als gegeben an, da der Richtlinienvorschlag auf eine
Verbesserung der Mobilität der Arbeitnehmer und -innen
abziele. Die heutigen Verfallbarkeitsregelungen entsprächen
nicht mehr den Anforderungen eines modernen Arbeits-
marktes. Notwendig sei, so früh wie möglich betriebliche
und private Vorsorge zu betreiben, um am Ende ein ausrei-
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 9 – Drucksache 16/1155
RAT DER
EUROPÄISCHEN UNION
Brüssel, den 24. Oktober 2005 (25.10)
(OR. en)
Interinstitutionelles Dossier:
2005/0214 (COD)
13686/05
SOC 412
ECOFIN 324
CODEC 933
VORSCHLAG
Absender: die Kommission
vom: 24. Oktober 2005
Betr.: Vorschlag für eine RICHTLINIE DES EUROPÄISCHEN
PARLAMENTS UND DES RATES zur Verbesserung der
Portabilität von Zusatzrentenansprüchen
Die Delegationen erhalten in der Anlage den mit Schreiben von Herrn Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU,
Direktor, an den Generalsekretär/Hohen Vertreter, Herrn Javier SOLANA, übermittelten Vorschlag
der Kommission.
Anl.: KOM(2005) 507 endgültig
Drucksache 16/1155 – 10 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN
Brüssel, den 20.10.2005
KOM(2005) 507 endgültig
2005/0214 (COD)
Vorschlag für eine
RICHTLINIE DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS UND DES RATES
zur Verbesserung der Portabilität von Zusatzrentenansprüchen
{SEC(2005)1293}
(von der Kommission vorgelegt)
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 11 – Drucksache 16/1155
BEGRÜNDUNG
1) HINTERGRUND DES VORSCHLAGS
110 x Gründe und Ziele
In der überarbeiteten Lissabon-Strategie1 und in der Sozialagenda2 wird
herausgestrichen, dass Mobilität insofern eine wichtige Rolle spielt als sie die
Anpassungsfähigkeit der Arbeitskräfte und der Unternehmen sowie die Flexibilität der
Arbeitsmärkte steigert. Die zunehmende Bedeutung der Zusatzrentensysteme für die
Alterssicherung macht es erforderlich, durch diese Systeme bedingte
Mobilitätshindernisse zu beseitigen. Im Lissabon-Aktionsplan hat die Kommission
dementsprechend angekündigt, dass sie in diesem Bereich Legislativvorschläge
vorlegen wird.
Der vorliegende Vorschlag zielt darauf ab, durch einzelne Bestimmungen der
Zusatzrentensysteme bedingte Freizügigkeitshindernisse zwischen Mitgliedstaaten
sowie innerstaatliche Mobilitätshindernisse abzubauen. Konkret bestehen derartige
Hindernisse bei den Bedingungen für den Erwerb von Rentenansprüchen, bei der
Wahrung ruhender Rentenansprüche und bei der Übertragbarkeit von Ansprüchen.
Weiterhin will der Vorschlag bewirken, dass die Arbeitnehmer besser über die Folgen
der Mobilität für die Zusatzrentenansprüche aufgeklärt werden.
.120 x Allgemeiner Kontext
Die sozialen Sicherungssysteme der Mitgliedstaaten müssen dem Problem der
demografischen Alterung Rechnung tragen. Die in der Mehrzahl der Mitgliedstaaten
bereits vorgenommenen oder vorgesehenen Reformen setzen auf einen Ausbau der
Zusatzrentensysteme, deren Entwicklung in einigen Mitgliedstaaten im Übrigen aktiv
gefördert wird.
Es gilt sicherzustellen, dass Zusatzversorgungsregelungen nicht die Mobilität der
Arbeitskräfte behindern – sie dürfen es mobilen Arbeitskräften nicht erschweren, bis
zum Ende ihres Erwerbslebens ausreichende Rentenanwartschaften anzusammeln –
und damit die Arbeitsmarktflexibilität und –performance beeinträchtigen. Auch wenn
die Entscheidung eines Arbeitnehmers, den Arbeitsplatz zu wechseln, von zahlreichen
Faktoren abhängt, so ist doch unstrittig, dass die Gefahr einer erheblichen
Beschneidung der Zusatzrentenansprüche die Bereitschaft zu einem
Arbeitsplatzwechsel verringert.
Der Vorschlag stützt sich auf die Ergebnisse eines mehrere Jahre währenden
Informations- und Erfahrungsaustausches auf europäischer Ebene, bei dem man nach
geeigneten Möglichkeiten suchte, die Zusatzrentensysteme mobilitätsfreundlicher
auszulegen.
1 Zusammenarbeit für Wachstum und Arbeitsplätze – Ein Neubeginn für die Strategie von Lissabon,
KOM(2005) 24 endgültig, Brüssel, 2. Februar 2005.
2 Mitteilung der Kommission: Sozialpolitische Agenda, KOM(2005) 33 endgültig, Brüssel,
9. Februar 2005.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 12 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
130 x Bestehende einschlägige Rechtsvorschriften
Das Fehlen eines gemeinsamen Regelungsrahmens für die Portabilität von
Zusatzrentenansprüchen behindert nach wie vor die Freizügigkeit der Arbeitskräfte und
die berufliche Mobilität im Allgemeinen, auch innerhalb der Mitgliedstaaten.
Ein erster Schritt zum Abbau dieser Hindernisse war die Richtlinie 1998/49/EG3. Sie
sollte insbesondere die Gleichbehandlung von Personen sicherstellen, die
grenzüberschreitende Mobilität praktizieren.
140 x Kohärenz mit anderen Politiken und Zielen der Union
Die jüngste Mitteilung der Kommission für die Frühjahrstagung 2005 des
Europäischen Rates4 sowie die integrierten Leitlinien5 unterstreichen, wie wichtig es
ist, die Reagibilität des Arbeitsmarktes insbesondere durch Förderung der beruflichen
und geografischen Mobilität zu verbessern. Die politische Initiative zur legalen
Einwanderung, die die Kommission bis zum Ende des Jahres 2005 verabschieden wird,
wird sich auch hiermit befassen.
2) KONSULTATION DER STAKEHOLDER UND FOLGENABSCHÄTZUNG
x Konsultation der Stakeholder
211 Konsultationsmethoden, Hauptadressaten und allgemeines Profil der Antwortenden
Die Kommission hat die Sozialpartner zweimal konsultiert. Gegenstand der ersten
Konsultation waren die Zweckmäßigkeit und die mögliche Ausrichtung einer
Gemeinschaftsaktion zur Gewährleistung der Portabilität von
Betriebsrentenansprüchen6. Die Sozialpartner befürworteten zum Großteil eine
Gemeinschaftsaktion in diesem Bereich. In einer daraufhin von der Kommission
eingeleiteten zweiten Konsultation der europäischen Sozialpartner7 ging es um die
inhaltliche Ausgestaltung einer solchen Gemeinschaftsaktion. Diese Konsultation
ergab, dass die Sozialpartner unterschiedliche Vorstellungen haben über den Zweck
einer solchen Aktion und die einzusetzenden Mittel. Sie traten deshalb nicht in
Verhandlungen über eine autonome Vereinbarung ein.
Seit seiner Einsetzung im Jahr 2001 war der Ausschuss für zusätzliche
Altersversorgung8 (im Folgenden „Rentenforum“ genannt) unmittelbar in die
Untersuchung derjenigen Mobilitätshindernisse einbezogen, die durch Bestimmungen
3 Richtlinie 98/49/EG zur Wahrung ergänzender Rentenansprüche von Arbeitnehmern und
Selbständigen, die innerhalb der Europäischen Gemeinschaft zu- und abwandern, ABl. L 209 vom
25. Juli 1998.
4 Zusammenarbeit für Wachstum und Arbeitsplätze – Ein Neubeginn für die Strategie von Lissabon,
Mitteilung für die Frühjahrstagung des Europäischen Rates, KOM(2005) 24 endgültig, Brüssel,
2. Februar 2005.
5 Vor allem Leitlinie 21
6 SEK(2002) 597, veröffentlicht am 27. Mai 2002.
7 SEK(2003) 916 vom 12. September 2003.
8
Der Ausschuss wurde eingesetzt durch den Beschluss K(2001) 1775 der Kommission vom 9. Juli 2001,
ABl. L 196 vom 20. Juli 2001, S. 26-27.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 13 – Drucksache 16/1155
von Zusatzrentensystemen bedingt sind. Dem Rentenforum gehören Vertreter der
Mitgliedstaaten, der Sozialpartner, der Rentenfonds und anderer in diesem Bereich
tätiger Organisationen an.
Zusammenfassung und Berücksichtigung der Antworten
Die Antworten der Mitglieder des Rentenforums, einschließlich der Vertreter der
Mitgliedstaaten und der Sozialpartner, sind in die Folgenabschätzung eingegangen, die
dem vorliegenden Vorschlag beigefügt ist.
x Heranziehen von Fachwissen
Externe Fachleute mussten nicht herangezogen werden.
x Folgenabschätzung
Dieser Vorschlag ist im Arbeitsprogramm der Kommission nicht ausdrücklich
vorgesehen und muss daher nicht Gegenstand einer Folgenabschätzung sein. Im
Interesse einer besseren Rechtsetzung und einer größeren Transparenz haben die
Dienststellen der Kommission es dennoch für sinnvoll erachtet, die verschiedenen
Maßnahmenoptionen in diesem Bereich zu prüfen und dabei Kosten-Nutzen-Analysen
vorzunehmen.
3) RECHTLICHE ELEMENTE DES VORSCHLAGS
x Zusammenfassung der vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen
Der vorliegende Vorschlag legt gemeinsame Grundsätze fest, die das Recht auf
Freizügigkeit – eine der von der Gemeinschaft garantierten Grundfreiheiten– fördern
und das Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts verbessern. Diese Prinzipien werden in der in
den Mitgliedstaaten bereits laufenden Anpassung der Zusatzrentensysteme zu Grunde
gelegt.
Die Mobilität der Arbeitskräfte innerhalb der Mitgliedstaaten und zwischen den
Mitgliedstaaten ist wichtig für das reibungslose Funktionieren des europäischen
Arbeitsmarkts und integraler Bestandteil der Lissabon-Strategie, die das Ziel verfolgt,
Beschäftigung und Wirtschaftswachstum zu stärken. Demzufolge gilt es nicht nur die
Mobilität zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten, sondern auch die innerstaatliche berufliche
Mobilität zu fördern. Bestimmte Regelungen der Zusatzrentensysteme und
insbesondere Bestimmungen zum Erwerb von Rentenansprüchen hemmen die
innerstaatliche Mobilität. Behindert wird dadurch insbesondere die Entwicklung von
Unternehmen, die sich in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat niederlassen: sie stoßen auf
Schwierigkeiten, qualifiziertes Personal anzuwerben (in Frage kommende qualifizierte
Arbeitskräfte werden durch Zusatzrentenregelungen an andere Unternehmen
gebunden). Um hier Abhilfe zu schaffen, soll die vorgeschlagene Richtlinie eine
Annäherung der einschlägigen Rechtsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten bewirken und so
die Wettbewerbsbedingungen auf dem europäischen Arbeitsmarkt verbessern.
x Rechtsgrundlage
Rechtsgrundlage des vorliegenden Vorschlags sind die Artikel 42 und 94 EG-Vertrag.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 14 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Artikel 42 diente bereits als Rechtsgrundlage für die Richtlinie 1998/49/EG. Artikel 94
EG-Vertrag ist insofern relevant als eine echte Verbesserung der Portabilität von
Zusatzrentenansprüchen Hand in Hand gehen muss mit einer Verbesserung der
Bedingungen für die berufliche Mobilität – auch der innerstaatlichen. Darüber hinaus
ist die Steigerung der berufliche Mobilität generell unerlässlich für das reibungslose
Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts, was wiederum flexible Arbeitskräfte voraussetzt,
deren Mobilität nicht durch bestimmte Zusatzrentenregelungen gehemmt wird, z. B.
durch Bestimmungen, die bewirken, dass Arbeitnehmer bis zum Erwerb von
Rentenanwartschaften lange Zeit im selben Unternehmen verbleiben müssen.
x Subsidiaritätsprinzip
Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip gelangt zur Anwendung, weil der Vorschlag nicht einen
Bereich betrifft, der in die ausschließliche Zuständigkeit der Gemeinschaft fällt.
Die Ziele des Vorschlags können aus folgenden Gründen nicht in ausreichendem Maße
auf Ebene der Mitgliedstaaten erreicht werden:
Der Arbeitsmarkt macht nicht an den Grenzen der Mitgliedstaaten Halt. Es ist daher
sinnvoll, auf Gemeinschaftsebene den Arbeitsmarkt dadurch flexibler und wirksamer
zu gestalten, dass man durch Betriebsrentenregelungen bedingte Mobilitätshindernisse
beseitigt.
Eine Gemeinschaftsmaßnahme wird den Zielvorgaben des Vorschlags aus folgenden
Gründen besser gerecht:
Die von den europäischen Institutionen in den letzten zehn Jahren formulierten
Orientierungen und Empfehlungen haben keine signifikante Annäherung der
nationalen Rechtsvorschriften bewirkt. In der auf 25 Mitgliedstaaten erweiterten Union
ist mit noch ausgeprägteren Unterschieden zu rechnen.
Die gegenwärtige und absehbare Entwicklung der Rentensysteme auf europäischer
Ebene macht die Anwendung eines Gemeinschaftsinstruments unerlässlich: zum einen
verfügt die Union seit 2003 über einen Rechtsrahmen, der die grenzüberschreitende
Verwaltung der Zusatzrentensysteme fördert und zum anderen ist mit einer
dynamischen Entwicklung dieser Systeme zu rechnen – wie auch aus einer jüngeren
gemeinsamen Untersuchung des Ausschusses für Sozialschutz und der Kommission
über die Zukunft der betrieblichen Zusatzrentensysteme hervorgeht. Der Zeitpunkt ist
also gekommen, gemeinsame Orientierungen festzulegen.
Der Vorschlag steht demnach mit dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Einklang.
x Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip
Der Vorschlag entspricht aus folgenden Gründen dem Grundsatz der
Verhältnismäßigkeit:
Die Wahl des Rechtsinstruments und der Anwendungsmodalitäten entspricht dem
Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit: man hat sich für eine Richtlinie und nicht für eine
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 15 – Drucksache 16/1155
Verordnung entschieden, um der Heterogenität der Zusatzrentensysteme der
Mitgliedstaaten Rechnung zu tragen. Dabei wird dennoch ein Rahmen festgelegt, der
von den Mitgliedstaaten zu erreichende Ziele vorgibt, es diesen aber überlässt, auf
welchem Weg sie diese Ziele erreichen.
Die vorgeschlagenen Bestimmungen beschränken sich dabei auf das unerlässliche
Mindestmaß, wobei – gestützt auf die Folgenabschätzung – die möglichen
Auswirkungen auf die bestehenden nationalen Systeme berücksichtigt werden.
Außerdem werden für die Umsetzung bestimmter Vorschriften der Richtlinie
großzügige Übergangsfristen eingeräumt.
x Wahl des Rechtsinstruments
Vorgeschlagenes Rechtsinstrument: Richtlinie.
Andere Rechtsinstrumente wären aus folgenden Gründen unangemessen:
Ein weniger verbindliches Instrument, wie z. B. ein Verhaltenskodex, könnte wohl
kaum das gewünschte Ergebnis bringen: die auf europäischer Ebene seit mehr als
fünfzehn Jahren laufenden Diskussionen haben nicht zur Einleitung einer
entsprechenden Initiative auf Basis der Freiwilligkeit geführt. Darüber hinaus sind
zahlreiche Grundelemente der Zusatzrentensysteme in nationalen Rechtsvorschriften
festgeschrieben.
Ein zwingenderes Rechtsinstrument, wie z. B. eine Verordnung, würde nicht den
Spielraum lassen, der erforderlich ist, um der großen Vielfalt der Zusatzrentensysteme
und den vielfach auf dem Grundsatz der Freiwilligkeit beruhenden Regelungen gerecht
zu werden.
4) AUSWIRKUNGEN AUF DEN HAUSHALT
Die Richtlinie hätte keine Auswirkungen auf den Gemeinschaftshaushalt.
5) ZUSÄTZLICHE ANGABEN
x Entsprechungstabelle
Die Mitgliedstaaten werden gebeten, der Kommission den Wortlaut der nationalen
Rechtsvorschriften, mit denen die Richtlinie umgesetzt wird, sowie eine
Entsprechungstabelle zu übermitteln, in der diese Vorschriften den Bestimmungen der
Richtlinie gegenübergestellt sind.
x Europäischer Wirtschaftsraum
Der vorgeschlagene Rechtsakt ist von Bedeutung für den Europäischen
Wirtschaftsraum und sollte deshalb auf den EWR ausgedehnt werden.
x Erläuterung des Vorschlags nach Kapiteln bzw. nach Artikeln
Gegenstand (Artikel 1)
Drucksache 16/1155 – 16 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Artikel 1 übernimmt die in 1.2 genannten Ziele und fasst sie zusammen.
Anwendungsbereich (Artikel 2)
Zur Wahrung der Kohärenz mit der Richtlinie 98/49/EG ist der Anwendungsbereich
identisch. Abgedeckt sind demnach alle Zusatzrentensysteme (wie in Artikel 3
definiert), mit Ausnahme der unter die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1408/71 des Rates vom
14. Juni 1971 (geänderte Fassung) fallenden Systeme.
Definitionen (Artikel 3)
In Anbetracht der großen Heterogenität der Zusatzrentensysteme der Mitgliedstaaten
erscheint es unerlässlich, bestimmte in diesem Vorschlag verwendete Begriffe zu
definieren.
Die Definitionen unter den Buchstaben a) („Zusatzrente“), b) („Zusatzrentensystem“)
und d) („Rentenansprüche“) entsprechen den in der Richtlinie 98/49/EG zu Grunde
gelegten Definitionen, um die Übereinstimmung mit dem Anwendungsbereich dieser
Richtlinie zu gewährleisten.
Anzumerken ist, dass der in diesem Vorschlag verwendete Begriff „Portabilität“ die
Möglichkeit bezeichnet, bei Ausscheiden aus einem Zusatzrentensystem
Zusatzrentenansprüche zu erwerben oder zu bewahren.
Bedingungen für den Anspruchserwerb (Artikel 4)
Um die negativen Auswirkungen der Bedingungen für den Erwerb von
Zusatzrentenansprüchen auf die Ausübung des Rechts auf Freizügigkeit
abzuschwächen, sieht der Richtlinienvorschlag folgende Flexibilisierungen vor:
- Ein Arbeitnehmer, der noch keine Zusatzrentenansprüche erworben, aber
bereits Beiträge geleistet hat, darf diese Beitragswerte nicht verlieren. Um dies
sicherzustellen, ist die Gesamtheit der Beiträge zurückzuerstatten oder zu übertragen.
- Die Festlegung eines hohen Mindestalters bestraft die Mobilität junger
Arbeitnehmer, wenn ein Arbeitsplatzwechsel vor Erreichen des Mindestalters den
Verlust der Rentenansprüche für den Zeitraum vor Erreichen des Mindestalters zur
Folge hat. Ein Arbeitnehmer muss Zusatzrentenansprüche spätestens ab dem Alter von
21 Jahren erwerben können.
- Die Wartezeit, während der der Arbeitnehmer keine Rentensprüche erwirbt,
muss verkürzt werden. Sie darf ein Jahr nicht übersteigen (außer wenn das Mindestalter
noch nicht erreicht ist). Auf diese Weise kann in den Systemen weiterhin insbesondere
die Koppelung der Wartezeit mit der Probezeit (die normalerweise ein Jahr nicht
übersteigt) praktiziert werden.
- Um zu gewährleisten, dass aus einem System ausscheidende Arbeitnehmer im
Laufe ihres Berufslebens ausreichende Zusatzrentenansprüche erwerben – insbesondere
wenn sie den Arbeitsplatz mehrfach wechseln –, muss die Möglichkeit der Einführung
von Unverfallbarkeitsfristen beschränkt werden, d. h. der Versicherungszeiten, nach
deren Ablauf der Arbeitnehmer erst Ansprüche erwirbt. Die Frist darf zwei Jahre nicht
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 17 – Drucksache 16/1155
übersteigen.
Wahrung ruhender Rentenansprüche (Artikel 5)
Bei einem Arbeitsplatzwechsel ist zu vermeiden, dass der Arbeitnehmer eine
Minderung der im Zusatzrentensystem seines ehemaligen Arbeitgebers verbleibenden
Rentenansprüche hinnehmen muss. Die Mitgliedstaaten verfügen über unterschiedliche
Anpassungsinstrumente in Abhängigkeit von der Entwicklung der Rentenansprüche der
erwerbstätigen Versorgungsanwärter.
Um überbordende Kosten als Folge der Verwaltung einer Fülle ruhender Ansprüche
geringfügigen Wertes zu vermeiden, sieht der Vorschlag die Möglichkeit vor,
Rentenansprüche nicht stehen zu lassen, sondern zu übertragen oder eine
Kapitalauszahlung in Höhe des Anspruchswerts vorzunehmen, vorausgesetzt, der Wert
überschreitet nicht einen vom jeweiligen Mitgliedstaat festgesetzten Schwellenbetrag.
Übertragbarkeit (Artikel 6)
Der Richtlinienvorschlag sieht vor, dass der ausscheidende Arbeitnehmer bei einem
Arbeitsplatzwechsel die Wahl haben muss zwischen dem Erhalt seiner Ansprüche im
Rahmen des Zusatzrentensystems, dem er bisher angehörte, und der Übertragung seiner
Ansprüche. Dies gilt nicht, wenn er an seinem neuen Arbeitsplatz demselben
Zusatzrentensystem angehört oder wenn aufgrund des geringen Werts der erworbenen
Ansprüche der Anspruchswert ausgezahlt wird.
Entscheidet der Arbeitnehmer sich für eine Übertragung der Ansprüche, so darf für ihn
kein Nachteil entstehen, weder bei der Berechnung des zwischen dem abgebenden und
dem aufnehmenden System übertragenen Anspruchswerts noch durch übermäßige
Verwaltungskosten.
Auskünfte (Artikel 7)
Artikel 7 ergänzt die auf europäischer Ebene bestehenden Bestimmungen zur
Auskunftspflicht, wie sie in der Richtlinie 2003/41/EG vorgesehen sind. Da der
Anwendungsbereich der vorgeschlagenen Richtlinie, der auch die nicht
kapitalgedeckten Systeme einschließt, umfassender ist als der Anwendungsbereich der
Richtlinie 2003/41/EG, müssen zusätzliche Bestimmungen aufgenommen werden. Im
Übrigen betrifft die Richtlinie 2003/41/EG nur die Versorgungsanwärtern und
Leistungsempfängern zu erteilenden Auskünfte. Hier ist eine Ergänzung vonnöten:
jeder (potenziell) ausscheidende Arbeitnehmer – Mitglied oder nicht – muss darüber
aufgeklärt werden, wie sich eine Beendigung der Beschäftigung auf die
Zusatzrentenansprüche auswirkt.
Mindestvorschriften – Rückschrittsklausel (Artikel 8)
Im Geiste der Verwirklichung des Binnenmarkts und der damit verbundenen sozialen
Zielsetzungen würde der Richtlinienvorschlag kein Hindernis bilden für die
Anwendung vorteilhafterer Bestimmungen der Mitgliedstaaten zur Portabilität.
Gleichzeitig schließt er jedoch alle Maßnahmen aus, die einen Rückschritt gegenüber
der bestehenden Portabilitätsregelung darstellen würden.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 18 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Umsetzung (Artikel 9)
In Anbetracht der Vielfalt der Zusatzrentensysteme der Mitgliedstaaten wird in dem
Richtlinienvorschlag ein flexibler Ansatz in der Anwendung bestimmter Vorschriften
zu den Bedingungen des Erwerbs und der Übertragung von Rentenansprüchen zu
Grunde gelegt. Den Mitgliedstaaten kann demzufolge eine zusätzliche Frist für die
Umsetzung bestimmter Vorschriften eingeräumt werden, die auf kurze Sicht zu
übermäßigen Belastungen führen könnten.
In Anbetracht der wichtigen Rolle der Sozialpartner in der Organisation und
Verwaltung der betrieblichen Zusatzrentensysteme sieht die Richtlinie vor, dass die
Mitgliedstaaten die Sozialpartner mit der Durchführung betrauen können.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 19 – Drucksache 16/1155
2005/0214 (COD)
Vorschlag für eine
RICHTLINIE DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS UND DES RATES
zur Verbesserung der Portabilität von Zusatzrentenansprüchen
(Text von Bedeutung für den EWR)
DAS EUROPÄISCHE PARLAMENT UND DER RAT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION –
gestützt auf den Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, insbesondere auf die
Artikel 42 und 94,
auf Vorschlag der Kommission9,
nach Stellungnahme des Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschusses10,
nach Stellungnahme des Ausschusses der Regionen11,
gemäß dem Verfahren des Artikels 251 EG-Vertrag12,
in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe:
(1) Die Freizügigkeit ist eine der von der Gemeinschaft garantierten Grundfreiheiten. Der
Vertrag sieht in Artikel 42 vor, dass der Rat gemäß dem Verfahren des Artikels 251
die auf dem Gebiet der sozialen Sicherheit für die Herstellung der Freizügigkeit der
Arbeitnehmer notwendigen Maßnahmen beschließt.
(2) Die Alterssicherung der Arbeitnehmer wird durch die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung
gewährleistet, ergänzt durch die mit einem Beschäftigungsverhältnis gekoppelten
Zusatzversicherungssysteme, die in den Mitgliedstaaten immer mehr an Bedeutung
gewinnen.
(3) Der Rat verfügt über einen großen Ermessensspielraum in der Wahl der Maßnahmen
zur Realisierung der Zielvorgaben in Artikel 42 des Vertrags. Das
Koordinierungssystem, wie es vorgesehen ist in der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1408/71
des Rates vom 1. Juni 1971 zur Anwendung der Systeme der sozialen Sicherheit auf
Arbeitnehmer und deren Familien, die innerhalb der Gemeinschaft zu- und
9 ABl. C […] vom […], S. […].
10 ABl. C […] vom […], S. […].
11 ABl. C […] vom […], S. […].
12 ABl. C […] vom […], S. […].
Drucksache 16/1155 – 20 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
abwandern13, und in der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 574/72 des Rates vom 21. März 1972
über die Durchführung der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1408/7114, und insbesondere die
Bestimmungen zur Zusammenrechnung der Versicherungszeiten, gelten nicht für die
Zusatzrentensysteme, ausgenommen die Systeme, die Gegenstand von
„Rechtsvorschriften“ im Sinne von Artikel 1 Buchstabe j) erster Unterabsatz der
Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1408/71 oder auf der Basis dieses Artikels Gegenstand einer
entsprechenden Erklärung eines Mitgliedstaats sind. Die Zusatzrentensysteme
erfordern demzufolge spezifische Maßnahmen, die ihrem besonderen Charakter und
der Unterschiedlichkeit der Systeme innerhalb der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten und
zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten sowie insbesondere auch der Rolle der Sozialpartner in
der Anwendung dieser Systeme Rechnung tragen.
(4) Die Richtlinie 98/49/EG des Rates vom 29. Juni 1998 zur Wahrung ergänzender
Rentenansprüche von Arbeitnehmern und Selbstständigen, die innerhalb der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft zu- und abwandern15, ist eine erste spezifische
Maßnahme, die darauf abzielt, die Ausübung des Rechts der Arbeitnehmer auf
Freizügigkeit im Bereich der Zusatzrentensysteme zu erleichtern.
(5) Heranzuziehen in diesem Kontext ist auch Artikel 94 des Vertrags, denn die
Unterschiede zwischen den nationalen Rechtsvorschriften für die Zusatzrentensysteme
sind so geartet, dass sie die Freizügigkeit der Arbeitnehmer und das Funktionieren des
Binnenmarkts behindern. Zur Verbesserung der Portabilität von aus
Zusatzversorgungssystemen erwachsenden Ansprüchen von Arbeitnehmern, die
innerhalb der Gemeinschaft oder innerhalb eines Mitgliedstaats zu- und abwandern,
müssen deshalb bestimmte Bedingungen für den Erwerb von Rentenanwartschaften
vereinheitlicht und Regelungen zur Wahrung ruhender Ansprüche und zur
Übertragung von Ansprüchen angeglichen werden.
(6) Um zu gewährleisten, dass die Bedingungen für den Erwerb von
Zusatzrentenansprüchen das Recht der Arbeitnehmer in der Europäischen Union auf
Freizügigkeit nicht beeinträchtigen, gilt es die Bedingungen für den Erwerb von
Ansprüchen so zu regeln, dass der Arbeitnehmer bei Ausübung seines Rechts auf
Freizügigkeit oder bei Zu- und Abwanderung innerhalb eines Mitgliedstaats am Ende
seiner beruflichen Laufbahn eine Rente in angemessener Höhe bezieht.
(7) Außerdem ist darüber zu wachen, eine faire Anpassung der ruhenden
Rentenansprüche sicher zu stellen und damit zu gewährleisten, dass ausscheidende
Arbeitnehmer nicht benachteiligt werden.. Erreicht werden könnte dies durch eine
Anpassung ruhender Ansprüche in Abhängigkeit von der Entwicklung verschiedener
Referenzgrößen, darunter die Inflationsrate, das Lohnniveau, die aktuellen
Rentenleistungen und die vom Zusatzversicherungsträger erzielte Kapitalrendite.
(8) Um zu vermeiden, dass die Verwaltung einer Vielzahl ruhender Ansprüche mit
geringfügigem Wert übermäßig hohe Kosten verursacht, muss den Rentensystemen
die Möglichkeit eingeräumt werden, die erworbenen Ansprüche nicht zu erhalten,
13 ABl. L 149 vom 5.7.1971, S. 1. Verordnung zuletzt geändert durch Verordnung (EG) Nr. 631/2004
(ABl. L 100 du 6.4.2004, S. 1).
14 ABl. L 74 vom 27.3.1972, S. 1. Verordnung zuletzt geändert durch Verordnung (EG) Nr. 77/2005
(ABl. L 16 vom 20.1.2005, S. 3).
15 ABl. L 209 vom 25.7.1998, S. 46.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 21 – Drucksache 16/1155
sondern eine Übertragung oder Kapitalauszahlung in Höhe des Anspruchswerts
vorzunehmen, soweit diese nicht einen vom betreffenden Mitgliedstaat festgelegten
Schwellenwert übersteigt.
(9) Bei einem Arbeitsplatzwechsel müssen Arbeitnehmer wählen können zwischen dem
Erhalt ihrer Zusatzrentenansprüche im Rahmen des bisherigen Zusatzrentensystems
und einer Kapitalübertragung auf ein anderes Zusatzrentensystem, und zwar auch auf
ein System in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat.
(10) Aus Gründen der finanziellen Tragfähigkeit der Zusatzrentensysteme können die
Mitgliedstaaten nicht kapitalgedeckte Systeme grundsätzlich von der Verpflichtung
freistellen, den Arbeitnehmern die Übertragung der erworbenen Ansprüche zu
ermöglichen. Um die Gleichbehandlung der Arbeitnehmer, die in einem
Kapitaldeckungssystem versichert sind, mit den Arbeitnehmern, die in den in Artikel 9
Absatz 3 genannten Systemen versichert sind, zu gewährleisten, müssen sich die
Mitgliedstaaten jedoch bemühen, die Übertragbarkeit der Ansprüche aus nicht
kapitalgedeckten Systemen nach und nach zu verbessern.
(11) Unbeschadet der Richtlinie 2003/41/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates
vom 3. Juni 2003 über die Tätigkeiten und die Beaufsichtigung von Einrichtungen der
betrieblichen Altersversorgung16 sind Arbeitnehmer, die das Recht auf Freizügigkeit
wahrnehmen oder wahrnehmen wollen, von der für die Verwaltung des
Zusatzrentensystems verantwortlichen Person angemessen insbesondere darüber
aufzuklären, welche Folgen die Beendigung eines Beschäftigungsverhältnisses für ihre
Zusatzrentenansprüche hat.
(12) In Anbetracht der Vielfalt der ergänzenden sozialen Sicherungssysteme muss die
Gemeinschaft sich darauf beschränken, innerhalb eines allgemeinen Rahmens Ziele
vorzugeben. Eine Richtlinie ist daher das angemessene Rechtsinstrument.
(13) Das Ziel der vorgesehenen Maßnahme, also der Abbau der Hindernisse für die
Ausübung des Rechts auf Freizügigkeit durch die Arbeitnehmer und für das
Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts, kann auf der Ebene der Mitgliedstaaten nicht in
ausreichendem Maße realisiert werden. Aus diesem Grund und in Anbetracht der
Reichweite der Maßnahmen empfiehlt sich eine Aktion auf Gemeinschaftsebene. Im
Einklang mit dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip gemäß Artikel 5 des Vertrags kann
dementsprechend die Gemeinschaft tätig werden. Dem in diesem Artikel dargelegten
Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit folgend beschränkt sich die vorliegende Richtlinie,
gestützt insbesondere auf eine in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausschuss für zusätzliche
Altersversorgung vorgenommene Folgenabschätzung, auf das zur Realisierung des
genannten Ziels erforderliche Mindestmaß.
(14) Die vorliegende Richtlinie legt Mindestanforderungen fest. Dies lässt den
Mitgliedstaaten die Freiheit, vorteilhaftere Bestimmungen zu erlassen oder
beizubehalten. Die Umsetzung der vorliegenden Richtlinie kann keinen Rückschritt
gegenüber der in einem Mitgliedstaat bestehenden Situation rechtfertigen.
16 ABl. L 235 vom 23.9.2003, S.10.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 22 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
(15) Den Auswirkungen der vorliegenden Richtlinie insbesondere auf die finanzielle
Tragfähigkeit der Zusatzrentensysteme ist Rechnung zu tragen. Die Mitgliedstaaten
können deshalb eine zusätzliche Frist für die progressive Umsetzung der
Bestimmungen in Anspruch nehmen, die entsprechende Auswirkungen haben können.
(16) In Einklang mit den nationalen Bestimmungen zur Verwaltung der
Zusatzrentensysteme können die Mitgliedstaaten die Sozialpartner auf deren
gemeinsames Verlangen mit der Durchführung der in den Anwendungsbereich von
Tarifverträgen fallenden Bestimmungen der Richtlinie betrauen, vorausgesetzt, sie
treffen alle erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um zu garantieren, dass die Realisierung der
mit der Richtlinie angestrebten Ziele zu jedem Zeitpunkt gewährleistet ist –
HABEN FOLGENDE RICHTLINIE ERLASSEN:
Artikel 1
Gegenstand
Die vorliegende Richtlinie soll den Arbeitnehmern die Wahrnehmung des Rechts auf
Freizügigkeit und des Rechts auf innerstaatliche berufliche Mobilität dadurch erleichtern, dass
durch einzelne Bestimmungen der in den Mitgliedstaaten bestehenden Zusatzrentensysteme
bedingte Hindernisse abgebaut werden.
Artikel 2
Anwendungsbereich
Diese Richtlinie gilt für Zusatzrentensysteme, ausgenommen die unter die Verordnung
(EWG) Nr. 1408/71 fallenden Systeme.
Artikel 3
Definitionen
Für die Zwecke dieser Richtlinie gelten folgende Begriffsbestimmungen:
(a) „Zusatzrente“: die Altersrente und, sofern gemäß den Bestimmungen des nach
einzelstaatlichen Rechtsvorschriften und Gepflogenheiten eingerichteten
Zusatzrentensystems vorgesehen, die Invaliditäts- und Hinterbliebenenrenten,
durch die für dieselben Versicherungsfälle von den gesetzlichen
Sozialversicherungssystemen gewährte Leistungen ergänzt oder ersetzt
werden.
(b) „Zusatzrentensystem“: Nach einzelstaatlichen Rechtsvorschriften und
Gepflogenheiten eingerichtetes betriebliches Rentensystem, beispielsweise ein
Gruppenversicherungsvertrag oder ein branchenweit oder sektoral vereinbartes
System nach dem Umlageverfahren, ein Kapitaldeckungssystem oder
Rentenversprechen auf der Grundlage von Pensionsrückstellungen der
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 23 – Drucksache 16/1155
Unternehmen oder eine tarifliche oder sonstige vergleichbare Regelung, die
Zusatzrentenleistungen für Arbeitnehmer oder Selbständige bietet.
(c) „Versorgungsanwärter“: Personen, die aufgrund ihrer beruflichen Tätigkeit
nach den Bestimmungen eines Zusatzrentensystems Anspruch auf
Zusatzrentenleistungen haben oder haben werden.
(d) „Rentenansprüche“: Leistung, auf die Versorgungsanwärter und sonstige
Anspruchsberechtigte im Rahmen der Regelungen eines Zusatzrentensystems
und gegebenenfalls nach einzelstaatlichem Recht Anspruch haben.
(e) „Beendigung des Beschäftigungsverhältnisses“: Entscheidung, ein
Arbeitsverhältnis zu beenden.
(f) „Ausscheidender Arbeitnehmer“: Arbeitnehmer, der vor Erwerb einer
Rentenanwartschaft ein Beschäftigungsverhältnis beendet, in dessen Rahmen
er Rentenansprüche aufgebaut hat, oder bei Verbleiben in dem jeweiligen
Beschäftigungsverhältnis Rentenansprüche erworben hätte.
(g) „Portabilität“: Möglichkeit für den Arbeitnehmer, bei Wahrnehmung seines
Rechts auf Freizügigkeit oder auf berufliche Mobilität Rentenansprüche zu
erwerben und zu bewahren.
(h) „Versorgungsanwärter mit aufgeschobenen Ansprüchen“: Ehemaliges
Mitglied, dessen Ansprüche auf Rentenleistungen im Rahmen des
Zusatzrentensystems so lange ruhen, bis die Voraussetzungen für den Bezug
einer Zusatzrente erfüllt sind.
(i) „Ruhende Rentenansprüche“: Von einem ehemaligen Versorgungsanwärter im
Rahmen des Systems erworbene Rentenansprüche, die einen Anspruch auf
Zusatzrentenleistungen bedingen, wenn die Leistungsvoraussetzungen erfüllt
sind.
(j) „Anspruchsübertragung“: Im Rahmen eines Zusatzrentensystems Auszahlung
von Kapital, das einen Teil oder die Gesamtheit des in diesem System
erworbenen Anspruchswerts ausmacht; dabei kann dieses Kapital auf ein neues
Rentensystem übertragen oder an ein anderes Altersversorgungsmodelle
anbietendes Finanzinstitut transferiert werden.
Artikel 4
Bedingungen für den Anspruchserwerb
Die Mitgliedstaaten treffen die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um Folgendes sicherzustellen:
(a) Ist zum Zeitpunkt der Beendigung eines Beschäftigungsverhältnisses noch
keine Rentenanwartschaft begründet, so werden die gesamten vom
Arbeitnehmer oder vom Arbeitgeber im Namen des
Arbeitnehmerseingezahlten Beiträge erstattet oder übertragen.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 24 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
(b) Ein für den Erwerb von Rentenansprüchen festgelegtes Mindestalter darf 21
Jahre nicht übersteigen.
(c) Arbeitnehmer können nach einer Beschäftigungsdauer von einem Jahr oder
gegebenenfalls spätestens bei Erreichen des vorgeschriebenen Mindestalters
Mitglied eines Zusatzrentensystems werden.
(d) Arbeitnehmer erwerben nach einer Mitgliedschaft von maximal zwei Jahren
eine Rentenanwartschaft.
Artikel 5
Wahrung ruhender Rentenansprüche
1. Die Mitgliedstaaten nehmen die Maßnahmen die ihnen notwendig erscheinen um
eine faire Anpassung der ruhenden Rentenansprüche sicher zu stellen und damit zu
gewährleisten, dass ausscheidende Arbeitnehmer nicht benachteiligt werden.
2. Die Mitgliedstaaten können den Zusatzrentensystemen die Möglichkeit einräumen,
erworbene Ansprüche nicht zu erhalten, sondern in Höhe der erworbenen Ansprüche
Kapital zu übertragen oder auszuzahlen, soweit der Wert den vom betreffenden
Mitgliedstaat festgelegten Schwellenwert nicht überschreitet. Die Mitgliedstaaten
teilen der Kommission den jeweiligen Schwellenwert mit.
Artikel 6
Übertragbarkeit
1. Vorbehaltlich der Möglichkeit einer Kapitalauszahlung gemäß Artikel 5 Absatz 2
stellen die Mitgliedstaaten sicher, dass ein ausscheidender Arbeitnehmer, der in
seinem neuen Arbeitsverhältnis nicht demselben Zusatzrentensystem angeschlossen
ist, binnen 18 Monaten nach Beendigung des früheren Beschäftigungsverhältnisses
seine gesamten erworbenen Rentenansprüche innerhalb des betreffenden
Mitgliedstaats oder in einen anderen Mitgliedstaat übertragen lassen kann.
2. Die Mitgliedstaaten, im Einklang mit nationalen Gepflogenheiten, stellen sicher, dass
wenn versicherungsmathematische Annahmen und Annahmen zu den Zinssätzen den
Wert der zu übertragenden erworbenen Ansprüche bestimmen, diese dem
ausscheidenden Arbeitnehmer nicht zum Nachteil gereichen dürfen.
3. Das die Übertragung aufnehmende Zusatzrentensystem unterwirft die übertragenen
Ansprüche keinen für den Arbeitnehmer nachteiligen Bedingungen und garantiert die
Wahrung dieser Ansprüche mindestens unter denselben Bedingungen, die für
ruhende Ansprüche gemäß Artikel 5 Absatz 1 gelten.
4. Fallen bei einer Übertragung Verwaltungskosten an, so treffen die Mitgliedstaaten
die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um auszuschließen, dass diese in einem
unangemessenen Verhältnis zur Dauer der Mitgliedschaft des ausscheidenden
Arbeitnehmers stehen.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 25 – Drucksache 16/1155
Artikel 7
Auskünfte
1. Vorbehaltlich der Verpflichtungen der Einrichtungen der betrieblichen
Altersversorgung gemäß Artikel 11 der Richtlinie 2003/41/EG in Bezug auf die
Auskunftspflicht gegenüber Versorgungsanwärtern und Leistungsempfängern stellen
die Mitgliedstaaten sicher, dass die Arbeitnehmer von der für die Verwaltung des
Zusatzrentensystems zuständigen Person über die Folgen einer Beendigung des
Beschäftigungsverhältnisses für ihre Zusatzrentenansprüche aufgeklärt werden.
2. Den Arbeitnehmern werden auf ihr Verlangen und binnen einer angemessenen Frist
insbesondere folgende ausreichende Auskünfte erteilt:
(a) die Bedingungen für den Erwerb von Zusatzrentenansprüchen und die Folgen
der Anwendung dieser Bedingungen bei Beendigung des
Beschäftigungsverhältnisses;
(b) bei Beendigung des Beschäftigungsverhältnisses vorgesehene Rentenleistung;
(c) die Bedingungen für den Erhalt ruhender Rentenansprüche;
(d) die Bedingungen für die Übertragung erworbener Rentenansprüche.
3. Ein Versorgungsanwärter mit aufgeschobenen Ansprüchen wird auf sein Verlangen
von der für die Verwaltung des Zusatzrentensystems verantwortlichen Person über
seine ruhenden Rentenansprüche und alle seine Ansprüche betreffenden
Veränderungen der Zusatzrentenregelungen informiert.
4. Die in diesem Artikel genannten Informationen werden schriftlich und in leicht
verständlicher Form übermittelt.
Artikel 8
Mindestvorschriften – Rückschrittsklausel
1. In Bezug auf die Übertragbarkeit von Zusatzrentenansprüchen können die
Mitgliedstaaten Bestimmungen erlassen oder beibehalten, die vorteilhafter sind als
die in der Richtlinie vorgesehenen.
2. Die Umsetzung der Richtlinie kann in keinem Fall Anlass dafür sein, die in den
Mitgliedstaaten bestehende Portabilität von Zusatzrentenansprüchen zu beschneiden.
Artikel 9
Umsetzung
1. Die Mitgliedstaaten erlassen bis spätestens zum 1. Juli 2008 die erforderlichen
Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften, um dieser Richtlinie nachzukommen; sie
haben jedoch auch die Möglichkeit, die Sozialpartner auf deren gemeinsames
Drucksache 16/1155 – 26 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Verlangen mit der Durchführung der Richtlinie für die in den Anwendungsbereich
von Tarifverträgen fallenden Bestimmungen zu betrauen. In diesem Fall stellen sie
sicher, dass die Sozialpartner bis spätestens zum 1. Juli 2008 einvernehmlich die
erforderlichen Bestimmungen umgesetzt haben. Dabei müssen die betreffenden
Mitgliedstaaten alle erforderlichen Schritte unternehmen, um jederzeit die
Realisierung der von der Richtlinie vorgegebenen Ziele zu gewährleisten. Sie
unterrichten die Kommission unverzüglich davon.
2. Vorbehaltlich der Bestimmungen in Absatz 1 können die Mitgliedstaaten nötigenfalls
eine Zusatzfrist von 60 Monaten, vom 1. Juli 2008 an gerechnet, für die Umsetzung
der Zielvorgabe in Artikel 4 Buchstaben d) und e) in Anspruch nehmen. Jeder
Mitgliedstaat, der diese Zusatzfrist beanspruchen möchte, setzt die Kommission
davon unter Angabe der betreffenden Bestimmungen und Systeme in Kenntnis; die
Inanspruchnahme der Zusatzfrist ist konkret zu begründen.
3. Vorbehaltlich der Bestimmungen in Absatz 1 und bei Vorliegen ausreichend
begründeter spezieller Bedingungen, die mit der finanziellen Tragfähigkeit und der
Abdeckung durch Zusatzrentensysteme in Verbindung stehen, können die
Mitgliedstaaten die nach dem Umlageverfahren finanzierten Systeme, die
Unterstützungskassen und die Unternehmen, die Pensionsrückstellungen für ihre
Beschäftigten vornehmen, von der Anwendung des Artikels 6 Absatz 1 freistellen.
Jeder Mitgliedstaat, der diese Möglichkeit in Anspruch nehmen möchte, setzt die
Kommission davon unter Angabe der betreffenden Systeme und mit einer
spezifischen Begründung für diese Freistellung in Kenntnis, und er teilt mit, welche
Maßnahmen getroffen wurden oder geplant sind, um die Übertragbarkeit der
Ansprüche aus diesen Systemen zu verbessern.
4. Bei Erlass dieser Vorschriften nehmen die Mitgliedstaaten in den Vorschriften selbst
oder durch einen Hinweis bei der amtlichen Veröffentlichung auf diese Richtlinie
Bezug. Die Mitgliedstaaten regeln die Einzelheiten der Bezugnahme.
5. Die Mitgliedstaaten informieren die Kommission über die Maßnahmen zur
Umsetzung der Bestimmungen in Artikel 5.
Artikel 10
Berichterstattung
1. Alle fünf Jahre ab dem 1. Juli 2008 erstellt die Kommission auf der Grundlage der
von den Mitgliedstaaten gelieferten Informationen einen Bericht, der dem Rat, dem
Europäischen Parlament, dem Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss und
dem Ausschuss der Regionen vorzulegen ist.
2. Spätestens 10 Jahre nach dem 1. Juli 2008 erstellt die Kommission einen gesonderten
Bericht zur Anwendung des Artikels 9 Absatz 3. Auf dieser Grundlage wird die
Kommission gegebenenfalls einen Vorschlag mit allen Änderungen der vorliegenden
Richtlinie vorlegen, die sich als erforderlich erweisen, um hinsichtlich der
Übertragbarkeit erworbener Ansprüche die Gleichbehandlung der Arbeitnehmer, die
in einem Kapitaldeckungssystem versichert sind, mit den Arbeitnehmern, die in den
in Artikel 9 Absatz 3 genannten Systemen versichert sind, zu gewährleisten.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 27 – Drucksache 16/1155
Artikel 11
Inkrafttreten
Diese Richtlinie tritt am 20sten Tag nach Veröffentlichung im Amtsblatt der Europäischen
Union in Kraft.
Artikel 12
Adressaten
Diese Richtlinie ist an die Mitgliedstaaten gerichtet.
Brüssel, den
Für das Europäische Parlament Für den Rat
Der Präsident Der Präsident
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 29 – Drucksache 16/1155
COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Brussels, 24 October 2005
Interinstitutional File:
2005/0214 (COD)
13686/05
ADD 1
SOC 412
ECOFIN 324
CODEC 933
COVER NOTE
from: Secretary-General of the European Commission,
signed by Mr Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU, Director
date of receipt: 24 October 2005
to: Mr Javier SOLANA, Secretary-General/High Representative
Subject: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
improving the portability of supplementary pension rights
Delegations will find attached Commission document SEC(2005) 1293.
________________________
Encl.: SEC(2005) 1293
Drucksache 16/1155 – 30 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Brussels, 20.10.2005
SEC(2005) 1293
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Annex to the:
"Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the
improvement of portability of supplementary pension rights"
{COM(2005) 507 final}
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 31 – Drucksache 16/1155
Used terminology ..................................................................................................................... 34
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 34
1. The issue: Supplementary pension provision and free movement of workers................. 35
2. The problem: Aspects of supplementary pension provision constituting obstacles to
portability ................................................................................................................... 44
2.1. Acquisition.................................................................................................................. 44
2.2. Preservation of dormant rights .................................................................................. 46
2.3. Transferability............................................................................................................ 46
2.4. Information requirements .......................................................................................... 46
2.5. General conclusion: a need to undertake action to improve portability ................... 47
3. Objectives......................................................................................................................... 48
4. Policy options considered and selection of preferred option ........................................... 48
4.1. Do nothing.................................................................................................................. 48
4.2. European Collective agreement ................................................................................. 49
4.3. Code of conduct ......................................................................................................... 49
4.4. Legislative action ....................................................................................................... 50
4.5. Conclusion: need for a Directive................................................................................ 51
4.5.1. Scope .......................................................................................................................... 51
4.5.2. Legal basis.................................................................................................................. 51
5. sub-options for improving portability within the framework of the preferred policy
option.......................................................................................................................... 52
5.1. Acquisition of supplementary pension rights............................................................. 52
5.1.1. Waiting periods .......................................................................................................... 52
5.1.2. Minimum age ............................................................................................................. 52
5.1.3. Vesting periods........................................................................................................... 53
5.2. Preservation of dormant pension rights...................................................................... 53
5.3. Transferability of supplementary pension rights........................................................ 54
5.4. Information requirements........................................................................................... 54
6. Impacts of the sub-options considered ............................................................................. 54
6.1. Elements of impact taken into account ...................................................................... 55
6.2. Acquisition of supplementary pension rights............................................................. 57
Drucksache 16/1155 – 32 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
6.2.1. Waiting periods .......................................................................................................... 57
6.2.2. Minimum age ............................................................................................................. 59
6.2.3. Vesting periods........................................................................................................... 63
6.3. Preservation of dormant pension rights...................................................................... 65
6.4. Transferability of supplementary pension rights........................................................ 68
6.5. Information requirements........................................................................................... 71
7. The selected measures and their impact ........................................................................... 72
7.1. Acquisition conditions ............................................................................................... 72
7.1.1. Waiting periods .......................................................................................................... 72
7.1.2. Minimum ages............................................................................................................ 73
7.1.3. Vesting periods........................................................................................................... 73
7.1.4. Impact of the proposed measures on acquisition ....................................................... 73
7.2. Preservation of dormant rights ................................................................................... 74
7.2.1. Impact as concerns the measures proposed on preservation...................................... 74
7.3. Transferability ............................................................................................................ 75
7.3.1. Impact of the measures proposed on transferability .................................................. 76
7.4. Information provision................................................................................................. 76
7.4.1. Impact of the measures proposed on information provision...................................... 77
8. Further Monitoring and Evaluation.................................................................................. 77
Annex: Overview of the consequences of the proposed measures for the supplementary
pension systems in the Member States....................................................................... 78
Annex: The impact of the proposed measures on the main types of supplementary pension
provision in the EU. ................................................................................................... 83
Annex: EU initiatives already taken in the field of supplementary pension provision –
mobility of workers .................................................................................................... 85
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 85
1.1. Directive 98/49/CE..................................................................................................... 85
1.2. The Pensions Forum .................................................................................................. 86
1.3. Directive 2003/41/EC................................................................................................. 87
1.4. Taxation...................................................................................................................... 87
Annex: Description of Stakeholder consultation ..................................................................... 90
1. Consultation social partners ............................................................................................. 90
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 33 – Drucksache 16/1155
1.1. Consultation of social partners: first stage ................................................................. 90
1.2. Consultation of social partners: second stage ............................................................ 92
2. Involvement of the Pensions Forum................................................................................. 92
Annex: Current situation in the Member States ....................................................................... 94
Drucksache 16/1155 – 34 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
USED TERMINOLOGY
supplementary pension means retirement pensions and, where provided for by the rules of a
supplementary pension scheme established in conformity with national legislation and
practice, invalidity and survivors' benefits, intended to supplement or replace those provided
in respect of the same contingencies by statutory social security schemes;
supplementary pension scheme means any occupational pension scheme established in
conformity with national legislation and practice such as, amongst others, such as a group
insurance contract or pay-as-you-go scheme agreed by one or more branches or sectors,
funded scheme or pension promise backed by book reserves, or any collective or other
comparable arrangement intended to provide a supplementary pension for employed or self-
employed persons;
scheme members means those persons whose occupation entitles them or is likely to entitle
them to a supplementary pension in accordance with the provisions of a supplementary
pension scheme;
pension rights means any benefits to which a scheme member or others holding entitlement
are entitled under the rules of a supplementary pension scheme, and where relevant, under
national legislation ;
termination of employment means a decision to terminate an employment relationship;
early leaver means a worker who, before becoming eligible for a pension, leaves the
occupation in which she/he has been acquiring pension rights or would be acquiring pension
rights if she/he remained in that occupation;
portability means the possibility for a worker to acquire and preserve pension entitlements
when exercising his right of free movement;
deferred beneficiary means a former scheme member with pension rights that remain
dormant in the scheme until becoming eligible for drawing a supplementary pension;
dormant pension rights means pension rights that remain in the scheme under which they
were acquired by a deferred scheme beneficiary. The deferred scheme beneficiary will obtain
a pension benefit when she/he eligible for drawing a pension ;
transfer means the transfer from one pension scheme of a capital representing (entirely or
part of) the pension rights acquired under that scheme to another scheme or to another
financial institution for the purpose of providing pension benefits.
INTRODUCTION
The recently adopted Lisbon action plan1 identifies as one of the central policy areas the
improvement of the adaptability of workers and enterprises and the flexibility of labour
1
Lisbon Action Plan incorporating EU Lisbon Programme and recommendations for actions to Member
States for inclusion in their national Lisbon Programmes - SEC(2005)192
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 35 – Drucksache 16/1155
markets. One of the policy measures at the Community concerns the promotion of labour
mobility by removing obstacles to labour mobility arising from occupational pension
schemes. This goal should be reached by means of European legislation on portability of
occupational pension to be adopted by 2007. In the light of the impact on growth and jobs, the
action plan indicates that this initiative will result in workers being more likely to pursue
employment opportunities where the best use of their productive potential can be made. The
Commission will report on the progress on this initiative in its integrated report to the Spring
European Council2 for the first time in January 2006.
The integrated guidelines for growth and jobs (2005-2008)3 underline the need to develop
policies that increase the responsiveness of labour markets and enhance occupational and
geographical mobility as means to ensure that euro area Member States have the capacity to
rapidly adjust to shocks and to help to reduce unwarranted inflation differences between
Member States. Guideline 21 calls for the promotion of flexibility combined with
employment security and the reduction of labour segmentation, having due regard to the role
of the social partners, through support for transitions in occupational status, including
training, self-employment, business creation and geographic mobility.
Drawing up an impact assessment is not compulsory in this case. The choice to do so
nevertheless has been made in the interest of transparency on the reasons for selecting a
directive as the preferred policy option and on the expected impacts of the different options
for designing the key parameters of the proposal. This impact assessment presents the
outcome of the consultations and research by the Commission services in order to assess the
measures to be taken to remove obstacles to mobility arising from occupational pension
schemes.
1. THE ISSUE: SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION PROVISION AND FREE MOVEMENT OF
WORKERS
Background
Free movement of persons, i.e. citizens' right to live and work in another Member State, is one
of the fundamental freedoms of the European Union, enshrined in the Treaty.
Renewed emphasis has been put on the free movement of workers in the recently adopted
Commission work programme 20054, announcing the year 2006 as the "European Year of
Mobility for workers" as a means of promoting geographical mobility within and between
Member States as a contribution to improving the efficiency of European labour markets,
economic performance, the professional prospects of workers and the quality of living and
working conditions.
2 As announced by the Commission document "Delivering on growth and jobs: a new and integrated
economic and Employment co-ordination cycle in the EU" - SEC(2005)193
3
Note from Council (Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs) to the European Council
9927/05, Brussels, 8 June 2005.
4 COM (2005)15 of 26 January 2005
Drucksache 16/1155 – 36 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
The decision to change job and to work in another country is likely to depend on a variety of
factors5, but social security must be an important consideration as a large share of people's
income is ear-marked for building up pension rights. If people have reason to believe that
changing jobs and moving (to another Member State) will entail costs - in terms of their social
security rights – this will act as a disincentive to using their right of free movement (indeed,
some simple numerical examples in chapter 2 give indications on how workers risk being
penalised in terms of their pension rights because of their mobility). This tendency will
become more pronounced in the context of an ageing working population; older workers tend
to be more attentive to the building up of an adequate pension and will therefore be even more
reluctant to change jobs when they face a potential loss in pension rights due to mobility.
True free movement therefore is not possible without protecting the social security rights of
migrant workers and their families. This problem has been acknowledged since the creation of
the European Community and appropriate provisions have been enshrined in the Treaty.
Regulation 1408/71 on the co-ordination of social security systems for people who move
within the Union is today with its successive amendments a centrepiece in ensuring free
movement in view of statutory social security systems6.
Whilst this Regulation has been very successful in protecting people's rights under statutory
schemes, its effectiveness is diminished by the trend to increasing reliance on supplementary
provisions which are not covered by the co-ordination rules. This development has been well
documented throughout the 1990s in the different editions of the "Social Protection in
Europe" reports. More recently, it has been confirmed by the findings of the work carried out
jointly by Member States and the Commission in the framework of the "open method of
coordination" (OMC): the national strategy reports on pension reform presented by the
Member States in September 20027 show that reforms already adopted or envisaged in
response to the common challenge of an ageing population tend to foresee a greater role for
supplementary pension provision, thus adding to the importance of improving the portability
of supplementary pension rights so as to improve the social protection of mobile workers and
their families. Public policy tends to compensate for the decreasing ability of statutory
pension schemes to preserve the living standards achieved before retirement by promoting
supplementary pensions which therefore become an increasingly important element of social
protection. The discussion in the framework of the OMC shows that this trend also has to be
seen in the context of the adequacy of pension systems. Table 2 shows the current levels of
coverage of supplementary pension provision in the Member States (based on the report for
the Social Protection Committee "Privately managed pension provision"):
5 Administrative, legal, linguistic, and cultural factors, as well as those related to the housing market, to
the recognition of qualifications and to the transparency of job opportunities
6 There are some supplementary pension schemes that fall under the Regulation, like AGIRC and
ARCCO in France.
7 The 15 national strategy reports, as well as the Joint Report by the Commission and the Council on
adequate and sustainable pensions, are available at: www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-
prot/pensions/index_en.htm.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 37 – Drucksache 16/1155
TABLE 2 ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP IN SUPPLEMENTARY SCHEMES (% OF THE WORKING AGE
POPULATION OR OF THE POPULATION IN EMPLOYMENT)
BE
About 40% of the employees are covered (around 10% by branch provisions, 7.5% by
pension funds and 22.5% by group insurance). About 10% of self employed are covered by
supplementary schemes.
CZ In CZ, there are no occupational pension schemes.
DK
About 68% of the 35-55 year population are covered by an employer-managed scheme or
civil service pension scheme. From the 32% that do not have such a plan, a large proportion
(about 10%) pay contributions to an individual scheme (this is particularly true of self-
employed people; about 1.1 million people pay contributions to such schemes, that is around
40% of the population in employment in 2003) and around 6% by another dormant schemes
or schemes from which payments are made. Among the remaining 16% not covered by
supplementary schemes, 11.1% are covered by ATP or SP schemes.8
DE
In March 2003, the coverage by supplementary pension schemes was 57% of employees that
participate in the first pillar pay-as-you-go scheme (including both public and private
schemes). The pay conversion option covers around 20 millions workers that is around 80%
of workers covered by some collective agreement.
EE In EE, there are no supplementary pension schemes
EL There are no data available yet, as no supplementary pension funds are yet established.
ES
On 31st December 2003, there were around 720 000 participants of supplementary pension
schemes (around 4% of the employed population). An increase of the number of members of
supplementary pension schemes is expected during 2004, since it is foreseen that halfway
through the year a pension scheme is going to be formalized for civil servants, which will
increase the number of members by more than 500,000 persons (raising the proportion to
around 7% of the employed population). Along with this, Autonomous Communities are
promoting parallel schemes, which will increase the total number of members by 2 million
approximately (around 12% of the employed population).
FR Approximately 10% of the workforce.9
IE
The pension coverage rate for all persons in employment aged between 20 and 69 is 50.7%.
This coverage rate comprises 35.2% with an supplementary pension only, 12.6% with a
personal pension only (RAC) and 2.9% with both types of pension cover.
In relation to the pension cover for employees, the large majority (43.3%) are members of
supplementary pension schemes with a further 3.5% having both a supplementary pension
and a personal pension. A further 5.4% of employees are covered by personal pensions only.
These figures are based on a survey on pensions, undertaken by the Central Statistics Office,
in the first quarter of 2002, before the introduction of the new PRSAs.
IT
Supplementary pension funds cover around 4.3% of the working force, while open pension
funds cover around 1.5 % and pre-existing pension funds cover around 2.8 % of the working
force.
8 In particular, all employees not covered by occupational schemes are covered by ATP or SP and most
of self employed or fully unemployed. The remaining 5% not covered are for an important part
claimants of anticipatory pensions.
9 This figure does not take into account AGIRC and ARCCO which are covered by Regulation 1408/71.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 38 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
CY
The coverage of provident funds (year 2000) is about 27% of the population in employment
(17.5% of the 15-64 population) and that of supplementary pension schemes (year 2002,
including self employed persons) is about 13.5 % of the population in employment (8.5% of
the 15-64 population).
LV In LV, there are no supplementary pension schemes
LT In LT, there are no supplementary pension schemes
LU
Supplementary pension schemes are not evenly spread across the population and mostly
granted to white collar workers representing approximately 50% of the total labour force.10
In 2003, around 870 companies offered a supplementary pension scheme to their employees,
covering around 50 000 active members, that is around 17% of the employed population
(level of coverage is higher in the banking sector).
HU In HU, there are no supplementary pension schemes
MT In MT, there are no supplementary pension schemes
NL
In 1996, 91 % of the employees aged between 25 and 65 years old were covered by a second
pillar pension. This 9 % “no-coverage” (in 1985, it was 18 %) includes situations where the
employer has no pension scheme at all (2%) and where the employer has a pension scheme
but excludes some employees (7 %). In 2002 a study concluded that the part of the employers
who had no pension scheme for its employees at all had diminished in the period 1996 –
2001.11
AT
In March 2004, there were around 1 million workers covered by the new supplementary
pension scheme that emerged from the previous severance pay system (around 25% of the
employed population), while around 380 000 were covered by the traditional employer
pension schemes (10% of the employed population).
PL Occupational schemes cover around 0.6% of the working age population.
PT
The active membership included in supplementary schemes that exist as a substitute for the
1st pillar and other contractual schemes represents 3.8% of the working age population and
4% of the population in employment.
SI
About 53 % of the active population is covered (in summer 2004) by supplementary schemes:
28.5% for the private sector, 21% for the public sector and 4% for the compulsory
supplementary pension insurance.
Coverage levels are expected to increase and exceed 60% of the workforce.
SK In SK, there are no supplementary pension schemes
10 Occupational pension schemes are typically applicable to white collar workers, which represent about
50% of the total labour force. One consequence is that the overall coverage cannot be expected to go
beyond this level of coverage. Concerning blue collar workers, a strong general pension scheme is still
needed to guarantee adequate pensions.
11 At the national level, social partners recommended in 2001, that companies or branches provisions
should abolish the different exclusion reasons in pension schemes. The Secretary of State responsible
for Pensions stated that he expects that the “no coverage” as result of exclusions in pension schemes (7
percent in 1996) will be halved to 3½ percent in 2006. If social partners do not succeed in halving it he
would introduce a law abolishing the different exclusion reasons in pension provisions.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 39 – Drucksache 16/1155
FI
In 2002, the number of people covered by group pension insurance with a life insurance (also
including terminated insurance policies transformed into paid-up policies) was about 5 % of
the population in employment and 3.2 % of the working age population (15-64 years of age).
In 2002, company pension funds had been arranged for 2.2 % of the population in
employment and 1.5 % of the working age population, while industry-wide pension funds
covered 0.5 % of the population in employment and 0.3 % of the working age population.
There are few pension commitments based on book reserves.
SE
The coverage of supplementary schemes is around 75% of the 20-64 population and around
90% of the Swedish employed population.
UK
The coverage of supplementary schemes is of around 33% of working age population and
43% of the employed population.
N.A.: not available. Source: national sources; replies to the SPC questionnaire on privately managed pension
schemes. Note : figures referring to funded tiers of first pillar schemes are not included in this table.
The importance of labour mobility
Labour mobility is a prerequisite for a well-functioning labour market, i.e. one which allows
as close-to-optimal as possible an allocation of human resources. Workers' free movement is a
key element of the EU internal market.
Removing obstacles to labour market mobility, whether between jobs or geographically,
within or between Member States, is therefore essential. It is necessary in order to ensure both
that the right to free movement is a real option for European workers, and that the potential
gains in productivity, growth and jobs that a better functioning labour market offers can be
realised. In addition to increasing the career and development possibilities of individual
workers, eliminating barriers to mobility is therefore integral to the Lisbon ambitions to raise
employment, improve social cohesion and strengthen competitiveness.
Even if calculations12 on the cost of lower-than-optimal mobility in terms of reduced GDP
and employment rates are not available, the persistent co-existence of unemployment in some
regions with skills shortages in others powerfully demonstrates that more mobility would be
desirable. For this reason, Member States have strongly committed themselves, both in the
context of the European Employment Strategy and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, to
tackling obstacles to mobility.
Following the 2001 Stockholm European Council, an Action Plan on Skills and Mobility13
was drawn up with the aim to expand occupational mobility and skills development as well as
facilitate geographical mobility both through Member States' and Community efforts. The
mid-term review on the implementation of the Skills and Mobility Action Plan from February
200414 has concluded that despite improvement in a number of areas, occupational and
12 Like those provided for by the "Cecchini report". This report published in 1988 investigated the costs of
not proceeding with the Single Market and concluded that the successful completion of the Market
would have substantial economic benefits for all Member States.
13 Commission's Action Plan for skills and mobility, COM(2002)72 final, 13 February 2002
14 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Report on the Implementation of
the Commission's Action Plan for Skills and Mobility, COM(2004)66 final
Drucksache 16/1155 – 40 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
geographical mobility still remain low in the EU. The portability of supplementary pension
rights has been identified as an area, where further action is needed to promote mobility.
Within the EU25, about 9% of employees change employer each year (see graph 1). There is
some diversity among Member States, with a group of Member States with lower rates
(around 5 or 6%), while it is higher than 10% in eight Member States. The year to year
probability that an employee changes employer is therefore significant (around 10%). This
level is coherent with ECHP15 information indicating for the EU 15 that around 1/3 of
employees change job within 5 years.
Graph 1 Percentage of employees changing employer over last year
0,0%
2,0%
4,0%
6,0%
8,0%
10,0%
12,0%
14,0%
16,0%
E
U
-2
5
E
U
-1
5
N
M
S
1
0
B
E
C
Z
D
K
D
E
E
E
E
L
E
S
F
R IE IT
C
Y
L
V L
T
L
U
H
U
M
T
N
L
A
T P
L
P
T S
I
S
K F
I
S
E
U
K
Source : Labour Force Surveys 1997, 2000 and 2003.
Note : Figures provided here refer to averages for these 3 years, as to smooth business cycles effects. However,
it should be noted that figures for the three years are not available for all Member States, but can rely on only
one or two years.
Job tenure gives another indication on professional mobility. In the EU-25 about 25% of
people in employment have less than 2 years of job tenure (see graph 2). This level varies
from about 10% to more than 35% according to the Member State. Moreover, about 20% of
employed people have a job tenure ranging between 2 and 5 years. And about 55% of
employees have a job tenure of more than 5 years (varying from 45% to 75% among Member
States).
15 European Community Household Panel
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 41 – Drucksache 16/1155
Graph 2 Job tenure of people in employment
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
E
U
-2
5
E
U
-1
5
N
M
S
10 B
E
C
Z
D
K
D
E
E
E
E
L E
S
F
R IE IT C
Y
L
V
L
T
L
U
H
U
M
T
N
L
A
T P
L
P
T S
I
S
K F
I
S
E
U
K
Less than 2 years 2 to 5 years More than 5 years
Source : Labour Force Surveys 1997, 2000 and 2003.
Note : Figures provided here refer to averages for these 3 years, as to smooth business cycles effects. However,
it should be noted that figures for the three years are not available for all Member States, but can rely on only
one or two years.
Finally, another indicator relates to sector mobility (this indicator depends of course on the
choice of the number of sectors). With the NACE 1 (taking into account 17 sectors in the
economy), estimates from the Labour Force Survey indicate that about 4.5% of employed
people change sector every year in EU 25.
The EU tends to display low levels of geographical mobility. Table 1 illustrates the extent to
which EU working age residents changed country of residence from one year to the next.
Between 2001 and 2002 (only) some 0.2% of the population moved from one Member State
to another (other estimates put that figure even lower). It should be recognised, however, that
this measure does not cover cross-border commuting since this does not entail a change of
residence. Although research remains to be done to establish what should be the benchmark
level of mobility, in practice the EU is often compared to the US. Whereas in 1999 in the EU
only 1.4% of the employed population has changed residence between regions, 5.9% have
moved to another county during the same period in the US. A direct comparison should
however take into account that only a limited number of the US moves were job-related and
even fewer due to unemployment.16
16 Employment in Europe 2001 – Recent Trends and Prospects, European Commission 2001:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/employ_2001_en.htm
Drucksache 16/1155 – 42 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Table 1: Population aged 15+ by country of residence in the year before the survey –
2002 Q2.
Same country Other Country
Thousands Thousands % of non EU
BE 8483 22 38
DK * 4338 15 66
EL 8967 10 60
ES 34343 66 85
FR 46764 192 63
IT * 45769 52 51
LU 351 2 28
AT 6619 30 51
PT 8658 41 72
FI * 4242 5 55
TOTAL 168533 435 63
Source: LFS Q2 2002, spring results.
Notes:
– Data for intra-EU mobility in 2002 is of course restricted to the EU15, but excluding IE, NL, SE (data not
available) and DE, UK (high non-response rate).
– Non-responses are excluded from the totals. Due to the high number of non-responses (mainly from
nationals) in IT, DK and FI, the results should be interpreted with caution
Even if the current level of mobility in the EU is relatively low, empirical findings about the
attitude of young people (15-24 years) in Germany, France and the United Kingdom suggest
that there is a considerable potential for increased labour mobility in the future.17 Importantly
it has to be noted that the above figures display the mobility over a short time span of one
year. Taking into account that a career in average amounts to 30-40 years, the likelihood of an
employee changing jobs throughout his/her career is significantly higher than the above
mentioned percentages.
Conclusion
With the prospect of increasing numbers of employees covered by supplementary pension
provision the current problem of a lack of portability of supplementary pension rights is likely
to continue to increase. There is empirical evidence that mobile workers risk ending up their
17 Eurobarometer 1997, 2nd wave; Fertig, Schmidt (2002): Mobility within Europe. The Attitude of
European Youngsters. RWI Discussion Paper No.1. More than 60% of respondents considered the right
to work in any EU country a major advantage of the EU.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 43 – Drucksache 16/1155
career with lower supplementary pension rights as compared to those employees who stayed
during their entire career with the same employer. Studies on supplementary pension schemes
and mobility of workers in EU countries and the USA have shown that workers covered by
supplementary pension schemes are in general less likely to move to other jobs than those
workers that are not covered by an employment related pension schemes18. One of the reasons
for this phenomenon may be the fact that those who change jobs face a capital loss. A survey
carried out by PricewaterhouseCoopers shows that the lack of pension portability is seen as
significant negative factor affecting the willingness of an individual to live and work in
another country19.
A study20 on supplementary pensions and job mobility in Germany examines voluntary job changes observed
throughout a one year-period. Estimations are based on a probit model, delivering results about the probability
of job mobility, given the implied capital loss due to supplementary pension arrangements. The basic equation
for an individual is
I = (Ym - Ys) - CL
where I is the benefit resulting from mobility; if I>0, the individual moves to another job. Ym and Ys are the
present values of estimated lifetime earnings when moving to another job (Ym) or staying in the old one (Ys),
respectively. These values depend on personal characteristics (e.g. education, sex). Thus, the difference Ym - Ys
quantifies the potential gain from job mobility in terms of earnings. CL stands for the capital loss incurred by
leaving the job due to supplementary pension rights. It depends on personal characteristics and on job and firm
specific variables (e.g., if the employer offers an supplementary pension) and is defined as
CL = SP – LP
where SP is the present value of pension rights accrued until retirement when staying with the same company
and LP is the present value of pension rights accrued in the past when leaving the company (LP = 0 if rights are
not vested). The expected capital loss thus depends on the present wage level and years of service, the expected
future wage increases and inflation rates as well as on the treatment of dormant pension rights.
The study shows that the loss of both vested and non-vested pension rights due to a lack of portability discourage
job mobility to the same extent. In both cases, the mobility probability is reduced by 11% per DM1,000 (€511) of
expected capital loss in supplementary pension rights.
Empirical evidence thus supports the hypothesis that workers will be less inclined to move to
another job when they know that their pension rights in the end of the career will be reduced.
The current situation as regards supplementary pension rights is not sufficiently allowing the
exercise of the right of freedom of movement for workers. Moreover, this situation is in
contradiction with the goals set at European level to get a more mobile and flexible workforce
and thus improve the functioning of the Internal market. In spite of these clear findings, so far
18 Andrietti, V (2001) "Occupational pensions and interfirm mobility in the European Union. Evidence
from the ECHP Survey", W.P. 05-2001, Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare policies.
Andrietti, V and Hildebrand, V.A. (2001) "Pension portability in the United States. New evidence from
SIPP data", W.P. 10-2001, Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare policies.
19
Managing mobility matters – a European perspective, PricewaterhouseCoopers 2002
20 Birgitta Rabe "Occupational Pensions and Job Mobility in Germany", 28 May 2004, Max Planck
Institute Germany.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 44 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
no Community provision to improve the portability of supplementary pension rights thus
securing the rights of mobile workers has been set up21.
2. THE PROBLEM: ASPECTS OF SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION PROVISION CONSTITUTING
OBSTACLES TO PORTABILITY
This section discusses the identified obstacles to the mobility of workers arising from
supplementary pension systems. On the basis of the current situation in the Member States
(see Annex), four main areas can be identified which can affect negatively the social
protection of mobile workers and thus constitute obstacles to the exercise of the right of free
movement22 (in general):
x tax treatment of cross border contributions and transfers;
x conditions for the acquisition of supplementary pension rights;
x rules on preservation of dormant pension rights and
x the way the transfer of acquired rights is organised.
All these areas are interlinked and determine whether the mobile worker can expect to receive
at the end of the career an adequate pension or whether he/she will be penalised because of
his/her mobility.
In addition to these areas, it has to be recognised that the information provided to scheme
members and in particular to (potential) early leavers plays an essential role in enabling
mobility on a well informed basis.
The following section will describe the last three identified main areas23 where obstacles
occur. As tax obstacles are not being dealt with by the proposed directive they are examined
in the annex. A description will also be given of the situation in terms of information related
to the supplementary pension rights of the (potentially) mobile worker.
2.1. Acquisition
The acquisition of supplementary pension rights can be subject to certain qualifying
conditions. Three main criteria have to be distinguished here;
(1) waiting periods, i.e. the period of employment after which an employee becomes a
scheme member. When a waiting period is applied, the early leaver who leaves the
employment before having accomplished this period will not have become a scheme
member and will therefore not have any vested rights. In the case where the
employment period before the completion of the waiting period accounts for the
21 Directive 98/49/EC is the only instrument aimed at safeguarding supplementary pension rights of
mobile workers and self-employed, but does not provide a sufficient guarantee against the loss of
supplementary pension rights
22 These areas were identified already in the Commission's Green Paper "Supplementary pensions in the
Single Market" COM (97) 283.
23 These have also been examined by working groups of the Pensions Forum, their findings are taken into
account in the following section.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 45 – Drucksache 16/1155
vesting of rights, the early leaver will thus lose out in comparison to the employee who
remains with the same employer throughout his/her career. Moreover, the worker who
changes jobs several times may not be able to build up an adequate pension at the end
of the career when the different schemes apply waiting periods.
(2) minimum ages: two types of minimum age requirements can be distinguished; the
minimum age needed for the employee to join the scheme and the age at which the
employee, member of the scheme, has acquired rights. In both cases, like for waiting
periods, the early leaver who leaves the company before having reached the minimum
age applied will not have become scheme member and thus will not have any vested
rights. If the employment period fulfilled before having reached the minimum age
counts for the vesting of rights, the early leaver will lose out in comparison to the
employee who remains with the same employer after having reached the minimum
age.
(3) vesting periods, i.e. the minimum period of scheme membership after which a pension
entitlement must be recognised for an early leaver. Where the waiting period and
minimum age determine whether an employee can become affiliated to a
supplementary pension scheme, in the case of vesting period, the employee is already
a scheme member but will have to complete a certain period as a scheme member
before having established acquired/vested rights. An early leaver, who is a scheme
member, but leaves the employment relationship before having completed the vesting
period, will lose out in comparison to the employee who remains with the same
employer beyond the vesting period. In general the early leaver will only receive a
reimbursement of his own contributions, but no vested rights to a future pension.
Vesting periods are in fact equivalent to qualifying periods in statutory schemes where
the need for EU legislation is accepted since the 1950s. This EU legislation
(Regulation 1408/71/EEC) is based on a system of mutual recognition between
supplementary pension schemes. Such a system would however be difficult to achieve
because of the important diversity of supplementary pension schemes (see also under
section 4.1 instruments considered).
Impact of certain acquisition rules on pension rights 24
We assume that all employers offer a pension worth 1% of final earnings for each year of employment. The
employee earns €10000 per year during a career starting at 25 and ending at 65 (40 years). There is no
inflation.
Employee A remains with the same employer during the entire career: the pension will amount to €4000 per
year.
A mobile career can result in significantly lower pension entitlement.
Suppose employee B works between 25 and 28 in a scheme where pension rights only vest at 30; for the next 7
years, B works for another employer with a scheme with a 10-year vesting period. At 36 years of age B still has
not earned any pension rights. The third job, held between 37 and 49 (13 years) gives rise to pension rights for
11 years because of a waiting period of 2 years before being admitted into the pension scheme. A fourth job held
between 50 and 55 gives rise to no pension entitlement because the employee has to be in the company at the
24 Please note that the examples proposed here and further in the text are purely hypothetical. They are not
intended to reflect the actual situation which is characterised by a high level of complexity and diversity
of occupational pension arrangements. The purpose of this calculation is only to demonstrate how
acquisition rules can reduce pension rights after a particularly mobile career
Drucksache 16/1155 – 46 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
moment of retirement in order to obtain a pension. The last job, between 56 and 65, is covered by a scheme with
a waiting period of one year.
The resulting pension at the end of employee B's career would amount to only €1900 per year. B has worked
during 40 years, but only less than half of this period counted for the building up of pension rights (19 years).
2.2. Preservation of dormant rights
An early leaver who has acquired rights can in principle leave these rights in the scheme of
origin. In this case it is important to know whether and how these acquired rights are
preserved. Such preservation may be limited to a nominal value (e.g. a monthly pension of €
100 as of the age of 65). This implies that the real value of preserved pension entitlements
would fall as a result of inflation. Moreover, pay rises are not reflected in pension
entitlements, as is the case for workers who remain in the same job if benefits are expressed
as a percentage of earnings or adjusted average earnings. Frequent job changers who leave
their entitlements in different pension schemes will therefore receive significantly reduced
supplementary pensions at the end of their careers compared to people who remain within the
same pension scheme.
Impact of preservation rules on pension rights
We assume that all employers offer a pension worth 1% of final earnings for each year of employment. The
employee earns €10000 per year during a career starting at 25 and ending at 65 (40 years). Inflation is at 2%
per annum during the entire period. Real wages are constant and their nominal amounts are €10000 at the
beginning and €22522 at the end of the career.
Employee A (entire career with the same employer) will receive a pension of €9009 per annum (40% of final
earnings).
Employee C worked for 20 years for one employer and for another 20 years for another. Employee C will
receive a €3031 from the first employer and €4505 from the second employer. The total pension amounts to
€7536 per annum (33% of final earnings). The higher the inflation rate, the greater the mobility loss due to
insufficient preservation.
The mobility loss will be amplified by the fact that individual earnings tend to rise faster than prices or even
aggregate earnings.
2.3. Transferability
Transferability refers to the possibility of transferring a capital value representing the acquired
pension entitlements from one pension scheme to another scheme or to a similar financial
institution. Besides the tax treatment, an issue discussed in the Annex, specific conditions
related to the transfer itself or to the receiving scheme, can limit the transferability of a
worker's pension capital. Also the methods for calculating transfer values may lead to reduced
pension benefits for the mobile worker.
2.4. Information requirements
At EU level some requirements as concerns the information to be provided to scheme
members already exist.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 47 – Drucksache 16/1155
Article 7 of Directive 98/49/EC25 requires that information provided to scheme members
when moving to another Member State should at least correspond to information given to
scheme members in respect of whom contributions cease to be made, but who remain within
the same Member State.
Nonetheless, the Directive does not contain any provision on the effective level of
information provided to scheme members who leave a pension scheme.
The only provisions in this respect are contained in Article 11 of the IORP Directive26 which
provides for detailed and substantive information of scheme members and beneficiaries on the
target level of benefits, on the actual financing of accrued pension entitlements and on the
level of benefits in case of termination of employment. In particular, the directive provides
that pension scheme members will receive every year particulars on the current level of
financing of their accrued individual entitlements. Moreover, each member can receive, on
request, information on the arrangements relating to the transfer of pension rights to another
pension fund in the event of termination of the employment relationship.
In order for employees to be able to make a well considered choice, it is essential that they be
made fully aware of his rights, on the options available in the event of a job change or career
interruption and on the costs associated with these options.
2.5. General conclusion: a need to undertake action to improve portability
The above description confirms that a number of significant obstacles to the portability of
supplementary pension rights indeed exist:
x The application of sometimes long and strict acquisition conditions can result in a
deterioration of the social protection of the mobile worker and will create disincentives to
move between jobs.
x Where the worker moves to another job and leaves his acquired rights behind in the
scheme of the former employment, the dormant rights will in many cases not be protected
sufficiently to avoid that the early leaver is significantly worse off than a worker with a
similar profile who remains within the same employment.
x The worker who moves to another employment often does not have the choice between
transferring the acquired rights and the preservation of these rights in the former scheme.
Where a transfer is possible and the worker decides to make use of it, it depends largely on
the conditions of this transfer and the assumptions used in calculations for the
determination of the transfer value whether the worker will not lose out too much by
transferring the rights.
x Finally, the (potential) mobile worker in the EU does not have the guarantee that she/he
will be informed on all the consequences on the supplementary pension rights upon leaving
the employment or on the options available with regard to the preservation or transfer of
the acquired rights.
25 Directive 98/49/EC, on safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of employed and self-employed
persons moving within the Community, OJ L 209 of 25 July 1998.
26 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the activities and supervision of institutions
for occupational retirement provision, 2003/41/EC of 3 June 2003.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 48 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
The above underlines the need to improve the portability of supplementary pension rights, in
particular for the increasing number of schemes that contribute in an essential way to the
social protection of (mobile) workers. It is also clear that in order to tackle this problem
effectively, it is necessary to address the identified problems in a comprehensive way.
3. OBJECTIVES
The various actions that have been taken at European level with regard to supplementary
pension provision are not yet sufficient to improve substantially the supplementary social
protection of mobile workers by preventing significant losses of pension entitlements of early
leavers (see also a description of the already taken actions in the Annex). Important legal
action by the Commission in the field of taxation is in progress, Directive 98/49/EC has
confirmed in particular the principle of equal treatment between those workers who move
across borders and those who change jobs within their country and the recently adopted
Directive on Institutions of Occupational Retirement Provision (2003/41/EC) could enhance
the freedom of movement of those workers who remain within the same group of companies.
However, these initiatives have not, or only partially (in the case of taxation), addressed the
main obstacles to portability of supplementary pension rights as identified above; especially
the tax treatment of cross border transfers, the conditions for acquisition of rights, the
preservation of dormant rights and transferability conditions. In view of the problems
identified, the Commission services are obliged to examine whether there is a need for
Community action and, if this is the case, to discuss the options for the appropriate form,
content and scope of such an action. These issues shall be discussed in the following section.
With a view to the already ongoing activities to address the tax obstacles related to
supplementary pension provision, further measures aiming at improving the portability can
concentrate on the other elements identified above: acquisition conditions, preservation of
dormant rights, transferability and the information provision to (potentially) mobile workers.
4. POLICY OPTIONS CONSIDERED AND SELECTION OF PREFERRED OPTION
4.1. Do nothing
In the light of the analysis presented above, not to act at all would not lead to the expected
result of an improved portability. Even if some individual Member states and pension
schemes are in the process of improving portability, the lack of commonly agreed principles
and requirements in this area at the European level would not allow making real progress in
the elimination of the existing and probably increasing obstacles to free movement created by
the design of supplementary pension provision. The EU has to take action not only because of
the negative effect of insufficient portability on the working of the internal market but
because the Commission has to assume its obligations as a guardian of the Treaty ensuring the
respect of the basic freedoms prescribed by this Treaty, in particular the freedom of
movement of workers.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 49 – Drucksache 16/1155
The major actors and stakeholders in the field of supplementary pension provision, the social
partners (representing both sides of industry) have already recognised since long that there is
a necessity to act at EU level27.
With regard to the need to take action at the European level, the problem could be addressed
either by instruments that are not legally binding (option 2: code of conduct) or by legally
binding provisions, either developed in the framework of the social dialogue (option one:
collective agreement) or proposed by the Commission (option 3: Regulation or Directive).
These different possible instruments will be discussed in this section.
4.2. European Collective agreement
As indicated, the European social partners representing both sides of industry recognised the
need for action at EU level. Their opinions differed, however, concerning the instruments to
achieve this aim. Some social partner organisations felt that exchanges of experiences and
information-sharing or codes of conduct would be the best way to achieve this, others asked
for legislative action to be taken.
The Commission services are well aware of the contractual and voluntary nature of the
supplementary pension provision in the EU. Supplementary pension provision not only is an
increasingly important element of the social protection system, it is also part of the
remuneration package agreed at national, sector or company level by social partners or
directly between employer and employee. Therefore, as a logical step, the Commission
consulted social partners first of all on the question to know whether action at Community
level aimed at improving portability of supplementary pensions was desirable and secondly,
after the social partners recognised that Community action was needed, whether the social
partners would be prepared to start negotiations on a European collective agreement
improving the portability of supplementary pension rights. The social partners did not agree,
however, on the instruments to be used at European level to improve the portability and did
therefore not engage in negotiations.
Since no European collective agreement will be negotiated the main options that remained to
improve the portability at European level were a code of conduct or legislative action.
4.3. Code of conduct
Such a code establishing guidelines addressed to all parties involved in the design of
supplementary pension provision and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders and in
particular social partners would have the advantage of allowing a great flexibility for
individual schemes in establishing their rules of operation. However, discussions at European
level on the improvement of portability have been ongoing since more than fifteen years
without resulting in an initiative of this kind28. There is no obvious reason why the actors
concerned would change attitude and behaviour at this stage. This puts into question the
probability, and also the credibility of any form of voluntary agreement. Also, with a view to
the diverging opinions of social partners in this context, it is very unlikely that such a code of
conduct would see the light in a near future. Moreover, account should be taken of the fact
27 See also description of the consultation of the social partners in Annex 1.
28 In fact the issue has been discussed at European level for much longer. Already in 1966 the
Commission issued a study on the possibilities to coordinate supplementary systems of social security
in the countries of the CEE.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 50 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
that even if social partners and individual employers have an important role to play in the
design of supplementary pension provision, many aspects of supplementary pension provision
are regulated by laws of the Member States (social law, but also fiscal regulations for
instance). In the light of the experiences made, the Commission services have no reason to
believe that a code of conduct would be sufficient to effectively adjust all the specific
obstacles to portability created by such legislation.
4.4. Legislative action
Another option would be to make use of a legislative instrument, such as e.g. a Regulation or
a Directive. A strong point of legally binding action would be that it would allow for
addressing all problems identified and hereby ensure to tackle the problem in an effective way
(voluntary action, on the other hand, could run the risk that only some of the problems are
solved, but not all).
An extension of Regulation 1408/71 to supplementary pension schemes would at first sight be
a logical step but applying the same rules to supplementary pension provision as to statutory
social security schemes is not possible29 for three main reasons:
x it would require a system of mutual recognition between supplementary pension schemes
(difficult to achieve because of the important diversity of supplementary pension schemes)
x this would result in very high costs for the schemes/employers (who would have to take
into account the period during which the employee worked and was insured with a former
employer).
x An up-dated and simplified version of Regulation 1408/71 was agreed in 2003 after years
of negotiation – it would prove very difficult to open discussions again.
Such a coordination system in the form of a Regulation would moreover not allow the
flexibility needed to take into account the important diversity of supplementary pension
provision in the Member States and its voluntary nature30.
On the other hand a Directive would not have these shortcomings. In particular a Directive
establishing minimum requirements, thus respecting the contractual nature and the diversity
of supplementary pension provision, could reconcile the need to improve the situation of
mobile workers and thus the exercise of their right to free movement and the functioning of
the internal market on a firm legal basis and to allow for the necessary flexibility taking into
29 This does not however exclude the application of principles of Regulation 1408/71 to occupational
pension schemes. At the request of Member States, the scope of the Regulation can be extended to non-
statutory schemes established by social partners. Moreover, Council Directive 98/49/EC explicitly
refers to Regulation 1408/71 as concerns posted workers and applies like the Regulation the principle of
equal treatment with regard to nationality and the cross-border payment of benefits.
30 Preamble 4 of Council Directive 98/49/EC recognises this problem: "(…) whereas the system of
coordination provided for in Regulations (EEC) No 1408/71 and (EEC) No 574/72, and in particular
the rules of aggregation, are not appropriate to supplementary pension schemes, except for schemes
which are covered by the term 'legislation` as defined by the first subparagraph of Article 1(j)of
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 or in respect of which a Member State makes a declaration under that
Article, and should therefore be subject to specific measures, of which this Directive is the first, in
order to take account of their special nature and characteristics and the diversity of such schemes
within and between Member States";
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 51 – Drucksache 16/1155
account the specific features of existing schemes and their diversity. A Directive would thus
allow Member States, social partners or other relevant stakeholders to determine the best way
to implement the minimum requirements established at EU level adapted to their specific
national situation.
4.5. Conclusion: need for a Directive
As the discussions ongoing over the last decade have shown, leaving the improvement of the
portability over to the individual Member States or schemes while doing nothing in this field
at the European level would not lead to a real improvement of the portability. EU action is
therefore needed, in particular with a view to the role the EU has to play in improving the
functioning of the internal market and enabling workers to exercise their right to free
movement. The most appropriate instrument for this action to achieve improved portability of
supplementary pension rights appears to be a legislative measure in the form of a Directive.
4.5.1. Scope
The aim of the proposed Directive is to improve the conditions for workers to exercise their
freedom of movement by improving the portability of supplementary pension rights. The
obstacles to mobility of workers across borders and the obstacles to mobility within the
Member States can in many aspects not be dissociated. It will for instance be impossible in
practice to apply different acquisition conditions depending on whether the mobile worker
moves to another Member State or whether she/he stays within the same country. This will
lead to difficulties for the funds, raising the administrative costs. Moreover, even if in
principle a European legal instrument can result in a situation where the cross-border mobile
worker is better off than the worker moving within the same Member State, in practice this
will not be a politically acceptable outcome. The Commission services are therefore
convinced that the proposed Directive will have to address also obstacles created by national
rules and thus improve both portability of supplementary pension rights within the Member
States as across borders.
4.5.2. Legal basis
In the light of the above the Commission services decided to prepare a proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council enhancing the free movement of
workers by improving the portability of supplementary pension rights within the European
Union. The proposal will be based on Article 42 of the EC Treaty, according to which the
Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, adopt such
measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for
workers and on Article 94, according to which the Council shall issue directives for the
approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market. This double legal basis
is justified since the obstacles to mobility across borders created by rules on supplementary
pension provision are inherently linked with obstacles affecting the mobility within Member
States. As shown in the above section, rules on supplementary pension provision can create
obstacles to the portability of supplementary pension rights and thus create barriers to the free
movement of workers between Member States. Moreover the differences in these rules lead to
distortion of the conditions of competition by their influence on the functioning of the labour
market.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 52 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
5. SUB-OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING PORTABILITY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
PREFERRED POLICY OPTION
In this section the different policy options considered are presented in order to address the
main issues in the field of portability as identified in section 2.
5.1. Acquisition of supplementary pension rights
5.1.1. Waiting periods
a) Do nothing
This option implies that Member States would be free to decide whether to fix a maximum
period after which a worker have to be with the employer before becoming member of the
scheme.
b) Total elimination of waiting periods
The elimination of waiting periods results in the right for the employee to become member of
the supplementary pension scheme as from the first day of the employment (however,
minimum age requirements could still apply).
c) Reduction of the maximum waiting period to one year
This option would imply that in the schemes where waiting periods apply, these do not exceed
the duration of one year.
5.1.2. Minimum age
a) Do nothing
This option would leave it over to the Member States to decide whether to fix a maximum age
after which supplementary pension rights have to be acquired.
b) Total elimination of minimum age requirements
This option would prohibit pension schemes to make the acquisition of supplementary
conditional to the age of the employee.
c) Fixing the highest minimum age at 21 years
Where a minimum age is applied for the acquisition of supplementary pension rights this
should not be more than 21 years.
d) Fixing the highest minimum age at 25/30 years
This option corresponds to option c) but higher minimum ages (25 or 30 years) can be set by
the scheme for the acquisition of supplementary pension rights.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 53 – Drucksache 16/1155
5.1.3. Vesting periods
a) Do nothing
Member States would have the possibility not to fix a maximum number of years of
membership after which the employee should have acquired rights and leave it over to the
individual schemes. In case Member States fix a maximum vesting period, they can determine
the length of the vesting period freely.
b) Immediate vesting
This option results in an immediate vesting of the supplementary pension rights of the
employee as from the first day of scheme membership (where applicable after having fulfilled
other acquisition conditions, like the minimum age).
c) Setting maximum vesting periods (1, 2, 5 years)
In case vesting periods are applied, these should not exceed 1, 2 or 5 years.
5.2. Preservation of dormant pension rights
a) Do nothing
This would leave it entirely over to Member States whether they wish to lay down in law a
requirement that dormant right should be adjusted and if so, to which extent. The only
applicable EU legislation in this field would remain Directive 98/49 establishing an equal
treatment between the dormant rights of a worker moving to another employment within a
Member States and the dormant rights of a worker moving to another Member State.
b) (Limited) inflation adjustment
This option corresponds to the system applied in the UK and Ireland where pensions are, up to
a specified ceiling, to be adjusted in line with inflation or consumer's price index.
c) Adjustment of dormant rights to the general wage development
Member States would have to fix the requirement that the adjustment of the dormant rights
follows the general development in wages.
d) Adjustment of dormant rights at the same rate as pensions in payment
This is a system currently applied in the Netherlands where, in case the pensions in payment
are adjusted, the dormant right in the supplementary pension scheme have to be adjusted to
the same extent.
e) Linking dormant rights to the rate of return of the assets of the institution for
supplementary retirement provision
This would be a partial option, which could apply only to schemes on a funded basis, where
the rate of return of the assets would determine the adjustment of the dormant rights. In
practice this is already applied by most schemes with defined contribution.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 54 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
5.3. Transferability of supplementary pension rights
a) Do nothing
Here the Member State would have the choice to regulate whether a worker would have the
possibility at the moment of leaving the employer to take the acquired rights to a new pension
scheme (linked to the new employer).
b) Every early leaver should have the choice between transfer and leaving dormant rights in
the scheme of origin.
Member States would have to ensure that all workers leaving their employer have the
possibility to take their acquired supplementary pension rights with them. Member States
would also have to ensure that this transfer takes place under conditions which do not reduce
substantially the entitlements (for instance due to unfavourable calculation of the transfer
value or high administrative costs).
c) The same conditions should apply to transfers across borders as to transfers within the
Member States.
This option implies that where transferring rights within the Member State is possible
between certain schemes, this should also be possible across borders and under the same
conditions. Where nationally no transfer is foreseen, there is no obligation to provide for the
possibility to transfer cross-border.
5.4. Information requirements
a) Do nothing
This would leave it over to the Member State to determine whether information should be
provided in relation to portability. At EU level they will in any case have to apply the
information requirements contained in the Article 11 Directive 2003/41/EC.
b) Specific information related to portability to be provided to workers
This option establishes, beyond the requirements contained in Directive 2003/41/EC, that
Member States have to ensure that workers, even if they are not (yet) member of the
supplementary pension scheme, receive the necessary information on the consequences
mobility could have on their supplementary pension rights. Moreover, information should be
provided on the conditions for the transfer of rights and the preservation of dormant rights.
6. IMPACTS OF THE SUB-OPTIONS CONSIDERED
In this section the different options for the measures considered for the proposed Directive are
evaluated with a view to their impact in terms of benefits and costs described above
(protection of rights, mobility, costs and coverage).
In order to evaluate the impact of these different options, a questionnaire was prepared in
cooperation with the Pensions Forum. In this questionnaire, Member States and other
stakeholders in the field of supplementary pension provision were invited to indicate the
impact of fixing certain rules at EU level in terms of
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 55 – Drucksache 16/1155
x Number of scheme members affected
x Costs implied (per scheme member)
x Likely impact on the provision of occupational pensions
x Impact on the mobility of workers
6.1. Elements of impact taken into account
The provisions of the Directive should only go as far as necessary to address in a sufficient
way the obstacles identified. In particular the Directive should allow for a certain degree of
flexibility to avoid discouraging the (further) development of supplementary pension
provision in the EU. It is important that the proposed measures do not put any unnecessary or
disproportionate administrative or financial burden on the employers providing for
supplementary pension provision or on the supplementary pension schemes themselves. In
order to come to a balanced proposal in particular the following factors have been taken into
account:
(1) Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
The main objective of the Directive is to improve the conditions for workers to exercise their
right to free movement by protecting the pension rights of mobile workers. This protection
will be measured in particular by examining whether the proposed measure enables the
mobile worker to end his/her career with sufficient and adequate pension rights in particular
in comparison to comparable employees who remain with the same employer during their
entire career.
b. Impact on mobility
The considered measures are moreover examined in terms of enhancing mobility of workers.
This will in particular be measured by examining whether the proposed measure will avoid
that a (potential) early leaver faces a significant loss of his pension rights at the moment of
cessation of employment so as to deter the willingness to change employment. This will also
impact on the functioning of the European labour market and the possibility for employers to
attract skilled employees.
(2) Costs
a. Costs to providers
The proposed measures will be examined with a view to striking the right balance between the
benefits and the costs incurred. A distinction will be made between the administrative costs
and the funding costs, the latter being the costs directly related to the additional
supplementary pension rights created for workers. These funding costs at a longer run might
can be expected to disappear and lead to a more fair distribution of the resources of the
pension scheme, in particular between mobile workers and those workers who remain within
the scheme. Therefore the cost impact for providers acknowledged here concerns the short
term funding costs and the administrative costs.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 56 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision
The proposal will also duly take into account the effects of measures on the willingness of the
providers to continue supplementary pension provision and on the potential opening of new
schemes. In general it should be noted that strict rules on supplementary pension provision as
such do not necessarily affect negatively the level of coverage of employees by
supplementary pension provision. This is shown by the experience in the Netherlands and the
UK, where the rules are relatively strict, but coverage is and remains high31.
It is however of utmost importance, in particular with a view to the increasing role played by
supplementary pension provision in the overall old-age benefit system, that the proposed
measures will not reduce the number of employees covered by those schemes. It is therefore
important to examine for each proposed measure which are the effects on the overall coverage
of supplementary pension provision.
In assessing the impact of the measures, account needs to be taken of the diversity in
supplementary pension provision in the Member States. As can be seen from the
description of the current situation in the Member States, the conditions defining the rights of
early leavers are usually fixed by the supplementary pension schemes themselves, subject to
general rules set by national legislation or collective agreements, and can very much vary
according to the characteristics of the schemes. The specific impact of these conditions on
pension portability therefore differs to a large extent. The distinction between defined-benefit
and defined-contribution schemes is also important in this context. The conditions for the
acquisition and transferability of supplementary pension rights are in fact typically stricter for
defined-benefit plans. In this case, employees' future benefits are defined in advance and
determined by a specific formula linking benefit accrual to employee earnings, length of
service or both.32 The employer or the pension scheme bears the risk of guaranteeing the
payment of the pension promise. In the case of defined-contributions plans the employer
and/or the employee contribute to an account established for each participating employee.
Contributions are defined either in absolute terms or as a proportion of earnings. Each scheme
member has an individual account with an amount that can be easily preserved or transferred
to another scheme of the same type. The resulting pension annuity reflects total contributions,
investment returns net of administration charges and annuity rates at the moment of
converting the accumulated capital into an annuity33. Problems of portability are less serious
in defined-contribution schemes. However, in this case beneficiaries have to bear the full
investment risk and, in the absence of a conversion into an annuity, longevity risks and thus
face far greater uncertainty about their living standard in old age.
31 There is however a tendency to modify the design of the pension schemes. In particular a shift from
defined benefit schemes towards schemes with a defined contribution nature can be noticed. In the
Netherlands the defined benefit schemes use more and more often the average salary, instead of the
final salary for the calculation of benefits
32 In the case of defined-benefit schemes, the level of benefits may be notably defined in fixed monetary
terms, perhaps depending on the number of years of service that the employee has served (flat benefit
arrangements) or, more frequently, in terms of the salary of the employee in combination with the
number of years of service. In this case, the definition may be based upon the salary or earnings
immediately (or over a short period) prior to the retirement (final salary arrangements) or on the salary
throughout service (career average arrangements).
33 It should be noted, however, that many occupational schemes pay out retirement benefits in the form of
a lump sum which does not have to be converted in an annuity.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 57 – Drucksache 16/1155
Another important factor concerns the distinction between funded and unfunded schemes. The
latter, often in the form of book reserve or pay-as-you-go schemes. The unfunded schemes in
many cases are not allowing for the transferring of acquired rights, since this will have to
imply the anticipated freeing of capital.
The proposed measures will have to take into account the characteristics of these different
types of schemes.
6.2. Acquisition of supplementary pension rights
6.2.1. Waiting periods
a) Do nothing
In the majority of supplementary pension schemes in the EU, no or low waiting periods are
applied. In most countries waiting periods are not specifically restricted by law. Where
waiting periods are applied by schemes, in many cases these correspond to the probation
period of the employee, but rarely exceed two years.
The current situation in the Member States as concerns the waiting periods and minimum ages
of entry to the scheme is such that frequent job changers still could be faced with losses in
pension benefits at the end of the career. Even if the applied waiting periods and the minimum
ages are often relatively low, the combination of an applied minimum age and the
accumulation of waiting periods throughout the career can lead to a significant loss in pension
benefits at the end of the career for a mobile employee as compared to the employee who
remains with the same employer throughout the entire career. The loss is even more serious
where defined benefit schemes take into account for the pension calculation the years
accomplished before the reaching of the minimum age of entry to the scheme and/or before
the fulfilment of the waiting period. In that case, the early leaver who leaves the job without
having completed the waiting period or reached the minimum age will be significantly worse
off as compared to the employee who remains with the same employer beyond the waiting
period/minimum age. Defined contribution schemes in general do not take into account the
years completed before the waiting period or the reaching of the minimum age.
a) Total elimination of waiting periods
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
In principle the impact on social protection right could be positive taken although other
acquisition requirements (minimum age or vesting periods) can still determine whether the
early leaver will have acquired rights at the moment of termination of his employment
relationship. The abolition of waiting periods could result in the coverage of employees with
fixed term or temporary contracts (often women)34 and therefore achieve a better pension
coverage for those workers.
34 It should be noted that the European social partners have recognised that "innovations in occupational
social protection systems are necessary in order to adapt them to current conditions, and in particular to
provide for the transferability of rights" with regard to fixed- term work (ETUC, UNICE and CEEP in
Drucksache 16/1155 – 58 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
b. Impact on mobility
The total abolition of waiting periods can have a positive effect on the mobility of workers,
since employees will become member of the scheme as from day one of the employment
relationship and will thus not be retained in the employment in order to fulfil this qualifying
period.
Costs
a. Costs to providers
The costs will depend on whether the pension scheme currently applies waiting periods or not.
In the majority of Member States schemes apply waiting periods, but in general these tend to
be of a short duration (see Annex). The additional administrative costs will in particular be
related to the administration of smaller entitlements in the case of cessation of the
employment. The overall costs furthermore depend on whether the elimination of waiting
periods will require all workers, including those with fixed term or temporary contracts to be
covered, or whether this would only concern employees with a long term contract. In case all
employees regardless of the type of contract would be covered, the overall costs might be
significant and this is also why in several countries schemes exclude fixed-term employees
from scheme membership or set waiting periods at the length of the probation period.
In some Member States certain schemes exclusively financed by employers and designed to
reward staff loyalty apply long waiting periods (sometimes 5-10 years). For these schemes the
funding costs related to an elimination of the waiting period might be very significant.
A total elimination of waiting periods could thus in specific cases result in significant costs.
Member States highlight this and point out that the administration of small entitlements would
lead to higher expenditure; they did not however quantify these possible costs. Only the UK
reports that the "extra costs of pensions" for the public service pension schemes would be
negligible and for the private sector pension schemes amount to GB £ 180-220 million on a
yearly basis if schemes would not adapt to the new situation.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
In countries where there is no compulsory membership and where waiting periods are
common practice, the total elimination of waiting periods could make employers more
reluctant to open new schemes, since they will have to start contributing immediately for new
employees. When the elimination of waiting periods would moreover result in the scheme
membership of employees with fixed-term contracts, this could have negative consequences
on the willingness of employers to open or continue such schemes. For instance employers
with many seasonal workers might in that case not be willing to provide for supplementary
pension schemes.
the preamble of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, implemented by Council Directive
1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999)
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 59 – Drucksache 16/1155
b) Reduction of the maximum waiting period to one year
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
In general the impact on social protection rights will be positive, but evidently to a lesser
extent than in the case of a total elimination of waiting periods. Moreover, in Member States
where schemes apply waiting periods, these periods tend already to be rather limited in time
(in general not exceeding two years) thus no major impact on the social protection rights is to
be expected. However, account should be taken of the fact that even a short waiting period in
combination with other acquisition conditions (minimum age, vesting period) can still result
in a significantly lower social protection of mobile workers as compared to workers who
remain within the same employment throughout their career.
b. Impact on mobility
The reduction of the maximum waiting period to one year can have a positive effect on the
mobility of workers, in particular for those schemes currently applying higher waiting
periods. Workers who tend to move frequently between jobs will not face major losses in the
acquisition of pension rights (evidently this still depends also on the applied vesting period).
Costs
a. Costs to providers
The impact on the costs will depend on whether the scheme currently applies a waiting period
longer than one year. In the literature examining the relationship between portability of
supplementary pension rights and mobility of workers, a waiting period of one year is
considered as reasonable since a shorter period would result in disproportionate administrative
costs as compared to the small entitlements acquired35. The UK reports here that the "extra
costs of pensions" for the public service pension schemes would be negligible and for the
private sector pension schemes amount to GB£ 100-120 million on a yearly basis if schemes
would not adapt to the new situation.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
The impact of a reduction of waiting periods to one year on the supplementary pension
coverage will be much less significant than the impact of the elimination of these waiting
periods (see above). In most countries the probation period is less than one year, employers
will therefore not be obliged to cover employees that are even still in their probation period.
6.2.2. Minimum age
a) Do nothing
Few Member States have restricted by law the minimum age requirement set to become a
scheme member or to have acquired rights, Germany being one of the main exceptions to this
rule where the law establishes that in the case of employer financed schemes, the employee
35 Verreth, p. 437
Drucksache 16/1155 – 60 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
has acquired rights only at the age of 30 years (if the vesting period of five years has been
fulfilled).
Even if in most cases the law does not provide for a minimum age, most defined benefit
schemes seem to apply in practice a certain minimum age required for the entry to the
scheme. When these minimum ages are set by the schemes they range in general from 18
years to 25 years.
In some countries, like the Netherlands, there is a trend towards the abolition of the
application of minimum age requirements.
Doing nothing would therefore result in maintaining a situation where many schemes still
apply (sometimes high) minimum ages the employees have to reach before actually acquiring
rights. (Thus retaining them in the employment relationship until this age has been reached).
b) Total elimination of minimum age requirements
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
The impact on the social protection rights of mobile workers will depend on whether pension
rights are awarded for the period of employment accomplished before reaching the minimum
age when all other conditions for vesting are fulfilled. In case in the current situation the years
before reaching the minimum age are taken into account, an elimination of the minimum age
will have a positive effect on the social protection rights of mobile workers, in particular
workers who tend to be more mobile. Moreover, blue collar workers who in general start their
career from a relatively young age will be able to build up pension rights at an earlier age.
Only other acquisition conditions might still limit the possibility to build up pension rights as
from the start of the employment.
b. Impact on mobility
The impact on the mobility of workers will be positive since acquisition of pension rights will
no longer depend on the age of the employee. Employees (after having fulfilled other
acquisition conditions where applicable) can therefore move more freely to a new employer
without losing out in terms of acquisition of rights. Moreover, from a perspective of
improving the flexibility of the work force it is difficult to justify the application of age
requirements.
Costs
a. Costs to providers
The costs could be significant for those schemes applying high minimum ages. However this
will depend on whether the years of employment before the reaching of the minimum age are
taken into account for the acquisition of rights. For instance for the German schemes financed
by the employer where a legal minimum age of 30 years applies, the funding costs (thus
provided by the employer) will increase due to an elimination of the minimum age
requirement. However these costs will not be substantial since workers will mostly stay with
the employer until they have a vested right (i.e. fulfilled the vesting period). Since younger
workers tend to be more mobile, the administrative costs related to the management of smaller
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 61 – Drucksache 16/1155
entitlements in the case of cessation of the employment can be significant, depending on the
vesting period applied.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
The impact on the coverage of the supplementary pension schemes will mainly depend on the
extra costs that are resulting from the elimination of minimum age requirements. In particular
the employer financed schemes in Germany might be affected. It might be that fewer
employers will be inclined to open schemes where contributions have to be paid irrespective
of the age of the employee (even if other acquisition conditions can still apply).
b) Fixing the highest minimum age at 21 years
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
The impact on the social protection rights of in particular white-collar mobile workers will be
positive. The ability for blue collar workers generally starting their career at a relatively
young age to start building up rights at an early stage will be reduced in comparison to a total
elimination of the minimum age requirements. Other acquisition conditions might also still
further limit the possibility to build up pension rights at an early stage in employment.
b. Impact on mobility
The impact on the mobility of workers will be positive since acquisition of pension rights will
start at an early age. Workers will be able to move relatively quickly to other jobs without the
risk of losing out in terms of acquisition of rights.
Costs
a. Costs to providers
The costs can be significant for those schemes applying high minimum ages. For instance for
the German schemes financed by the employer where a legal minimum age of 30 years
applies, the funding costs will be substantial. Administrative costs might also still be
relatively high, but this will depend on the vesting period applied. The UK has indicated that
the "extra costs of pensions" for the public service would be negligible and for private sector
pension schemes would amount to GB£ 40-50 million on a yearly basis if schemes would not
adapt to the new situation.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
Schemes currently applying high minimum ages will have to adapt substantially their
organisation. At the same time offering younger employees the possibility to become quickly
member of the pension scheme might also provide a supplementary incentive for young and
talented employees to choose a specific employer. This might therefore be an asset for the
most dynamic companies and is more in line with the requirements of a flexible labour
market.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 62 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
c) Fixing the highest minimum age at 25/30 years
Fixing the highest minimum age at 30 years would result in maintaining the current situation
since there is no evidence of schemes applying minimum ages for the entry to the scheme
higher than 30 years. Therefore the impact presented here will only concern the fixing of the
highest minimum age at 25 years.
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
The impact on social protection rights will be positive but limited, since relatively few
schemes apply a minimum age exceeding 25 years. There might however be a risk that setting
the statutory minimum in relation to the entry age could influence behaviour and lead to
schemes raising their minimum age to the statutory minimum. This would result in a
reduction of the period during which employees can build up their rights (for example
between 25 and 65) and "flexible" workers risk thus to end their career without diminished
pension rights.
b. Impact on mobility
Fixing the highest minimum age at 25 years will in principle have little impact on the mobility
of workers, since in most situations where minimum ages are applied these do not go beyond
25 years. Only in the case of Germany and Sweden (white collar workers schemes) and in
some individual schemes in other countries, where the minimum age is fixed at 30 or 28
years, there would be in principle (depending on whether pension rights are awarded for the
employment period accomplished before the reaching of the minimum age) a positive impact
on the mobility of workers when the highest minimum age would be reduced to 25 years. It
would mean that employees would start building up rights earlier and would thus be able to
move earlier to a new employer while having built up acquired rights (conditional on the other
applied acquisition conditions).
Costs
a. Costs to providers
The impact on both the funding costs and the administrative costs would be very small given
the small number of Member States where schemes apply a minimum age in excess of 25. As
mentioned above, mainly the employer financed schemes in Germany will be confronted with
higher costs. For Sweden, only white collar schemes currently applying minimum ages up to
28 years will be affected.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
In general, the coverage of supplementary pension provision will not be affected negatively,
with the exception of those schemes that will be confronted with higher costs. In these
specific cases this could have negative consequences for the willingness of providers to
continue or open schemes and thus affect the coverage.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 63 – Drucksache 16/1155
6.2.3. Vesting periods
a) Do nothing
In most Member States with supplementary pension provision, vesting periods are applied by
the supplementary pension schemes in the case of defined benefit schemes. The vesting
periods are fixed by collective agreements or by the schemes themselves and in some cases
regulated or restricted by legislation. Vesting periods range from several months, 1 year, 2
years, 5 years, 10 years to vesting only at the moment of retirement (the latter for certain
schemes in France and the majority of schemes in Portugal).
Defined contribution schemes in general do not apply vesting periods, the employee builds up
the rights as from the first day of contributions and the early leaver will not face a loss in
comparison with the employee who stays longer with the same employer.
In case nothing would be done to limit vesting periods the early leaver may face a serious loss
in pension rights and will be reluctant to leave the employment relation before having
accomplished the vesting period. If he leaves before the end of the vesting period, he will not
have built up any pension rights and may only receive a reimbursement of the own
contributions. This could result in a significant reduction of the (supplementary) pension
rights of the mobile worker.
b) Immediate vesting
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
Employees will start acquiring rights as from the first day of their scheme membership.
Immediate vesting seems also be justified since where employer contributions are made to a
supplementary pension scheme these have to be considered as deferred remuneration. It can
be argued that as a matter of principle, employees should not lose this part of remuneration
simply because of mobility.
b. Impact on mobility
The impact on the mobility of workers will in general be positive, since workers will no
longer be obliged to remain with the same employer during a certain period of scheme
membership in order to acquire rights. Early leavers will not face a pension deprivation
related to the vesting conditions of the rights and in principle not be treated worse than those
workers who remain within the same scheme (other losses could however still arise due to
unfavourable transfer arrangements or the lack of preservation of dormant rights)
Costs
a. Costs to providers
The funding costs for providing supplementary pension provision will increase significantly
for those schemes that apply currently long vesting periods. Moreover administrative costs
will increase, since the schemes will have to keep records of more deferred scheme
beneficiaries with sometimes small entitlements.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 64 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
In the UK, where the Pensions Bill 2004 foresees vesting from the moment the worker joins
the scheme (instead of currently a maximum of 2 years), the additional administrative costs
have been estimated at £ 5 million per annum36. The overall costs (funding and additional
administrative costs) will be more significant for schemes where longer vesting periods are
applied and where workers tend to be mobile. In particular schemes in Germany and
Luxemburg apply longer vesting periods and in Portugal and France certain schemes foresee
that the vesting only takes place at the moment of retirement of the worker.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
A quick introduction of immediate vesting could have negative consequences on the
willingness of providers to continue supplementary pension schemes where they currently
apply high vesting periods. The immediate high funding costs and the increase in
administrative could also be a deterrent to open up new schemes.
b) Setting maximum vesting periods (1, 2, 5 years)
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
A maximum vesting period of five years would not result in a significant improvement of the
social protection of mobile workers since few schemes apply vesting periods that exceed five
years. Only for schemes in Luxemburg where vesting periods range from 0 to 10 years,
depending on the length of the waiting period, mobile workers could end up with a better
social protection. The same applies for schemes with a direct commitment ('book reserves') in
Austria, where vesting takes place after a maximum period of ten years. For schemes applying
vesting upon the presence of the worker at the moment of retirement (France, Portugal) the
social protection of mobile workers will be improved, they will have acquired in case of
cessation of the employment before retirement (and after having accomplished the 5 year
vesting period), which is currently not the case.
In case a maximum vesting period would be set at 2 years, the improvement of the social
protection of mobile workers would be more significant. For the schemes already affected by
a fixing of the vesting period to five years (see above), the protection of mobile workers
would even further improve with a reduction of the vesting period to two years. Moreover, in
particular in Germany and Austria, the protection of rights of mobile workers would be
improved (vesting periods in Germany are five years and in Austria for Pensionskassen,
vesting periods of up to five years are applied).
Of these three options, setting a maximum vesting period of one year would evidently
represent a further improvement of the social protection of workers. For all aforementioned
types of schemes applying higher vesting periods the impact will be positive.
b. Impact on mobility
The impact of setting maximum vesting periods will differ depending on the currently applied
vesting periods. For instance the maximum vesting period in Belgium is already one year.
Setting the maximum period at 2 years would also correspond to the current legal maximum
36 Source: Regulatory Impact Assessment, Pensions Bill 2004, House of Lords (8 June 2004).
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 65 – Drucksache 16/1155
in the UK. In general, the lower the vesting period, the lesser the pension deprivation a mobile
worker would face by leaving the occupation, thus the higher the positive impact on the
mobility of workers will be.
Costs
a. Costs to providers
For fixing the maximum vesting period at five years the costs will in general be relatively
limited since few schemes apply longer vesting periods than five years. Only those specific
schemes identified above under "benefits" applying longer vesting periods or even make the
presence of the worker in the employment at the moment of retirement a vesting condition,
the costs can be very significant.
These costs would be higher if the maximum vesting period would be set at two years and
moreover have important implications for the costs of supplementary pension provision in
Germany (where vesting periods are five years). Since staff turnover is highest in the two first
years of employment, the administrative costs of entitlements in case of the cessation of
employment will be relatively balanced.
Setting the maximum vesting period at one year could bring significant costs since a very
large number of supplementary pension schemes in the EU will be affected. Moreover, there
will be important costs for the administration of a large number of relatively small
entitlements.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
The consequences for the coverage will be directly related to the costs incurred by the
measures. Where costs are high, providers will become more reluctant to continue schemes or
to open new ones, in particular defined benefit schemes, since in many cases defined
contribution schemes already have immediate vesting.
In this respect the reduction of the vesting period to one year would have too negative
consequences overall.
6.3. Preservation of dormant pension rights
Directive 98/49 already establishes an equal treatment between the dormant rights of a worker
moving to another employment within a Member States and the dormant rights of a worker
moving to another Member State. However, this does not guarantee that the dormant rights
are preserved in a sufficient manner, in particular in comparison to those rights acquired over
a same period of time by a similar worker who remains with the same employer.
As indicated above, a few Member States have laid down in law the requirement that dormant
rights should be adjusted. The measures discussed here are in line with these existing
provisions and only concern schemes of a defined benefit nature. In general defined
contribution schemes apply the same adjustment for dormant rights as for the rights of active
members (in line with the investment results of the funds or with the rate set for the scheme).
Drucksache 16/1155 – 66 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
a) Do nothing
For schemes of a defined benefit nature, only in four Member States (B, IE, NL, UK)
preservation of dormant rights is foreseen by law. The way dormant rights are preserved in
these countries ranges from inflation adjustment up to a ceiling (Ireland, UK) to the principle
that dormant rights should be treated in the same way as pension in payment (NL). In general
dormant rights in defined contribution schemes continue to grow according to the return of
assets or the rate that has been fixed by the scheme.
In countries where there is no legal obligation to adjust dormant rights, individual schemes
can still decide to do so. Nevertheless, it is clear that overall there is an important lack of
preservation of dormant rights. Doing nothing would therefore result in many early leavers
having a much lower amount of supplementary pension benefits at the end of their career as
compared to those employees who remain member of the same pension scheme throughout
their career.
b) (Limited) inflation adjustment
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
The social protection rights of mobile workers in the EU will certainly be improved by this
measure. At present only two Member States (IE, UK) require this type of preservation of
dormant rights. With this measure, mobile workers that have become deferred scheme
beneficiaries will have a guarantee that their dormant rights will be protected against inflation
erosion (up to a certain ceiling, in the UK the limited price indexation cap for dormant rights
is fixed at 5%, in IE 4%).
b. Impact on mobility
The impact on the mobility of workers will be positive, since early leavers will have the
guarantee that leaving behind the acquired rights in the scheme of the formers employment
are less at risk of being eroded by inflation.
Costs
a. Costs to providers
Since many schemes do not apply this type of adjustment, or any adjustment at all (see
description under "current situation in the Member States, above), the costs for the schemes
could increase significantly. These costs will of course depend on the rate of inflation and the
possible ceiling up to which the adjustment to inflation should take place.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
The increased costs might affect the willingness of providers to continue or to open
supplementary pension schemes of a defined benefit nature. A shift from defined benefit
schemes towards defined contribution schemes might be the result.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 67 – Drucksache 16/1155
b) Adjustment of dormant rights to the general wage development
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
As for the linking to inflation, the social protection rights of mobile workers in the EU will
certainly be improved by this measure.
b. Impact on mobility
The impact on the mobility of workers will be positive, since early leavers will have a
guarantee that their dormant rights will be preserved to a high degree.
Costs
a. Costs to providers
Since currently there are only very little schemes that apply an adjustment at this rate (e.g.
some public sector schemes in Ireland revalue dormant rights in line with wages), the costs
for the schemes will very significantly increase, even if these costs will depend on the wage
development. The Dutch reply to the questionnaire of the Pensions Forum states
"unconditional adjustment to wages just for the dormant pension rights will cost one billion
euro each year during a period of 15 years".
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
The significant costs this method would cause might deter providers from continuing
supplementary pension schemes of a defined benefit nature or to open new ones.
c) Adjustment of dormant rights at the same rate as pensions in payment
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
The social protection of mobile workers will depend on the treatment of pensioners of the
scheme. As is shown by the current situation in the Netherlands, where this requirement
applies, many schemes (80%) adjust their pensions in payment and thus the dormant rights.
However, the rate of adjustment will be determined by the rules of the individual schemes.
b. Impact on mobility
The impact on the mobility of workers will be relatively positive, since early leavers will have
a guarantee of an alignment of their dormant rights with the pensions already in payment.
However, whether their dormant rights will be adjusted and at what rate will depend on the
policy of the scheme.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 68 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Costs
a. Costs to providers
For those schemes not already applying this type of adjustment (or at a rate comparable to it),
the costs could increase. Because of the flexibility of this method which leaves it to the
scheme whether to apply adjustments and at what rate, the costs could however be well
contained.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
The impact on the coverage of supplementary schemes will depend on the freedom for the
schemes to decide if and how to adjust. The application of this method in the Netherlands
seems not to have had a negative impact on the coverage of supplementary pension provision
or to have lead to a shift from defined benefit schemes to defined contribution schemes.
d) Linking dormant rights to the rate of return of the assets of the institution for
supplementary retirement provision
Benefits and costs
Whether the social protection rights of mobile workers will evolve positively will depend on
the performance of the assets of the pension fund. This method is typical of defined
contribution schemes, where the risk is borne by the employee. This system seems however
not to be applicable to defined benefit schemes. Firstly because of the nature of these
schemes; the employer or pension schemes makes a pension promise to the employee and
bears the risks of investment. Secondly because of the very high costs the application of this
method to defined benefit schemes would entail. Linking the revaluation of pensions with the
return on funds would thus mean a very heavy burden on defined benefit pension schemes,
which could have a negative impact on the willingness of providers to continue and establish
supplementary pension schemes of a defined benefit nature.
Moreover, pensions in payment and the accrued rights of non-mobile workers could evolve
less favourably if only the dormant rights got adjusted in relation to the rate of return of
assets.
6.4. Transferability of supplementary pension rights
a) Do nothing
While transfers are possible within many Member States, they do not appear to be the main
instrument for securing portability of vested pension rights in general. However, transfers can
be particularly useful to avoid the management of a large number of (smaller) dormant
pension entitlements. Cross-border transfers, while usually possible in principle, face
additional problems linked to tax rules and recognition of foreign pension providers. Some
countries do not allow cross-border transfers in order to prevent tax evasion37.
37 See also the survey by the European Actuarial Consultative Group on "Taxation of occupational
pensions in the EU Countries", April 2004.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 69 – Drucksache 16/1155
A survey carried out by a GCAE survey of June 200138 found that a legal right to a transfer
existed in 13 of the 21 surveyed countries. In five other countries transfer payments were a
common practice, but on a discretionary basis; finally, in three countries the transfer of
pension rights was not possible at all. Cross-border transfers to a pension scheme in another
European country were possible in only eleven countries, in some cases subject to the
approval of the regulator or tax authority. In certain countries, the tax charge could be so high
that it prevented, in practice, any cross-border transfer. The survey also raised the problem of
differing methods and assumptions used to calculate transfer payments from one Member
States to another. As mentioned above, transfers between defined-contribution schemes
(where the transfer value can be simply the market value of the assets held on behalf of an
individual scheme member) do not pose any major problems, the only obstacles being the
administrative costs linked to the transfer and taxation. Transfers between defined-benefit
schemes may, by contrast, entail serious pension losses for the early leaver due to different
actuarial methods and assumptions used by the pension institutions involved in a transfer.
Legal guidance or actuarial standards for calculating transfer values exist in a number of
countries, and some also require the costs of a transfer to be borne by the employer.
Non-funded pension schemes
A particular position is taken up by the schemes of the "bookreserve type". For instance in
Germany, the recently adopted "Retirement Income Act" foresees that the employee has a
legal right to a capital transfer to the new employer. This right applies however only to
benefits under externally funded plans. If the new employer's plan is book reserved
(Direktzusagen) or financed through Unterstützungskassen, a transfer is only possible if the
previous and the new employer agree to it. The book reserved schemes are thus excluded
from the statutory right to transfer, in particular with a view to the negative consequences
transfers could have on the financial sustainability of the undertaking/pension scheme39.
There is however a process towards capitalisation with a view to the financial sustainability
and as a consequence of changed taxation rules and the application of international
accountancy standards (US-GAAP, IAS/IFRS). A major part of the current pension promises
for Directzusagen (probably around 40%) have already been covered by capital investments40.
Moreover around 50% of the DAX-30 undertakings and many German sister undertakings of
multinationals have set up Contractual Trust Arrangements (CTA)41.
38 "Actuarial standards for transfers between pension schemes in the countries of the EU and other
European countries. A survey by the Groupe Consultatif", Groupe Consultatif Actuariel Européen
(GCAE), June 2001; "Actuarial Methods and Assumptions used in the Valuation of Retirement Benefits
in the EU and other European countries". The countries studied were: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
39 It has to be noted in the same time that Austria has established a statutory right to transfer, also for book
reserve type of schemes.
40 Article Mercer HR consulting, 19 October 2004 "Bilanzierung von Pensionsverpflichtungen in
Deutschland" available on http://www.mercerhr.de
41 Trust arrangements for pension plan assets that are accounted for under IFRS or US GAAP. The CTA
provides security of the assets in case of the company’s bankruptcy. Further, the CTA provides
flexibility in terms of allowable funding levels and asset allocation, compared with other possible
pension arrangements in Germany.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 70 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
b) Every early leaver should have the choice between transfer and leaving dormant rights in
the scheme of origin.
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
Transferring of rights will enable the mobile worker to regroup the acquired rights in one
scheme and keep thus a clear picture of the total acquired rights. Whether the social protection
rights of mobile workers will be well preserved will depend on the conditions applying to the
transfer in terms of calculation of the transfer value and the application of charges or fees to
the transfer.
b. Impact on mobility
The effect on mobility will be positive in case the early leaver does not face a significant
capital loss as a result of the transfer or due to the applied charges and fees. The prospect of
being able of keeping all acquired rights together in one scheme might also facilitate the
mobility of workers.
Costs
a. Costs to providers
The costs of this measure will depend largely on the calculation of transfer values and to the
type of pension schemes. In general, and this applies to all types of schemes, the
administration of small entitlements is expensive and regrouping the entitlements by means of
a transfer could therefore greatly reduce these administrative costs (see also above under "The
measures proposed in the draft Directive on preservation of dormant rights").
Germany indicated that since a right to transfer might however have important consequences
for the financial sustainability of schemes in case the (total) amount represented by the
transfers is particularly high, it limited the right to transfer up to € 62400 in 2005. Pay-as-you-
go or book reserve schemes will have to free the acquired rights in the form of a transfer value
before the age of retirement of the employee.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
The consequences for the coverage of pay-as-you-go and book reserve schemes might be
negative in case transfers in and out are unbalanced. As for the funded schemes, there might
be negative consequences, but it has to be noted that in some Member States (Netherlands)
the transfer obligation in combination with a requirement for defined benefit schemes to be
fully funded on the transfer date does exist and did not lead to a tendency to abandon
supplementary pension provision or to a shift from defined benefit schemes towards defined
contribution schemes.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 71 – Drucksache 16/1155
b) The same conditions should apply to transfers across borders as to transfers within the
Member States.
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
The social protection rights of mobile workers will not significantly improve.
The mobile worker moving to another Member State will just have the guarantee that where
transfer is possible internally, it should also be possible across borders. The conditions
applying to the transfer in terms of calculation of the transfer value and the application of
charges or fees to the transfer will be the same as for mobile workers within the Member State
(This might eventually include the tax treatment of transfers). This is however not a safeguard
against losses due to transfer conditions.
b. Impact on mobility
The cross border mobility of workers might be favoured with regard to those Member States
where currently only transfer within the Member State is possible. However, where transfers
within the Member State are not possible or allowed, it will in most cases not be possible to
transfer across borders.
Costs
a. Costs to providers
The costs for the providers will not increase substantially with a view of the relatively small
number of workers moving to another Member State. In terms of administrative costs the
effect might be positive where this measure would result in establishing a right to transfer
cross-border. Regrouping of entitlements will then also be possible in case of cross-border
transfers.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
There is no evidence on the basis of the Member States' replies that the measure will affect
the willingness of providers to continue or to open supplementary pension schemes.
6.5. Information requirements
a) Do nothing
It results from the replies to the questionnaire issued to the members of the Pensions Forum,
that in all Member State there exist information requirements in legislation. However in some
cases this information provision will be significantly improved as a result of the
implementation of the Directive 2003/41/EC (deadline for implementation is 23 September
2005). For instance in Portugal, the information a scheme member should receive upon
request is for the moment limited to information needed for a proper understanding of the
functioning of the scheme.
Most other Member States, however, foresee annual information to the scheme members on
their acquired rights or prospective entitlements. For instance in Belgium, this information has
Drucksache 16/1155 – 72 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
to be provided on annually both to scheme members as to deferred scheme beneficiaries.
Spain even requires information to be provided quarterly. Certain Member States have
foreseen a specific requirement for workers leaving the employment. In France, these workers
should be informed within three months of their rights and where relevant of the possibilities
to transfer these rights. Ireland, Luxemburg and the Netherlands have similar requirements.
One can conclude from this that in case nothing would be done by an initiative on portability
most Member States require or will require some type of information provision partially as a
result of the implementation of existing EU requirements (Directive 2003/41). The
information provision related to the portability of supplementary pension rights is however
not systematic in all Member States and relying only on the information requirements already
contained in the Article 11 Directive 2003/41/EC would not lead to the expected result, i.e.
enabling the worker to be well informed on the consequences of leaving the occupation for
his/her supplementary pension rights, for the following reasons:
x According to this Article the information should be provided only to " members and
beneficiaries and/or, where applicable, their representatives". Since the proposed
Directive should aims at improving the conditions for workers to exercise their right of
freedom of movement, it will be important that also those workers who are not (yet)
member of the pension scheme know what the consequences will be of leaving the
occupation.
x The Article does not lay down requirements on the information to be provided on the
preservation of dormant rights.
b) Specific information related to portability to be provided to workers
In order for the information requirements to be in line with the measures contained in the
proposed Directive a separate Article could be necessary, while duly taken into account the
already existing requirements and the consequences in terms of administrative costs for the
schemes.
The Commission is fully aware of the fact that information requirements could result in a
significant financial burden for the management of schemes. The proposal should therefore
restrict itself to those requirements that are directly related to the proposed measures without
adding in a substantial way to those requirements that already exist (in particular those laid
down in Directive 2003/41/EC). These specific requirements will not add substantially to the
costs that may already result from the requirements laid down by Directive 2003/41 since
only the scope of people who should receive the information, at their request, will be enlarged
while the information to be provided does not differ significantly from the contents of the
aforementioned Directive.
7. THE SELECTED MEASURES AND THEIR IMPACT
7.1. Acquisition conditions
7.1.1. Waiting periods
Even if, as shown above, from a point of view of social protection for mobile workers, the
total elimination of waiting periods would be the preferred measure, account has to be taken
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 73 – Drucksache 16/1155
of the costs this might cause and the current practice in the Member States. Applying a
maximum waiting period of one year strikes the right balance in terms of costs (in particular
with a view to the administration of small entitlements) and in the same time gives the
possibility to restrict scheme membership to those employees who have fulfilled their
probation period (a current practice in some Member States).
7.1.2. Minimum ages
From a point of view of social protection of mobile workers and enhancing mobility, the most
preferred measure would be the total elimination of minimum ages required for the entry into
the scheme. However, in particular with regard to the legal possibility to the current situation
in the Member States and the costs incurred, fixing a maximum minimum age requirement is
the preferred measure for this proposed Directive. It is proposed that Member States take the
necessary measures in order to ensure that the minimum age applied for becoming member of
a scheme does not exceed 21 years. Fixing the maximum age requirement at 21 years takes
into account the average age at which people start their working life. Data from the European
Community Household Panel42 show that today's (2000) 35-44 year-olds in the EU15 were at
work at the age of 19.8. For low-skilled workers this average is lower (18.6), for high skilled
workers higher (22.0). Based on data from the International Labour Organisation it appears
that in the EU in 2000 the activity rate at around 21 years is close to 60%.
7.1.3. Vesting periods
A total elimination of vesting periods (for schemes with a defined benefit nature, vesting
periods in general do not exist in DC plans) would be the most beneficial for mobile workers,
however as is shown above, both the funding and the administrative costs implied with such a
measure would be too important and result in a lower coverage of employees by
supplementary pension provision because of the lack of willingness to continue or open such
schemes. Nevertheless, the application of vesting periods will have to be limited if the goal of
a more mobility friendly design of supplementary pension provision is to be met. The draft
Directive therefore fixes a maximum vesting period of two years. This will strike the right
balance with a view to the current situation in the Member States. In order to take further into
account the adaptation of schemes that would face difficulties in terms of financing if a lower
vesting period would be applied too quickly, the draft Directive gives Member States the
possibility to extend the implementation period for these specific schemes.
In case the worker has made contributions to the scheme, but leaves the occupation before
having acquired rights, it is proposed that this worker gets at least a reimbursement of these
contributions, or can transfer these to another scheme.
7.1.4. Impact of the proposed measures on acquisition
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
The situation will improve for all workers currently covered by schemes with high acquisition
conditions. Workers will be able to acquire rights earlier and build up more rights during their
(mobile) career.
42 Employment in Europe 2003, p. 170-173
Drucksache 16/1155 – 74 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
b. Impact on mobility
Workers could leave earlier and more frequently due to an earlier acquisition of pension
rights. Undertakings will benefit from the increased availability and flexibility of the
workforce. This also illustrated by the fact that in certain market segments (services)
undertakings already apply lower vesting periods than legally required.
Costs
a. Costs to providers
Where shorter acquisition periods will apply as a consequence of the directive, this might in
the short term lead to higher costs. However:
x where workers would leave earlier, the undertaking might delay the replacement of this
person depending on the economic situation and where the worker is replaced, the new
worker would only acquire rights once the acquisition conditions are fulfilled.
x Systems could adapt to the new conditions and change to reflect the longer periods of
accruing rights.
In order to accommodate the adaptation to lower acquisition conditions, the proposal foresees
a long transition period.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
The number of employees with supplementary pension rights will increase. The willingness of
the employer to provide a supplementary pension will mostly depend on the overall costs.
These costs will be mitigated due to the possibility to apply the lower vesting period only
after a long transition period.
7.2. Preservation of dormant rights
Each of the above mentioned measures results in a guarantee for the early leaver that his/her
acquired are adjusted and thus protected to some extent. However, the proposal should take
into account the high heterogeneity of supplementary pension provision in the Member States.
Therefore the proposal will restrict itself to laying down a general principle. This principle
consists in the guarantee that dormant rights will be adjusted in such a way as not to penalise
early leavers. It will be left over to Member States (and individual schemes) to ensure the
application of this principle. One of the above mentioned measures could be used in this
respect for defined benefit schemes.
It will moreover be necessary to take into account that the preservation of an important
number of small entitlements might result in very high administration costs. The proposal
gives therefore the Member States the possibility to allow schemes not to preserve these small
entitlements but to pay them out to the early leaver or to transfer them.
7.2.1. Impact as concerns the measures proposed on preservation
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 75 – Drucksache 16/1155
The situation of workers with dormant rights which are currently not adjusted will improve.
b. Impact on mobility
The disincentive to mobility due to the lack of preservation of dormant rights will be reduced
or taken away, depending on the form of adjustment chosen by the Member State or
individual scheme/employer.
Costs
a. Costs to providers
Costs to providers will depend on the system of adjustment. The relative high costs for the
administration and preservation of small entitlements is avoided by the possibility for
Member States to make a transfer or pay out obligatory for small entitlements.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
The impact on the coverage of supplementary schemes will depend on the decision of the
Member States how adjustment should take place.
7.3. Transferability
To achieve a maximum effect on the improvement of the social protection of mobile workers
and the enhancement of mobility, workers should have the choice between preserving the
acquired rights in the scheme of origin or transferring these to another scheme or similar
financial instrument or institution. The draft proposal will require Member States to ensure
that early leavers can obtain upon request and within a reasonable period of time after the
cessation of employment a transfer of all acquired rights, including to another Member State.
In order to take into account the specific situation of schemes where the pension promise is
backed by book reserves and for schemes operating on a pay-as-you-go basis, these types of
schemes can for the moment be excluded from this requirement for reasons of financial
sustainability. The Commission will re-examine the situation after a determined period with a
view to proposing measures to ensure the transferability of rights for early leavers covered by
book reserve schemes and schemes operating on a pay-as-you-go basis. This (temporary)
exemption will allow these schemes to constitute the necessary financial buffer in order to
accommodate the transferring out of the pension rights of the mobile workers. This would be
additional to the clear trend towards capitalisation of (part of) the pension promises of book
reserve schemes as a consequence of changed taxation rules and the application of
international accountancy standards (US-GAAP, IAS/IFRS).
The right of transfer and its beneficial effects on the social protection of mobile workers will
only become effective if the transfer value represents the "fair value" of the acquired rights.
No specific calculation method is proposed in order to take into account the wide diversity of
schemes and respecting the freedom of Member States/schemes or social partners to define
detailed rules themselves or to decide for instance that guidance can be given by the national
professional associations for actuaries. The proposal lays down a general principal according
to which it should be ensured that the actuarial and interest assumptions used for the
calculation of the transfer value are fair and reasonable and not biased against early leavers.
The latter also means that it should be ensured that where administrative charges are applied,
these are proportionate and do not result in a significant reduction of the net transfer value.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 76 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
7.3.1. Impact of the measures proposed on transferability
Benefits
a. Impact on social protection rights of mobile workers
Workers will be able to regroup their entitlements in one scheme. The proposal will moreover
ensure that the actuarial and interest assumptions used for the calculation of the transfer value
are fair and reasonable and not biased against early leavers.
b. Impact on mobility
The possibility to chose between maintaining the entitlements in the former scheme or to
transfer them gives more flexibility for the worker and can enhance his/her mobility.
Costs
a. Costs to providers
The net administrative costs will be limited for the following reasons:
– the low degree of professional and geographical mobility in the EU
– the transferred entitlements will no longer have to be administered by the scheme
– part of the costs can be borne by the mobile worker (in a proportionate way).
No costs would occur at this stage for unfunded schemes (bookreserve and pay-as-you-go
schemes) not (yet) designed for providing a transfer since these can be excluded from the
application of the requirement to transfer for reasons of financial sustainability. The proposal
foresees a re-examination of the exemption of these schemes taken into account:
– in some Member States a transfer from and to unfunded (bookreserve) schemes is already
possible (AT)
– unfunded schemes have to anticipate expenditure anyway and use increasingly capitalised
reserves
– the low turn over will in general not lead to very significant amounts to be transferred.
b. Consequences for the coverage of supplementary pension provision.
There is no evidence of an impact on the willingness of providers to continue or start
supplementary pension provision.
7.4. Information provision
Since every worker can potentially be a mobile worker, the proposed Directive requires
Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that workers (thus not only scheme
members) are made fully aware of the consequences for their pension rights in the case of
cessation of the employment. Workers should therefore receive upon their request and within
a reasonable period of time information on the conditions for the acquisition of pension rights
and the consequences thereof in the case of cessation of the employment. Moreover,
information should be given on the prospective benefit entitlement in case of cessation of
employment. The workers should also receive information on the possibilities to transfer the
acquired rights and where transfer is possible on the conditions for this transfer, the actuarial
calculations involved and on the presence of any fees or charges.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 77 – Drucksache 16/1155
Once the worker leaves the employment and the acquired rights are left behind in the scheme
of the former employment, she/he has to be informed on the prospective benefit entitlement
and changes that may affect the dormant rights.
As it is not the quantity of the information that counts but the extent to which the worker can
make an assessment of the consequences for his pension rights of the cessation of
employment, the Commission puts emphasis on the need to provide this information in
writing and in a way that is understood by the persons to whom the information is addressed.
7.4.1. Impact of the measures proposed on information provision
The Commission proposal contains requirements that take into account the specific situation
in relation to portability, but these will not add substantially to the costs that may already
result from the requirements laid down by Directive 2003/41 since only the scope of people
who should receive the information, at their request, will be enlarged while the information to
be provided does not differ significantly from the contents of the aforementioned Directive.
8. FURTHER MONITORING AND EVALUATION
The proposal foresees the presentation by the Commission of a report on the implementation
of the directive five years after its entering into force. In order to monitor and evaluate
effectively the implementation of the directive, it is essential that the problem of a lack of
reliable and complete statistics on supplementary pension provision in the EU is addressed.
Research and literature in this field is scarce and in the consultations that took place for the
preparation of the present impact assessment, very few Member States and organisations
provided the Commission services with concrete impact estimations of the presented options
and limited themselves to merely general descriptions. In order to address this problem, the
Pensions Forum has recently set up a working group providing assistance on the contents of a
questionnaire allowing the Commission to gather information from the Member States on
supplementary pension provision in quantitative and qualitative terms. This working group
should present its recommendations by the summer of 2006. The Commission will then
decide on how to set up a systematic information gathering in the field of supplementary
pensions.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 78 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
ANNEX: OVERVIEW OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED MEASURES FOR THE
SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE MEMBER STATES
Member States that, on the basis of the information collected, do not have supplementary
pension schemes (yet) falling under the scope of the proposed measures: CZ, EE, EL (funds
are not yet established), HU, LV, LT, MT, SK. This does however not discharge these
Member States of implementing the provisions of the Directive, once adopted
The situation in the other Member States:
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 79 – Drucksache 16/1155
Coverage Acquisition
conditions
Preservation
(current situation)
Transferability
BE
About 40% of the employees
are covered (around 10% by
branch provisions, 7.5% by
pension funds and 22.5% by
group insurance). About
10% of self employed are
covered by supplementary
schemes.
Minimum ages will have
to be brought down from
25 to 21
Currently there is no
adjustment of dormant rights
Transfer is already possible
DK
About 68% of the 35-55 year
population are covered by an
employer-managed scheme
or civil service pension
scheme.
Vesting of employer
financed benefits has to be
brought down from 5 to
two years.
Adjustment of dormant rights
is uncommon
Transfer is already possible but
cross-border might be hindered
by taxation rules.
DE
In March 2003, the coverage
by supplementary pension
schemes was 57% of
employees that participate in
the first pillar pay-as-you-go
scheme (including both
public and private schemes).
Vesting periods for
employer financed
schemes have to be
brought down from 5 to 3
years. Minimum ages will
have to be brought down
from 30 to 21 years.
Adjustment of dormant rights
is uncommon
Transfer is already possible, but
only between funded schemes.
Even if the proposal foresees an
exemption possibility,
bookreserve and the public sector
pay-as-you-go schemes will have
to work towards the introduction
of the possibility to transfer
ES
Around 12% of the
employed population.
Specific (non qualified)
plans will have to reduce
substantially the vesting
periods from 20 to 3 years.
Transformation of acquired
rights in capitalisation fund.
Transfer is currently not possible
FR
Approximately 10% of the
workforce (excluded
AGIRC-ARRCO not
covered by the Directive).
Some schemes foresee
vesting only at retirement
if still present in the
company. These schemes
will have to change
radically the vesting
conditions.
No information Transfer is currently possible, for
DB schemes cross-border transfer
is only possible on a collective
basis.
IE
43% of employees are
members of supplementary
pension schemes
Reduction of waiting
periods (30% of DB
schemes currently apply
waiting periods of 5
years). Reduction of
minimum ages (2%
Adjustment of dormant rights
by the lower of 4% or
inflation
Transfer internally is possible.
Cross border subject to
agreement schemes and tax
treaties.
IT
Supplementary pension
funds cover around 4.3% of
the working force, while
open pension funds cover
around 1.5 % and pre-
existing pension funds cover
around 2.8 % of the working
force.
No foreseeable
consequences
Increases are generally linked
to investment returns (defined
contribution schemes)
Transfer internally is possible.
Cross-border transfer is not
possible (can only take place as a
repurchase of individual rights,
this has an important fiscal
impact)
Drucksache 16/1155 – 80 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Coverage Acquisition
conditions
Preservation
(current situation)
Transferability
CY
The coverage of provident
funds (year 2000) is about
27% of the population in
employment (17.5% of the
15-64 population) and that of
supplementary pension
schemes (year 2002,
including self employed
persons) is about 13.5 % of
the population in
employment (8.5% of the 15-
64 population).
Vesting period for
employer contributions has
to be brought down from
five to two years
No preservation of dormant
right (at leaving the company
a lump sum is paid out).
In general lump sum payments.
Only some collective agreements
foresee a transfer possibility.
LU
In 2003, around 870
companies offered a
supplementary pension
scheme to their employees,
covering around 50 000
active members, that is
around 17% of the employed
population
Waiting and vesting
periods have to be brought
down (currently legislation
foresees that waiting +
vesting period should not
exceed 10 years).
Generally schemes now
apply 1-2 year waiting and
5 year vesting period.
Some minimum ages will
have to be lowered
(schemes currently apply
ages between 18 and 25).
No legal requirement for
adjustment of dormant rights.
Transfer in principle possible.
Cross border has to be approved
by the control authority
NL
Around 94 % of the
employees aged between 25
and 65 years old are covered
by a second pillar pension.
Minimum ages will have
to be reduced in some
schemes (around 40% of
the schemes apply ages
between 21 and 24 years).
Adjustment of dormant rights
in line with adjustment of
pensions in payment (in
practice 80% of the schemes
apply indexation)
Transfer possible only to schemes
provided by the employer.
AT
In March 2004, there were
around 1 million workers
covered by the new
supplementary pension
scheme that emerged from
the previous severance pay
system (around 25% of the
employed population), while
around 380 000 were
covered by the traditional
employer pension schemes
(10% of the employed
population).
In some cases waiting
periods (currently 1-5
years) and minimum ages
will have to be lowered.
Vesting periods for
bookreserve schemes
(currently 5-10 years) and
pension funds (currently 5
years) have to be brought
down.
Adjustment is not foreseen Right to transfer. Cross border
only when permanently leaving
the country.
PL
Occupational schemes cover
around 0.6% of the working
age population.
No foreseeable
consequences
Linked to investment return No information
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 81 – Drucksache 16/1155
Coverage Acquisition
conditions
Preservation
(current situation)
Transferability
PT
The active membership
included in supplementary
schemes that exist as a
substitute for the 1st pillar
and other contractual
schemes represents 3.8% of
the working age population
and 4% of the population in
employment.
In some case minimum
ages will have to be
lowered (currently 25).
The majority of schemes
will have to adapt
drastically their vesting
periods (currently workers
only have rights if they are
in the company at the
moment of retirement).
In general no adjustment Transfer is possible
SI
About 53 % of the active
population is covered (in
summer 2004) by
supplementary schemes:
28.5% for the private sector,
21% for the public sector and
4% for the compulsory
supplementary pension
insurance. Coverage levels
are expected to increase and
exceed 60% of the
workforce.
No information No information No information
FI
In 2002, the number of
people covered by group
pension insurance with a life
insurance was about 5 % of
the population in
employment and 3.2 % of
the working age population
(15-64 years of age). In
2002, company pension
funds had been arranged for
2.2 % of the population in
employment and 1.5 % of
the working age population,
while industry-wide pension
funds covered 0.5 % of the
population in employment
and 0.3 % of the working age
population.
Vesting periods in
company funds will have
to be reduced (currently up
to 10 years).
Same inflation protection as
for 1st pillar pensions
No transfer possible
SE
The coverage of
supplementary schemes is
around 75% of the 20-64
population and around 90%
of the Swedish employed
population.
Some schemes will have to
lower the minimum age
(currently 21up to 28
years)
Some adjustment either to the
asset returns or in line with
prices.
Transfer is only possible with
collective agreements. No cross-
border transfer allowed
Drucksache 16/1155 – 82 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Coverage Acquisition
conditions
Preservation
(current situation)
Transferability
UK
The coverage of
supplementary schemes is of
around 33% of working age
population and 43% of the
employed population.
Minimum ages will have
to be reduced in some rare
cases in the private sector
(around 93%of schemes
apply already minimum
age lower than 21 years)
Adjustment in line with
inflation up to 5%
Right to transfer. Cross border
only when permanently leaving
the country.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 83 – Drucksache 16/1155
ANNEX: THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED MEASURES ON THE MAIN TYPES OF
SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION PROVISION IN THE EU.
Defined benefit- defined contribution
The conditions for the acquisition and transferability of supplementary pension rights are typically
stricter for defined-benefit plans. The impact of the proposed measures will therefore be more
important for this type of schemes. In these schemes, employees' future benefits are defined in
advance and determined by a specific formula linking benefit accrual to employee earnings, length of
service or both43. The employer or the pension scheme bears the risk of guaranteeing the payment of
the pension promise.
In the case of defined-contributions plans the employer and/or the employee contribute to an account
established for each participating employee. Contributions are defined either in absolute terms or as a
proportion of earnings. Each scheme member has an individual account with an amount that can be
easily preserved or transferred to another scheme of the same type. The resulting pension annuity
reflects total contributions, investment returns net of administration charges and annuity rates at the
moment of converting the accumulated capital into an annuity44. Since problems of portability are less
serious in defined-contribution schemes, this type of schemes will therefore also be less affected by
the proposed measures in the directive.
Funded- unfunded schemes
Unfunded schemes (book reserve or pay-as-you-go schemes) currently in many cases are not allowing
for the transferring of acquired rights, since this will have to imply the anticipated freeing of capital.
Introducing a right to transfer would therefore have an important impact on these schemes. It has to be
noted however, that as a general trend the "pure" book reserve scheme is disappearing progressively.
For instance in Germany, where bookreserve schemes constitute 2/3 of the supplementary pension
promise there is a process towards capitalisation with a view to the financial sustainability and as a
consequence of changed taxation rules and the application of international accountancy standards (US-
GAAP, IAS/IFRS). A major part of the current pension promises for Directzusagen (probably around
43 In the case of defined-benefit schemes, the level of benefits may be notably defined in fixed monetary
terms, perhaps depending on the number of years of service that the employee has served (flat benefit
arrangements) or, more frequently, in terms of the salary of the employee in combination with the
number of years of service. In this case, the definition may be based upon the salary or earnings
immediately (or over a short period) prior to the retirement (final salary arrangements) or on the salary
throughout service (career average arrangements)
44 It should be noted, however, that many occupational schemes pay out retirement benefits in the form of
a lump sum which does not have to be converted in an annuity.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 84 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
40%) have already been covered by capital investments45. Moreover around 50% of the DAX-30
undertakings and many German sister undertakings of multinationals have set up Contractual Trust
Arrangements (CTA)46. By providing the possibility to exempt these schemes from the
implementation of the right to transfer and proposing to re-examine the situation after a determined
period, the proposed directive accompanies this process and enables book reserve schemes to adapt
and enable transfer of entitlements (some Member States like Austria have already established such a
right for entitlements under book reserve schemes) at a later stage.
45 Article Mercer HR consulting, 19 October 2004 "Bilanzierung von Pensionsverpflichtungen in
Deutschland" available on http://www.mercerhr.de
46 Trust arrangements for pension plan assets that are accounted for under IFRS or US GAAP. The CTA
provides security of the assets in case of the company’s bankruptcy. Further, the CTA provides
flexibility in terms of allowable funding levels and asset allocation, compared with other possible
pension arrangements in Germany.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 85 – Drucksache 16/1155
ANNEX: EU INITIATIVES ALREADY TAKEN IN THE FIELD OF SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION
PROVISION – MOBILITY OF WORKERS
1. INTRODUCTION
Already in its Communication of 22 July 1991 on supplementary social security schemes47,
the Commission highlighted that the Community should recognise the principle that each
worker should be able to move to a job in another Member State without having to fear any
undue loss of rights to future retirement benefits.
In 1996, since there was no progress on this matter during several years, the Commission
referred the problems encountered by workers moving from one Member State to another to a
high level panel on free movement of persons, chaired by Mrs. Veil. The report presented by
the Panel to the Commission on 18 March 1997 underlined that the prospect of a loss of
supplementary pension rights is a clear disincentive to mobility and represents a serious
obstacle to the exercise of the right of free movement, as foreseen by the EC Treaty. The
Panel proposed to the Commission two initiatives: (i) the adoption of a Directive addressing
the questions of preservation of acquired rights, cross-border payments and cross-border
membership in the case of short term employment in another Member State; and (ii) the
creation of a Pensions Forum involving the Member States, the social partners and relevant
European federations, which would act as a forum for debate and research into new initiatives
on supplementary pensions.
The Commission Green Paper on supplementary pensions in the Single Market of 10 June
199748 covered all the main issues relating to supplementary pensions including the operation
of pension funds as financial services providers and the obstacles to the free movement of
workers. It announced, as a follow-up to the report of the high level panel on the free
movement of workers, the Commission's intention to introduce a proposal for a Directive to
deal particularly with the preservation of accrued pension rights and the particular problems
that apply to workers seconded to another Member State.
1.1. Directive 98/49/CE
On 28 June 1998 the Council adopted Directive 98/49/EC on safeguarding the supplementary
pension rights of employed and self-employed persons moving within the Community49. The
directive is the only existing legal instrument at European level on the free movement of
persons in relation to supplementary pensions. It is intended to ensure the right to the equality
of treatment as regards the preservation of supplementary pension rights when moving within
47 Communication from the Commission to the Council of 22 July 1991 "Supplementary social security
schemes: the role of occupational pension schemes in the social protection of workers and their
implications for freedom of movement" (SEC (91) 1332 final). See also Council Recommendation of 27
July 1992 on the convergence of social protection objectives and policies (OJ L 245 of 26 August 1992,
p. 49) which invites the Member States to promote "changes to the conditions governing the acquisition
of retirement and, especially, supplementary pension rights with a view to eliminating obstacles to the
mobility of employed workers" (par. 5, h).
48 Supplementary Pensions in the Single Market -A green paper- (COM (97) 283 final).
49 (OJ L 209 of 25 July 1998, p. 46). Member States had to implement the Directive by 25 July 2001 and
were asked to communicate to the Commission the text of the implementation provisions adopted at
national level no later than 25 January 2002.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 86 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
the Community, but it does not concern the conditions of acquisition of supplementary
pension rights or their transferability.
The directive obliges Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure the preservation
of vested pension rights for members of a supplementary pension scheme in respect of whom
contributions are no longer being made to that scheme as a consequence of their moving from
one Member State to another, to the same extent as for members in respect of whom
contributions are no longer being made but who remain within the same Member State.
Moreover, Member States have to ensure that supplementary pension schemes make
payments in other Member States of all benefits due to workers, net of any taxes and
transaction charges that may be applicable.
With regard to posted workers, Directive 98/49/EC provides that contributions can continue to
be made to a supplementary pension scheme in the worker's Member State of origin and
exempts at the same time the employer from the obligation to make contributions to
supplementary pension schemes in the host Member State50.
Directive 98/49/EC finally requires that workers who move to another Member State receive
at least the same information as national job changers on their pension rights and the choices
which are available to them under the scheme.
Member States had to implement this directive by July 2001 and to communicate no later than
25 January 2002 the implementation measures that have been taken.
The Commission services are currently preparing a report on the application of this
Directive51.
1.2. The Pensions Forum
Following the recommendations by the High Level Panel on free movement of persons, a
Pensions Forum was set up and first met in 2000. It has been officially established by
Commission Decision of 9 July 200152. Its role is to assist the Commission in finding
solutions to the problems and obstacles associated with cross-border mobility of workers in
the area of supplementary pensions.
In order to identify the most serious obstacles to mobility arising from supplementary pension
schemes and to explore solutions that exist within Member States that could be promoted at
European level, the Pensions Forum set up three working groups in December 2000,
concerning, respectively, the acquisition and preservation of supplementary pension rights,
the transferability of supplementary pension rights and cross-border membership in
50 This possibility applies only for a limited period of time, in accordance with the provisions on posting
of workers in Regulation 1408/71/EEC.
51 Article 10 par 3 states "On the basis of the information supplied by Member States, the Commission
shall submit a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee,
within six years of the entry into force of this Directive.
The report shall deal with the application of this Directive and shall, where appropriate, propose any
amendments that may prove necessary".
52 Commission Decision of 9 July 2001 on the setting-up of a Committee in the area of supplementary
pensions (OJ L 196 of 20 July 2001, p. 26).
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 87 – Drucksache 16/1155
supplementary pension schemes. Their reports were presented to the Pensions Forum plenary
meeting of 23 February 2001.
The findings of the working groups of the Pensions Forum have been used as an important
input to the two consultation documents addressed to the European social partners53.
1.3. Directive 2003/41/EC
Directive 2003/41/EC of 3 June 2003 on the activities and supervision of institutions for
occupational retirement provision (IORP) aims at creating at European level a common legal
framework for the activities of institutions for occupational retirement provision, so as to
allow them to fully benefit from the advantages of the Internal Market. It regulates the setting
up of a full prudential framework which is necessary so as to provide affordability of pensions
and a high level of protection for the rights of future pensioners. The proposal seeks to ensure
that institutions enjoy sufficient freedom to develop an effective investment policy and can
benefit from the greater depth and liquidity of the capital markets resulting from the
introduction of the Euro. The directive establishes the right for institutions for retirement
provision to manage pension schemes across borders. It will therefore allow pan-European
groups of companies to set up pan-European pension funds, which may facilitate labour
mobility within these groups. The Member States have to transpose the Directive at the latest
by 23 September 2005.
1.4. Taxation
The Commission Communication of 19 April 200154, on the elimination of tax obstacles to
the cross-border provision of occupational pensions, proposed a comprehensive strategy to
address the tax obstacles that acted as a major disincentive to cross-border membership. It
recognised that taxation rules applied to supplementary pension schemes can constitute a
major obstacle to the freedom of movement of workers across borders. Two main obstacles
were identified:
x the tax treatment of cross border payments of pension contributions
x the tax obstacles to the cross-border transfer of pension capital.
Individuals wishing to contribute to pension schemes outside their home Member State and
pension institutions that wish to provide pensions across borders may be hindered to do so
because of the design of the tax system. In particular, a Member States may apply tax
incentives only to contributions made within that Member State. In such cases there is no tax
deductibility for pension contributions paid to a pension fund in another Member State. This
not only limits the attractiveness of paying cross-border contributions, but also seals off the
national market from competition from other Member States, making it difficult to create pan-
European funds. The Commission is undertaking legal action against those Member States
that restrict the freedom to provide services and the free movement of workers by refusing tax
deductibility for pension contributions paid to pension funds in other Member States55.
53 For a description of this consultation see Annex 1.
54 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee of 19 April 2001 "The elimination of tax obstacles to the cross-border provision of
occupational pensions" (COM (2001) 214).
55 See website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/taxation/personal_tax/pensions/index_en.htm
Drucksache 16/1155 – 88 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
On the basis of these procedures and rulings by the European Court of Justice56, it can be
concluded that initially at least ten Member States (France, Finland, Sweden, Belgium,
Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Denmark and the UK) had tax legislation that discriminated
against foreign pension funds. While the infringement procedures are continuing, Belgium,
France, Finland, Ireland, Portugal Spain and the UK have already announced they will change
their tax legislation in order to give contributions paid to pension funds located in another
Member State the same tax treatment as contributions paid to domestic funds. Germany,
Austria and the Netherlands already allowed tax relief for contributions paid to foreign funds.
The second obstacle relates to the cross-border transfer of pension capital. There may be
cross-border situations where national tax rules are contrary to the Treaty provisions on the
freedom of movement for workers and/or the free movement of capital. An example of such a
situation could be an EET or ETT57 State taxing the value of the pension capital upon cross-
border transfer, where it would not tax a transfer within its territory, and where it applies the
principle of residence taxation of pension benefits in its double tax treaties58.
Regarding tax obstacles to cross border transfers, the Commission has already started an
infringement procedure against Belgium. In the Belgian case the Commission pointed out that
it is unacceptable that in Belgium the transfer of pension capital to a foreign pension fund
gives rise to special taxation59, whereas the transfer of pension capital within Belgium is tax
free. Belgium has announced that it will abolish the restriction to cross-border transfers. On
the basis of the information provided by the members of the Pensions Forum (see Annex) and
other sources60 it seems that the tax legislation in several other Member States also hinders the
transfer of acquired pension rights to schemes situated in another Member State61. The
Commission already in its Pension Taxation Communication of April 2001 announced that it
would examine national tax rules impeding the cross-border transferability of pension capital
and take the necessary steps to ensure effective compliance with the Treaty rules. Moreover,
56 Danner case (C-136/00) and Skandia case (C-422/01)
57 EET system: Exempt contributions, Exempt investment income and capital gains of the pension
institution, Taxed benefits). ETT system: Exempt contributions, Taxed investment income and capital
gains of the pension institution, Taxed benefits.
58 See also the survey by the European Actuarial Consultative Group on "Taxation of occupational
pensions in the EU Countries", April 2004 and paragraph 3.6. of the Communication on the elimination
of tax obstacles to the cross-border provision of occupational pensions, 19.4.2001, COM(2001) 214
final..
59 Press release IP/03/1756 of 17 December 2003
60 For instance the "Survey on the portability of occupational pensions in the countries of the European
Union", Watson Wyatt Brans & Co., December 2004
61 This seems to be in any event the case for DK, DE, IT. In some other Member States the taxation of the
cross border transfer depends on the bilateral tax treaties applicable: F, NL, IE.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 89 – Drucksache 16/1155
on 27 April 2005 the European Federation for Retirement Provision announced that it would
launch a formal complaint with the Commission against the Member States which in its view
had unjustified obstacles to the cross-border transfer of pension capital.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 90 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
ANNEX: DESCRIPTION OF STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION
1. CONSULTATION SOCIAL PARTNERS
1.1. Consultation of social partners: first stage
In accordance with Article 138, paragraph 2 of the EC Treaty, a first consultation of the
European social partners was launched62 on the portability of supplementary pension rights. In
particular, the Commission consulted them on the usefulness of a Community action in this
field, the form such action should take (collective agreement, directive, recommendation,
code of practice, etc.), what the main features of such a measure might be, whether action in
the form of collective agreements at cross-sectoral and/or sectoral level should be considered
and the possible material scope of the measure envisaged (type of pension schemes to be
covered).
The social partners responded to the first stage consultation with a broad recognition of the
need for action at European level to improve the portability of supplementary pensions.
Their views differed, however, on the instruments needed to address the issue and ranged
from proposing non-binding exchanges of information to requesting the adoption of a
Community legal instrument. Some organisations invoked the possibility of engaging in
negotiations on a framework agreement at European level.
A number of employers' organisations (UNICE63, UEAPME64, HOTREC65) considered that a
Community initiative on the portability of supplementary pension rights should limit itself to
cross-border transfers; they opposed the introduction of EU legislation on the conditions of
acquisition, preservation and transferability of supplementary pension rights, insofar as this
would go beyond cross-border issues and thus interfere with the organisation of
supplementary pension arrangements at national level. In their view, a single solution at EU
level could discourage employers from offering an supplementary pension scheme to their
employees. The EU should therefore foster the portability of pensions by organising
exchanges of experiences and information-sharing on the solutions found in the various
European countries.
Other employers' organisations (FBE66, CEA67, FIEC68) supported the setting up of a common
European framework to ensure the protection of supplementary pension rights in case of
labour mobility, but demanded that flexible instruments, such as recommendations, guidelines
or codes of best practice, be adopted, so as to respect the large diversity of supplementary
pension schemes in the Union.
62 SEC(2002)597.
63 Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe.
64 European Association of Craft and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.
65 European Association of Hotels, Restaurants & Cafés in Europe.
66 Fédération Bancaire de l'Union européenne.
67 Comité Européen des Assurances.
68 European Construction Industry Federation.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 91 – Drucksache 16/1155
UEAPME recommended a detailed study to be conducted, so as to put more information at
the disposal of the social partners and the Member States before deciding upon the best
possible course of action. It suggested that problems of mobility within a Member State be
addressed within the open method of co-ordination in the field of pensions.
The European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General
Economic Interest (CEEP) supported EU action on the portability of supplementary pensions
and suggested that the social partners take the lead, in the framework of the European social
dialogue. Moreover, it considered that certain aspects of transferability could be resolved
through a directive.
All the employees' organisations (ETUC69, CEC70, EUROCADRES71) clearly expressed
themselves in favour of a European regulatory framework. In their opinion, the best form of
action would be a Community directive, setting common principles to ensure the portability
of supplementary pension rights within the Union. Being aware of the difficulties linked to the
question of vesting periods, ETUC suggested that negotiations could be engaged on this issue
with a view to reaching a framework agreement setting broad principles at European level.
EUROCADRES suggested that a directive should intervene only if the European social
partners fail to engage in negotiations on a framework agreement on pension portability.
As regards the substantive issues raised in response to the Commission's first stage
consultation, all the respondents recognised that unnecessarily long waiting and vesting
periods or excessively high minimum ages obstruct the development of supplementary
pension schemes and labour mobility, and therefore have to be reconsidered. They also agreed
that reductions in vesting periods should be phased in gradually, so as to limit the additional
costs associated with their reduction for the employers. The social partners equally agreed that
acquired supplementary pension rights should be adequately preserved and that the
transferability of pension entitlements should be facilitated. On the last point in particular,
UNICE and UEAPME took the view that the calculation of transfer values should not be left
to the discretion or interpretation of the actuary and supported the definition, insofar as
possible, of some basic common actuarial principles at European level. All the organisations
also wanted to stress that improved information, transparency and simplification are needed to
ensure an effective portability of supplementary pension rights.
Regarding the choice between collective bargaining at cross-sectoral or sectoral level, the
large majority of the social partners favoured a cross-sectoral approach to the question, while
leaving open the door for sector-based agreements in those professions and sectors that are the
most concerned by geographical mobility.
Finally, most organisations demanded that Community action focus on schemes financed
jointly by the employer and the employees, without distinction between pension entitlements
based on individual contracts and those based on collective agreements, thus leaving out of
the scope of the envisaged measures all voluntary supplementary pension schemes solely
financed by the employer. UEAPME proposed that transnational measures apply to
compulsory pension schemes.
69
European Trade Union Confederation.
70 Confédération Européenne des Cadres.
71 Council of European Professional and Managerial Staff.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 92 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
1.2. Consultation of social partners: second stage
Taking into account the broad recognition by social partners of a need to address the
improvement of portability of supplementary schemes at EU level, the Commission launched
a second stage consultation of the European social partners72, on the possible content of
Community action to improve the portability of supplementary pension rights, pursuant to
Article 138(3) of the EC Treaty.
In this document the Commission called upon the social partners to seek an agreement that
would tackle issues such as long qualifying periods and age conditions for the acquisition of
supplementary pension rights and inadequate preservation of "dormant" rights, as well as on
the definition of a set of common principles for the calculation of transfer values.
The social partners that replied are divided about the principle of holding negotiations.
UNICE, UEAPME and CEA73 do not want to negotiate, while ETUC, CEEP and Eurocadres
are in favour of negotiations. There is also divergence on whether a Community initiative
should only be related to cross-border portability (UNICE, UEAPME, CEEP) or also address
the obstacles to portability created by conditions for acquisition, preservation or
transferability of supplementary pension rights at national level (ETUC, Eurocadres, CEA).
2. INVOLVEMENT OF THE PENSIONS FORUM74
As already indicated, the Pensions Forum discussed in its working groups and plenary
sessions the different types of obstacles to mobility created by rules on supplementary pension
provision. Members of the Pensions Forum are besides representatives of the Member States
and EFTA and of the two sides of industry, representatives of the following organisations:
x EFRP (European Federation for Retirement Provision),
x FEFSI (European Federation of Investment Funds and Companies)
x ACME (Association of European Cooperative and Mutual Insurers)
x AIM (International Association for Mutual Assistance)
x CEA (European Insurance Committee)
x AEIP (European Association of Paritarian Institutions)
x EAPSPI (European Association of Public Sector Pension Institutions)
x GCAACE (Groupe Consultatif des Associations d'actuaires des pays de la CE)
x FBE (Banking Federation of the European Union)
x AGE (the European older people's platform).
As part of the preparation of this impact assessment a questionnaire was addressed to the
members of the Pensions Forum. This questionnaire aimed at collecting factual information
on the design of supplementary pension systems in the Member States and asked for an
estimation of the impact on these systems of a number of options for the possible measures to
be proposed.
Replies were received from all Member States, except for Slovenia and Slovakia, and from
Norway.
72 SEC(2003)916
73 CEA: European Federation of National Insurance Associations
74 For a description of the Forum see the main document under section 3
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 93 – Drucksache 16/1155
The following social partner organisations replied to the questionnaire (in many cases these
replies were composed of replies of national members of these organisations):
x ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation)
x UNICE (Union des Industries de la Communauté européenne)
x UEAPME (European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises)
x Eurocadres (Council of European professional and managerial staff)
Replies were received from the following stakeholder organisations (here also in many cases
these replies were composed of replies of one or more national members of these
organisations): AEIP, AGE, AIM, EAPSPI, EFRP. Some national organisations replied
individually to the questionnaire.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 94 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
ANNEX: CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MEMBER STATES
This Annex contains information on the current situation in the Member States based in
particular on the information provided by the members of the Pensions Forum.
The following table indicates whether a (maximum) waiting period is foreseen by law and
what is the current practice.
Legal restriction Practice
BE: No No waiting period (only used occasionally by some
schemes before the minimum age of 25)
CZ:
DK: No Private sector: 9 months (in a number of areas lowered
to 6 months). Usually in case of job mobility within a
sector the waiting period will only have to be served
once.
Public sector: varying between one and four years. In
many schemes there exists a special waiting period
scheme for employees that due to waiting periods not are
entitled to membership of the main scheme. In the
waiting period schemes there may also be a waiting
period and the contributions have traditionally been
smaller than in the main scheme, but the difference is
narrowing down and is expected to disappear in a not
too distant future. Served waiting periods are
transferable inside the public sector and to the private
sector. In general the employee starts acquiring pension
rights when the payments of contributions start.
DE: No In the schemes financed by the employer, waiting
periods can be applied (in combination with a minimum
age). In the schemes financed by employees, there are no
waiting periods applied.
EE:
EL: No Supplementary pension schemes have not been set up
yet
ES: Maximum waiting period of two
years
Waiting periods up to two years are applied
FR: No No information
IE: No A waiting period of 6 to 12 months is common. About
30% of defined benefit schemes do not have any
requirements in this regard, while a further 30% have a
waiting period of 5 years.
In defined contribution arrangements the waiting periods
are shorter with 78% of schemes having a period of zero
to 12 months. Only 10% have a waiting period of over 2
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 95 – Drucksache 16/1155
Legal restriction Practice
years.
IT: No Certain restrictions apply to employees with short term
contracts
CY:
LV: No No information
LT: No No information
LU: Waiting and vesting period
together should not exceed 10
years.
Waiting periods are applied (in many schemes typically
1 or 2 years).
HU:
MT:
NL: No In 2001, 96,7 % of the schemes did not apply a waiting
period.
AT: No In practice, for Pensionskassenzusagen the applied
waiting periods are varying from one to five years or
scheme membership starts at the beginning of a
permanent contract.
PL: Waiting period of at least three
months, unless the company
pension agreement states
otherwise
PT: No The majority of schemes have eligibility conditions that
depend on the nature of the contract, usually only
permanent employees are eligible. In a minor number of
schemes a combination of the minimum duration of the
contract (2, 3, 5, rarely 10 years) and age conditions are
applied.
SL:
SK:
FI: No The usually applied waiting period varies between 4 to 6
months. In many company pension funds the waiting
periods can be 10 years.
SE: Waiting periods are regulated by
nation wide collective agreements.
In principle employees become immediately member of
the pension plan at the time of employment. Special
rules may apply for temporarily employed or
internships. For the white collar worker plan (ITP), this
means coverage by the supplementary pension insurance
after a qualification period of three months. After this
period, the insurance will apply retroactively from the
first month of employment.
Drucksache 16/1155 – 96 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Legal restriction Practice
UK: No Most private sector schemes have either no waiting
period, or a waiting period of one year or less. 84% of
defined benefit and 78% of defined contribution
schemes in the private sector had no waiting period.
10% of defined benefit and 20% of defined contribution
schemes had a waiting period of one year or less. In the
public sector the general practice is for there to be no
waiting period.
NO No waiting periods -
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 97 – Drucksache 16/1155
The following table gives general information on whether an age at which an employee
should at the latest become member of a scheme has been laid down by law, if and how
minimum age are applied in practice by schemes.
Legal restriction Practice
BE Legal minimum age is 25 years (but
rights are only acquired as from the
age of 26).
Immediate membership for those employees having
reached the age of 25 years.
CZ
DK No Private sector: in general 20 years.
Public sector/state: 25 years. People serving a
waiting period due to not fulfilling the age
requirement are covered by the waiting period
scheme, which means they can become members
from the age of 20 years.
Public sector/local government: 25 years but some
schemes apply lower age limits. The waiting period
schemes for local governments have an age
minimum of 21 years.
DE In the case of employer financed
schemes, the employee who has
reached the age of 30 years (and has
fulfilled the vesting period of five
years) has acquired rights (applicable
for promises given as from 1-1-2001,
with a transitional period up to 1-1-
2006). For schemes financed by the
employee alone, no minimum age
requirements apply.
EE
EL No Supplementary pension schemes have not been set
up yet
ES No No minimum age applied
FR No Probably no application of minimum ages by the
schemes
IE No Minimum age requirements are sometimes set for
eligibility for membership of a scheme or for
inclusion within a scheme for retirement benefits.
These age limits would typically be in the range 18
to 25 with only 2% of schemes imposing age
requirements in excess of 25. (Note during this
waiting period members may be included within the
scheme for death in service benefits only). Some
employers set no minimum age.
For defined contribution schemes, members do not
Drucksache 16/1155 – 98 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Legal restriction Practice
acquire any benefits in respect of the waiting period.
For defined benefit schemes, practice is mixed with
some schemes backdating service to the date of
joining the company and some not. There is however
no legislative requirement in this regard.
IT No No minimum age applied
CY
LV No information No information
LT No information No information
LU No Some schemes apply a minimum age between 18
and 25 years.
HU
MT
NL No In 2001, 54,6% of pension schemes did not apply
minimum age requirements for becoming scheme
member (compared to 27,4 in 1996). In most cases
where minimum ages are applied these are fixed
between 21 and 24 years. Participants normally don't
acquire pension rights in respect of employment
periods below the minimum age.
AT No In many cases trainees are excluded for scheme
membership or minimum ages are applied. In
general the employment before having reached the
minimum age or the traineeship period is taken into
account in the calculation of rights (in particular in
schemes with a direct commitment of the employer)
for the employee who remains with the same
employer
PL No Not applied
PT No If a minimum age is set, this is at 25 years. Years of
employment accomplished before that age are taken
into account in the calculation of the total years of
service.
SI
SK
FI No In general workers enter the scheme when they start
to work.
SE No The minimum age differs from pension plan to
pension plan: from 21 as the lowest age to 28 as the
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 99 – Drucksache 16/1155
Legal restriction Practice
highest age.
UK No 63% of private sector defined benefit and 46% of
private sector defined contribution schemes stipulate
a minimum age for entry into a scheme. No public
sector schemes have a minimum age higher than 21.
94% of private sector defined benefit schemes and
92% of private sector defined contribution schemes
have a minimum age lower than 21. Very few
schemes have a minimum age in excess of 25 years
old. It seems that in general most pension rights start
accruing from the day of joining the scheme rather
than the date of joining the company.
NO 20 years (public sector), no minimum
age in private sector
Corresponds with legal requirements
Drucksache 16/1155 – 100 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
The following table gives an overview of the legal requirements and the current practice in the
Member States concerning the length of scheme membership required before having acquired
pension rights.
Legal requirement Practice
BE Vesting takes place at the latest
one year after start of scheme
membership
Vesting periods are in general one year, except for
personal contributions from the employee for which the
rights are acquired immediately
CZ
DK No Immediate vesting for employees contributions. Vesting
of employer financed benefits after five years.
DE The legal maximum vesting
period for employer financed
schemes is 5 years (applicable for
promises given as from 1-1-2001,
with a transitional period up to 1-
1-2006). In the case of
"Entgeltumwaltung" (conversion
of earnings into pension
contributions) there is immediate
vesting.
In practice, very few employers apply vesting periods of
less than five years.
EE
EL One year vesting period in case an
employee leaves a scheme
without changing jobs.
Supplementary pension schemes have not been set up yet
ES Law (1987) foresees immediate
vesting for qualified plans.
Most non qualified plans provide for a vesting scale up to
20 years.
FR No Vesting periods are not applied in many cases, however
in some schemes the employee only has acquired rights if
still working for the company at moment of retirement (in
case of mobility no vesting rights exist).
IE Vested rights must be provided
after 2 years as a full member of
the scheme.
IT No No vesting period (only when the employee wishes to
transfer, without changing jobs or employer, a vesting
period of three years is applied)
CY The employer contributions vest generally after five years
of membership.
LV No No vesting period
LT No Defined contribution schemes: any period of
membership is recognised.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 101 – Drucksache 16/1155
Legal requirement Practice
LU Legal maximum vesting period is
10 years minus the waiting period
The vesting periods applied by the schemes generally are
five years (in a phased manner in the case of local
companies)
HU
MT
NL There are no legal maxima. The
law allows a reimbursement of
contributions in a pension scheme
when the participation in a
pension scheme lasted less than 1
year.
In practice no vesting periods apply.
AT Direct insurance: immediate
vesting. For pension funds the
employer contributions are vested
after a minimum of five years,
employee contributions vest
immediately. In the case of book
reserve schemes the minimum
vesting period is five years, with
the possibility to extend to a
maximum of ten years. Employee
contributions vest immediately.
The vesting period for support
funds is five years.
In practice for pension funds, small undertakings (1 to 20
employees) apply vesting periods from 0 to 3 years. In
the case of a setting up of a new system of Pension funds
the vesting period is 3-5 years. Big undertakings with a
system of direct commitment by the employer (book
reserves) normally apply no vesting periods.
PL No DC schemes: any period of membership is recognised
PT No The majority of pension schemes don’t have vested
rights. Workers only have pension rights if they retire
when they are still working at the company. Where
vesting periods are applied these are in general 10 years.
SI
SK
FI No. Usually short (max. 4 months) vesting periods.
SE No no vesting periods applied
UK Legal maximum vesting period is
two years. New legislation
effectively reduces this to 3
months by stipulating that where a
person leaves an supplementary
scheme after three months but
before his/her rights are vested,
trustees will have to offer the
member the choice of a cash
75% of all defined benefit supplementary schemes and
50% of all defined contribution schemes apply a 2 year
vesting period. 20% of defined benefit and 40% of
defined contribution schemes operate immediate vesting.
All other schemes apply a vesting period between 0 and 2
years.
transfer sum (the actuarial value
of their rights in the scheme)
Drucksache 16/1155 – 102 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Legal requirement Practice
which must be paid into another
pensions vehicle, or a refund of
the contributions paid by the
member (law adopted in
November 2004, most provisions
enter into force in April 2005)
NO Private sector: vesting period of
one year in case of job change. No
vesting period for DC schemes.
Public sector: vesting period 3
years (but not completed vesting
period is taken into account when
taking a new employment in the
public sector.
Practice corresponds with legal requirements.
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 103 – Drucksache 16/1155
The following table indicates whether there is a statutory obligation stipulating the way how
dormant rights should be preserved. It also provides for information on the current practice as
regards the preservation of dormant rights.
Statutory right Practice
BE No In the general no preservation
CZ
DK No Uncommon
DE No Uncommon
EE
EL No No information available
ES No The most method is the transformation of the Technical
Provision established until the date of the cessation or
suspension of the employment relationship into a
Capitalisation Fund with the rules as applied to DC
plans being applicable.
FR No No information available
IE Preserved pensions under defined
benefit schemes must be increased
each year by the lower of 4% or
inflation (CPI). The full legislative
requirements are in force for
employees who leave service on or
after 1st June 2002. The preservation
requirements have been phased in
gradually for defined benefit
schemes for leavers after 1991.
There is no legislative requirement
to provide preserved benefits in
respect of persons leaving prior to
1991.
Most schemes apply the minimum required. Some
public sector schemes revalue deferred pensions in line
with wage inflation.
IT No Increases are generally linked to investment returns
(DC schemes)
CY Not possible to keep dormant rights (on resignation a lump sum is taken out)
LV No Individual schemes decide whether and how they up
rate dormant rights.
LT
LU No The law stipulates that in case of departure before
having reached the retirement age, the preservation of
the acquired rights has to be guaranteed to the early
leaver. Undertakings are free to determine whether to
Drucksache 16/1155 – 104 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Statutory right Practice
adjust dormant rights and how.
HU
MT
NL Dormant pension rights have to be
adjusted in the same way as the
entitlements of pensioners that are
already in payment.
In practice in 80% of supplementary pension schemes
indexation is applied, thus dormant rights are indexed
in these cases as well. The type of indexation depends
on the nature of the supplementary pension provision75.
AT No, but in the case of pension funds
dormant rights have to be treated in
the same way as rights of active
scheme members.
Preservation of dormant rights is in general not
foreseen.
PL No DC schemes
PT No Uncommon (some exceptions particularly in the
banking sector)
SI
SK
FI Same inflation protection as for first
pillar schemes
Dormant rights are usually adjusted by the index used
for first pillar pensions (80% linked to change in
wages, 20% linked to change in prices). Some schemes
apply other index weighting: 50% wages, 50% prices or
20% wages, 80% prices.
SE No In some schemes indexation is be linked to the asset
returns of the IORP. In other schemes dormant rights
are indexed according to the price base amount (this
amount is decided by Parliament).
UK Dormant rights have to be up-rated
in line with the retail price index up
to a maximum of 5% per annum.
75 Verreth, page 336
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 105 – Drucksache 16/1155
The following table gives information on the statutory possibility to transfer acquired rights
both within the Member States and across borders. It gives also an indication on whether a
capital pay-out is possible and how the transfer value is calculated.
Statutory right to
transfer internal
Possibility
cross-border
transfer
Capital
pay-out to early
leaver
Calculation of
transfer value
BE To pension scheme of the
new employer or to another
pension scheme. New
Belgian employer has to
accept the transfer without
charging costs.
Possibility to
transfer to new
employer or to
another pension
scheme upon
agreement of all
parties.
International
transfers are
liable for
taxation.
No, (until the age of
60 years)
DB schemes: law foresees
that calculation according to
the rules of the scheme
should not result in a lower
amount than the minimum
reserve (i.e. 6% discount
rate).
DC schemes: transferred
value represents the
accumulated capital
including asset returns
(sometimes at a fixed
guaranteed rate)
CZ
DK There is a statutory obligation
to provide for the possibility
to transfer in case of job
change. A transfer is possible
to a pension scheme when the
tax treatment is similar.
As foreign
schemes will in
general have a
different tax
status in Danish
tax law, a cross
border transfer
will imply
payment of tax.
DE For promises given as from
1-1-2005 an employee has a
statutory right to transfer if
the sum does not exceed a
certain amount (€62400 in
2005). This only applies to
transfer between externally
funded schemes (Pensions
funds and direct insurance).
Direct commitments and
support funds are therefore
excluded. Partial transfers are
not allowed. The early leaver
has to decide within a year
whether she/he wants to
transfer.
Yes, on the
agreement of all
parties concerned.
There may be tax
obstacles,
depending on
bilateral tax treaty
No (very strict
exceptions on this
prohibition)
In the case of direct
commitments and support
funds the transfer value
corresponds with the cash
value (calculated according
to agreed actuarial
standards). For pensions
funds and direct insurance
the value represents the
capital built up.
EE
EL Statutory right to transfer Yes, under same
conditions as
within EL.
Yes Based on personal pension
account, taking into account
the investment returns and
administrative costs.
ES No (general rule: vested
rights are not transferable,
unless provided for in the
plan specifications)
No No DC schemes: the share
attributable to the member
DB schemes: individual
technical provision plus the
part of the solvency margin
of the pensions plan
corresponding to the
Drucksache 16/1155 – 106 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Statutory right to
transfer internal
Possibility
cross-border
transfer
Capital
pay-out to early
leaver
Calculation of
transfer value
member. Some pension
plans can exclude the
solvency part in the
calculation.
FR Statutory right to transfer
from a DC plan. Transfer
from a DB scheme is possible
Yes for DC
schemes (the
receiving scheme
must meet certain
criteria). For DB
schemes only
collective
transfers can be
considered.
Taxation depends
on tax treaties
applicable.
DC schemes: in most cases
accumulated reserve less
expenses. DB schemes:
conditions specified in
transfer agreement.
IE Statutory right to transfer, but
no partial transfers are
permitted.
Yes, provided the
rules of the
schemes permit
the transfer,
trustees of the
transferring
scheme comply
with national
Regulations and
the format in
which benefits
may be taken is
similar to the
Irish scheme.
Double taxation
treaties apply.
No DB scheme: accrued benefit
calculated following
actuarial guidance at
national level.
DC scheme: the value of the
individual member's fund.
IT Statutory right to transfer A transfer as such
is not possible,
this should take
place in the form
of a surrender (re-
purchase of the
individual rights),
which has an
important fiscal
impact.
DC schemes
CY No Upon agreement
between
employers and
employee
international
transfer of
pension is
possible.
Lump sum payment
to early leaver is the
common practice.
Only some
collective
agreements foresee
a possibility to
transfer (banking,
hotels)
LV Yes Possible if the
pension fund
board gives
Only in case of
invalidity or
bankruptcy of
Only DC schemes, no
actuarial calculations
applied.
agreement. employer.
LT Yes Same conditions Yes Only DC schemes
Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode – 107 – Drucksache 16/1155
Statutory right to
transfer internal
Possibility
cross-border
transfer
Capital
pay-out to early
leaver
Calculation of
transfer value
as within MS
LU Yes, transfer to pension plan
of new employer in case of
agreement between two
parties. Otherwise, (new
employer has no pension plan
or without mutual agreement)
the former employer can
transfer to pension fund or
group insurance. There
should be no penalty for the
scheme member.
Same conditions
as within MS, but
no legal right to
transfer. Cross-
border transfers
have to be
approved by the
national control
authority.
No taxable event.
Under strict
conditions (e.g.
member leaves the
country or is older
than 50 years)
DB: established by law
HU
MT
NL Statutory right to transfer
(only to schemes provided by
employer).
Statutory
possibility under
similar conditions
as within MS.
Rules of
supervisor and
tax authorities are
applied. Costs are
borne by
employer/pension
fund. Taxation
depends on
bilateral tax
treaty.
No Regulated by law. DB
schemes have to be fully
funded on transfer date in
case of statutory right to
transfer. In case of voluntary
transfer schemes can apply
their own calculations or
commonly agreed actuarial
assumptions.
AT Statutory right to transfer
(except for Support funds)
Yes, for
employee who
moves
permanently
abroad. Costs
have to be borne
by the employee.
No taxable event.
Up to a ceiling of €
9.300
Regulated by law.
PL N.A. No N.A. N.A.
PT No but transfer agreements
exist.
Yes, to
supervised
pension funds or
insurance
companies within
the EU.
No No legal requirements (are
part of the contract setting
up the pension fund or
collective agreements)
SI
SK
FI No statutory right. Earned
pension rights cannot be
transferred to another
scheme.
Not possible. Yes, in case of very
low amounts
N.A.
SE Only within collective
agreement private blue-collar
workers (Avtalpension SAF-
Cross border
transfer not
possible
No No commonly agreed
actuarial principles. Fees
also differ significantly.
LO) (DC schemes)
.
UK Statutory right to transfer to Yes, subject to Not allowed Regulated by law and in
Drucksache 16/1155 – 108 – Deutscher Bundestag – 16. Wahlperiode
Statutory right to
transfer internal
Possibility
cross-border
transfer
Capital
pay-out to early
leaver
Calculation of
transfer value
supplementary pension
scheme new employer or to a
personal (including
stakeholder) pension.
Cross border transfer is
allowed, subject to the
scheme member permanently
emigrating, severing all
employment links with the
UK and having an
employment in the new
country of residence.
certain criteria. accordance with the
guidance by the Institute and
the Faculty of Actuaries.
NO Private sector: statutory right
to transfer.
Public sector: no.
Yes, but only in
private sector
transfer is
possible by
foreign citizens
having been
resident for less
than three years.
Not allowed Defined by scheme